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THE UNITY OF NATURE:




The Unity of Nature idea is a strong metatheoretical theme in a number o f scientific 
and environmental fields (from ecosystems ecology, through quantum physics to environmental 
philosophy and ecopolitics). Why this is so is discussed. One of the prime reasons the Unity of 
Nature idea is adopted in these fields is to give rise to an inspiring, optimistic, socially-responsive 
and environmentally-friendly worldview. Why this is so is also discussed. These fields of science and 
environmentalism have inherited this metatheoretical theme of natural unity through an intellectual 
lineage that passes through many non-scientific and non-environmental fields (sociology, theology 
and political philosophy, for instance). Many of these non-environmental and non-scientific fields 
have used natural unity in a way which is in stark metaphysical and political opposition to the 
metaphysical and political desires of those who promulgate the unity of nature for progressive social 
change. The exact way this has transpired is discussed so that the various social and intellectual 
processes that have been at work can be examined. Such social and intellectual processes include the 
social construction of the Organicism Vs Mechanicism debate in ecology, the intellectual links 
between neo-classical economic principles and the New Sciences, the techno-scientific background of 
Gaia theory, and the social conservatism of ecological functionalism. After this is done, and after the 
ecopolitical importance of the Unity of Nature idea has been thoroughly questioned, an alternative 
suggestion towards a non-unity worldview is made which draws strength from contemporary 
developments in postmodern theory, ecological thought and ethological sstudy.
CONTENTS:
INTRODUCTION p4
PART A: It's All An Environmentalist Plot!
CHAPTER ONE: An Introduction to the Unity of Nature Concept in the Late
Twentieth Century: Unity as an Environmental Metanarrative pl5
PART B: IPs All A Bourgeois Plot!
CHAPTER TWO: The Unity of Nature, Differing Ecological Sciences, and
Over-Zealous Ecological Holism p30
CHAPTER THREE: Gaia: the Technocentric Embodiment of the Unity of Nature? p58 
CHAPTER FOUR: The Unity of Nature: a Metanarrative of Social Conservatism? p86 
CHAPTER FIVE: The Unity of Nature: Uniting the Economy with the Ecosystem? pl05
PART C: It's All A Postmodern Plot(lessness)!
CHAPTER SIX: What is This Thing Called Postmodern Science? p i51 
CHAPTER SEVEN: Mechanicism Vs Organicism: A False Dichotomy? p204 






This work enters into a critique of a body of recent natural philosophical 
literature which is self-consciously amalgamating itself together (under various labels) 
in order to initiate a paradigm change in the way both science and society look at the 
larger world. This new way of looking at the world is via unity: everything in the 
living world is united.
One of the major political aims of this worldview is to promote environmental 
friendliness. Often pronouncements about the unity of nature are heralded as being so 
utterly important to humanity’s ideas about itself and about nature that they have been 
described as being fundamental precepts within human knowledge. The very idea of 
nature in unity is thought to stir the blood of humans towards a kindness to the 
environment. It is a concept that is supposed to intellectually inspire humans; 
promoting within us a sense of a togetherness and belonging with the Earth. Unity is 
therefore something to be revered, cherished and respected.
This work, however, takes a different tack. Rather than simply revering the unity 
of nature, this work aims to investigate the cultural milieu that has produced the , 
concept. While doing this I argue that the body of literature extolling this worldview 
of unity may well possess an internal coherence, but it is also replete with 
metaphysical, ethical and social connotations that may contradict the very political 
aims that its supporters extol. One of the manifestations of this important point is that 
a lot of the discussion about the unity of nature has been made in an attempt to add 
value to, and protect, the environment. It is my contention that the unity of nature 
may well devalue the environment. This is most especially the case when the unity of 
nature concept makes knowledge claims with regards to the nature of the terrestrial
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However, I intend to suggest that such ecological value is undermined and 
overwhelmed when these ecological communities are made to submit to the unity o f  
nature concept. Such conclusions are quite radical and l wouldn’t want to suggest 
that they are necessarily more than a rhetorical exercise aimed just as much at 
engaging the theorists o f  unity on some o f  the problems o f  their worldview as it is a 
presentation o f  an alternative reading. Let me acknowledge here, too, that I 
understand well that my particular reading o f  unity is almost entirely against the grain 
o f  most Unitarian thinking. But that is my point, to produce an alternative reading 
which prompts a response from Unitarians, in order that they defend themselves and 
their ideas better.
If the reader is to accept my reading of unitarianism, then they might find that the 
potential malevolency of the unity of nature concept does not stop in the realm of the 
ecological; it is also apparent in the realm of the social. The unity of nature concept 
does not just exist on its own as an independent idea. It has a whole attendant army of 
supporting concepts, narratives and metaphors which it feeds from and feeds into; for 
example unity has attachments to the concepts of balance, order, hierarchy, stability, 
organicism, and the system. In this work, these companion concepts are filtered out of 
the unity of nature concept and then, one by one, deconstructed so as to show their 
potential social malevolence. In the end I surmise that the concept of the System may 
be the most entrenched and lethal of these companion concepts.
If it is held that the unity of nature concept might be an inappropriate 
metanarrative given the character of its late Twentieth Century intellectual expression, 
then we might reasonably ask what would be a more appropriate ecological narrative? 
The answer to this, as it applies to terrestrial ecological communities (most notably 
forest communities), is foreshadowed throughout this work but reaches its climax in * 
the final chapter as I enter into a discussion about a possible alternative. This 
alternative narrative is at least as well equipped to handle the ecopolitical metaphysics 
of environmentalism within the context of terrestrial ecological communities as the 
unity of nature concept, without needlessly inflicting the negative consequences of 
unitarianism upon the social and ecological world.
When examining the cultural milieu surrounding the unity of nature concept, an 
intense investigation of humanity’s relationship with nature must ensue. Sociologists,
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philosophers, historians, scientists, and environmentalists have all studied various 
aspects of humanity’s relationship with nature in an intensive way for many years 
now. It is from all of these disciplines that this work brings ideas. Despite this 
eclecticism it is still possible to locate this work within a certain disciplinary 
perspective: it is a piece of work that forges out an articulation between the social and 
cultural study of science and technology and the social and cultural study of the 
environment (STS and Environmental Studies, respectively), especially with regards 
to the way that both of these fields may reflect upon grand metaphysical issues in 
science and environmentalism. This means that studnets of the culture of 
environmentalism and students of the culture of science would probably be in the best 
position to appreciate the nuances explored.
Within these disciplines (and many more besides) there is an ongoing debate 
between naturalism and realism on the one hand and cultural constructionism on the 
other; and I should state at the outset that I am, myself, more allied to the latter than 
to the former. Within the history and sociology of science and environmentalism this 
debate now seems ever-present and from it emerges much of the analytical spirit 
applied in the arguments contained within the work. I use the word ‘spirit’ rather than 
some other word such as ‘tool’ to indicate that while there are some well-constructed 
core theoretical frameworks within the history and sociology of science, these 
frameworks are only used sparingly in this work compared to a wider focus upon the 
social, cultural, political and metatheoretical problems in ecological science, 
environmentalism and natural philosophy. This is to say that this work is no mere 
‘history of ecological science’ or ‘history of environmentalism’ or ‘history of natural 
philosophy’ but a work that whole-heartedly enters into the theoretical details that 
ecological scientists, environmentalists and natural philosophers talk about as well as 
proffering some sociological and ecological insights into the problems that infect, give 
rise to, arise from these theoretical details.
Having declared my constructionist sympathies 1 can now admit that such a route 
foregoes the production of the ultimate word on: 1) the reality of nature, 2) the reality 
of the social, 3) the reality of a specific interaction between the two, and 4) the 
objectivity of a narrative that might explain this interaction. A constructionist 
approach nevertheless presents an opportunity to address some of the issues within
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environmental studies in a much more creative and tangential way than most 
scholarship yet undertaken in the field since, as a distinct discipline, environmental 
studies has only just entered into the waters of social constructionism in the past few 
years. As we shall see in the final chapter, however, it is likely that environmental 
studies presents social constructionism with a challenging perspective, too. The 
approach explored here suggests that social constructionism might need to anticipate 
its own widening to take account of the critique of humanity’s claim to be the only 
social creatures upon the planet that are capable of social construction.
Above I refer to this work as a critique of a body of emerging literature. The 
purveyors ot this literature I label either ‘natural philosophers’ or ‘environmental 
thinkers’. I use the term natural philosophers since those I label as such are at once 
philosophical enunciators about nature as well as late Twentieth Century practitioners 
of the tradition known as natural philosophy; a tradition which has in the past 
involved the setting up of grand sweeping schemes that detail how the universe is 
organised. I use the term environmental thinker, because many of these writers are 
politically or metaphysically or intellectually inspired towards the protection of the 
environment. From this inspiration there flows concern within their thinking for 
analysing the social, political and cultural causes of the environmental crisis.
If, as social constructionists might advocate, terms and names are 
socially-negotiated appendages that float somewhat incongruously above the referent 
about which they make descriptions, rather than being firmly attached to some or 
other characteristic of a real object, then it is hard for any terms or names to be used 
with absolute confidence in a scholarly exercise such as this. Thus when detailing a set 
of ideas under the rubric of a specific paradigm, or announcing the commonality of 
certain thinkers as belonging to that paradigm, one must do so with a clear caveat in * 
mind. In this respect some of the players that I label as team-mates, due to their 
respective adherence to a particular mode of metaphysics, sometimes make strange 
bed fellows. Likewise, by classifying all the players that I examine in this work under a 
catch-all phrase—say ‘environmental thinkers’ or ‘natural philosophers’—it is always 
probable that some players would hardly consider themselves either ‘environmental’, 
or ‘thinkers’, or ‘philosophers’. Nevertheless, these phrases, along with the terms 
‘environmental thinking’ and ‘natural philosophy’, are adequate enough to distinguish
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or "thinkers’, or "philosophers’. Nevertheless, these phrases, along with the terms 
‘environmental thinking’ and "natural philosophy’, are adequate enough to distinguish 
a group of thinkers whose natural philosophical assumptions and environmental 
assertions are similar enough for a sustained critique to be employed. All this goes 
towards a declaration which would state that although they might disagree with each 
other over many things, the ‘environmental thinkers/natural philosophers’ here-in 
analysed are nevertheless contributors towards, and products of’ a unified discourse 
on nature. If nothing else (and there are actually a lot of elses) they all believe in the 
‘unity of nature’.
In light of the above points it may also be suitable to class this work as a critique 
of four prominent players in the field of contemporary natural philosophy, namely 
Fritjof Capra, James Lovelock, Edward Goldsmith and Paul Davies1. More
1 A short biography to introduce these four thinkers would read as follows:
Fntjof Capra is by training a theoretical high-energy physicist, but he is more reknown for his writing of 
popular science works. Bom in Vienna, he received his Ph.D. on stellar astronomy from the University of Vienna 
in 1966 where he studied with Werner Heisenberg. He taught and researched theoretical high-energy physics at 
Orsay in Paris from 1966-1968, the University of California in Santa Cruz from 1968-1970, Stanford Linear 
Accelerator Centre, and at the Imperial College m London. Capra founded and served as Director of the Elmwood 
Institute, Berkeley, which is dedicated to nurturing new ecological visions and applying them to current social, 
economic and environmental problems. He has published many technical papers and lectured extensively on the 
philosophical implications of modem science. He does research at the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory and lectures 
at the University of California, Berkeley.
James Lovelock describes himself as an inventor, a scientist and an independent scholar. Others have 
described him as a philosopher, a scientific maverick, and a visionary. As an inventor of atmospheric measuring 
instruments (for eg: the electron capture detector) Lovelock was one of a team invited, in the 1960s, to devise tests 
for life on Mars by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. After time spent at NASA he pointed out, 
in a senes of popular and academic papers, that the composition of the Earth's atmosphere is far out of chemical 
equilibrium because of the living processes that interact with it. Mars or any other planet with life on it should 
show chemical imbalance in the composition o f its atmosphere. This led him to what became known as the Gaia 
hypothesis, that the Earth as a whole fimctions as a single living organism, regulating its environment (for 
example, temperature and atmospheric oxygen) to serve its life needs. Gaia, as novelist William Golding pointed 
out to Lovelock in the 1970s, was the name for the Greek goddess of the Earth, so Lovelock adopted it as a name 
for his theory; a theory which looked at the processes of the whole Earth. For many people Lovelock's Gaia has 
become a symbol of ecological concerns and respect for the complex, interconnected, life-supporting processes of 
our home planet.
Edward Goldsmith has, for over 30 years, been in the forefront of efforts both to warn about the scale and 
seriousness o f environmental destruction and to present proposals to reverse it. His principal vehicle has been the 
magazine The Ecologist, which was founded in 1969, with Goldsmith first as Editor, then as Co-Editor, now as 
publisher. The Ecologist first came to prominence in 1972 with its issue entitled 'Blueprint for Survival’, which 
sold half a million copies in 17 languages. One purported result was the formation of a green party in the UK., the 
first in the world. Several times thereafter The Ecologist was to adopt a radical stance on some issue which was 
subsequently to become a prime campaigning focus for other groups. Goldsmith is also a notable scholar on both 
theoretical and applied matters. With regard to the latter he was the co-author in the 1980s, with Nicholas 
Hildyard, now a co-editor of The Ecologist, of a monumental three volume study. The Social and Environmental 
Effects o f  Large Dams. With regard to the former. Goldsmith has been a key contnbutro to a senes of seminars 
exploring and developing the implications ot James Lovelock s Gaia Hypothesis which perceives.
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specifically this work might be recognised as a concerted eftort to critique the four 
respective books by these natural philosophers that deal with the unity of nature 
concept; Capra’s The Web o f Life, Goldsmith’s The Way, Lovelock’s Healing Gaia 
and Davies’ The Cosmic Blueprint. All of these writers are major players in either 
natural philosophical discourse and all of these works might be considered major 
works in recent natural philosophy. While these four works might be said to form the 
hub of what this work sets out to critique, many other players exist in the field and 
their works, too, are often observed and critiqued in a systematic way.
A sub-text that might be seen to emerge as a corollary to this critique is the 
laying down of an attempt to disenfranchise the competence of the knowledge claims 
of those listed above when they specifically deal with ecological science. This is the 
science that unity of nature supporters often appeal to and this is the science in which 
they believe they can have a lot of influence. It has become my view, however, that 
their claims to know how to operate with, and extend, ecological ideas are riddled 
with intellectual lacunae and scholarly synecdoche. Theirs is an ecology that stumbles 
from what is uncertain in ecological theory to what is certain in environmental 
evaluation and theirs is an ecology that confuses the whole of ecological science for a 
part.
This work is organised into three parts which are divided into eight chapters 
which are, themselves, divided into numerous sections. Each section represents a 
portion of supporting evidence and theory that contributes to the main argument of 
the chapter.
Paul Davies was bom in London and gained his terminating degree from University College London in 
1970. Since then he has held academic appoinments at Cambridge and London Universities until he was appointed 
Professor of Theoretical Physics at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne. He remained there until his emigration „ 
to Australia in 1990 to take the Chair of Mathematical Physics at The University of Adelaide. In May 1993 the 
University created a new position. Professor of Natural Philosophy, specially lor him. In May 1997 he decided to 
take early retirement from the University. He currently holds a Visiting Professor position at imperial College, 
London. Paul Davies has published numerous papers in physics journals, in the fields of cosmology, gravitation, 
and quantum field theory, with particular emphasis on black holes and the origin ot the universe. He is also 
interested in the nature of time, high energy particle physics, the foundations ot quantum mechamcs. chaos theory 
and the theory of complex sy stems. His former colleagues at the University ol Adelaide are investigating topics in 
quantum gravity including superstnngs. higher-dimensional black holes and quantum cosmology, in addition to 
his research, Paul Davies is well known as an author, broadcaster and public lecturer. He has written man\ popular 
science books for the general public. Davies writes regularly lor newspapers, journals and magazines in several 
countries, both about science and the political and social aspects ol science and technology. He has been a 
longstanding contributor to The Guardian, The Economist, 'The Independent and The Daily 'Telegraph in the UK., 
and the The Australian and The Sydney Morning Herald in Australia, as well as more specialist publications such
as New Scientist.
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20th Century: Unity as an Environmental Metanarrative, introduces the unity of 
nature concept as an identitiably environmental or ecopolitical worldview. It identifies 
the (uncontroversial) idea that the scientific conception of the unity of nature concept 
is, at least in part, a construction of the environmental movement which has much 
ecopolitical investment in the concept. To environmentalists, the unity of nature 
suggests the need to tread lightly on the Earth since what we may do to one part of it 
will always have ramifications for many other parts. There is a common historical 
narrative told and retold by environmentalists when they discuss the broader cultural 
acceptance of these views. This common historical narrative is recounted in Chapter 
One and it is a narrative that generally suggests that bad thinking, especially that 
which posits a non-united nature, leads to bad environmental practices. From this 
perspective the environmental crisis is, at least in part, a result of an ecopolitically 
inappropriate non-unitarian worldview.
Chapter Two, l  he Unity o f  Nature, Differing Eecological Sciences a?id 
Over-Zealous Ecological Holism, makes the point that, despite their best intentions, 
Unitarians have often entered into an ecological and environmental discourse which 
exhibits over-zealous use of holism. The unity of nature concept may be so full of 
anti-individualism, physical reductionism and hierarchical epistemological schemes 
that it hardly rates well as an environmentally-friendly metanarrative. In Chapter Two 
the historical and intellectual heritage of the unity of nature concept is analysed to 
reveal these over-zealous holist tendencies.
Chapter Three, Gaia: The Living Embodiment o f  the Unity o f Nature, addresses 
one of the best organised attempts at establishing a distinct theory of natural unity: the 
Gaia theory. As a brand of unitarianism that is intellectually tied to those analysed in 
Chapter Two, it is suggested that the Gaia theory might not be as ecopolitically 
relevant as some people have thought. Certainly, it is premature to proffer Gaia 
theory as the new environmental narrative for the Twenty First century as some 
environmental thinkers have suggested. Gaia, in fact, may just be the product of a 
functionalist, technocentric approach to ecological and environmental problems.
Chapter Four, The Unity o f  Nature: A Metanarrative o f Social Conservatismf 
examines whether or not the unity of nature concept might possess conservative 
tendencies when it is transferred from the study of nature and utilised in the study of
society. The conclusion reached is that it does. Whether or not these tendencies are 
inherent and necessary is still left open but the specific intellectual milieu surrounding 
and feeding into the very unitarianism that environmentalists and ecologists theorise 
(and promote) is profoundly continuous with the unitarianism promoted by 
conservative thinkers. This chapter goes on to describe exactly how these links are 
forged through an adherence to social and ecological functionalism, and social 
systems theory.
Chapter Five, The Unity o f Nature: Uniting the Ecosystem with the Economy?, 
examines the possible links between the unity of nature concept (and its recent 
scientific representation within Unitarian theories such Chaos theory, Complexity 
theory and Self-organisation theory) and the ideas of liberal capitalism. Chapter Five 
suggests that the newest configurations of unitarianism are intellectually and 
historically associated with some of the oldest self-legitimising ideas within liberal 
capitalism. If environmental thinkers are to continue to expound the idea of 
unitarianism, they may find, it is suggested in this chapter, that they are expounding 
metaphysical elaborations of, and support for, liberal capitalism also. This link 
between unitarianism and liberal capitalism revolves around the various concepts that 
directly interplay with the unity concept as it is conceptualised by a group of 
scientifically literate Unitarians called the ‘New Scientists". It is apparent that the New 
Scientists operate their scientific programme with direct reference to the unity of 
nature and its attendant army of accompanying ideas.
Chapter Six, What Is This Thing Called Postmodern Science?, investigates how 
the unity of nature concept has become a central tenet in Postmodern Science and 
then goes on to identify the nature of Postmodern Science and its relationship to the 
postmodern intellectual movement generally. In this chapter 1 detail how Postmodern 
Science is unable to eject from itself many Modernist tendencies. Because of this I 
conclude that Postmodern Science, despite its name, is far from postmodern.
Chapter Seven, Mechanicism Vs Organicism-. A Ealse Dichotomy‘s  looks at the 
links between the unity of nature, mechanicism and organicism and goes on to 
indicate how these three things are intimately connected. Their connections are such 
that it no longer seems tenable to regard mechanicism and organicism as generic 
bi-polar opposites in environmental and ecological thinking.
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Chapter Eight, An(other) Postmodern Ecology, assumes that Chapters Two 
through Seven have shown the inadequacy of the unity of nature concept as an 
environmental and ecological metanarrative. Chapter Eight seeks to investigate the 
possibility of suggesting an alternative postmodern conceptualisation of ecology 
whereby nature itself may be deconstructed in an ecopolitically benign way through an 
awareness of ‘otherness’. Within such a perspective it is believed that we should not 
be scared of identifying and locating the differences between the various members of 
the environment; splitting them up, and atomising them, since if we do it with a view 
to celebrating otherness then we may well contribute to an environmental narrative 
that is better equipped to value the individual lives of each living member in the world.
These chapters are arranged into three Parts which delineate the peculiar scholarly 
themes to which they belong. The first part {It ’s A ll an Environmentalist Plot!) 
suggests how environmental thinkers have constructed the unity of nature concept as 
part of a contemporary environmental natural philosophy. Part Two {IPs All a 
Bourgeois Plot!) revolves around the consideration that the unity of nature idea is just 
as much a social construction of conservatism, fascism and liberal capitalism as it is a 
social construction of environmentalism. Part Three {It’s All a Postmodern 
Plot[lessnessJ!) brings in the theme that the unity of nature concept may or may not 
be a decidedly postmodern concept and it investigates how ‘constructive’ Postmodern 
Science constructs the unity of nature concept and how 
‘deconstructive’postmodernists might deconstruct it.
PARTA
I t’s All an Environmentalist
Plot!
INTRODUCTION TOPARI A
Part A recounts the well-worn idea that the unity of nature concept is 
quintessentially an environmental idea. As such, environmentalists have colonised the 
concept, reinvented it, and reinvigorated it to serve as a legitimising tool in their 
environmental aims. This colonisation, reinvention and remvigoration has been so 
successful that today the unity of nature is commonly accepted within many facets of 
Western culture as the intellectual preserve of environmentalists and environmental 
sympathisers.
Part A is comprised of only one chapter; An Introduction to the Unity oj Nature 
Concept in the Late Iwentieth Century: Unity as an Environmental Metanarrative. 
This chapter serves as an introduction to the rest of the chapters in this work. It is 
important since it lays down, as a baseline, the fundamental partnership between 
environmentalism and the unity of nature concept as conceived by its environmental 
supporters. It is important, also, since it lays down the tundamental relationship 
between scientific thinking and social practice as conceived by both environmental 
thinkers and natural philosophers. It also recounts a peculiarly environmental narrative 
with regards to the history of environmental thought; a narrative which divides the
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history of Western natural philosophy into three distinct stages whilst proposing that 
late Twentieth Century society sits at the cusp of the second and third stages. Such an 
introduction is needed at this point in the work since the fundamental stories of 
environmentalism and the unity of nature concept are the ones that will be 
re-examined again and again as this work proceeds.
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CHAPTER 1
An Introduction to the Unity o f Nature Concept 
in the Late Twentieth Century:
Unity as an Environmental Metanarrative
THINKING ABOUT NATURE. AND WHY IT IS IMPORTANT
Social paradigms are linked to scientific paradigms. This is the thesis of Fritjof 
Capra (1996), Edward Goldsmith (1993), Paul Davies (1987), Charles Birch (1990), 
Arran Gare (1995), David Pepper (1984), Arthur Fabel (1994), Bill Devall and 
George Sessions (1985), Theodore Roszak (1979), Frederick Ferre (1993), Carolyn 
Merchant (1980), David Abram (1992), David Bohm (1994), John Cobb (1988), and 
countless others who write about science, society, nature, and the environment.
Within such a framework it is held that scientific outlooks, metaphysical overviews, 
cosmological worldviews—call them what you will--profoundly afreet social practices 
and political activities. By extending Kuhn’s notion of scientific paradigms into the 
wider realm of the social, environmental thinkers and natural philosophers have made 
links between how we think about nature and the effect of this thinking on both nature 
and society. By doing this environmental thinkers are able to see exactly which natural 
philosophies/social paradigms/metaphysical outlooks give rise to exactly which social 
and ecological situations. In environmental scholarship it is apparent that very specific 
ideas seem to have given rise to very specific social practices.
With regard to this last point it is notable that environmental scholars often lay
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much blame for the environmental woes of the Twentieth Century on the fragmented, 
mechanistic and atomistic way that the natural environment is viewed since this way 
ot viewing produces a fragmented, partial and incomplete appraisal of environmental 
problems and fosters a fragmented, partial and incomplete set of practices that might 
steer us away from the environmental crisis.
What is needed is a recognition of, and a commitment to, what the 
environmentalists regard as a truism of ecology (and what many ancient and modem 
day natural philosophers regard as a truism of nature); the natural world exists as an 
interconnected unity:
To accept the biocentnc outlook and regard ourselves and our place in the world
from its perspective is to see the whole natural order of the Earth’s biosphere as a
complex but unified web of interconnected organisms, objects and events.
(Taylor. 1981:111).
We must rediscover the unity of humanity and all creation. (Pomtt. 1984:211).
The grandeur and majesty of oneness 1 have only found in nature. (Spretnak, 1986:8).
Life is fundamentally one. (Naess, 1989:192).
No one can deny that we are all interdependent with each other and with all of nature.
(Nicholson. 1992:11).
The biosphere is one. (Goldsmith, 1993:96).
Here the above writers may be presumed to be either: a) stating the truth of 
matters, or b) utilising an as yet to be determined truth for political purposes. Whether 
or not you believe that ‘a’ or ‘b’ is correct it would be difficult to deny that the above 
references to the unity of nature are being made for wholly non-political purposes and 
were mere pronouncements of the way things are. When suggesting and reiterating 
the unity of nature, the above writers are making political as well as metaphysical 
points. Environmentalists are using unity to claim that nature can only be looked after 
properly if it is held to be united.
Within this structure of thinking, humans are held to be morally obliged to look
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after nature because they are a part of it. If humans are separate from nature, or if 
nature is held to be separated into various bits and pieces, then environmental 
problems will continue indefinitely since humanity will not be obliged to care for 
something that is not connected to itself (i.e. does not aftect humans) and its 
members will always presume that what they do to one part of nature will only be 
localised to that part (and therefore they will hardly worry about the aftect it has on 
the rest of nature). None of these statements are controversial: they are merely 
reflecting the mainstream environmental line when dealing with intellectual matters 
about the nature of nature.
If we are convinced that how we think about nature somehow determines how 
humanity operates in practice then it is obvious that how we think about the world is 
profoundly important. There are many examples emanating from environmental 
writing which detail the precise relationship between how we think about nature and 
how this thinking influences humanity and aftects nature. Here are a tew:
In this phase of human history there is widespread conflict between our conception of 
ourselves and our conception of the world. We see ourselves as beings that are 
conscious, that are rational, we have freewill and are purposive. But we see the world 
as consisting of mindless, meaningless, totally determined physical bits and pieces that 
are non-purposive. A society that lives with this dichotomy is operating 
on a profound error that is destroying much that is worth while both in ourselves and 
in the world. (Birch, 1990:ix).
[TJhe major problems o f our time--the growing threat of nuclear war. the devastation of 
our natural environment, our inability to deal with poverty and starvation around the 
world, to name just the most urgent ones—are all diff erent facets of one single crisis, 
which is essentially a crisis of perception...ft derives from the fact that most of us. and 
especially our large social institutions, subscribe to the
concepts of an outdated worldview , inadequate for dealing with the problems of an 
overpopulated, globally interconnected world. (Capra. 1996:4).
We have seen that fragmentary thinking is giving rise to a reality that is constantly- 
breaking up into disorderly, disharmonious and partial, destructive activities. (Bohm, 
1994:350).
In these quotes a specific link is alluded to over and over again: bad thinking,
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especially that which posits a fragmentary nature, leads to bad environmental 
practices. The environmental crisis is thus, at least in part, a result o f ‘outdated’, 
‘erroneous’, ‘fragmentary’ natural philosophy.
THE STORY SO FAR: THE HISTORY OF SCIENTIFIC WORLDVIEWS 
ACCORDING TO ‘NEW P ARADIGMERS’
In their elaboration of this link, environmental thinkers have often embarked 
upon a three stage narrative history of the origins and development of this situation. It 
goes something like this:
Stage 1: Ancient natural philosophy:
Before modem times the world was not viewed as ‘fragmented’ and ‘dead’ but 
‘organic’ and ‘alive’. Humans did not regard themselves as over and above nature but 
as an intimate part of it. This ‘organic’ worldview--as Bohm (1994:343) calls it--was 
epitomised, according to modem day natural philosopher; Paul Davies, by:
Itjhe Greek philosopher Aristotle [who (constructed a picture of the universe closely 
in accord with this intuitive feeling of holistic harmony. (Davies, 1987: 6).
This organic view of the world as characterised by Aristotle (and more 
importantly, according to George Sessions, by the pre-Socratics“) vitalised the Earth, 
casting all its members as alive rather than dead and interconnected rather than 
isolated. The Earth, too, was seen as alive; it possessed an overall harmony and 
integrity much the same as the harmony and integrity of a single living creature. Such 
respect for, and emphasis on, living things, and upon the unity of all these living 
things, suggests, according to modern-day environmentalists, a non-anthropocentric 
value system since Earthlings were living in a world with other beings whom they 
were deeply interconnected with, and they were also living in a world where the Earth 
itself was an organic being. 2
2George Sessions believes that casting Aristotle as some sort of ancient environmental philosopher is somewhat 
dubious since:
"Although Aristotle’s philosophy was biologically inspired, nevertheless he arrived at a hierarchical 
concept of the ‘great chain of being’ in which nature made plants for animals, and ammals were made for 
the sake of humans.” (Sessions, 1994:142).
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Western philosophy, of course, did not originate or exclusively own such organic 
worldviews and much is said within environmentalism about how non-Western 
cultures had almost invariably held the sacred unity of the world and the sacredness of 
non-human beings within it. For such ‘primal cultures’, as Sessions, 1994, calls them, 
(or ‘vernacular societies’, as Goldsmith, 1993, calls them) the sacred unity of nature 
bestowed a certain moral and metaphysical outlook: “[tjhese cosmologies, involving a 
sacred sense of the earth and all its inhabitants, helped order their lives and determine 
their values” (Sessions, 1994:140). Traditional societies thus had lives and values, say 
Sessions and Goldsmith, that revered both the world and the beings in it.
Stage 2: Cartesian natural philosophy and 19th century advent of Modernism,
Enter Rene Descartes, the environmental evil one; mid-wife of mechanicism and 
hinderer of holism. Cartesian philosophy, it is said, “separated mind from body”
(Zohar and Marshall, 1993:46), isolating the world from the observer, and it 
emphasised the mechanical nature of things; thus breaking up the unity and 
interconnectedness of the universe into machine-like parts. This:
mechanicism stresses an unbridgeable gulf between human beings and the physical 
world... We can see in such a distorted perception the origins of our current ecological 
cnsis. (Zohar and Marshall, 1993:5).
A break was thus made between ancient/primal ‘natural philosophy’ and modem 
‘science’, and between traditional and modem ways of looking at life and living 
things:
[wjhereas traditional biology had explained the activity , organisation, and direction 
of lite by a hierarchy of vegetative, sensitive and intelligent faculties or souls,
Descartes reduced the involuntary physiological process of the body to mechanical 
processes and eliminated the vegetative and animal souls from physiology. Sensitivity 
and thought were confined to humans and attributed to an immaterial rational soul. 
(Christensen, 1994:252).
There was thus an “emphatic rejection ot all forms ot animism or finalism, and 
most modem biologists are strongly mechanistic and reductionist in their approach” 
(Davies, 1987:8). According to Pepper (1984:50) “Descartes extended the concept of 
nature as a machine initiated by Kepler and Galileo”, and he:
viewed animals, and the human body, too, as machines. They were automata, and their 
workings could be fully known by reducing them to matters ot physics and chemistry, 
which in turn could be understood in terms of mathematics. (Pepper. 1984:50).
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All in all, Cartesian philosophy was the onset of the ‘modem era’, and:
[wjith the coming of the modem era...nature could be thoroughly understood and 
eventually brought under control by means of the systematic development of 
scientific knowledge. (Bohm. 1994:432).
In the modem era “Aristotelian ideas were banished from the physical sciences” 
(Davies, 1987:7) and purpose and teleology as explanatory devices were confined to 
the intellectual dustbin of superstition and religion. The modem era pictured “the 
universe as a gigantic contrivance and ourselves as small contrivances or machines” 
(Birch, 1991:x).
The history of environmental thought generally continues in this vein with 
regards to the rise and rise of mechanicism, atomism, reductionism and rationalism in 
the modem era of Newton’s time: “Newtonian physics was in the same spirit as 
Cartesian philosophy” (Zohar and Marshall, 1993:108), we are told, and
the general picture most of us have about the world is derived from Newton’s 
mechanics of the Seventeenth century (Birch, 1991 :ix).
According to Bohm:
the mechanistic view in physics., .was characteristic of the modem view and...reached 
its highest point towards the end of the nineteenth century... this view remains the 
basis of the approach of most physicists and other scientists today. (Bohm, 1994:343).
When scientists, and science popularisers, in the mid-19th century became aware 
of their own power to prescribe worldviews for the rest of society to follow, and 
when these people rallied with the Western world’s leaders and managers to promote 
an optmistic view of relentless scientific and technological progress, then a new belief 
in progressive human betterment developed. This belief is often referred to as 
Modernism.
The current (or modem or ‘Modernist’) paradigm forged by Cartesianism and 
Newtonianism, and self-consciously disseminated by 19th Century scientists and 
natural philosophers, about the dead, fragmentary nature of all existence is inimical to 
nature and nature’s components. Or so suggest many late Twentieth Century 
environmental thinkers. This is because Newtonianism rejects natural freedoms in 
favour of physical determinism, converts all things to machines—devaluing them in the 
process—and then goes on to simplify the processes of nature into simple mechanical 
systems of interaction like the physics of a billiard-ball table:
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In classical Newtonian mechanics, once the initial conditions and the force laws are 
given, everything is calculable forever before and alter. The sy stem is governed 
completely by the laws o f mechanics and o f conservation o f energy. It is totally 
determined. It has no freedom. (Birch. 1991 fix).
When trying to unearth the negative effects of the mechanical worldview it is 
often the case that three philosophical relations of mechanicism are unearthed as well. 
These are ‘atomism7, ‘reductionism7 and ‘dualism7. As Davies points out reductionism 
is:
The procedure o f breaking down physical sy stems into their elementary components 
and looking for an explanation o f their behaviour. (Davies, 1987:13).
Reductionism is usually thought to be strongly related to atomism, a view that all 
the world is made up of distinct independent bits and pieces:
The Newtonian paradigm fits in well with the philosophy of atomism...The behaviour 
o f a macroscopic body can be reduced to the motion o f its constituent atoms moving 
according to Newton’s physical laws (Davies. 1987).
As Davies and Birch would explain it, these law-obeying bits and pieces are 
generally what reductionism reduces natural phenomena and processes to. In modem 
science such bits and pieces might be atomic or sub-atomic particles or they might be 
the molecules that make up the genetic codes ofliving things.
Dualism, the third relative of mechanicism, is variously held to be that brand of 
Cartesian philosophy that either separates mind from matter or humans from 
non-humans. Since, within Cartesian natural philosophy, humans are the only things 
that possess mind then both of these variants amount to the rejection of non-humans 
from the realm of the truly conscious and animated. Non-human beings, including our 
own bodies, are mere machines with no animate soul. The human mind, on the other 
hand, exists above these things as the divine or evolutionary epitome of all existence 
since it is the realm to which all human thinking and feeling belongs.
According to many late Twentieth Century environmental scholars and natural 
philosophers this quartet of modernist foes; mechanicism, dualism, reductionism and 
atomism, are the intellectual harbingers of death. They deaden the environment by 
reducing the natural world to broken up bits and pieces which have no soul, no 
animation, no life. The only thing within this world that does possesses life in its frill 
and glorious extent, and therefore the only thing worthy of complete respect, is
human consciousness—and as such, everything else is subordinated in value to it.
You do not have to be an environmentalist to see mechanicism, dualism, 
reductionism and atomism as the quartet of death. For late Twentieth Century natural 
philosophers who have no special interest in the environmental crisis, like Paul Davies 
for example, this quartet o f death has manipulated science and produced a worldview 
of death, decay and pessimism. Davies admits that mechanicism has succeeded in 
providing modem society with very many of its scientific and technological marvels 
but he feels that these have come at the price of seeing the world as meaningless and 
purposeless (see Davies, 1987, and Davies, 1993).
This modem tendency towards meaninglessness and purposelessness is most 
stark, according to Davies (1987), if we consider the cosmological implications of the 
mechanical worldview. Once the mechanistic worldview was interpreted through the 
Nineteenth Century science of thermodynamics and then reapplied to the universe as a 
whole, it was soon realised that the universe was decaying. Just as a Nineteenth 
Century machine could not hope to operate without converting some of its tiiel into 
waste heat as it struggled to do productive work, so the universe as a whole must 
struggle with its daily loses of energy through heat waste until one day it has no 
energy left to exist. Or as Davies puts it:
Everyday the universe depletes its stock o f available, potent energy, dissipating it 
into waste heat. The inexorable squandering o f this finite and irretrievable resource 
implies that the universe is slowly but surely dying (Davies, 1987:19).
Because of this cosmological picture that Newtonianism presents to modem day 
science and modem day society:
[wje have come to believe that the total useful, or working, energy of the universe, 
according to the laws o f physics,...is gradually running down. (Sahtouris, 1992:21).
If the universe is dying—slowly decaying towards non-existence—then, alludes 
Davies, a vast shadow of pessimism seems to descend upon all human endeavours. 
Any hope for an eternal life for humanity, or just a better one for our descendants, is 
pointless since the universe itself will one day die, taking with it any degree of 
purpose that may have existed within it.
Stage 3: The New Paradigm:
Because “there is growing dissatisfaction with sweeping reductionism, a feeling 
that the whole really is the sum of its parts” (Davies, 1987:8), and because of “the
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sweeping nature o f scientific discoveries in cosmology, fundamental physics and 
biology” (Davies, 1987:8), Paul Davies, amongst many others, believes that a new set 
o f scientific disciplines are arising which present a new scientific outlook on life and a 
new worldview of the cosmos. This new view emphasises, once again, the organic, 
dynamic, holistic nature o f the universe.
O f this current eclipsing of the modem way of thinking about science and nature 
Charles Birch says:
It | he mechanical images no longer fit. They are giving way to quite a ditterent image of 
the universe and ourselves. This discovery is being made simultaneously by a 
science, a philosophy and a theology as yet little known. Its new images are no longer 
mechanical: they are organic and ecological. The universe turns out to be less like a 
machine and more like a life. This constitutes a new revolution in the science, 
philosophy and theology o f our time. (Birch, 1990::xi).
Fritjof Capra, too, expresses the eclipse of the modem way of thinking in similar 
terms:
The social paradigm now receding has dominated our culture for several hundred 
years, during which it has shaped our modem Western society and has significantly 
influenced the rest o f the world. The paradigm consists o f a number o f ideas and 
values, among them the view of the universe as a mechanical sy stem composed of 
elementary building blocks, the view of the human body as a machine, the view of 
life in society as a competitive struggle for existence, the belief in unlimited material 
progress to be achieved through economic and technical growth. (Capra, 1996:6).
O f the new way of thinking Birch and Capra declare that a more complex, 
life-affirming, interactive and interdependent sensibility is emerging; one which affirms 
the principles o f ecology and reaffirms the ancient ideas of unity and holism.
Davies (1987) and Fabel (1994) find that the social utility of the new paradigm 
revolves around its inherent optimism since while Cartesianism and Newtonianism 
promoted a worldview of death and decay for the universe, the new paradigm “just 
now arising, may set aside this pessimistic view, replacing it with a conception of the 
cosmos as a self-organising genesis” (Fabel 1994:303). Davies (1987:197) in this 
regard believes that the social acceptance of holism is directly related to collective 
pessimism and “despair o f a reductionist universe”.
Capra, Goldsmith, Birch, Sahtouris, Spretnak and many others, however, feel
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that the social repercussions go much further than this; that the new paradigm is 
producing new environmentally friendly narratives: “the emerging new paradigm may 
be called a holistic, or an ecological, worldview” (Capra, 1996:6). And by
calling the emerging new vision o f reality 'ecological5...we emphasise that life is at its 
very centre. This is an important point for science, because in the old paradigm physics 
has been the model and source o f all metaphors for all other sciences. (Capra, 
1996:12).
The new emerging paradigm, in contrast to its ‘modem’ predecessor, reasserts 
the organismic, biological basis of reality in an Aristotelian vein. The living organism 
becomes the metaphor o f choice and nature is no longer regarded as a disparate 
collection of clashing parts but as an interconnected and interdependent unity.
This association with unity is what new paradigmers feel affords the organic 
paradigm an inherently environmental stance since it is the unity o f nature which has 
also served as a metaphysical constant for environmentalists when they choose to 
philosophise about nature. The new paradigmers believe that environmental 
conceptualisations of unity have been influenced and informed by the ideas of both 
ancient science and by very recent scientific developments.
Within these new ‘organic’ and ‘ecological’ developments:
researchers in several scientific disciplines, various social movements, and numerous 
alternative organisations and networks are developing a new vision o f reality that 
will form the basis o f our future technologies, economic systems and social institutions. 
(Capra, 1994:335).
CONCLUSION: A PROLEGOMENON TO PARTS B & C
This three-staged historical narrative is common throughout the body of 
literature that has amalgamated itself under the title ‘the New Paradigm’. It is a story 
which is repeatedly told within this body of literature. For instance, it is retold, or 
alluded to, in Roszak (1979), Bohm (1980), Merchant (1980), Capra (1982), Cobb 
(1982), Pepper (1984), Devall and Sessions (1985), Griffin (1988), Cobb (1988), 
Ferre (1988), Davies (1987), Birch (1990), Roszak (1991), Fabel (1994), Abram
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(1992), Nicholson and Rosen, eds (1992), Zohar and Marshall (1992), Ferre (1993), 
Goldsmith (1993), Bohm (1994), Gare (1995), and Capra (1996).
There are a number of obvious problems with this three stage environmental 
version o f the history and philosophy of changing ‘paradigms’. Most notably:
1) are the links between social and scientific paradigms really as natural 
philosophers describe (i.e. does bad thinking really give rise to bad practices)?
2) If we admit that bad thinking can lead to bad practices, what relevance has this 
got to environmentalism (i.e.: does this necessarily mean that bad environmental 
thinking has caused the environmental crisis)?
3) Is the historical representation of Cartesian/Newtonian/Modemist philosophy 
as contributory intellectual factors in the rise o f anti-environmental thought valid (i.e. . 
might the environmentalist characterisation and periodization of Cartesianism and 
Newtonianism be less than solid bases (maybe examples of inverse Whiggism) upon 
which to make comparisons of pro-environmental and anti-environmental 
metaphysics)?
These problems are major but they are not the ones considered in the chapters 
that follow. Instead this work enters wholeheartedly into the arguments that the ‘new 
paradigmers’ themselves make. It enters into the terms of the debate as actually set 
out by the natural philosophers and environmental thinkers that adhere to the new 
paradigm of unity, organicism and holism, rather than stepping back and attacking 
them from outside their intellectual domain. In doing this, however, we see that the 
terms of debate internal to the natural philosophy of the new paradigm are often 
morally flawed (in the way they philosophise and politicise natural phenomenon) and 
also self-contradictory (in that the new paradigm is replete with the very social and 
environmental dangers that new paradigmers accuse modem paradigmers of).
Before I go on beyond this introduction to the unity of nature as perceived by its 
supporters, a warning must be issued with regard to some labels. Where I have talked 
o f ‘new paradigmers’ here as those that hold to philosophical beliefs in organicism, 
holism, oneness, and unity, in other chapters (and for specific reasons) they come to 
be known under various other labels. For instance, in Chapters Two to Four 1 refer to 
them under the general name o f ‘Unitarians’, in Chapter Five they are referred to as 
‘New Scientists’, and in Chapter Six they become known as ‘Postmodern Scientists’.
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There are very good reasons for me to use these various labels at varying points in 
this work since I am shadowing the self-conscious invention of these names by their 
users who, despite slight variations, can all be described as story-tellers of the 
Unitarian narrative. I shall alert the reader of the reasons for these various names as 
the work proceeds. Note that 1 shall only endeavour to jump from one name to 
another after adequate warnings as to the exact relationship between those who 
operate under the respective names.
As far as labels like ‘concept5, ‘metaphysics5, ‘paradigm5 and ‘worldview5 go, I 
use these words in a contiguous manner because, again, I shadow the terminology as 
played out in the writings of those natural philosophers and environmental thinkers 
whom I examine. For instance, Paul Davies (1987) usually sticks to the label 
‘worldview5 to describe his grand schemes about the nature of the universe, whilst 
someone like Griftin (1988) utilises the label ‘paradigm5 tor the same sort of job. 1 
myself will shadow these usages but it will still aid the reader if I can identity the exact 
parameters in which I use the labels listed above, despite how they are configured by 
the various people I study.
I use the label ‘concept5 to describe an abstract idea whose abstractness may not 
be generally acknowledged within the literature, while 1 utilise the word ‘metaphysics5 
to describe an abstract idea whose abstractness is well-known at least in the scholarly 
literature. Beyond this, the labels ‘paradigm5 and ‘worldview51 take to refer to a 
concept or a metaphysical point of view that has become so general within a certain 
scientific or cultural framework that it is used to categorise and explain all (or many) 
other concepts. Another name tor such all-embracing stories is ‘metanarrative5, and 
this is the word (derived from Lyotard, 1984) that I tend to favour when discussing 
the story o f unity since it is the more favoured term when describing grandiose 
theories in contemporary academic discourse. What I intend all this to mean is that 
when Griffin talks of a ‘paradigm5; when Davies talks of a ‘worldview5; and when 
Lyotard talks of a ‘metanarrative5, they are all referring to a grand story that is held to 
possess such undeniable explanatory ability that it forms the basis of a whole field of 
knowledge. It might be noted, then, that unity can be described at once, as a 
paradigm, a worldview, a metanarrative, a metaphysics, and, given its abstractness, a 
concept.
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Whilst I am explaining labels 1 might also introduce some others that are 
sometimes used synonymously in the literature that I am exploring but which 1 tend to 
differentiate within my own writing. In this particular work ‘ecology’ refers to the 
science o f ecology and not to the social movement involved with protecting specific 
ecological and environmental settings. The latter is termed ‘environmentalism’. A 
contributing factor to the prevalence of the idea that ecology deals with and operates 
within the paradigm of natural unity is this conflation between ecology and 
environmentalism under the term ‘ecology’. Often people hear talk coming from 
‘ecologists’ who are actually ‘environmentalists’ and then go on to suppose that their 
messages (including those of metaphysical unity) are part of an acknowledged 
scientific tradition and/or position. Most, but not all, writers examined in this work, 
do not succumb to this conflation but I suggest that their readers often do.
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PAR T B:
All a Bour^ Plot!
INTRODUCTION TO PART B
Part B forges a story about the unity of nature that differs from that recounted in
Part A. Instead of suggesting that the unity o f nature is a conceptualisation/cultural 
construct o f environmental discourse it suggests that the unity o f nature is the cultural 
construct of potent conservative, fascist, liberal, capitalist and technocentric forces in 
contemporary Western culture. It could thus be described by those of a left-wing 
persuasion as a product o f the bourgeoisie; the product of those with capital and 
power. It should be noted, however, that this is a cursory note used to categorise the 
thesis into its appropriate parts rather than a commitment to make any sustained 
Marxist analysis of the unity of nature metanarrative.
Part B is divided into four chapters. Chapter Two looks at the specific ecological 
problems within Unitarian thought. It examines the probability that the Twentieth 
Century renderings of the unity of nature manifest a type of holism which is 
ecologically fascist since it denies the value and stories of individual organisms in 
favour of collective wholes. Chapter Three investigates the philosophical and 
environmental premises o f the Gaia theory and how it, too, is a function of the same 
type of holism described in Chapter Two. Chapter Three also examines some of the 
technocentric and anthropocentric impulses within the Gaia theory. Chapter Four 
works with the familiar sociological idea that biological intrusions into the social 
sciences are often of a conservative bent. This idea is examined in relation to the unity 
of nature concept. Chapter Five identifies yet another distinct cultural impulse within 
the unity o f nature concept; its close intellectual heritage with liberal capitalist 
thought. This heritage flows into late Twentieth Century versions of the unity of 
nature concept via various political, philosophical and metaphysical conduits. These
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conduits are studied so as to betray their association with the liberalist (neo-classical) 
agenda in contemporary Western economics.
What tends to unite all of these chapters is a critical focus upon the concept of 
the ‘system’. The system is such a strong model for unity in late Twentieth Century 
natural philosophising that it has bound nature and humanity together within various 
discourses so that the Earth’s natural ecological systems are held to give enormous 
insight into the operation o f human social and economic systems.
Any intrusion of biological models into the study of social phenomenon is 
inherently a hazardous exercises, as has been outlined many times before (see, for 
example, Biggins, 1976; Sahlins, 1977; Lewontin et al, 1984; Levins and Lewontin, 
1985; Young, 1985). Many of these writers see such an enterprise as inherently 
conservative and they have laid down a general, standing-order critique of such an 
enterprise. I should say at this introduction to the following chapters that I do not 
necessarily adhere to this critique, though (as reflected in Chapter Four) I do have 
sympathy tor it. Rather, I adhere to a view that says that we can not get away from 
modelling the social world without the use of narratives which at one time or another 
were used to narrate about nature. A social narrative must not be castigated as 
inappropriate just because it seems to come from nature to society. Each model has to 
be judged on its own merits, within the historical context of its use. The important 
thing to note here, as I introduce the chapters of Part B, is that unity of nature is a 
narrative incapable of providing a normative framework that works well enough 
within ecopolitical discourse to be used as the primary environmental narrative.
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CHAPTER 2
The Unity o f Nature, Different Ecological 
Sciences and Over-Zealous Ecological Holism,
INTRODUCTION
As I have noted in Chapter One, exclamations about the natural reality of 
unity—and the necessity to recognise this in ecological and environmental ideas and 
practices—seems to be a theoretical and rhetorical necessity for many environmental 
thinkers. All is not well and finally resolved in this regard however. By placing an 
over-arching emphasis upon unity, environmental thinkers might open themselves up 
to the criticism of being branded promotional agents for some politically offensive 
ideas that they would normally, themselves, protest against. Over-zealous use of 
ecological holism is one particular charge that is often made for instance and this 
chapter will explore this charge3.
The sense in which I use the phrase "over-zealous ecological holism’ revolves 
around the tendency to devalue individuality while being intolerant of difference, 
dissension and plurality.
OVER-ZEALOUS ECOLOGICAL HOLISM
If the emphasis is upon unity and holism in the natural world (which includes 
humans) does not the individual (whether human or not) get swallowed up in the
3 Often this over-zealous use of holism is described as ‘ecological fascism’ (see Weston, 1987; Marrietta, 1993; 
Pepper, 1993; and Marshall, 1997) but due to the potential misunderstandings this phrase may cause within 
readers 1 have elected not to use i t .
whole unity? According to many Unitarian thinkers it does not. For instance Macy 
states:
Do not think that to broaden the construct of the self in this way involves an eclipse 
o f one's distinctiveness. Do not think that you lose your identity like a drop in the 
ocean merging into the oneness o f Brahman. From the systems perspective, this 
interaction, creating larger wholes and patterns, fosters and requires diversity . You 
become more yourself. Integration and differentiation go hand in hand. (Macy. 
1994:297).
Alas these retorts in the face of the fascism charge do not allay the fears of those 
making the charges. Marietta signifies this when she states:
The dire picture o f the effects o f holism is not simply a response to what the holists 
have said. It is also based upon possibilities that holists did not mention and that 
they may not have foreseen. (Marietta: 1993, 407).
Any claim that a worldview of natural unity might immediately give rise to 
dangerous fascist ideas within social thought can only come about if there is slippage 
between ecological unity and social unity. This slippage is made possible in 
environmental thinking, as it is in a lot of scientific thinking, by the—albeit sometimes 
vague—acknowledgement that there is an ontological unity between humanity and 
nature. As humans are biological, ecological and physical organisms, 
environmentalists generally claim that there is no distinction between humans and the 
rest o f the ecological world. We humans are derived from that world (both historically 
and physically) and we are an intimate interacting part of it. Many people have thus 
drawn the conclusion that the natural world in a strong sense shapes human nature 
and human society; or to say this differently: society reflects at least some natural 
processes.
However, others that hold to the unity of nature concept believe that although 
humans are intimately connected with nature, human society possesses its own unique 
characteristics which are not derived from nature. This particular way of looking at 
unity is used as a defence by committed Unitarian holists, like Freya Mathews 
(Mathews, 1991), who believe that the charge of fascism cannot stand since 
recognising the inherent unity of nature does not mean the recognition of, or support 
for, social unity.
Suppose we accept this point as valid: natural unity does not necessarily force
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upon human society a social unity. If we do accept it as valid, this only defends the 
unity of nature narrative from social fascism. Claims of ecological fascism—that the 
unity of nature narrative is anti-individualistic and intolerant of dissent and difference 
in non-human ecological settings—may still remain. This is the topic in question in this 
chapter.
In the late Twentieth Century it has become axiomatic within a variety of human 
scientific endeavours that natural unity exists in one form or another. Physicists have 
held that quantum mechanics shows a world in unity. Biologists hold that the living 
world is united by a common evolutionary ancestry. Environmental scientists adhere 
to unitarianism when describing the flow of materials through environmental systems.
The unity o f nature is hardly a Twentieth Century peculiarity but the degree of its 
scientization is. The paradigmatic example of a science that recognises the unity of 
nature concept is ecology. Ecology studies all sorts of things, of course, from the 
behaviour of single animals to the behaviour of whole landscapes; from the life 
histories of house flies to the trans-continental migration of birds. In all this diversity 
o f study, however, there is (according to Fritjof Capra, Paul Davies, Edward 
Goldsmith and others) a common metaphysical commitment to unity. The very 
essence o f ecological science, according to Capra, for example, is its recognition of 
natural unity: “ecological awareness...recognises the fundamental interdependence of 
all phenomena” (Capra, 1994:335).
FREDERIC CLEMENTS AND THE USE OF UNITY AS A METAPHOR
There are numerous traditions that Unitarians draw upon to announce the 
legitimacy and truth of the unity o f nature concept but the most revered site tor the 
science and metaphysics o f unity is modem day ecology. Ecological science is held to 
prove that natural things upon the Earth are interrelated and interdependent to the 
point o f being in unity: “[tjhe ecological point of view is, first of all, holistic. It 
focuses upon the ‘all-ness’ of nature” declares Partridge (1984:106).“Ecology is 
holistic” repeats (Goldsmith, 1993:15).
One o f the first manifestations o f this scientization of holism was when the
American prairie ecologist Frederic Clements developed and promoted his 
superorganism thesis in the early Twentieth Century (see Clements, 1916). To 
Clements the prairie community of plants and animals had a structure and a 
physiology analogous to that ot an organism. The prairie community grew like an 
organism, reproduced like an organism, and maintained its boundary integrity like an 
organism does. To modern-day environmentalist Edward Goldsmith, the 
superorganism is what distinguishes ecology from just plain old biology4 5.
The use of the word superorganism by Clements, and his modern-day intellectual 
followers like Goldsmith, might immediately strike one to believe that Clements meant 
that the prairies were in fact great big vast organisms but really it could mean any 
manner of things. The open-endedness of the metaphor allows for a variety of 
meanings. For instance; that the prairie has boundaries like a living organism but no 
physiology. Or conversely it has a physiology but no boundaries. In other words, the 
prairie is significantly comparable to an organism or some of the aspects of an 
organism but is not actually an organism itself The ‘prairie as an organism’ is merely 
metaphorical. In the vein of Aristotle' we can describe it as an attempt to see similars 
amongst dissimilars, a quest to elucidate the unfamiliar (the properties of prairies) in 
terms of the familiar (the properties of an organism).
The very fact that the superorganism is a metaphor might mean to some that we 
should not take it too seriously. Ecological communities are only like organisms.
They are not put forward as organisms. Clements himself, tor instance, “called the 
climax a complex organism to distinguish it from the well recognised individual 
organism” says Golley (1993:24), a modem day ecologist. Similar arguments are 
made by environmental philosophers as well as ecologists. For example, Laura 
Westra, says:
Of course, there is no claim made here that individuals and ecosystems are analogous 
in all respects. It simply appears that their status as developing, changing entities 
containing life, renders them similar to each other in some relevant respects. (Westra ,
4See Chapters 2-4 in Goldsmith (1993).
5 See Aristotle’s P o e tic s , in, for example Aristotle (1941). Don Miller (1983) points out that .Aristotle's is still the 
dominant Western configuration of metaphor and he points us (Miller, 1983:1) towards the Oxford English 
Dictionary as an example of how this configuration is defined. The Oxford English Dictionary states that a 
metaphor is: 1) “the application of a name or a description to something to which it is not literally applicable or 
2) “an instance of this” (Thompson, ed, 1996:55).
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1994:43).
This is an argument that may be raised again and again against some of the points 
in this work since it is a work that deals with both acknowledged and 
unacknowledged metaphors; i.e.: ‘because the metaphors are loose and only an 
attempt to explain what things are tike rather than how things are one should restrain 
oneself from investigating metaphors too intensely lest one falls into an 
over-determined explanation tor their application7. Why investigate metaphors, this 
argument would ask, when, after all, the progress of science has a way of weeding out 
metaphors that are wrong or inaccurate and only leaving those that truly reflect 
reality?6 7
If we consider that metaphor is an inferior, non-translating and non-literal form 
of human expression, we are, however, still left with two undeniable problems in the 
use of holistic metaphors in ecology. Firstly, the metaphors that ecologists such as 
Clements use are often not utilised as loose descriptions at all but as appeals to the 
literal truth. Clements7 superorganisms are not just rhetorical devices that attempt to 
elucidate the unfamiliar in terms of the familiar but are attempts to categorise the 
reality of a certain circumstance. Even Clements, for instance, speaks of his 
organismic metaphors as more than heuristic tools (see McIntosh, 1985, and Hagen, 
1992). They are sustained attempts to positively say that something is so comparable 
to something else that they both belong to the same category of things7.
6This is a simple expression of one of two main contemporary philosophical conceptualisations of metaphor (as 
noted, for example, by Miller (1982). Derived from Aristotle's P o e tic s  this view of metaphor holds that metaphor 
is a primitive, imperfect, non-representational, non-translating, rudimentary, pre-scientific. rhetorical, immature, 
polvsemic, artistic, figurative, non-corresponding, poetic tool in human speech, behaviour and activities that can be 
contrasted with rational, monosemic, scientific, literal, logical, translatable, natural, linear, referential, 
representational language and thought upon which our proper attention should be focused. From this perspective 
metaphor, while clever and poetic, is also a danger to scientific discourse since while it may possibly make things 
easier to comprehend, too often it fogs over what is literally true with various kinds of rhetorical wizardry . The 
other main contemporary philosophical conceptualisation of metaphor, reports Miller (1982), declares that 
metaphor is not just an inferior poetic form of expression subservient to representational language and thought but 
that metaphor is the only available form of expression. From this point of view -w ith which Miller agrees and 
with which I have much sympathy-representational language and thought is but a part of metaphor: a part that, 
according to Miller, denies its own metaphoricity in order to increase the depth of its knowledge claims. Miller's 
ideas upon metaphor feed into those examined later in this work: see Chapters Five. Six. Seven and Eight. Miller 
himself acknowledges the influence of a diverse variety of scholars of metaphor in his work: these include: 
Frederick Nietzsche. Max Black. Jacques Derrida, Paul Ricouer. George Lakoff and M. Johnson. For works on 
metaphor by these scholars see: Nietzsche (1979), Black (1979). Derrida (1974), Ricouer (1977), Lakoff and
Johnson (1980).
7 That Clements' use of holistic ideas are sustained attempts to codify the superorgaiiism into the realm of the
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The same can be said o f modem day ecological/environmental thinkers and their 
use of holistic metaphors. For instance, Capra (1982:308) writes “[tjhe Earth, then, is 
a living system; it functions not just like an organism but actually seems to be an 
organism—Gaia, a living being”. Similarly “[t]or Goodwin and Mitchell, the 
emergence of such regularities is what characterises a superorganism, rather than its 
being like a superorganism” (Lewin, 1996:29).
Secondly, there is the question; ‘how come one particular metaphor was chosen 
over others?5 Why is the ecology of the world more like a superorganism than a 
machine, a river, a whistling wind? If there are a whole lot of potentially available 
metaphors, why are particular ones chosen over others? These two replies draw us 
into taking metaphors seriously.
ECOLOGICAL SCIENCE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
SUPERORGANISM
For Clements, in the early part of the Twentieth Century, and tor modem-day 
holist ecologists, like Goldsmith, Goodwin and Mitchell, the superorganism is 
supposed to be composed of individuals and species that are so interrelated and 
interdependent that the community or ecosystem they comprise can be regarded as a 
balanced, self-regulating and highly defined organic unit; a unit whose constituent 
species possess a certain ecological complimentarity with one another such that it has 
the characteristics of stability, resilience and non-invasibility conferred upon it. 
Because o f all of this the larger community some how resembles an organism. Roger 
Lewin puts it this way:
[ajlthough a prerise definition is elusive, a superorganism can be thought of as a 
group of individual organisms whose collective behaviour leads to group level_______
literal, rather than a passing rhetorical strategy, can be realised if we acknowledge the length of time that Clements 
stuck with it. From Clements (1916) until Clements (1936) we can note that he had invested much of his 
professional life championing the literal truth of the climax community as a real superorganism.
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Junctions that resemble the behaviour of a single organism. (Lewin. 1996:31).
Clements’ superorganism not only exists in space; it also exists in time: a 
superorganism grows or evolves. This is encapsulated in Clements well-known theory 
of ecological succession. Succession theory is a theory of ecological development 
which posits that progressive sequential vegetation change on any given geographical 
site proceeds from invading pioneer species through intermediary stages to a stable, 
mature and relatively uniformly-arranged climax community. This process not only 
occurred in Clements’ beloved prairie regions. Clements thought that it was a near 
universal phenomena in all terrestrial communities from mountain forests in Canada to 
swamps in Florida.
The Succession process was not only universal but also somewhat predictable, 
too. Given a certain bunch of initial species, and given a certain set geographical 
factors (such as rainfall, soil type and atmospheric temperature), the sequence of 
succession was teleologically destined towards a single resultant community of plants 
(or to a very tew variations of this result).
Clements was a major figure in pre-War American science, having contributed to 
the development of two icons o f ecological theory and practice; firstly, the theory of 
Succession as just outlined; and secondly, the quadratic sampling technique (see 
Clements, 1905). With regards to the second, Clements, in his early years, at the 
Universities of Chicago and Nebraska around the turn of the century, was determined 
to turn the rather patchy intellectual profession of botanical natural history into a 
‘real’ science; the science of ecology. According to Macintosh (1985:77) Clements: 
decried... descriptive ecology, meaning verbal descriptions of vegetation, often only 
accompanied by species lists. Clements wrote of such descriptive ecology that no 
method can ‘yield results farther from the truth ...[frjcology was, in Clements’ 
conception, quantitative.
Clements’ model discipline in this endeavour to quantify ecology was physiology 
(as it was for so many other young biological disciplines in the early Twentieth 
Century*). By constantly measuring the physical and numerical parameters of his 
subject o f study, the prairie communities of the Midwest, Clements moved ecology 
towards the status of being a real science. He, himselfi also moved up the ranks of the
8 On this see Nordenskiold (1928), Morton (1981), Tobey (1981), McIntosh (1985)
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scientific establishment and in the 1920s reached the higher echelons of American 
biology when he was awarded a permanent research position at the new Carnegie 
Institute.
By the 1940s however the quantitative appeal of Clements’ botanical studies 
were outshone by his growing theoretical obsession with superorganicism and 
Succession (see Tobey, 1981; McIntosh, 1985; Hagen, 1992 and Golley, 1993). 
Although Succession is still much discussed today within terrestrial ecology circles, it 
is usually described as an ideal model and often given only a pedagogical role. In most 
places of professional ecology Succession theory is thought of as being an 
over-generalising, deterministic view of natural communities. These problems were 
becoming aware to Clements’ later contemporaries and very few of them actually 
thought Succession was quite deserving of the theoretical purity that Clements 
attached to it. For instance, Tobey (1981) and McIntosh (1985) explain how some of 
contemporary Clements’ critics, like S. A. Cain, regarded his propensity to classify 
and categorise hundreds of different types of Climax communities as 
self-contradictory proof that Climax communities were not deterministically inclined 
towards a particular endpoint. In contrast, Clements continued to think of both 
Climax and Succession as central concepts to the study of virtually all terrestrial 
ecological settings.
Although he had many supporters, Clements also had some detractors, and these 
grew in number as his career and life went on. It might be noted that none of this 
criticism or support for Clements ever fell away after his death and today we can still 
discern two ways of thinking within professional terrestrial ecology; that of 
unitarianism and that of anti-unitarianism (although these two schools of ecological 
thought are usually labelled using the terms of ‘holism’ and ‘anti-holism’).
The anti-unitarians are often castigated by holist thinkers as mechanistic, 
reductionist^, and unworthy of the title of ecologist (see, as a recent example, Rowe, 
1997). The world, the holists often believe, is made a poorer place by the presence of 
such ‘atomistic’ ecologists in it. Edward Goldsmith (Goldsmith, 1993) and Lynn 
Margulis (see Bunyard and Goldsmith, eds, 1989), for example, are adherents of this 
position. Goldsmith, for example, when writing to honour a man he perceives to be a 
modem day Clementsian ecologist finds it impossible not to have a stab at atomistic
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ecology:
I am indebted to Hugene Odum, one o f the few remaining academic ecologists whose 
work has not been perverted to fit in the paradigm of mechanistic science.
(Goldsmith, 1993 :xix).
The loudness of the holist intellectual movement in ecology and 
environmentalism is, however, probably matched by the sheer number of anti-holist 
ecologists in the profession of ecology. Although there is a lot of it, the presence of 
anti-holism in ecological science is generally ignored by environmentalists. Or to put it 
more accurately, the implications of the professional ecological distrust of holism is 
ignored. (Actually, this generalisation is also inaccurate to some extent since some 
environmental holist thinkers do acknowledge the prevalence of anti-unitarians within 
ecological science but this is generally to promote themselves as the underdogs and 
the victims of a metaphysical war against their pro-atomist toe). Many environmental 
thinkers however are just about totally ignorant of professional anti-unitarianism in 
ecology and so go on to believe that ecology is really the only discipline in science 
where holism is concomitantly supported in both theory and practice9.
Despite being variously aware and unaware of anti-holism in ecological science, 
environmentalism generally still hails ecology as the holistic science. Many 
professional ecologists are somewhat bewildered by the continued appraisal that 
‘ecology equals holism’ when their own professional lives revolve around working 
with theories that declare the subjects of their study are somewhat atomistic in nature. 
Such anti-unitarianism started early within professional ecological science. Scientists 
such as Henry Cowles, P.J. Ramensky, W.S. Cooper, Arthur Tansley, Forrest Shreve, 
S.A. Cain and Henry Gleason reacted, mostly gently, against Clements and his 
supporters’ use of superorganisms. The most celebrated and perhaps the most 
relevant of these anti-unitarians was Henry Gleason.
Henry Gleason’s reactions are best recorded in a 1926 paper that has come to be 
regarded as a classic in the science of ecology10. In this paper Gleason described 
ecological communities not as interdependent unities but as fortuitous associations of
9 This might apply, for instance to Capra (1996), 
l0Gleason’s 1926 paper is reprinted in an anthclc
Fabel (1994) and Bohm (1994).
gy edited by Real and Brown (1991) that is entitled F ou n dations
o f  E c o lo g y : C la ss ic  P a p e r s  w ith  C om m en taries.
ecologically and genetically unrelated plants brought together by chance happenings in 
their history and migration. The Gleasonian view of ecological communities 
emphasises that the well-defined and integrated character o f any particular 
naturally-occurring group ot plants and animals is a human abstraction, and that 
communities are anarchic, stochastic and fluctuating. Species composition is not 
uniform but continuously varies over space and time in such a disjointed and 
unpredictable manner that generalisations such as succession are impossible or 
useless. Plant aggregates are thus boundless and bondless associations rather than 
hard and fast well-defined unities. Or in Gleason’s own words:
just as it is often difficult and sometimes impossible to locate satisfactorily the 
boundaries of an association in space, so it is frequently impossible to distinguish 
accurately the beginning or the end of an association m time... A community is 
frequently so heterogeneous as to lead observers to conflicting ideas as to its 
associational identity, its boundaries may be so poorly marked that they 
can not be located with any degree of accuracy, its origins and disappearance may be so 
gradual that its time boundaries can not be located; small fragments of associations 
with only small proportions of their normal components of species are often observed; 
the duration of a community may be so short that it tails to show a period of 
equilibrium in its structure. (Gleason, 1926:13).
Another important difference between Clemenstian and Gleasonian ecology is 
their respective attitude to the unusual in ecological situations. Whereas Clements7 
superorganismic theory of communities would regard fragments of vegetation that do 
not conform to the regional climax community as being peculiar, Gleason’s outlook 
would see these non-conformities as typical:
[ejveiy ecologist has seen these fragmented associations, or instances of distribution, 
but they are generally passed by as negligible exceptions to what is regarded as the 
general rule. (Gleason; 1926:12).
If the superorganism and the community were Clements’ main metaphors of 
elucidation then Gleason’s main metaphor of elucidation was the ‘association’. Within 
the framework of the association, ecological groupings of organisms may possess 
interdependent relationships—that may even be obligatory for the individuals and 
species involved—but the whole aggregate does not register holistic properties that 
confer upon it the status of a unity.
It may, at this point, be useful to concoct a definition of Gleason’s association
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versus Clements’ superorganísmic unities in order to elaborate upon the difference 
between the tw o11.
-a unity is a united entity composed of non-separable parts which act in a unified, 
integrated and interdependent manner, whether conscious of it or not, toward a 
common agenda; the maintenance of the unit-entity as a whole.
-an association is a loosely-gathered group of coincidentally-arranged, separate 
‘unitary’ organisms living together, sometimes in an interactive and interdependent 
way, but which act individualistically and without contribution to a common agenda.
Although Gleasonian ecological settings exist more as random and ill-defined 
associations rather than the bounded and integrated superorganismic unities that 
Clements and his followers suppose, this does not mean that ecological associations 
are never at all integrated, that the members that compose them are not highly 
interdependent in particular situations and that the individual members do not enter 
the occasional strategic alliance in order to uphold a common interest. It is highly 
improbable that any one individual exists as an isolated ecological atom in an 
association (although this may happen sometimes). Most individuals do interact but 
Gleason would say that this would be at a localised scale rather than at the whole 
community or ecosystem scale as advocated by Clementsian ecologists or modem day 
advocates o f Unitarian ecology. The Gleasonian view of ecology can just a well be 
read as a recommendation to recognise the interactions of ecological agents but, as 
we shall see, Gleasonian ecology suggests that this ecological interaction is not of the 
type that Unitarians uphold.
From the 1940s on, the debate between anti-unitarians and Unitarians became 
significantly more complicated and sophisticated. Tansley had introduced the 
ecosystem  concept so as to put the organic holism of Clements into a more acceptable 
‘scientific’ framework. When Tansley put forward his ecosystem concept, he was 
“qualifying without disabling” Clements’ earlier organismic concepts (Hagen 
1992:80).
While Tansley invented the ecosystem concept in 1935, it was not until 1941 that 
someone, the Yale ecologist Raymond Lindeman, actually found one: the Cedar
11 While acknowledging that this may be dangerous since singular definitions often do not do justice to the myriad 
uses of the terms that they attempt to define.
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Creek Bog ecosystem in Minnesota. Instead of studying incidental organisms in this 
bog, Lindeman studied, and more importantly for most scientists, he measured, the 
bog’s energy characteristics (see Lindeman, 1941 and Lindeman, 1942). By doing 
this--by asserting that energy flowed throughout the ecosystem—Lindeman came to 
realise that everything was interconnected and united within the bog because of this 
flow. This uncompromising appeal to quantitative energy measurement and tracking 
distinguished Lindeman from his contemporaries who were unready to apply 
Tansley’s ecosystem ideas to their own field studies.
Hagen (1992:97) confirms this when he says:
what most clearly distinguished Lindeman from older ecologists was his use of the 
ecosystem concept. With this concept he was able to synthesise elements taken from 
traditional studies in fisheries biology and limnology, the newer biogeochemical 
approach to studying lakes, Elton’s terrestrial ecology and traditional plant ecology.
In the 1950s and 1960s:
most studies essentially repeated Lindeman’s study of Cedar Bog lake, in that they 
aggregated the diverse fauna and flora into a small set of trophic groups, determined the 
flows of energy and materials between groups, calculated ratios of inputs and outputs. 
(Golley, 1993:72).
The differing viewpoints o f ecology that variously correspond to an adherence of 
a superorganismic outlook or an association outlook parallel the different approaches 
between two breeds of professional ecology; ‘ecosystem ecology’ and ‘community 
ecology’:
[wjhile neo-individualist theories tend to view succession as a consequence of the 
plants that dominate a system the ecosystem theorist might view the successional 
change as being manifested in the balancing ol production and respiration or of 
equilibrium of input and output of major nutrients. (Shugart, 1984:19).
The irony within community ecology is that community ecologists often do not 
believe in the concept o f the community whilst ecosystems ecologists believe in both 
the community and ecosystem concepts as being applicable to ecological reality. For 
ecosystem ecologists “the ecosystem is the more fundamental unit” (Lindeman, 1942) 
of ecology but they are still inclined to invoke the community concept as defining the 
biological component of that ecosystem. For community ecologists, on the other 
hand, the various organismic members o f a community and their immediate
42
relationships are the fundamental units o f ecology. Given their chaotic, ill-defined 
state, however, communities themselves are just arbitrarily defined abstractions.
Whereas community ecologists usually hail from traditional zoology and botany 
schools (or ecology departments that evolved from such schools) ecosystem 
ecologists are just as likely to be physical or mathematical scientists as experienced 
biologists. Not content to set about describing the enormous variability in the 
ecological world by the pragmatic and fragmentary methods of botany and zoology, 
systems-inclined ecologists have attempted to harden the discipline of ecology into a 
‘real7 science; one replete with universal scientific laws.
List (1994) argues that ecologists have never arrived at a scientific law as one 
finds in the physical sciences; ecological laws are much too flimsy or specific. This 
on-going criticism—which emerges from within and without the ranks of ecology—has 
prompted the (now-ageing) program of the transference of techniques associated with 
geochemistry, process engineering, network analysis and cybernetics into the study of 
ecological subjects.
Although the critique of ecology’s inability to formulate basic laws continues and 
although ecosystem ecologists continue to try and physicalise and quantity then- 
subjects o f study to arrive at those laws, community ecologists generally go merrily 
along on their way ignoring such criticism as they set about describing the actions and 
interactions within particular ecological settings. This difference in ecological 
approach is by no means new: in the 1950s:
Hutchinson and Wollack...identified a dichotomy in ecology which was to become 
increasingly evident as ecosystem ecology developed. One method of ecology, they 
said, concentrated on the ‘biosociologicaT, based on individual species and their 
relations. The other isolated a space and studied the transference of matter and/or 
energy across the boundaries of space. (McIntosh, 1985:133).
While the superorganismic concept was suffering intellectual suspicion during 
Clements’ declining years12, it was, soon after, to be reconstituted and reconfigured 
into ecosystem ecology. As Richardson argues (1980:466) the ecosystem approach is, 
at least in part, “a child o f the organismic concept—a child that in turn has nurtured its
12As exemplified in the works of Gleason (1926) and Tansley (1935). Both of whom were suspicious of the ability 




This philosophical affinity between superorganismic unity and the ecosystem 
concept is transparent in the writings o f modem day ecological/environmental 
thinkers. Capra (1994:27), for instance, writes: “a system has come to mean an 
integrated whole whose essential properties arise from the relationships between its 
parts, and ‘systems thinking’, the understanding of a phenomenon within the context 
of a larger whole” (Capra, 1994:27).
SYSTEMS ECOLOGY AND THE UNITY OF NATURE
At the extreme end of ecosystem science is what is called ‘systems ecology’. 
Systems ecology is often perceived as being distinct from ecosystem ecology (the 
latter being a biological discipline which makes extensive use of physical science 
methods to analyse ecological situations whereas the former defines biological and 
ecological activity purely by the operations o f physical processes discovered by such 
methods) but the division between the two is somewhat fuzzy. They exist side by side 
with regards to having many common analytical techniques and similar conceptual 
frameworks13. Thus any criticism directed at either systems ecology or ecosystems 
ecology in particular usually must tall upon both of them.
Within the metaphysics o f systems ecology all living things on the planet are 
united and unified due to the physical transfer of materials and energy between the 
system constituents. The cycling o f ‘nutrients’ (a term that embodies both matter and 
energy) is a key focus o f study in unity approach, as Tyler Volk makes clear in his 
short exposition of the work of two particular systems ecologists:
Tim Allen and Thomas Hoekstra see nutrient cycles as the very markers for 
designating the existence of ecosystems. (Volk, 1998:53).14
Systems ecology is a functional ecology: it sets out to functionalise its subjects ot 
study; be that subject a pond, a stand of trees, an ocean or the whole entire planet. To 
Frank Golley (1993:80) the enthusiasm within systems/ecosystems ecology:
13 For instance, they share a penchant for mathématisation, quantification, the tracking of material exchange 
within ecological settings and the use of models of cycles, flows and networks.
14Allen and Hoekstra’s unification of ecology via the use of nutrient cy cling studies (and ecological hierarchy) is 
elaborated in a book of theirs entitled T o w a rd  a  U n ified  E co logy . See Alien and Hoekstra (1992).
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for a physical or engineering approach to systems tended to de-emphasise the 
significance ol biological differences. Species and individuals were represented as 
mass, energy or chemical elements...[AJlthough the advantages were many, the 
disadvantage was that most of the biological reality encompassed in the species was lost. 
“In the ecosystem model”, carries on Golley (1993:80), “species acted abstractly like 
robots” .
When talking about the whole planet, the term biosphere sometimes rears its 
head in systems talk. The biosphere is the largest ecosystem and it comprises all living 
things on the planet plus the geochemical systems that they are a part of. By 
systematising the whole planet, all the different and separate members of that 
biosphere become functionalised; placed into categories and awarded a role. Rather 
than existing as distinct living beings, individual organisms—and the local collections 
that they comprise—are turned into components in a system. Each component is then 
judged by its contribution to the continued cycling or transfer of matter and energy 
within the system. Often the exact species are o f no importance in this process of 
systematisation. For instance:
[wjhen the Odums had studied the metabolism of the reef at Eniwetok A toll, they were 
not concerned with individual species. Indeed, at the time they were unable to identify 
them. (Hagen, 1992:139).
The conceptual framework of systems ecology rapidly transforms individual 
living beings and collections o f living beings into typological categories according to 
their particular role in the ecosystem (see Bookchin, 1990, and Marshall, 1998). For, 
instance a wattle becomes a carbon-fixing autotroph which transforms so many 
einsteins o f light into carbon over so many years, a wombat becomes a heterotrophic 
carbon consumer releasing x  amount o f calories into the system cycle per unit time, 
and woodrot fungi becomes a decomposing component working at so and so rate of 
efficiency as ascribed by its functional status. It matters little whether the plant is a 
wattle, an exotic pine, a great vat o f seaweed or an amorphous blob of plant cells, 
since its function as a photosynthetic carbon producer is all that is cared about.
This emphasis on the link between unity and function is also brought out by some 
environmental philosophers. For instance Westra shows a predilection toward 
Unitarian functionalism by saying “integrity conveys the idea of wholeness and 
unbroken functioning” (Westra, 1994:xi).
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Given the systems stance it might be suggested that a change in the biotic 
construction of an ecological setting (such as species composition) is unimportant if 
the matter and energy flow systems are maintained. This is apparently the view of 
many ecologists who exhibit a penchant for superorganismic theories. For example, 
Robert O’Neill is cited as taking such an extreme view as this for he is said to 
maintain that ecosystems retain their character even when the individual or species 
composition changes (see Burrows, 1990:426). Systems ecologist Pat Klinger, also 
tends to do this. Klinger is quoted in Lewin (1996:31) as saying:
1 could show you a handful of vegetation from a peat bog and challenge you to tell me 
whether it came from the Congo or northern Minnesota. You couldn’t say and that is 
because, structurally they are all the same. Yes, the species may be different in different 
parts of the world, but often the genera are the same. And in terms of physical form--the 
shape of the mosses, the sedges and other bog species—they are the same the world over. 
This fixation of genera over species shows the primacy of generalisations over 
specifics within systems ecology. When Lindeman was unearthing his handful of mud 
from a Minnesota Cedar Bog he might as well have been unearthing it from a 
Congolese bog; so common are their attributes, according to Lewin and Klinger. A 
similar tendency towards the primacy of generalisations can be seen in the following 
passage by Edward Goldsmith (which tries to prove the unitary nature o f ecosystems 
and communities):
A number of experiments have been carried out to determine whether ecosystems 
display resilience stability and, if so, whether this can be attributed to their own 
efforts-and hence whether they are cybernetic or self-regulating systems, capable 
of maintaining homeostasis. The best known of such experiments are those conducted 
by Simberloff and E.O.L. Wilson. They removed all the fauna from several small 
mangrove islets and then closely watched the way they were re-colonised by 
terrestrial arthropods. They established that although the islets were eventually 
populated by very different species from the original ones, the total number ot species
was very much the same. (Goldsmith, 1993:131).
Goldsmith is a very strong advocate tor unity and the superorganism idea but his 
preoccupation with unity and finding generalisation means that he ignores the very 
differences that exist within ecological settings. This is to say that species differences 
in any particular comparison between two different ecological settings are cast aside 
in Goldsmith’s approach in order for him to make a statement about the ecological
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reality of unity.
Reiterating Goldsmith’s preoccupation with overall structural similarities (instead 
of specific differences) is Pat Klinger:
Klinger strongly believes that the robust dynamics of succession towards peatland 
displays the characteristics of a complex system, partly because they promote their own 
formation but also because they are so similar in fundamental structure. (Lewin, 1996: 
31).
The tact that Klinger sees the peatbogs as all showing a few community types 
shows his assumptions towards climax and superorganicism since Clements’ 
succession theory also presupposed a few common types of climax community. 
Klinger admits as much to Lewin, who says of his work: “Klinger’s peat bogs figure 
in the current revival of the idea of the superorganism” (Lewin, 1996:28).
THE ASSOCIATION PERSPECTIVE : GLEASON’S ECOLOGY OF
INDIVIDUALS
In contrast to the unity perspective of superorganicism one of the important ideas 
to emerge out of the association way of looking at ecological communities is that 
when the individual or species composition of an ecological community change, then 
the whole community can be considered to have changed. This is not merely a 
statement of the value of individual organisms, it can also be considered a description 
of ecological reality, since:
as far as is known, each species is uniquely different from each other species in at least 
some respects. This means each species must respond uniquely to the ecological 
situation in which it occurs, compared with other species exposed to the same set of 
conditions. In tact...genotypic variation within species and even within individuals 
will produce some ecological difference between populations of the same species.
(Burrows, 1990:82).
This statement, from a community ecologist, concurs with another, from an 
environmental philosopher:
To speak of human uniqueness is quite acceptable as long as we are prepared to accept 
that chimpanzees, dolphins, bees and humming-birds are also unique.
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(Horrigan: 1988:105).
Such an overwhelming quantity of uniqueness within and between species would 
surely suggest that any competent ecological science would acknowledge the sheer 
complicated texture of the ecological world. Schulze and Zwolfer (1987), for 
instance, maintain that the reason for difficulties in formulating universal laws in 
theoretical ecology is the sheer diversity of the behaviour, interactions and adaptations
of individual species. If the diversity between and within species is so great then, far 
from retaining its character in the face of a change to its species composition, as 
Robert O’Neill would assert, species composition is an important defining feature of 
ecological communities.
It may also be the case that the personal history of an individual (and the 
localised context in which it is embedded) might suggest that uniqueness is an 
individual property and not just a species property. For instance, if we could analyse 
genotypic twin plants as they grew in slightly different environmental conditions we 
might find that after years of separate development, each plant would react to a 
similar situation (say a certain predation rate or a certain amount of rainfall) in a 
different way. This effect would not come from genetic heritage but from the lived 
experience of the plants15. From this point of view it seems fair to say that the
15 Evidence which might support such a conclusion can be offered in the case of plants which produce toxins in 
relation to the specific herbivoiy episodes they experience. Rhoades (1979). for instance, details how some plants 
react to such heibivory in a specific way according to the exact nature of the predation. If such a plant had a twin 
who was predated upon differently, then these plants, taken together, may react to identical ecological situations in 
different ways given their past variations in lived history.
It might also be noted here that one of the strongest pieces of evidence which would cast ecological 
communities as being decidedly more Gleasonian than Clementsian (i.e.: individualistic rather than united) would 
be a situation like the colonization of new areas whereby we could find out if successive individuals of named 
species were in anvwav influenced by --or influential to—other individuals of named species that either preceeded 
them or came after them. This is what Burrows (1990) and White (1979) and others have done and what they have 
found was this: in a situation whereby a new area has been colonised by new and different plant species (say a 
newlv created volcanic island, a receding glacier, the barren ground of a felled forest) Burrows and White found 
that the successional processes did not depend on the presence of various species types. So when a bunch of pioneer 
species invaded the new sites, they did not prepare or facilitate further invasion, since even if the pioneer species 
did not arrive, second-commer species would arrive anyway. Thus pioneer species weren’t pioneering the land for 
others, they were merely pioneering it for themselves. Pioneer, in this context, just means ‘the first ones there , 
rather than the ‘pathfinders’ or the ‘trail-blazers’. The secondary invader species did not have their prospects 
enhanced or diminished by the pioneers. In contrast to such an interactive assumption, the second-commers either 
arrived at the same timeas the pioneers and just took a little bit longer to grow or they took a little longer to get 
there (because, for instance, their vectors of transport were slower). Similarly any species that arrived after the 
second-commers were not affected, either positively or negatively, by the presence of the pioneers or 
second-commers, they just took a bit longer to arrive, germinate and establish. The first-commers, in turn were not 
necessarily affected tty the late-commers, since they had either expired through the possession of a far shorter
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character o f any one ecological community must be peculiar to that particular 
community; not only because it has a unique assemblage of unique species, but 
because it has a unique assemblage of unique individuals.
While the composite members of an ecological community all possess their own 
unique character, for nearly all individuals this character is not independent of its 
environmental context. This is to say that there are interactions within the abstract 
community that have the capacity to influence the nature of the individuals and 
species within it. This is done through the medium of emergent properties. Emergent 
properties such as soil fertility, nutrient availability, predation rates, niche patterns and 
resource distribution commonly affect the character of individuals within a 
community16.
Herein arises an apparent paradox in my interpretation of Gleasonianism for 
while emphasising an appreciation of atomism in ecology (so that large community or 
ecosystem wholes are counted as abstracted or constructed entities) there is 
nevertheless a willingness to attribute super-structural feedback upon individuals via a 
holistic and unitarian-like concept such as ‘emergent properties’. It is my view that an 
individualistic conception of ecological communities can co-exist with the concept of 
emergent properties. Although ecological communities are justly regarded as 
abstractions of the lives of individuals and their interactions, ecological communities 
do possess properties that any individual cannot exhibit on its own. This is to say that 
emergent properties are not dependent upon these communities being hard and fast 
self-organising and unitary entities. It must also be emphasised, though, and this is a 
crucial point, that emergent properties are just as heterogeneous, variable, 
self-contradictory, transient, and evasive of generalisations as the associations from 
which they emerge; such that patterns of feedback can only be ascribed very 
tentatively in any ecological situation.
lifespan, or they continued to exist with the later-commers. From this point of view, no real interaction is taking 
place to create a climax community which we may regard as a united Clementsian superorganism. In fact, 
Succession, from this viewpoint, is just the slow establishment of a myriad of species, the slowest of which just 
happen to be of interest to humans since they are the longest lived, most economically important, and most 
spatially-dominant.
16 The concept of emergent properties finds it way into ecological discourse via the writings of Richmond e t a l 
(1975), Fenchel and Christensen (1976), Salt (1979), Edson e t  a l (1981), Allen and Starr (1982), Burrows (1990), 
and Drake (1990). In most of these works, emergent properties are regarded as the “features of a biological system 
which amount to more than the sum of the effects created by its constituent species” (Burrows, 1990:525).
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SYSTEMS ECOLOGY: A REDUCTIONISTIC TYPE OF HOLISM?
Systems ecology claims to be a holistic approach to ecology but any ecological 
approach based purely upon the study of matter and energy is an approach rooted to 
reductionism since ecological actors and processes are reduced to physical entities 
only. Or to put this another way; much of systems ecology is not ecological, since the 
phenomena being explained:
can be evaluated by physical and chemical methods, with total disregard for ecological 
ones. (Trojan, 1984:30)
The physicalism of systems ecology is the main supportive base for the 
conception of the Earth’s living biota existing in a state of unity. However, while the 
physicalist approach of systems unitarianism might be an adequate explanation for the 
integrated nature of a unitary individual organism—where the transfer of matter and 
energy proceed without a hitch according to physico-chemical laws—it is not an 
adequate explanation for the activities of an association of distinct individuals; where 
the phenomena involved with getting into or out of a position that enables the transfer 
of matter and energy are more important in determining ecological structures and 
biotic relationships than the mere transfer of matter and energy. Such phenomena (like 
predator-prey interactions, competition, mutualism and parasitism) are not reducible 
to physical laws. As a demonstration of this consider a forest community. The 
ecological structures and natural relationships within a stand of forest trees are not 
determined by the physical connection that photosynthesis might be said to effect 
between a tree and the physical components of its environment (light, water, air etc.) 
but are determined by a great range of factors which involve the tree attempting to 
effect such a connection, including, tor example: subsurface water competition, 
above-ground competition for light, herbivory evasion, parasite avoidance, and 
chance confrontations with ecological disturbance17. None of these processes proceed
17 On the importance of these aspects in the creation of particular ecological settings, the following publications 
may be noted. On competition see Richmond e t  a l (1975), Tilman (1988), Carney (1989), Yodzis (1989). On 
herbivory see Crawley (1983). On parasitism see May and Anderson (1979). On disturbance see Heinselman and 
Wright (1973), White (1979), Picket and White (1985).
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according to physico-chemical laws and so they cannot be incorporated as subsystems 
into a total systems model of the forest, yet they are far more important when 
describing the structure of the forest stand than the physics and chemistry of 
photosynthesis.
We might also find that in adhering to the physicalism of systems ecology, many 
relationships that are crucial in determining the emergent (though transient) structures 
of the Earth’s ecological communities are ignored because they do not significantly 
contribute to the flow of matter and energy. The most obvious examples are those 
relating to sexual interaction such as pollination, seed dispersal, courtship displays and 
off-spring care.18
ECOLOGICAL UNITY AND HIERARCHY
The concept of unity is often broken up into layers by Unitarians. The way they 
do this is by the use of hierarchical levels (sometimes called ‘levels of organisation’). 
Under this schema the various units that make up the whole entire unity of the natural 
world are distributed hierarchically on levels. According to Capra:
an outstanding property of all life is the tendency to form multi-levelled structures of 
systems within systems. Each of these forms a whole with respect to its parts while at 
the same time being a part of a larger whole. Thus, cells combine to form tissues, tissues 
to form organs, and organs to form organisms. These in turn exist within social systems
and ecosystems. (Capra 1994:28).
Rollo explains hierarchical levels thus:
[a] hierarchy is a system of organisation in which different levels can be 
distinguished or where lower levels are sequentially nested within levels above.
(Rollo, 1995:7).
As Rollo says it is possible to see that he could find an ally in Edward Goldsmith 
who lets us know that: “[t]he biosphere is a hierarchical organisation of natural
18In this regard, social scientists might note a parallel between ecosystem ecology and Liberalist and Marxist 
sociology. All of these scholarly traditions tend to give little or no cognisance to the sexual aspects involved in the 
subjects of their study. The exclusion of sexuality thus presents a deficient interpretation of the localised lives of 
most individuals.
51
systems” (Goldsmith, 1993: chapter 38 title).
The systems ecologist, George Van Dyne (1995:5) described this hierarchy of 
increasingly-complex levels by pointing out its structure as being: 
cell<tissue<organ<orgaiiism<population<community<ecosystem.
The ever-present nature of hierarchies in unity theory is of much importance and 
will be focused on more than once in this work. My purpose here, however, is just to 
draw the readers attention to the tact that unity and hierarchy may be connected 
concepts.
THE ORDER OF THINGS
Environmentalists that operate under the ontological reality of the unity of nature 
also subscribe to metaphysical companion concepts that prop up and support 
unitarianism. Along with unity, nature is held to exist as a naturally stable, 
sell-regulating, orderly and harmonious balance. Thus stability, harmony, balance and 
self-regulation all exist with and within the unity of nature concept. From within the 
science of ecology these ideas have been attacked. In this section (adapted from 
Marshall, 1998) these adjunct concepts of unitarianism are examined one by one and 
contrasted against the Gleasonian alternatives. In explicating these alternatives, I am 
not just putting forward the case of the comparable heuristic value of the Gleasonian 
alternative, I am also stating that the first pair of all the binaries has been a privileged 
metaphysical focus within Clementsian, ecosystemic, and Unitarian research.
a) stability versus change:
According to Edward Goldsmith “[stability rather than change is the basic 
feature o f the living world” (Goldsmith, 1993:112). The idea that natural communities 
are stable entities is manifested in the popular environmental expression: ‘the balance 
of nature7. Although the balance of nature concept has permeated the study of the 
natural world since antiquity19 it has become scientised through Clementsian plant 
ecology and ecosystem ecology; both of which perceive that balance and stability are
19See Glacken (1967), Egerton (1973), Botkin (1990), Worster (1994).
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common characteristics of biological phenomena of many types and at many levels.
While stability and balance may appear to be prevalent phenomena at various 
scales in nature; stability and balance as pervasive explanatory devices are inadequate 
when confronted by the many instances of imbalance recorded and experienced by 
various observers of nature.20 Even dynamic stability (whereby periodic and episodic 
cycles of change proceed within certain parameters) can not necessarily be regarded 
as a fundamental characteristic of biotic collections. Indeed, according to Gleasonian 
ecologists, stability may only ever be an ephemeral phenomena of but a few 
communities21.
In Wiens (1984) it is pointed out that many ecologists presume that stability and 
balance as ecological concepts are directly relevant to the study of any particular 
ecological community and because of this presumption they tend to use 
methodological techniques that automatically find stability. Connell and Sousa 
(1983:794) in turn point out that “natural perturbations are often so frequent that 
there is not enough time for a community to achieve a stable equilibrium state”. 
Another point of significance was made by Frank (1968) who indicates that humans 
tend to infer a state of balance and stability within ecological communities because the 
communities are composed of long-lived individuals whose life-span is many times
Specific outbreaks of ecological imbalance at various scales include the following (as compiled by Marshall, 
1998):
a) outbreaks of herbivory in which defoliation exceeds 100%, such as the catastrophic changes to fields and corals 
caused by population outbreaks of plague caterpillar (Conway, 1976) and the crown of thorns starfish (Cameron 
and Endean, 1982), respectively;
b) the lack of stability in North American forests over ecological time (Peterkin and Tubbs, 1965; Botkin and 
Sobel, 1975), as well as over geological time (Davis, 1981; Delcourt et al, 1982),
c) global mass extinctions in the Cambrian, the Ordivician, the Penman, the Cretaceous, and throughout the 
Eocene can be regarded as cases of ecological imbalance in ecological collections of global and evolutionary 
importance. Generalised treatments (including theory proposals) of biotic imbalance in ecological collections can 
be found in: Egerton (1973), Connell and Slatyer (1977), White (1979), Connel and Sousa (1983), Wiens (1984), 
Picket and White (1985), Chesson and Case (1986), May (1986), Botkin (1990) and Wu and Loucks (1995). 
Borrowing a passage from environmental historian, Donald Worster, it might be appropriate to consider that.
“The message in all these papers is consistent: the old ideal ol equilibrium is dead; the 
ecosystem has receded in usefulness; and in their place we have the idea of the lowly 
‘patch’. Nature should be regarded as a landscape of patches of all sizes, textures, colours, 
changing continually through time and space, responding to an unceasing barrage ol 
perturbations.” (Worster, 1995:74).
21 See Thistle (1981), Caswell (1982), Connel and Sousa (1983), Harris (1986), Burrows (1990) for examples of 
those who adhere to this view.
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that ot a human. A forest or a coral reef only seem stable because humans live such 
short lives.
It is important to recognise that the concepts of ecological stability and/or 
ecological equilibrium often mean different things to systems ecologists and 
community ecologists, respectively. This involves a perceptual difference in scale as 
well as a difference in what Connell and Sousa (1983) call the ‘characteristics of 
interest7. An ecosystem might be considered by a systems ecologist as being in 
energetic or nutrient stability but its species composition and biotic structure may be 
changing all around.
With regards to scale, it might be asserted that stability is not a standard feature 
at the population or community level of organisation but becomes more prevalent as 
one observes at greater and greater scales. In other words; those that do not see 
stability and balance are not thinking big enough, either spatially (to take into account 
the whole biosphere) or temporally (to take into account evolutionary history). 
However, as the examples in the footnotes show, stability at even these grand scales is 
not assured.
The prevalence of stability within the ecological discussions of environmentalism 
has at times been contrasted with the prevalence of instability within the discourse of 
professional community ecology (see Brennan, 1986; Cahen, 1988; Botkin, 1990; 
Worster, 1993; Clements, 1995) yet both environmentalism, in general, and 
environmental philosophy, specifically, sometimes seem to be rather slow on the 
uptake of this contrast between environmentalism and ecology,
b) homeostasis versus unregulated chaos
Not only is nature described as being in a stable and balanced unity; Unitarian 
environmentalists and systems ecologists hold that the stability of the unity is a 
self-regulated stability. The process o f ‘homeostasis7 which biologists have for along 
time pronounced to exist in individual organisms is taken from this narrow biological 
level and ascribed to collections of individual organisms. Ot this homeostasis Capra 
says:
The flexibility of an ecosystem is a consequence of its multiple feedback loops, 
which tend to bring the system back to into balance whenever there is a 
deviation from the norm due to environmental conditions. (Capra, 1996:293).
According to the Deep Ecologist M.O. Hallman (1991:119), ecological science
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emphatically demonstrates that “the entire biosphere is composed of delicate 
homeostatic mechanisms which go to make up the balance of nature”. The ‘goodness’ 
of such self-regulatory homeostasis is encapsulated in the well-known Leopoldian 
Land Ethic; which prescribes that a thing is right when it tends to preserve the 
integrity, stability and beauty of a natural community and is wrong when it tends to 
otherwise (see Callicott, 1989).
Doubts about the existence of homeostasis beyond the organismal sphere, 
however, are rather strong within the science of ecology22. Burrows (1990:466), for 
example, states:
Ecosystems are not really homeostatic because the plants and animals of which 
they are composed are not capable of the degree of communication, cognition and 
organisational foresight which would be required to achieve this.
Even if inter-organismal communication, cognition and foresight were achievable 
in a natural collection of disparate organisms these aspects could not surmount the 
incommensurable differences of interest that exist between different species and 
individuals.
Whether or not balance, stability or equilibrium exist as fundamental features in 
an ecological collection, the mere presence of stability is not, in itself adequate 
evidence for the operation of superorganismic homeostasis. As Williams (1992) points 
out; just because the input of a particular chemical element is equivalent to the output 
of the same element it does not mean that that particular system is maintaining the 
balance. In contrast to homeostatic unity, the Gleasonian acknowledgement of biotic 
disunity and contradictory feedback patterns in ecological communities would 
encourage a view that ecological interactions we see in ecological communities are 
unregulated and unrestrained. Homeostatic feedback cycles may exist but they are 
spatially and temporally transient and may have little or no relevance to the 
compositional character of communities. Indeed Wu and Loucks (1995:442) admit 
that:
[djirect evidence that ecological systems are inherently in equilibrium, however, is 
still lacking. Indeed, individual organisms may be the only systems within which 
homeostatic mechanisms havebeen demonstrated to operate.
22See, for instance, Engelberg and Boyarsky (1979), Burrows (1990), Drake (1990).
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c) deterministic maturation versus non-determinism
Systems unitarianism, through its adoption of Clementsian ecological principles, 
also has a strongly deterministic stance. Clementsian ecology and ecosystem ecology 
both affirm the existence ot ecosystemic or community maturity via the concept of the 
ecological climax. The ecological climax is perceived to be the final teleological 
end-state within a succession ot natural communities. However, such ecosystemic 
maturity seems, to Gleason and the Gleasonians, more likely to be a human 
abstraction. Maturity, like balance, stability and homeostasis, is only ever a 
phenomena of unities and not associations.
The Clementsian theory of Succession states that an orderly and sequential 
development of an ecological system/community occurs through time (characterised 
by increases in biomass, species diversity, community stability, community 
self-regulation and control, biotic complexity and productivity) as it proceeds from 
pioneer stages through intermediary stages to a mature climax community. However, 
that these developmental tendencies actually occur in a majority of ecological settings 
is debatable. Correlations between ageing and increases in biomass, diversity, stability, 
production etc. are often non-existent in many (maybe most) natural communities.23 
For many contemporary ecologists the Succession theory, in one form or another, still 
stands but others feel that it has more or less been slain. For them, the term climax 
must always risk being a misnomer when applied to particular ecological situations. 
There is no Succession, only change.
THE UNITY OF NATURE: A METANARRATIVE OF OVER-ZEALOUS 
ECOLOGICAL HOLISM?: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
To derive values from the metaphysical outlook of systems ecology may be to
23For example, see Drury and Nisbet (1973), Delcourt (1979), Burrows (1990).
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stumble at the starting blocks of one’s environmental value formulation. Systems 
ecology can not direct us towards valuing the very things that most ecologists believe 
make up the environment, namely: the individual members of that environment and 
the indistinct communities that they compose. Instead the functionalism of systems 
ecology tells us to value mere abstractions and the physical make-up of the 
environment.
Systems ecology is the result of adapting Clementsian superorganicism to the 
trends and traditions of modem science in the middle decades of the Twentieth 
century where it was thought (by Raymond Lindeman and Arthur Tansley most 
notably) that ecology could only become a powerful scientific field of science by 
giving into physics envy.
Both superorganicism in Clements’ time and systems ecology in the latter 
Twentieth Century have exhibited similar conceptual drawbacks; namely 
over-generalisation, the relegation of the specific, and intrinsic determinism, but now 
the physicalist superorganicism of systems ecology may be even worse for it suffers 
from an even stronger case of functionalism, reductionlsm, and over-generalisation.
Such functionalism, reductionism and over-generalisation does not bode well for 
the value of ecological communities and the species that make them up since these 
things are often not even acknowledged by systems-inspired Unitarian views of 
ecology. If environmentalists choose to adopt systems ecology as their primary 
metaphysical stance then they may be reducing their worldview to one which is 
inimical to valuing important parts of the natural environment that they are committed 
to protecting.
In order to reconfigure this lack of concern within superorganicism and systems 
ecology for the specific, the unique, the abnormal, and in order to develop the unity of 
concept into a metaphysics that can appreciate and value change, indeterminism, and 
the nuances of ecological processes it is perhaps necessary to take note of Clements 
intellectual adversary, Henry Gleason. Unlike Clements and his systems ecology heirs, 
Gleason’s association ecology appreciates these things. This idea, that Gleasonian 
ecology, rather than Clementsian ecology, could serve as the ecological site of an 
environmental narrative is fully explored in Chapter Eight. However, before then, 




Gaia: The Technocentric Embodiment of the
Unity of Nature
INTRODUCTION: GAIA:
THE ULTIMATE IN ORGANISMS AND THE ULTIMATE IN
ECOSYSTEMS
The story which is recounted in Chapter One indicates that holistic, organic 
theories o f nature are inherently ecological, inherently able to offer stories about how 
to save the planet from destruction. Gaia theory might be regarded as the Earthly 
apex of such holistic, Unitarian views of nature24. However, the Gaia theory might not 
be as environmentally friendly as many of its supporters may think, and in this chapter 
it is indicated how Gaia may be a theory as well endowed with ecological fascism as 
the superorganismic and systems ecology theories addressed in Chapter Two. This 
chapter also erodes the environmental potential of the Gaia theory by suggesting it is 
a theory of high technology, a theory of imperialism, and a theory that is hostile to 
socially-aware environmental policy-making.
Gaia theory is a theory initially conceived by James Lovelock in the 1960s and 
developed by him and a handful of other scientists, most notably Lynn Margulis,
Indeed this is the reading offered of Gaia by Abram (1985), Abram (1991), Allaby. (1989), Brown 
(1996), Bunyard and Goldsmith, eds, (1989), Capra (1996), Lovelock (1991), Merchant, ed, (1994), 
Roszak, (1991), Sahtouris (1992), Volk, (1998). Such readings of Gaia theory are an order of 
magnitude more popular than the one I suggest here as an alternative. Again, it 1 do nothing other 
than provide an alternative to the dominant reading of Gaia in this chapter then I can consider my aim 
to produce intellectual debate to be achieved.
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throughout the 1970s, 80s and 90s. The theory’s title comes from the ancient Greek 
Goddess of the Earth who goes by the same name.
The Gaia theory states that the whole of the world’s biota constitutes one great 
big homeostatic system, a system that is palpably analogous to the system that is a 
cell, an organism or an ecosystem. In recent years there has been a concerted effort to 
claim that the Gaia theory is the modem incarnation of the superorganismic thesis that 
Clements promoted earlier in the century. For instance, the second Oxford University 
gathering of Gaian specialists had as its main theme: ‘the Evolution of the 
Superorganism’ (Volk, 1998). Similarly, Lewin (1996) reaffirms the existence of Gaia 
under the intellectual framework of the superorganism in an article in the New 
Scientist. These acknowledged links between Gaia and superorganicism are of telling 
importance and will be examined in this and other sections.
So what is the Gaia theory, exactly? According to Bonsor (1997:26):
[s] imply stated the Gaia hypothesis suggests that life as it exists today on the Earth 
does so because in the distant past early life created conditions suitable to itself, and 
that since that time life, in concert with some purely chemical and physical processes 
of the planet, has been actively maintaining those conditions at optimum values.
Although universal scientific respectability for the theory is not entirely 
forthcoming there is nevertheless a lot of support for Gaia from those scientists with a 
penchant for superorganisms and systems thinking. The systems ecologists Eugene 
Odum and Pat Klinger, for instance, are on record as supporting the Gaia theory (see 
Bunyard and Goldsmith, eds, 1989; Joseph, 1990; and Lewin, 1996). Perhaps more 
importantly, however, is the support given to the Gaia theory by numerous 
environmentalists. Edward Goldsmith for instance praises the global systems science 
of James Lovelock:
whose Gaia thesis l (and a lot of other people) regard as absolutely vital to the 
development of an ecological worldview. (Goldsmith, 1993:xviii).
Similarly, David Abram (1985), Michael Allaby (1989) Theodore Roszak (1991), 
and Carolyn Merchant (1994) are amongst the many environmentalists who lavish 
praise upon the theory for it finally provides scientific proof for what they had known 
all along: nature is in unity.
For Edward Goldsmith, Gaia has become the fundamental unit of study in 
ecology (“[ejcology studies natural systems in their Gaian context”, says Goldsmith,
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1993:11) as well as the fundamental unit of study in evolutionary biology (“Gaia, seen 
as a total spatio-temporal process, is the unit of evolution” declares Goldsmith, 
1993:105). Gaia is not only the fundamental unit in biological study, however. It is, 
according to Goldsmith, fundamental in social studies, too, as we shall see later.
One of the selling points of Gaia for Lovelock, and many others that write about 
the theory, is its presumed non-anthropocentric framework25. Gaia, it is claimed, gets 
over anthropocentrism by detailing exactly how the systems networks of the Gaian 
organism are not attuned to caring about human aspirations and endeavours. If 
humanity hurts and hinders Gaian processes, it will not necessarily be Gaia that suffers 
but humanity since Gaia may readjust its systems to exclude humans by altering the 
precise ambient conditions of its physical environment.
Because Gaia is philosophically (and historically) linked with systems science and 
superorganicism it suffers from much of the same scientific problems that these 
philosophies suffer from. For instance; just as it is difficult to confirm the stability of 
an ecosystem merely because it is in energetic and material equilibrium so it is difficult 
to confirm the stability of the whole planet on the same basis. Likewise the negative 
feedback patterns observable to some extent in local ecosystems might be observable 
in a global Gaian system but in both cases such feedback may only be associated with 
some minor characteristic of interest. Also, as Brennan (1988:131) points out, such 
global feedback patterns may exist but this does not mean they are “of necessity 
complex and densely interrelated”.
As well as suffering from familiar scientific problems, Gaia theory also suffers 
from the same philosophical/ethical problems that systems ecology suffers from. Gaia 
functionalises, de-personalises and de-ecologises the natural entities of the world, 
converting them into typological black boxes that serve as mere conduits of energy 
and matter.
The intellectual linkage between Gaianism and the systems thinking of ecosystem 
ecology and systems ecology can be quickly summed up by examining the following 
sentence written by Lovelock (1988:11): “[bjecause Gaia was seen from outside as a 
physiological system, I have called the science of Gaia geophysiology” . Just as
25See, for example, claims of non-anthropocentrism for Gaia in Lovelock (1979), Lovelock (1988), Allaby (1989), 
Joseph (1990), Lovelock (1991).
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Clements saw prairie communities as organismal physiological systems and just as the 
systems ecologists utilised physiological analogies to describe their ecosystems, so, 
too, does Lovelock rely on physiology to define the subject of his study; the Earth. 
The exact analogies are sometimes slippery, Gaia may be compared to the physiology 
of a cell (e.g.: Lovelock, 1987), of an organism (e.g.: Lovelock, 1979, Volk, 199826) 
or of a whole ecosystem (e.g.: Lovelock, 199127; Goldsmith, 1993), but the primacy 
of looking at the Earth as a physiological system remains. It is relatively unimportant 
(for both Gaian advocates and Gaian detractors) as to what metaphor is used to 
explain the functioning of Gaia since, to Gaians, all these biological entities function in 
the same way: as systems. Lovelock, like other Gaians, happily dives in between the 
specific analogies when it suits him. He makes this explicit when he graphically 
correlates the physiology of a cell with an organism and with an ecosystem and with 
the biosphere (see Myers, 1985, Lovelock, 1991).
This emphasis on global, whole Earth physiology has, as we have just seen, led 
Lovelock to label his peculiar brand of science ‘geophysiology7. By assigning his 
theory to this new science (and indeed, by assigning Gaia as the fiagbearer of this new 
science), Lovelock then proceeds to offer himself up as a ‘planetary physician7 
involved in the diagnosis and cure of the Earth’s maladies (see Lovelock, 1991:9).
GAIA AND ECOLOGICAL FUNCTIONALISM
As with the functionalism of systems ecology so, too, the functionalism of Gaian 
ecology declares that the whole is of more importance that the parts. In the case of 
Gaia, the whole equals the planet: “Gaia theory forces a planetary perspective. It is 
the health of the planet that matters, not that of some individual species of organisms
26Volk’s analogy of the Gaian organism as being like a human body proceeds like this:
“just as the organs occupy unique locations within us, so the biomes [which Volk holds to be 
the largest-scale ecosystems! spread across the planet in distinct biogeographical provinces, 
tropical rainforests, savannas, deserts, temperate grasslands, temperate forests, boreal forests, 
tundra. This dissection of Gaia into parts has immediate appeal because the viscera ot Gaia would 
then be visual biological regions.” (Volk, 1998:95).
27Lovelock describes G aia as a “Planetary Ecosystem ”, on page 6 o f Lovelock (1991).
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(Lovelock, 1988:xvii).
The importance of the parts is a derivative of their role in contributing to the 
whole, and not all parts are of equal value in Lovelock’s Gaia. Some parts of the 
geophysiology of Gaia are declared by Lovelock as essential and some are considered 
expendable:
Gaia has vital organs at the core, as well as expendable or redundant ones in the 
periphery. What we may do to the planet may depend greatly on where we do it 
(Lovelock, 1987:127).
Through this differentiation of importance, some species and ecosystems are 
devalued because they do not significantly contribute to the matter and energy flows 
that make up the Gaian physiological system. For instance, while coastal wetlands and 
tropical forests are identified by Lovelock as being essential to the cycling of matter 
and energy in Gaia’s geophysiology, many other types of ecosystems, for instance; 
Arctic tundra and benthic ecosystems, are but functionless superfluities which may be 
lost without consequence to the Gaian superorganism. This sort of differential value 
judging of the Earth’s ecosystems pervades Lovelock’s work. For instance he also 
says:
dense perturbation in the northern temperate regions may be less a perturbation than in 
the humid tropics. (Lovelock, 1988:179).
The functionalism inherent within Gaia leads Lovelock to rather startling 
conclusions with regard to the destruction of species and of large stretches of the 
Earth’s environment. Gaian ecology suggests, for example, that in the event of 
massive changes in the taxonomic composition of the Earth’s biota, the identity of 
Gaia remains unchanged because the mechanisms involved in the geophysiological 
processes of Gaia (i.e. matter and energy cycling) remain in place. The extinctions of 
the Cambrian and during the ice ages could not have impacted upon Gaia s identity, it 
is said by Lovelock, since: “[a]n ice age doesn’t really seriously affect the whole Earth 
as a living system” (Lovelock, 1994:357) because the matter and energy cycles 
recover quickly in the long term scheme of things to become stable again.
This sort of long-termism and predilection towards grand scales is also present in 
Lewin’s recent defence of the importance of the superorganism concept. He states.
|i]n the history of the Earth since complex forms of life evolved 500 million years ago 
the biota has collapsed five times in mass extinctions involving the loss oi at least
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50 per cent of species and sometimes as much as 95 percent. After each extinction the 
biota bounced back in diversity with different players on the stage, but with the pattern 
ot interaction— the pattern oi niches— remaining the same. Reptiles were the major 
carnivores before the extinction at the end of the cretaceous 65 million years ago, and 
mammals filled that role afterward for instance. (Lewin, 1996:33).
The extinctions Lewin talks about could possibly be interpreted as manifesting 
difference (since wholly different types of organisms are given rise to) but they are 
not. They are interpreted—via roles and functions—as constituting sameness and 
changelessness.
This emphasis on roles and functions rather than those entities that perform them 
is a potentially morally-questionable one. If all things are converted to roles, the 
concept of role performance becomes more important than the actual individuals and 
species who supposedly perform them. Apart from being ethically dubious—since 
individuals become entirely associated with their roles and nothing else—this is also 
ecologically dubious. Individual organisms inordinately drift away from their 
supposed ecological roles as it best suits them. Brennan (1988:191) alludes to this 
phenomenon in his statement about how:
many organisms are ecological opportunists, exploiting what resources they can and 
switching their feeding preferences according to the resources available and the 
competition they face.
The expression of the essential ecological role of species and organisms is most 
manifest in the ecological concept of the ‘niche’; a term that is often translated so as 
to mean the ecological profession or job of an individual species or organism. This 
concept of ‘niche’, however, may be a tyrannous one since when using it, the 
ecological reality and environmental identity of a species or organism is directly 
correlated to its niche. If environmental values are drawn from this, it will lead to a 
presumption of superior value in niche fulfilment rather than the intrinsic value of the 
species/organism itself'.
Lovelock both tends towards and extends the tyranny ot the niche by applying 
niche roles not just to organisms and species but to entire ecosystems and biomes. 
Thus a tropical rainforest is worthy of preservation, according to Lovelock, not 
because it is intrinsically valuable or because it houses intrinsically valuable species 
and individuals but because it is functionally important to Gaia:
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we are failing to recognise the true value of the forest, as a self-regulating system that 
keeps the climate of the region comfortable for life. (Lovelock, 1991:16).
For many environmentalists the functionalism of Gaia is a perceived source of 
strength for the politics and philosophy of environmentalism since one cannot go 
about hurting ecosystems haphazardly since the whole biosphere might collapse into 
an undesirable state. However, there is a difference between Gaia’s brand of 
functionalism, with its differential ascription of what is ecologically useful and 
un-usefiil, and the ecological lunctionalism of someone like Rachel Carson who in the 
early 1960s promoted a different brand (see Carson, 1962). Firstly Carson was 
concentrating on the ecosystemic level of nature and nothing so grand as the whole 
planet; and secondly her work suggested that all organisms and communities were 
essential. Unlike Lovelock’s Gaianism, this meant humanity had to protect all types of 
ecosystems and all species rather than those deemed by humans to be of essential 
function. What’s more, in Rachel Carson’s functionalist ideas we did not know what 
the consequences of decimating ecosystems and species would be. Science could not 
judge, for example, what may happen if tropical rainforests were cut down.
Compared to Carson’s ideas, Lovelock is much more omniscient. Not only does 
he know the processes that go on but he can actively identify those that are 
redundant. Whereas Carson would have said ‘don’t chop down the tropical rainforests 
and don’t destroy the benthic ecosystems of the world because we don’t know what 
the ramifications for the rest of the world will be’, Lovelock would say ‘don’t chop 
down the tropical rainforests because that will upset the air conditioning balance of 
the world but trawl and despoil benthic ecosystems all you like because they don’t do 
anything important’. No new scientific evidence has been found since Carson’s time 
for Lovelock to arrive at his conclusions; the difference is merely one of philosophical 
perspective. Lovelock is prepared to declare that weird things happen but science can 
sort them out, whereas Carson declares weird things happen but science cannot 
follow them and cannot sort them out.
When it comes to addressing those people within ecology who believe that the 
world is not nearly as stable and continuous over space and time as his Gaia theory 
suggests, Lovelock brings in some telling analogies. Theoretical ecology, Lovelock 
says:
is more concerned with sick than healthy ecosystems. The vagaries of weather are more
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interesting than the long-term stability of climate. (Lovelock, 1988:219).
Here the philosophical equivalence between balance and health, and change and 
sickness come through. Ecosystems that change are sick according to Lovelock; sick, 
abnormal, and not worthy ot generalising from. In this way Lovelock castigates those 
things which are inherently changeable as of peripheral concern; as atypical; even ill. 
What this means from an environmental philosophical point of view is that what we 
should be protecting and striving tor are ecological settings that remain the same. 
There is a certain way that things behave; a normal ‘stable7 way, and any deviation 
from this is abnormal. This also applies in the case of some mainstream environmental 
philosophy. For instance, going back to Westra’s concept of integrity: if “integrity 
conveys the idea of wholeness and of unbroken functioning” (Westra, 1994:xi), then, 
according to Westra7 s philosophy, disintegration conveys the idea of dysfunction and 
separation. Here we come to see a particular intellectual fixation of unitarianism 
emerging. If things are not unified they are broken, disintegrated and probably sick.
GAIA AND PHYSICAL REDUCTIONISM
Lovelock and Margulis7 scientific conception of Gaia theory runs like this;
The Gaia hypothesis states that the surface temperature, composition of the reactive 
gases, oxidation state, alkalinity-acidity on today’s Earth are kept homeorrhetically 
at values set by the sum of the activities of the current biota. (Margulis and Sagan, 
1992:1).
It might be asked how come Lovelock and Margulis find it so easy to jump from 
the self-regulation of the world’s chemistry to thinking of the world as a living 
organism? It seems somewhat of a long bow to draw to claim that the biotic control 
of the Earth’s ocean and atmospheric chemistry leads to a conclusion that the Earth is 
a living organism. Not for, Lovelock and other Gaians, however. For them it is easy, 
since, from the start, their view of the Earth’s biota, and of living things, is a 
physico-chemical one. Life is directly equated with physico-chemical homeostasis so 
that anything displaying physico-chemical homeostasis is alive. That Lovelock, and 
other Gaians, are conducting a physico-chemical interpretation ot life is exemplified in 
Tyler Volk’s book about Gaia when he declares that the prime directives ot the Gaia
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theory are: 1) “Attend to the cycles of matter”, and 2) “Attend to the cycles of causes 
(of the cycles of matter)” (Volk, 1998:23).
Under Gaia theory, the individuals, species and ecological communities first of all 
exist as physical entities whose existence is defined by their chemical consumptions 
and productions. This is to say that a plant, to Lovelock and Volk, is mainly a 
photosynthesis factory; a collection of mitochondria and chloroplasts that fix carbon 
dioxide and release oxygen. Like systems ecology, Gaia theory claims to be holistic. 
But by reducing life to physical essences it really is reductionist.
If the Earth emerges, through Lovelock and Volk, as a global unity whose parts 
are united by the passing of matter and energy between them then it seems as though 
a person is at one with nature not because he or she may care for it but because they 
transfer matter and energy with it; i.e.: because they eat it and it eats them. As in 
systems ecology, production and consumption of food is given over as the basic 
interactions of nature. This, in itself, contributes to the tyranny of the niche spoken 
about above since species are categorised as being in a particular niche according to 
the food they eat. Brennan, in contrast, however, comments that:
if things were entirely what they ate, then the story about the natures of things would be 
less complicated than it is. (Brennan, 1988:191).
This objection by Brennan is not the only philosophical objection that can be 
made towards the production and consumption fetish of Gaia theory. At the global 
scale, according to Gaianism, it seems as though the Earth’s various production and 
consumption components may rightly be visualised as unified masses. For instance, 
whereas systems ecology converts all plants into singular producers, Gaia theory 
would go further and present all the world’s plants as part of the “Global Green 
Photon Harvester” (Volk, 1998:127). Such metaphorical choices further drive 
Gaianism towards fascist inclinations since the unique behaviour and values of 
individual plants are glossed over as they merge together to become faceless 
functional components in the great Gaian entity.
GAIA AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
One might believe that the anti-individualistic philosophical tendencies within
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Gaianism are hardly about to afreet concrete environmental situations but this may be 
a forlorn wish. For one thing, it is clear that Lovelock thinks Gaia can just about take 
care of herself and that many environmental programs are in error because they do not 
take this into account. Gaia’s ability to regulate itself via intricate feedback 
mechanisms means, says Lovelock, that the Earth’s biota is never fully in danger.
True, human activities might produce feedbacks within the global system that produce 
a world unpalatable to human concerns but life on Earth as a whole will never be 
destroyed says Lovelock28.
At pains to expose what he thinks is an environmental myth, Lovelock presses 
forward the view that he in no way considers life to be vulnerable or fragile. To do 
this Lovelock first converts ‘life’ (which we may signify with a small T’) into the 
concept of ‘Life’ (which we may signify with a with a big ‘L’). Whereas life is open to 
all sorts of meanings and interpretations Lovelock’s Life is always a total view of life, 
Life on the Earth as a whole. In this regard Lovelock believes that Life (life on the
Earth as a whole) is hardly vulnerable.
However, it need not be accepted-even within Lovelock’s own 
philosophical appraisal— that Life is not vulnerable. Since (according to Lovelock)
Life must in some way adjust conditions of the planet for itself to exist, Life must in 
some associated way be considered fastidious (only existing within particular 
parameters; albeit parameters that it can control to some degree). If Life is fastidious 
then it must be vulnerable to conditions not naturally existing without the presence of 
Life and Lite’s homeostatic activities. It might as well be argued that Life could be 
considered less vulnerable if it just put up with these naturally 
biologically-independent conditions and adapted to them, coping with whatever 
physical environmental conditions that are thrown at it.
Regardless of whether the above point is valid or not, if life, or more accurately, 
Life, is not vulnerable or fragile, as Gaianism suggests, then it makes the protestations 
of environmentalists seem a little strange. Life cannot be destroyed or harmed so what 
is the use of worrying about those things that seem to destroy or harm it? Lovelock 
has always announced that he considers environmentalists to be a little skewed when
28See Lovelock (1979), Lovelock (1988), Lovelock (1991).
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voicing their worries since it is hardly Life that suffers from environmental problems, 
only humans. In fact
James Lovelock has suggested that the Green movement with its opposition to all 
industry and its contempt for science and technology, has been a potent force 
preventing the requisite environmental reform. (Gare, 1995:100).
This last statement shows up a key political strand of thought within Lovelock’s 
environmental credentials. Firstly; he accepts a brand of environmentalism that most 
environmentalists would call ‘technocentrism’. Pepper (1984:241) defines 
technocentrism as a type of environmental thought:
which recognises environmental ‘problems’ but believes either unrestrainedly that 
man will always solve them and achieve unlimited growth...or, more cautiously, that by 
careful economic and environmental management they can be negotiated...In either 
case considerable faith is placed in the ability and usefulness of classical science, 
technology, conventional economic reasoning (e.g. cost-benefit analysis), and their 
practitioners.
Thus, for Lovelock, scientific know-how and technological growth can be an 
intimate part of understanding and protecting Gaia. In tact in The Ages o f Gaia and 
Healing Gaia he actively encourages industrial growth since it provides the 
intellectual and economic impetus to solve environmental problems. This would stand 
in sharp contrast to many environmentalists who see both science and technology and 
unrestrained economic growth as major contributory factors in the environmental 
crisis29.
Lovelock is also negatively predisposed to the social relevance of environmental 
ills. This is evident, for instance, when Joseph recounts an anecdote that he gained 
from Lovelock himself. Conversing at a dinner table at an international development 
and environment meeting we find both Lovelock and Mother Theresa. According to 
Joseph (1990:245) this is the essence of the conversation:
Their differences were clear. Essentially, Lovelock’s message was: take care of the 
Earth and humanity’s problems will start to take care of themselves . Mother Theresa 
expressed just the opposite: ‘take care of the people, and the Earth s problems will come 
round’.
Lovelock’s asocial approach to environmental problems is characterised most
29For instance see Porritt (1984), Pepper (1984), Devall and Sessions (1985).
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saliently with regard to population issues where he chooses to describe human 
population increase as a ‘serious planetary malady’ (Lovelock, 1991). If there was 
one environmental policy that Lovelock would like to prescribe for the world if he 
had the power it would be population control. Befitting someone who confides in 
nature’s way of doing things Lovelock gains his knowledge of population issues not 
from the social sciences but from the natural and mathematical sciences as he goes 
ahead to compare human population growth with lilies in a lily pond:
To understand what exponential growth is really like, imagine a lily pond on whose 
surface a water lily is growing and spreading so as to double its leaf area daily. It has 
taken the lily 19 days to cover half of the pond’s surface with its leaves. How long 
will it be before the leaf area doubles again so that the pond is entirely covered? Does 
the answer come instantly to mind? Not another 19 days, but one day” (Lovelock, 
1991:155).
Lovelock then goes on to assert that “[w]e humans must be close to that 19 day 
period of lily growth” (Lovelock, 1991:155).
It might be contended, however, that unlike lily ponds, humans tend to reproduce 
more when resources are low since there is a lack ot reproductive freedom and a lack 
of contraception available to those who tend to reproduce the most (poor rural 
women of the developing world) and also because high reproductive rates are the only 
way of insuring that the parents are provided with welfare in old age. Social relations 
that lead to these circumstances are hardly to do with the mathematics and biology ot 
lilies and their ponds. They are more to do with resource maldistribution amongst men 
and women, urban and rural areas, rich and poor and First and Third World nations .
Lovelock’s naturalisation of the problem ot over-population avoids the social 
background that leads to over-population. This, in effect, would seem to encourage 
the population problem about which Lovelock warns since it deflects any 
understanding of how we should solve the problem away from the social 
circumstances that must be sorted out in order for the problem to be addressed 
properly.
Where Lovelock envisions the population problem to be at its worse is also very 
telling. For Lovelock, the worst concentrations of the population problem are in the
30See Cromartie, ed., (1995), D um ing et a l (1997), Holm, ed., (1995).
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tropics; in those nations that are home to the tropical rainforests which Lovelock 
holds to be the ‘air-conditioning units of Gaia’. Temperate areas, being not so 
essential for the Gaian whole, are not so impacted by high population numbers:
“dense population in the northern temperate regions may be less a perturbation than in 
the humid tropics” (Lovelock, 1988 :179). If one wants to be cynical about this 
approach one could point out that Lovelock seems to want to kill oft' the poor 
coloured people of the world in order to save it for a few wealthy white people. 
Lovelock dose not say this, of course, but the intimations are there in Healing Gaia 
and the The Ages o f Gaia that population control can be distributed with differing 
intensities in different regions. This varying distribution of population control might 
easily be convertible into unjust population plans by future Gaian practitioners.
The depth of Lovelock’s anti-population feelings are revealed when he says: 
“[t]he statement ‘There is no pollution but people’ carries an awful truth” (Lovelock, 
1991:155). He goes on to say:
None of the environmental agonies now confronting us--the destruction of the 
tropical forests; the degradation of land and seas; the looming threat of global 
warming; ozone depletion and acid rain—would be a perceptible problem at a global 
population of 50 millions. (Lovelock, 1991:155).
A less technocentric environmentalist might indicate that at any population 
human technology and industrialism would reek havoc upon the world’s environment. 
This would mean that if humanity somehow did manage to decrease the population of 
itself* down to the fifty millions, consumerism and technology and industrialism would 
just expand so as to eff ect the damage that was previously wrought by six billion 
people.
Another aspect of environmental policy that emerges from Gaia and in particular 
from Lovelock is what most environmentalists would call its ‘softly, softly approach 
to pollution. For Lovelock, the ‘poison is the dose’ (Lovelock, 1991:10). What he 
means to indicate by referring to this notion is that industrial pollution is only bad 
when there is too much of it. This seems to be reasonable enough but if we take his 
definition of ‘too much’ we find that it revolves around the protection of Gaia s 
energy and matter cycles which are very easy to protect, Lovelock alludes, even if 
high technology, industrialism and pollution is rampant in the world. Thus Lovelock 
finds it easy to support uranium mining, nuclear power use, and various forms of
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techno-industrial growth because they hardly, according to him, afreet Gaia’s ability 
to operate her self-regulating feedback mechanisms.
If we base the definition of ‘too much’ on less abstract notions than Life, Gaia or 
the Global System we find that Lovelock’s acceptable doses are much higher than 
those acceptable by local ecological communities. It is of no consequence for Gaia 
(and Lovelock) if a nuclear meltdown occurs in the Ukraine or if an oil spill occurs on 
the Alaskan coast since, although the local environment is destroyed, the environment 
as a global whole carries on in the form of the abstract Gaia. Similarly the lives that 
are destroyed in these disasters carry on in the form of Lovelock’s abstract notion of 
Life. (Lovelock would also state that the oil and nuclear fuel industries that may have 
initiated these local disasters actually operate in the long run to save the environment 
by providing economic growth and thus stimulus for technolgical innovation and 
scientific know-how which could be used to fight further environmental problems).
All this said, many might still argue that Gaia has at least enabled us to see the 
interconnections between concrete living systems. However, there was a long enough 
tradition in ecology for this to be the case without Gaia being around31. Another 
related argument would point out that Gaia theory, as a philosophy, makes us aware 
and conscious of vital processes that must be protected. But as Andrew Brennan 
points out:
We do not need to imagine Gaia to be a unified superorgamsm to appreciate the 
importance of regulating the salinity of the sea, the oxygen content of the atmosphere, 
the volume of the ozone layer and so on (Brennan, 1988:131).
THE SELLING OF GAIA AS SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY
That the Earth has planetary-wide physical and geo-chemical cycles is, of course, 
an old idea. Alfred Lotka in the early decades of the Twentieth Century, for instance, 
viewed the Earth as a single system linked by exchanges of chemical elements and 
driven by solar energy. (Golley, 1993:58).
Hagen also finds that:
31 As has been explored in Chapter Two.
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|tjhe idea that the chemistry of aquatic ecosystems is regulated by organic activities 
had also been briefly discussed by the biological oceanographer All'ner Redfield 
during the late 1950s. (Hagen, 1992:191)
Lovelock, himself, also delights in drawing attention to James Hutton's 
superficial ruminations of the Earth as a living being. This Lovelock does to present 
himself as amongst distinguished scientific company (see Lovelock, 1991:27).
If there are all these progenitors to Gaia why did they not attach metaphysical 
importance to it like Lovelock? In short, they did. Hutton fitted his geo-organism in 
with the metaphysics of the geological uniformitarianism of the day32. Lotka fitted his 
physically-unified Earth within the quantitative predilections of his tradition of 
quantitative biology33. Lovelock, likewise, was operating within the metaphysics of 
mid to late Twentieth Century systems theory but he was able to jump on the political 
acceptability associated with the currently fashionable penchant towards holistic 
ecology in order to sell his theory both within science and outside of it.
We may still ask, however, why Gaia has become so popular as a philosophy in 
public circles and not, say, Clements’ superorganism. Apart from Lovelock’s obvious 
predilection toward popularising his ideas34 we might indicate here a preoccupation in 
the late Twentieth Century public for ‘worldism’. The icon that most 
environmentalists often refer to and revere is not the forest, the lake or the mountain 
but the Earth as a whole. This reverence is best encapsulated within the iconographic 
photographs of the planet Earth as taken from space. This abstract image acts as an 
all-encompassing symbol of the environmental movement. It not only symbolises the 
fragility and loneliness of the Earth but it also symbolises everything which is at stake 
since the Earth contains everything. The Earth image thus reflects a holistic mindset 
which must be tended to in order for the Earth to be preserved. The Earth image 
becomes the ultimate embodiment of holist thought since it is the greatest holistic 
perspective that can be taken when dealing with environmental issues. This is where 
Gaia may gain a lot of its selling power.
32See Gould (1988).
33See Kingsland (1985) and Kingsland (1994).
34To date Lovelock has released three books and more than thirty articles publicising his theory for wide 
audiences. This is, incidently, far more than the amount of scientific peer-reviewed articles that Lovelock has had 
published on Gaia.
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That such mixtures o f philosophy and science pervade the critique of Gaia should 
not be too much of a surprise since Lovelock, Margulis and other scientific Gaians are 
themselves involved in selling Gaia not just through science but through philosophical 
premises as well. What could be more imbued with natural philosophical meaning, for 
example, than the following passages:
We inhabit a global metabolism with a four-billion year pedigree. In just the past tew 
decades, we have awakened to an awareness of damage we ourselves are inflicting on 
this metabolism with our blind urges to procreate and appropriate. Perhaps in the 
fantasies of many, the "taxi outta here’ would be a time machine. Just tell the time-taxi 
to stop at nature a thousand or more years ago. But because most of us would want to 
keep the postal service, the Internet, MR1 scans, and an abundance of items in stock 
at the local supermarket, we must proceed with the world as it is, and that requires 
knowing how the foundational processes of nature work. 1 am convinced that such 
knowledge, if widely held, will contribute to shaping the future of Gaia-a future in 
which we, as a new biochemical guild, will necessarily be integrated into the global 
metabolism, for better or for worse. (Volk, 1998:xiii-xiv).
The essence of living green, of being a citizen of Gaia, is not fretful puritanism. If we 
can think of ourselves as part of a giant living organism and perhaps even a cause of its 
indigestion, then we may be guided to live within Gaia in a way that is seemly and 
healthy. Even thinking this way is an antidote to the fatalism of accepting the Earth as 
dead with life as just a passenger. (Lovelock, 1991:20).
While employing natural philosophy to sell the Gaia theory, Lovelock, Margulis, 
Volk and the other scientific Gaians go to great lengths to spell out that their theory is 
a theory embedded in science. For example Lovelock (1991:6) declares that Gaia is 
not just a metaphor but is hard-core science: “I insist that Gaia theory itselt is proper 
science”. If Gaia is a natural philosophy or a metaphysical viewpoint it is one that is, 
according to Lovelock, Margulis and Volk, intensely devoted to scientific ideals. 
Those that adopt the natural philosophy of Gaia without its science have been known 
to offend the scientific Gaians. This is most evident when Lovelock and Margulis 
Gaia is usurped by the philosophy of certain environmental and spiritual movements. 
This is where Gaia and the environmental movement...part company. (Lovelock, 
1988:xvii).
The religious overtones of Gaia make me sick. (Margulis quoted in Joseph, 1990.70).
74
Neither Lovelock nor Margulis indicate to which facets of the environmental 
movement and Gaian spiritualism they direct these comments, but the 
characterisations that Lovelock has expressed about ‘Environmentalists’ as a group 
(including those within Lovelock, 1987 and Lovelock, 1991, discussed earlier) 
indicate that, to him, environmentalists are anti-science, anti-technology and 
anti-industry; all philosophical stances to which Lovelock just cannot abide.
This enthusiasm for their own philosophising and intolerance of philosophising 
that they do not like has been a characteristic of Lovelock and Margulis as they 
continue to sell Gaia. We also find that when the Gaia theory is criticised from a 
scientific viewpoint, Lovelock and Margulis often resort to philosophical premises to 
gain ground and when they are attacked from a philosophical point of view they 
retreat to the authority of science in order to bolster their defences from within its 
walls. For instance, when certain ethical implications of the Gaia theory, not unlike 
those that you are now reading, were presented to Margulis in Marshall (1997), 
Margulis indicated in her referee review that the paper was not at all scientific and so 
by connotation not worth publishing. This is despite Margulis’ own predilections 
towards publishing metaphysically-involved works (see, for example, Margulis and 
Sagan, 1995). Lovelock and Margulis claim to have been subjected to virulent and 
unwarranted intellectual attack and abuse from orthodox science as they sought to 
disseminate their ideas on Gaia (see Lovelock, 1991:6-7) but they are equally 
vindictive o f alternative ideas that express unorthodox readings of the Gaia theory.
What can be observed to be happening in all this discursive articulation between 
natural philosophy and science is the constant self-positioning of Gaian scientists 
within the higher bastions o f human knowledge. Both Lovelock and Margulis are 
aware o f the great prestige and status of science and both are aware that they have to 
operate within it when making generalisations of the nature of the planet. They are 
also patently aware, however, that Gaia is being heavily criticised from within science 
and they have adopted a number o f strategies to deal with this. Firstly, they may try 
and enter into a ‘scientific’ debate with the critique. But they only do this it they 
consider the critique worthy enough to rebuke. Or, perhaps more accurately, they 
only do thus when the criticism can be rebuked within the scientific background 
presupposed by Gaia theory (for instance, Lovelock’s creation of the Daisy World
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model35 arose out of his acceptance of the anti-teleological arguments of some Gaians 
critics).
Secondly, they may revise their science in ditferent philosophical terms so as to 
get their message across in a different way (for example, Lovelock defends his ideas 
that the Earth is alive by variously referring to living trees36, self-regulating machines37 
and cybernetic processes38). This second strategy might be thought of as a main 
conduit by which natural philosophy enters Gaian discourse.
However, there is another strategy that Lovelock and Margulis take in the face of 
scientific criticism. They may claim that such criticism is, itself, unscientific. For 
instance when addressing the criticism that Gaia theory is unscientific Lovelock claims 
that those who level such criticisms are themselves unscientific. This is evident in the 
following paragraph:
creative science is the province of working scientists, and tew of these are found 
among our critics. Those who condemn Gaia as unscientific are, for the most part, 
science writers and professional science critics. Creative suggest 
experiments. This is something that science writers and critics rarely wish to 
know, tor it would make the telling of the stories so much more difficult. (Lovelock, 1991:7). 
Here Lovelock makes the declaration that if you claim Gaia as unscientific you, 
yourself* are not scientific and so, conversely, he is making the claim that the only 
scientific approach to take is to believe in Gaia.
35The Daisy World model served as an answer to the scientific criticism that came from Richard Dawkins and W. 
Ford Doolittle who criticised the Gaia theory on the grounds “that there is no way that diverse living organisms of 
the Earth could act in symbiosis...to regulate the planetary environment” (Lovelock (1991:62). Lovelock s Daisy 
World model answered such criticism by stating:
“Welcome to planet Daisyworld: a computer model planet like the earth, orbiting a star like the sun, 
but on which the only species are light and dark daisies, in the distant past, when the star was less 
luminous, only the equatorial region would have been warm enough to permit the growth of 
daisies and the dark daisies would have flourished, because they absorb more warmth from the 
sunlight, and by absorbing heat began to warm the environment. However, as the star s luminosity 
increased the lighter daisies would have been favoured instead, due to their natural ability to keep 
themselves land the planet] cool by reflecting sunlight.” (Lovelock, 1991:67).
36See Lovelock (1991:31)
37See Lovelock (1991:60)
38Like that of animal homeostasis or automatic piloting (see Lovelock, 1991:88)
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GAIA AND NON-ANTHROPOCENTRISM
James Lovelock makes much of the non-anthropocentric focus of Gaianism. He 
states that Gaia is not a human-centred environmental view because it cares more 
about the health of the Earth than it does about the health of people and in doing this 
it differs radically from most conventional environmentalisms. For instance in Healing 
Gaia he states:
Environmentalists, churches, politicians, and science, all are concerned about the 
damage to the environment. But their concern is for the good of humankind. So deep is 
this introspection that even now few apart from eccentrics really care about other 
living organisms. The oft-stated objection to the rape of the forests is that they might 
include within them some rare plant that bears the cure for cancer, or that the trees fix 
carbon dioxide, so that if they are cut down we may no longer enjoy our privilege of 
private transport. (Lovelock, 1991:16).
He repeats himself'on page 158 when he states:
Scientists and campaigners in the First World and in the tropics still try to plead for 
the preservation of these forests on the feeble and human-centred grounds that they are 
home to rare species of animals and plants, and especially to plants containing drugs 
that could cure cancer and other frightening human diseases. (Lovelock, 1991:158).
This is a line he peddles in all of his three major Gaia books; from Gaia:A New 
Look o f Life on Earth, through The Ages o f Gaia, to Healing Gaia. One notable 
thing about these statements is the profound ignorance Lovelock seems to exhibit 
with regards to the non-anthropocentric nature of most contemporary streams of 
environmentalism. Deep Ecology, Third World Ecology, Ecofeminism, Ecosocialism, 
Bioregionalism and Social Ecology (let alone those environmentalists involved in the 
scholarly fields of environmental ethics and environmental philosophy) have all 
entered into a debate with anthropocentrism which is considerably more sophisticated 
than the ‘preserve nature for humans’ line that Lovelock thinks environmentalists 
uniformly adopt39. In just about any type of recent (i.e. post-1975) environmentalist 
book this ‘preserve nature for humans’ anthropocentrism has been thoroughly 
questioned if* not rejected and the protection of non-human species and non-human
39See, for instance, Devall and Sessions (1985), Brennan (1988), Callicot (1989), Naess (1989), Bookchin (1990), 
Armstrong and Botzler, eds, (1993, Westra (1994), Zimmerman (1994), Brennan, ed, (1995), Elliot, ed (1995).
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environments is now commonly advocated upon the intrinsic value of these species 
and environments.
What can be demonstrated also is that Lovelock, himself —despite warning 
against human-centeredness and accusing environmentalists of it—surely does not 
adhere to the anti-anthropocentric ideas that he suggests his readers might support. 
This can be starkly demonstrated by quoting the sentences made by Lovelock that 
appear in Healing Gaia immediately after the passages quoted above:
... other frightening diseases. They may be so but they offer so much more than this. 
Through their capacity to evaporate vast volumes of water vapour the forests serve to 
keep their regions cool and moist, by wearing a white sunshade of reflecting clouds and 
bringing rain that sustains them. More even than this, the great forests of the tropics are 
part of the cooling and air-conditioning system of the whole earth. (Lovelock,
1991:158).
..our privilege of private transport. None of this is bad only stupid, We are tailing to 
recognise the true value of the forest, as a self-regulating system that keeps the climate 
of the region suitable for life. (Lovelock, 1991:16).
Here we see Lovelock is just as unable to recognise the intrinsic value of the 
animals and plants of the forests as the human-centred environmentalists he refers to, 
and he can only value them from a perspective of functionalism.
As well as accusing most environmentalists of an anthropocentrism they do not 
have, Lovelock extols the Gaia theory as the very epitome ot non-anthropocentrism 
for it is not the concern of Gaia to worry about humans. However, the crucial point 
here is that Lovelock does not need to extol the value of protecting the Earth for 
humans since his Gaia theory does that already. Gaia possesses an implicit kind of 
anthropocentrism that naturalises Lovelock’s own personal political attitudes towards 
population growth, economic growth and high-technology within the form ot Gaia. 
You do not need to promote an anthropocentric value system it your Goddess so 
willingly operates her laws to look after human interests. Gaia theory thus possesses a 
hidden type of anthropocentrism, an anthropocentrism that operates under the guise 
of Gaia but actually is just an incarnation of Lovelock’s interests and philosophies.
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THE REPRODUCTION OF GAIA: LOVELOCK’S TECHNOCENTRIC. 
IMPERIALIST ORGANISM
According to Lynn Margulis, Dorian Sagan and Gregory Hinkle, the Gaia 
concept emerged from James Lovelock’s fertile imagination and the United States 
space program (Sagan and Margulis, 1988; Margulis and Hinkle, 1991). There is 
certainly a strong connection between space exploration and Gaia. Some of the most 
prominent Gaians are interested in spaceflight. For instance; James Lovelock has been 
involved in the planetary program of NASA and has written a book about colonising 
Mars40, Lynn Margulis is involved in NASA’s Planetary Biology program and has also 
written about colonising Mars (Margulis and Sagan 1992), Margulis’ son, Dorian 
Sagan (also son of the late astronomer Carl Sagan) has also been known to write 
about space expansion (Sagan and Margulis, 1988; Margulis and Sagan, 1992), while 
Lewis Thomas, Freeman Dyson and Tyler Volk have also written popular articles or 
books about both Gaia and spaceflight. Thomas has been involved in NASA’s 
Planetary Biology program while Dyson is well-known for his sometimes grandiose 
space plans, while Volk has been involved in research about expanding terrestrial 
ecosystems into space. It might also be noted that Rusty Schwieckert, an Apollo 
astronaut has also found Gaia Theory of significant importance in his philosophical 
writings about spaceflight (Schwieckart, 1987).
For Lovelock specifically, the connection between spaceflight and Gaia theory is 
very strong since he acknowledges it as a prime factor in the theory’s origin:
For me, the personal revelation of Gaia came quite suddenly-like a flash of 
enlightenment. 1 was in a small room on top ot a building at [NASA sj Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory in Pasadena, California. It was the Autumn of 1965, the room was an office 
of the Biosciences Division, and 1 was talking with a colleague, Dian Hitchcock, about 
a paper we were preparing on a method for remote detection of life on a planet.
(Lovelock, 1991:21).
The planet about which Lovelock speaks is Mars and he goes on to explain that
40See Lovelock and Allaby (1985).
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when he w'as working for NASA to investigate the possibility of life on Mars it 
suddenly dawned on him and his colleague that life on a planet could be detected 
remotely just by analysing the atmospheric composition from alar since an atmosphere 
created by a living planet would differ from the atmosphere of a dead planet Thus if 
Mars was living it would have an atmosphere somewhat similar to the Earth’s:
Now the air of a dead planet would be expected to have a composition close to what is 
called the chemical equilibrium state. That is to say, all possible chemical reactions 
among the gases would have taken place and the atmosphere would be like the 
exhaust gas from escaping from a car or a factory chimney; a mixture from which no 
more energy could be extracted. A planet that bore life would have a very different 
atmosphere because living organisms are obliged to use the air as a source or raw 
materials and as a depository for their waste products. Both of these uses would 
change the atmosphere away from the chemical equilibrium state, if the observed 
degree of disequilibrium among the gases of a planetary atmosphere was great, it 
would suggest the presence of life. (Lovelock, 1991:21).
In this regard Lovelock believed that the Martian atmosphere was in a state of 
chemical equilibrium^, and so Mars was, and is, accoxuing tu L<uvciuv/k, quite u6au.
This connection between space activities and Gaia takes an interesting turn when 
we note that James Lovelock and the other above-named Gaians are seeking to 
expand Earth life onto other ‘dead’ planets such as Mars. Such expansion, to them, 
will be the manifest reproduction of Gaia. The onward advance of humans into space 
is seen by these Gaians as indicative of the reproductive tendencies of the organism 
that is Gaia. Being an organism, Gaia is biologically inclined to reproduce. For 
instance, w'hen summarising the Gaia theory for a space industry audience Marguhs 
says:
The Gaia hypothesis states that the surface temperature, composition of the reactive 
gases, oxidation state, alkalinity-acidity on today’s Earth are kept homeorrhetically at 
values set by the sum of the activities of the current biota. Life, in other words, is a 
planetary phenomenon. Since the natural tendency of all life is to grow exponentially 
to fill a proximal volume, a question for the Nineties is ’Can life expand to Mars?’, that
is, ‘Can Gaia reproduce?’ (Margulis and Sagan, 1992:1).
Martin-Smith, an advocate for human space expansion into the Solar System van
41 Which should not be confused with the ecological equilibrium of ecosystem ecoiogists which is a dinerent 
phenomena altogether.
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similarly justify his aspirations through Gaia theory:
The Gaia Theory has shown us how life and Earth have developed in lockstep, with 
life adapting Earth to suit its needs, via chemical homeostasis. This has provided a 
fruitful inspiration lor the new devotees of the ancient Earth goddess, the 
environmentalists. Such a view, although poetic, is incomplete, since the prime role 
of Mothers is procreation! Slowly, the closed ‘Spaceship Earth’ ecological 
worldview is being challenged by a new paradigm—the fact that human ecology is 
Solar System-wide, and that our survival depends on extending our reach to match. 
(Martin-Smith, 1997:31).
Rusty Schweickart, ex-NASA astronaut, makes a similar argument for space 
expansion with regard to the Gaian organism:
that humanity’s accelerating growth rate and demands for resources and waste 
processing are the same kind of burgeoning needs that tax a mother’s ability to 
nurture a growing foetus. (Schwiekart quoted in Joseph, 1990:63).
It is important to note that humans have a special role in this reproduction. They 
are either the midwives to the birth (as Martin-Smith, 1997, and Sagan and Margulis,
1988, would state) or they are perceived as the seeds or spores of Gaia (as Allaby,
1989, would state) rightly acting to spread a representative biota of Earth to abiotic 
worlds. These analogies (‘Gaia giving birth’, ‘humans as seeds’) are analogies that 
seek to evade the social and political nature of human expansion into space. Those 
entities taking part in space expansion, like nations, space agencies and aerospace 
companies, are social entities operating according to social, political and historical 
contingencies and forces. Gaia is an attempt to naturalise the social, political and 
economic forces that lead to space expansion42.
Michael Allaby (1989) states that “[hjumans might not be the seeds of the Earth, 
but we are behaving as though we were, so it comes down to the same thing in the 
end” . In this admission we see the strength of biological metaphors for Gaian space 
expansion. This acknowledgement that humans are not the evolutionary derived 
biological dispersal agents of the Gaian superorganism but have asserted their role to 
act as such exposes the Gaia theory as an active instrument in the legitimisation ot 
human space expansion.
42For investigations into the exact social, political and economic nature of Gaian-type Solar System colonising 
plans see Marshall (1995).
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It might be pertinent to ask: ‘who voted humans to be the reproductive 
representatives of the Earth?7. Of course, humans did. The other members of Gaia had 
no say in the matter. According to the Gaia concept, however, it is easy to convince 
ourselves that it is right and proper to act in an imperialistic manner throughout the 
cosmos and then disguise such self-interest under a veil of ‘just doing what comes 
naturally7.
Nigel Clark (1988) has intimated that Gaia theory is part of a New Age 
philosophy that purports to be able to change the world by becoming personally more 
attached to it, much of the time through the continued development of benevolent 
technology. Gaia’s association with space development would tend to concur with 
this view. James Lovelock’s Gaia is a technocentric Gaia who utilises high technology 
to advance her natural right to reproduce and colonise other worlds. Many 
environmentalist Gaians would certainly not like to be associated with such 
technocentric grandeur and arrogance but they might have trouble in avoiding it if 
they accept Lovelock’s version of Gaianism.
The charge of grandeur and arrogance might be seen as solid but how can Gaia 
be criticised as imperialist given that there are no indigenous cultures in space? No 
indigenous cultures, may be, but indigenous life? That is another matter—especially for 
the favourite candidate planet for Gaian reproduction; Mars. If Gaians want to 
maintain their facade of non-anthropocentrism they have to admit that endangering 
the life of Martians—even if they are mere microbes—must in some way be ethically 
troublesome (as argued in Marshall, 1993). The probability of the existence of native 
species upon Mars is small but it is real and the effects of a Gaian expansion on such 
life-forms would probably be devastating. If Gaian invasion does not alter the 
environment of the native life-forms irrevocably they may still be condemned to 
extinction by the action of invasive terrestrial microbes (Marshall, 1997a).
As intimated above the primary candidate planet for Gaia’s progeny is Mars. 
Allaby (1989) comments that in the 1970s “the Viking landers confirmed Mars to be 
lifeless”, and therefore there can be no objection to human interference with, and 
colonisation of, Mars. Margulis and Sagan (1992:1) agree:
The Viking missions complemented ground-based astronomical observations and 
yielded definitive evidence for the lack of life on the red planet.
Lovelock also agrees (see Lovelock, 1988, and Lovelock, 1991). To declare that
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the Viking Landers did this is hardly appropriate, however. Even within the scientific 
community this subject is heavily debated, especially within the context of the 1996 
Allen Hills Martian meteorite discoveries (see Digregario et al, 1997, and D. 
Goldsmith, 1998).
Gaians might tend to elevate the Viking results above all remaining doubts 
because a negative result (regarding life on Mars) contributes to their own scientific 
and metaphysical commitments. That Viking landers found no life is not clear for a lot 
of scientists researching the matter. All they can say is that it seems is the Viking 
landers were unable to find life in the few inches of dust that they tested at two 
particular landing sites investigated. As Viking Project biochemist, Klaus Biemann, 
makes clear with regard to the Viking results: “to say there is no life on Mars would 
not be a scientific conclusion” (Biemann, 1978:32).
We may be able to forgive Lovelock’s, Margulis’ and Allaby’s assertions of a 
lifeless Mars since, as Gaian advocates, they find it impossible to believe that extant 
life on Mars could exist because according to the Gaian concept, life exists as a 
planetary-wide, global phenomenon. If there is life on Mars it must exist in an easily 
detectable and geographically extensive form that possesses robust planetary-scale 
homeostatic abilities.
It is o f little consequence if' scientists are willing to risk their professional 
credibility on the correctness of a theory suggesting life on Mars is impossible but it is 
intolerable arrogance that these scientists risk the extinction of another life-form on 
the basis o f a yet to be proved theory which suggests that expansion to Mars can 
proceed with impunity43.
If life on any planet is only able to be present in a geographically extensive form 
and if it is the program of Gaians to give rise to the natural reproduction of Gaia then 
what we find in the space exploration plans of Gaians is not some piecemeal flags and
43Both Margulis and Lovelock continually talk about speaking for, representing and defending microbes. Lovelock 
says that he and Margulis are not directly interested in the fate of humans but instead are interested in the.
"much maligned microbes with which the Gaian system originated and which continue to do its 
basic work” (Lovelock, 1991: 101)
This is somewhat ironic, however, if we consider how they adopt an attitude that positively endangers the lives of 
whole species of microbes on other planets.
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footsteps approach to space endeavours but wholesale planetary-wide colonialism and 
engineering. The plan is not to land humans on Mars and scatter a few laboratories 
about (as is, for instance, presently the case in Antarctica) but to colonise and 
engineer the planet with Earth-life and human technologies in order to create a 
self-regulating biosphere like that of the Earth’s. This is a “process known by tradition 
in science fiction as ‘terraforming’” (Bonsor, 1997:27) but which we are now 
encouraged to regard as “Gaiaforming”. Gaiaforming, Bonsor (1997:26) tells us, is 
the controlled modification by scientific and technical means of a planetary 
environment, including its surface and in particular its atmosphere, to establish a 
self-sustaining biological life-support system regulated by negative feedback loops. 
Lovelock and Allaby describe this process for a general audience in some detail within 
a fictional account of Martian colonisation entitled The Greening o f Mars.
What is rather interesting in the writings of would-be terraformers and 
Gaiaformers such as Lovelock and Allaby is their particular conceptions about how 
life might develop. Plans for terraforming generally start with the seeding of lifeless 
planets with ‘primitive’ microscopic Earth organisms before more complex life-forms 
are introduced (see for instance Lovelock and Allaby, 1985; Carl Sagan, 1981 and 
Clarke, 1992). As outlined in Marshall (1997a: 3 8):
it is commonly perceived that the development of life on a candidate planet from a 
microbial to macrobial communities can be achieved by letting the processes of 
ecology run naturally along.
The natural processes of ecology assumed by terraformers to be capable of 
giving rise to earth-like ecosystems upon other planets (and about which the above 
sentence refers) is that contained within the familiar Clementsian concept of 
Succession. Terraformers like Clarke, Carl Sagan, Lovelock and Allaby seem to be of 
the opinion that through ecological succession simple human transplanted species will 
prepare the environment o f other planets for the successful transplantation of more 
complex ecological communities and ecosystems. As is indicated in Marshall (1997a). 
Arthur C. Clarke, for instance, adheres to this view in his book on terraforming by 
imagining the successive colonisation of a Martian landscape by lichens, then pines, 
then oak trees. (Marshall, 1997a:39).
As discussed in Chapter Two, however, the dubious validity of Succession 
theory might cast doubt upon the efficacy of any human sponsored program of
84
ecological Succession on this planet let alone one to which terrestrial microbes and 
macrobes are not use to. And so:
because Succession theory has been slain, terraforming ecologists may be left with 
alternative models of community change that suggest that Succession from simple 
pioneering species to complex ecosystems is unlikely. Despite supplying a 
continuous rain of seeds of the desired species, terraformers could find themselves 
unable to develop their chosen ideal ecosystem. Instead of creating planets filled 
with enchanting forests and lakes reminiscent of the Earth’s great terrestrial 
ecosystems, humans may create nothing but millions of square kilometres of pungent 
microbial bogs more redolent of Earth’s polluted industrial waste sites. (Marshall, 
1997a:38).
Like many others who are fascinated by space exploration Lovelock, Allaby, 
Sagan and Margulis champion space activities as an ecological endeavour since it 
allows for new ways of looking at the Earth. Indeed for them, and for many others, 
the very unity of nature can be best understood and appreciated via the space 
photographs and images of the Earth in space. Included in a list ot writers who posit 
the environmental nature of the Earth image would be Capra (1996), Martin-Smith 
(1997), Bonsor (1997), and Sagan (1981). The irony of the whole Earth photograph 
as an environmental icon has also struck some environmental writers. For instance in 
Zimmerman (1994:75) and Marshall (1997a:51), respectively, these comments are 
found:
In such photos, we see Earth reflected in the rear-view mirror of the spaceship taking us 
tar away from home in order to conquer the universe.
The whole Earth image does not only symbolise the beauty, fragility and unity of the 
world we inhabit. It also symbolises the feats of technology that industrialism has 
ottered that world. Space enthusiasts continue to explicate the environmentalist nature 
of space exploration but the irony of the whole Earth image escapes them. Only by 
conquering the terrestrial environment and making nature the dutiful servant of 
technology, has humanity managed to propel itself space-wards. The space photographs 
that capture the earth image stand as testimony to this all-conquering victory over the
natural world.
CONCLUSJONS: GAIA: AN ENVIRONMENTAL GODDESS?
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If Lovelock has his way the appreciation of the unity of nature would manifest 
itself in a hierarchically-arranged, global systems-view of the world. According to 
Lovelock, if such a view was explored scientifically to its completion we would be 
able to unlock all the various physically-interconnected pathways that exist in nature 
so that we do not disturb them. According to Lovelock, and more importantly his 
many environmental supporters (like Joseph, 1990; Goldsmith, 1993 and Nicholson, 
1992), if such a view was explored philosophically to its completion, according to 
Lovelock, we would appreciate the united aspects and come to realise the organic 
nature of all things. This chapter has attempted to show that even if we do this the 
environmental crisis will still continue since the unity represented by systems science 
and Gaian ecology fails to capture the values of the living members of the Earth that 
are being overwhelmed by that crisis. The unity concept, especially as manifested 
through Lovelock’s Gaianism, would also mislocate the causes of environmental 
destruction in asocial ‘natural’ processes such as over-population. What these faults, 
taken together, might suggest is the that Gaia is the global philosophical apex of 
systems ecology and as such it is hardly in the position to offer sound environmental 
narratives about the world. Not only that, but Gaia’s technocentrism advocates a 




The Unity of Nature: a Metanarrative of 
Social Conservatism?
INTRODUCTION: UNITY BETWEEN ECOLOGY AND SOCIETY
If we claim that unity as manifested through systems ecology and Gaia theory is 
holistically over-zealous and if it is acknowledged (by Unitarians, amongst others) that 
there is unity between ecology and society—between nature and humanity-then might 
not the same sort of critiques of over-zealous holist tendencies apply in the social 
realm? The obvious thing to want to find out in answering this question is how exactly 
do Unitarians see the unity relationship between ecology and society; between 
humanity and nature? This question is important since there may be different ways 
that humanity and nature can be said to be united. Some of them benign, some of
them not
Some, like Goldsmith (1993), see the humanity-nature relationship very strongly. 
Goldsmith would say that there are values in the biosphere, that ecological knowledge 
reflects those values and those values must be adopted in order that both humanity 
and nature survive as we would like.44
44Note, for instance, the following comments of Goldsmith’s: “Ecology reflects the values of the biosphere 
(Goldsmith, 1993:82). “There is no fundamental barrier separating man and other living things (Goldsmith, title 
of chapter 37); “the biosphere displays a...single set of laws whose generalities apply equally well to biological 
organisms, communities, societies and ecosystems and to Gaia herself’ (Goldsmith, 1993:186) and:
{tjhere is no fundamental difference between the structure and behaviour of vernacular
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One o f the most common ways of identifying nature with society is by classing 
them both in economic terms. Environmental philosopher J. Baird Callicott does this 
for instance when he says:
The various parts of the ‘biotic community’ (individual animals and plants) depend on 
one another eco n o m ica lly  so that the system as such acquires characteristics of its own. 
Just as it is possible to characterise and define collectively peasant societies, agrarian 
communities, industrial complex, capitalist, communist and socialist economic systems, 
and so on, ecology characterises and defines various biomes as desert, savannah, 
wetland and tundra, woodland and other communities, each with its particular 
‘professions’, or ‘niches.’ (Callicott, 1995:41).
Here again we see, even if only using an over-generalised example, the issue of 
lunctionalism emerging since it is perceived by Callicott that functions are analogous 
across the humanity-nature barrier. This emphasis in the analogy on functions has a 
long heritage in the history of biology and economics (see Mirowski, ed, 1994) but it 
is not a phenomenon confined just to long-gone history. In 1994, for instance, Ayres 
philosophised about the similarities of economics and biological analogies in terms of 
functions:
For an economic system, the analogues of cells are individuals, the analogues of 
specialised organs are firms and industries; and the products of industry are analogous 
to the minerals, amino acids, sugars, and lipids as well as the more specialised vitamins 
that circulate through the organisms and are metabolised for energy and/or incorporated 
into biomass. (Ayres, 1994:186).
Similarly, as Golley (1993) points out, Eugene Odum, the greatest campaigner 
for ecosystem ecology in the 1950s and 60s, was never afraid to analogise with 
economic references; interchanging, as he did, money for energy and jobs for niches 
when he attempted to diagrammatically represent the ecology ot certain regions (see 
Odum, 1971).
UNITY VIA THE SYSTEM
Ayres does not only believe that a vague functional perspective offers appropriate
analogies between the economic world and the natural world, he goes on to list three
[i.e. traditional] man and that of other living things. Both are governed by the same laws 
that govern the natural systems which make up the Oaian hierarchy. (Goldsmith, 1993.209).
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basic ways that they are related:
An economic system is, in three important respects, a kind of living system...firstly...an 
economic system is similar to biological systems...in exhibiting 
self-organisation...secondly... [both havej the need for continuous inputs of useful 
energy...thirdly...[aJ strong similarity between economic systems and living systems is 
their ability to grow and evolve. (Ayres 1993 186-187).
We can see in Ayres’ passage the ease to which simple analogies become 
complex when filtered through the lens of systems theory. Instead of comparing 
‘nature7 and ‘economics7 as Callicott does, Ayres compares ‘living7 and ‘economic7 
systems. Systems theory enables similarities to become far more transparent. Once 
the systemic nature of something or other is identified it is very easy to find the way it 
resembles the properties o f completely different things which have also been 
systematised.
This description of various things as systems and their comparison with other 
things is an avowed goal of systems science and always has been. The search for 
parallel principles in diverse phenomena is neatly summed up, complete with technical 
names, by one of the progenitors of systems science; Ludwig von Bertalanfly, who 
describes the presence of similar principles in different areas of study as ‘isomorphy7: 
“[t]he search for such isomorphies is a major pursuit of systems science77 (Bertalanfly, 
1967:117). Bertalanfly then goes on to summarise what isomorphy is:
isomorphy... is a consequence of the fact that in certain aspects, corresponding 
abstractions and conceptual models can be applied to different phenomena. It is in 
view of these aspects that system laws will apply. (Bertalanfly, 1967:118).
Speaking about Bertalanfly from a historical point of view Hagen summarises his 
program of systems science and cybernetics like this:
cyberneticians were attempting to construct an overarching mathematical theory to 
explain the behaviour of organisms, machines and other complex systems. In fact, from 
the perspective of cybernetic analysis, distinctions between machines, organisms and 
even societies seemed to evaporate; all were treated mathematically as ‘systems . 
(Hagen, 1992:69).
In 1967, Bertalanfly made friendly warnings about the supposed closeness ol 
systems analogies. Just because analogies are made between certain conceptual 
models:
[tjhis does not mean that physical systems, organisms and societies are all the same.
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In principle, it is the same as the situation as when the law of gravitation applies to 
Newton’s apple, the planetary system, and the phenomenon of tides. This means 
that in view of some rather limited aspects a certain theoretical system, that of 
mechanics, holds true; it does not mean that there is also a particular resemblance 
between apples, planets and oceans in a great many other respects. (Bertalanfly, 
1967:118).
It is interesting that Bertalanfly has to explain the relationship of systems 
analogies by using an analogy but his warning nevertheless seems to be that systems 
analogies are functional, not structural. The apple, the planets and the oceans are 
structurally dissimilar but they function in relation to gravity in the same way.
However, we may be sceptical of Bertalanfly’s assurance that function is all that 
matters in systems science in its job to find isomorphies and that there are no 
structural similarities between the components of one system and the next. At least in 
the abstract, systems scientists are quite capable of assuming that systems across 
different disciplines/subjects/worlds are in fact as similar in structure as they are in 
function. One way they do this is through the use of hierarchically arranged levels. For 
example, Ayres tells us that there is:
the obvious and close analogy between an economic system and the food web 
of an ecological system or community. In the latter case one can consider each 
species as a node. The energy inputs to any node are derived from other species from a 
lower trophic level, except in the case of the lowest level (vegetation), which derives 
its energy from photosynthesis. The node and flow structure can be defined 
in diagrammatic form land when we do so we find] not surprisingly, essentially the 
same diagram applies to the economic case. (Ayresl994:209).
Ayres says on the same page that the economic and ecological systems that exist 
on the dipole o f his analogy are so close that “the corresponding mathematics is 
almost identical if one conceptually substitutes money flow  for energy flow  .
When Ayres talks about the identical structure and functions of various processes 
in ecology and economics he might be considered to be finding isomorphies, actually 
existing objective similarities between one worldly frame of reference and another. 
This was Bertallanfy’s plan; not to create analogies based on metaphors of similarity 
taken from one tradition to another but to discover real similarities.
That the ecology-economy relationship is merely a metaphor is presented in a 
more transparent way in Callicott’s above statements since when Callicott talks about
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the identical structures o f economic and ecological settings he knows he is taking the 
language of one discipline and applying it to another. From Callicott’s point of view 
this does not make his own economy-ecology associations weak since his use of the 
particular metaphor assumes that there is sufficient resemblance between economics 
and ecology for the metaphor to work in a sustained way. While Callicott can accept 
that he is comparing what humans say about various things as being applicable in 
different situations, Ayres—via systems science—is convinced that the comparisons are 
reflections o f human-independent isomorphies.
Whether or not economic/ecological metaphor users admit to their comparisons 
as being metaphorical it often seems that in situations such as this the appropriate 
thing to do is to identify from where the metaphor comes and having found it, expose 
it as mere metaphor and thus undermine its truth-hood. If we abide by this idea (which 
has its problems45) we then might go on to ask where the original referent lies in the 
ecology/economics analogy.
If ecology is interpreted as being fundamentally like economics by Callicott, and 
alternatively, if economics can be fundamentally based on ecological principles, as for 
instance Ayres sometimes says, then which one is the original referent? Which one 
should we expose as the masked metaphor that must be revealed as such? Was it 
ecology that supplied economics with a grounded base from which to analogise from 
or vice versa. The answer seems to be that it is impossible to state which subject 
served as the referent and which one was being the metaphor. It is not that ecology 
gave Ayres economical principles or that economic principles gave Callicott the 
principles o f ecology. Both economics and ecology have had such a long and tortuous 
history of cross-fertilisation that principles in one feed from the other and then 
feedback to the ‘original’. We may call these types of narratives ‘reprojective spiral 
narratives’ after some of the terms that Mirowski (1994) is driven to use when 
examining the nuances of the history of natural images in economics.
The relevance of these reprojective spiral narratives to this work is in directing us 
away from just trying to stick to an approach of identifying from whence the original 
metaphor came so as to expose them as mere metaphors. For instance in trying to
45As has been outlined in Chapter Two with reference to Miller (1982) and Miller (1983); and as will be outlined 
in Chapters Five and Six with reference to Nietzsche (1979), Lakoff & Johnson (1980) and Mirowski, ed, (1994).
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work out why nature is considered in unity with society we have to explore the use of 
metaphors taken from social science and natural science that say it is so. But I suggest 
that we will get nowhere if we permanently look for the original metaphor because 
both social science and the natural sciences have been feeding oft' of each other for so 
long46. Following the twisting past of metaphors, however, might open up some of the 
intellectual heritage of the unity of nature concept (and this is what is attempted in the 
Chapters Four and Five).
UNITY AND SOCIAL HOLISM
If humanity and nature are united so that they obey at least some ot the same 
rules (as the systems thinkers suggest) then what sort of society do these rules create? 
Might they not suffer from the same problems as united and systematised ecologies? 
Will they suffer from being functionalist and thereby ignore the individual? Will they 
suffer from lack of acknowledgement of change and thus from conservatism ot a 
social type? These questions form the basis of the next few sections of this chapter.
One of the most obvious points to note about ecological theory with a penchant 
for unity (i.e. systems ecology) is its closeness of approach to the sociological 
tradition known as ‘structural functionalism’. Both systems ecology and structural 
lunctionalism draw on a common historical and theoretical affinity associated with 
holism and systems theory. The orthodox way for recounting the history of structural
functionalism is by saying something like:
Functionalism uses an organismic model of systems as the basic reality, 
draws on concepts of structure and function from physiology and stresses 
adjustment or adaptation as a goal for organisms, social groups or whatever.
(Young, 1992:167).
Of these intrusions of biology into sociology, Benton writes.
Overwhelmingly, biological intrusions into the domain of the human sciences have
^1 am by no means the first to suggest this. See, for instance, Young (1985) and Mirowski, ed, (1994).
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been politically conservative, and this is especially true of their widespread 
popular diffusion. (Benton, 1991:15)
From the perspective of this work, however, it is not so much a biological 
intrusion as it is two way traffic between the biological and social. Organicism in 
nature supports organicism in sociology and vice versa. Sometimes it is impossible to 
tell whether the original application was one way or the other. Even in the writings of 
particular people it is not clear whether the terminology is taken to be primarily social 
or natural and then reapplied.47
Although social functionalists are dedicated to the study of social situations, in 
many cases distinct analogies/metaphors are drawn from the biological world. In other 
cases analogies to the biological world are avoided by social functionalists but 
analogies to the work of systems thinkers who themselves talk about the biological 
and social applicability of their work is strong. Thus a structural functionalist social 
scientist may be able to superficially de-link his or her work from organicism and 
biology (and ecology) but this does not negate both philosophical and historical 
linkages.
In the case of others the association is more distant (to the point that some 
structural functionalists and some ecosystems workers have probably never cited a 
writer relevant to both). Talcott Parsons--the most famous advocate of structural 
functionalism—for instance, never attributed any of his version of systems thinking to 
the systems thinking of those that have become known as the principle ‘fathers of 
systems theory (such as Ludwig von Bertalanffy, Norbert Wiener and John von 
Neumann) whereas Eugene Odum, Robert Ayres and Fritjof Capra make this
47We ran illustrate this coarsely by noting the influences upon one of today s foremost unitanans, Edward 
Goldsmith. Goldsmith says that both human communities and ecological communities function like systems. 
Goldsmith himself claims to have been influenced by sociologist Talcott Parsons, physical scientist James Lovelock 
and ecologist Eugene Odum when coming to this conclusion. But Parsons was influenced by social thinkers that 
themselves were holist-inspired ex-biologists, people like Walter Cannon and Lawrence Henderson. Parsons was 
also influenced by people who themselves were directly influenced by biological ideas of holism, people like Emile 
Durkheim, Herbert Spencer and Vilffedo Pareto (see Lilienfeld, 1988; Heims, 1991, Richardson, 1992, Heyl,
1998). Goldsmith’s other influences, Lovelock and Odum, on the other hand, were influenced by people like the 
biologist Bertalanffy and the systems engineers John von Neumann and Noibert Wiener (see Hagen, 1992, 
Goldsmith, 1993; Golley, 1993; Capra, 1996). But Bertallanfy, von Neumann and Wiener themselves were 
influenced by people like Cannon, Henderson, Parsons and other social holist theorists (see Wiener, 1961. 
Davidson, 1983; Capra, 1996), who-as we have just seen-were influenced by holist biologists. Out of this 
inter-articulation of influences comes a morass of dead and dying metaphors which Edward Goldsmith (an 
others) have forgotten are metaphors.
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attribution for their own work quite enthusiastically. However, the same people that 
influence Parsons, people like Lawrence Henderson and Walter Cannon, influenced 
Bertalanfiy, Wiener and Neumann (see Lilienfeld, 1978, Heims, 1991, Heyl, 1998). 
Despite this, it can be claimed, as Lilienfeld does, that the ideas are so strongly 
affiliated between biological systems analysts and social systems analysts that they 
may be placed upon the same ‘analytic operating table’:
Parson’s ’system’ may be classified as belonging to systems thinking; certainly its 
philosophical categories and its metaphysics are the same. (Lilienfeld 1978:199)
If this is true, any critique of the unity of nature concept and of ecosystems 
philosophy must also make forays into social systems theory. Where ecosystem 
ecologists honour the ecosystem in ecology as the basic unit, so structural 
fonctionalists honour the social system as the basic unit in sociological study. Let us 
see how these two approaches draw from these common thematic premises and so 
give rise to common problems. That will enable us to come back to the larger problem 
of the existence of conservative and anti-individualistic impulses within unitarianism.
SOCIAL SYSTEMS AND CHANGE
As in the analysis of ecological systems, social systems analysts tend to 
emphasise stability over change: “[a]ny system that does not have some ability to 
resist perturbation tends to cease to exist as a system” (Clayton, 1993:159). Within 
social science this metaphysical or methodological commitment to stability has often 
lead to systems-inclined sociologists being labelled by non-systems-inclined 
sociologists as politically conservative since the former are involved in legitimising the 
predominating social order. This is most evident in the case ot the structural 
functionalist tradition which was the dominant Western sociological tradition in the 
mid-Twentieth Century. The primary flag-bearer for this tradition was Talcott 
Parsons. For many sociologists writing during the decline ot structural functionalism 
in the 1960s, Parsonianism was thought of as “a celebration and affirmation ot the 
status q u o ” (Darhendorf in Farganis, 1993:222). Today a non-functionalist sociologist 
might sum up the principle ideas of structural iunctionalism in this way.
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Parsons is essentially a conservative thinker who ignores the exploitative and 
unequal character of capitalism, along with the resulting division and disharmony. 
(Layder, 1994:23).
If we place this sort of criticism within its historical context it becomes clear just what 
sort of status quo and what sort of stability Parsons, and most of the other structural 
functionalists, were aiming for:
it is important to understand Parsons work as an attempt to defend capitalist society 
against the criticism contained in Marxist analysis. Although both Marx and Parsons 
see capitalism as a ‘social system’, their assessments of it are very different. Marx 
envisioned capitalist society as basically exploitative (of the working classes), 
conflict-ridden, and governed primarily by the profit motiveinherent in the economic 
system. On the other hand Parsons recognised that capitalism was still 
striving towards its ideal form, he saw it as a basically fair and meritocratic system. 
(Layder 1994:14).
Marxists might be keen to add to this conceptualisation of Marxism that :
with its emphasis on dialectics, permanent upheaval and irresolvable conflicts between 
classes, Marxism would seem incapable of adopting an organismic view of society, one 
which is in essential balance. (Dickens 1992:44).
Although, historically, structural functionalism was a way to show how capitalist 
society was a wonderful, self-adjusting system that was incapable of being perturbed 
greatly from within, the concept of the social system that Parsons advanced might be 
utilised to show how any particular preferred social system might operate. Goldsmith 
does this very thing with his ongoing celebration of traditional societies which are, to 
him, the only truly Parsons-like self-regulating societies that exist. Just as change in 
the social system for many—if not most—structural functionalists is something either
strange or undesirable so it is for Goldsmith.
If “[stability rather than change is the basic feature of the living world” 
(Goldsmith, 1993:112) and if human communities and ecological communities are of 
the same structure, then stability is the basic feature in the human world too. This is 
the line that Goldsmith takes in The Way, he merely maintains that modem societies 
do not adhere to such natural stability while traditional societies did. So what did 
traditional societies do in order to operate in a way that was as stable as ecosystems 
are? Well, they basically did the same things that Parsons said people do to keep the 
American social system stable:
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-the members ot the community have a common belief system and common 
values and those that do not adhere to these values are ejected or 
re-educated/rehabilitated.
-the members fulfil their role within the community decided upon by these 
common beliefs and values. Those that do not are ejected from the system or 
re-educated/rehabilitated.
Because Goldsmith presents his traditional societies as operating in this 
Parsons-like way, they may be adjudged as being incapable of tolerating dissent and 
difterences of opinion and lifestyle. Such a judgement would fall heavily upon 
Parson’s 1950s America and it may well do so on Goldsmith’s traditional societies.
Although their ideal societies are very different, the Parsons and Goldsmith 
variants of stable societies had much in common. Parsons (1967) emphasised common 
values, as does Goldsmith (1993). Parsons (1967) emphasised the essential role of the 
family, as does Goldsmith (1993). And Parsons (1967) emphasised the tightness of 
traditions, as does Goldsmith (1993).
Parsons, like Goldsmith, also had a hierarchy of systems within systems that 
resembled the levels of organization posited by modem day proponents of systems 
theory. Just like the levels of biological organisation presupposed by systems 
ecologists (and by Goldsmith) Parsons’ levels worked in the same way; by ‘backward 
causation’ or ‘negative feedback’. Just as Goldsmith (as well as Capra, and Davies, 
and Lovelock) would present the interaction between cellular systems organismal 
systems, ecosystems and the global Gaian system so that the lower levels contribute 
to the higher levels which then act to extend influence back upon lower levels, so 
Parsons invented a four-level system of systems in which 1) the body system, 2) the 
psychology system, 3) the social system and 4) the cultural system were all nestled 
within each other so that lower systems gave rise to higher systems which in turn 
extended influences on the lower systems once more.
So if the principles that run and stabilise and harmonise Goldsmith s and Parsons 
social systems are the same, how can they give rise to such varying social visions, in 
Parsons’ case, mid-Twentieth Century Western capitalist-industrialism; and in 
Goldsmith’s case ecologically-benevolent traditional societies? This is a relatively 
unimportant question for this work since it is by no means proven that Parsons social
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systems were operating to produce his beloved America or that Goldsmith’s social 
systems were operating in traditional societies to give rise to his beloved eco-friendly 
communities. What is of interest is the way that they both use changelessness and 
stability—and hence intrinsically conservative regimes~to legitimise the societies they 
variously desire.
Goldsmith does not have much time for Parsons’ affirmation of capitalism but he 
does share Parsons’ love of systems. The great difference between the two, says 
Goldsmith, is that modem society is not stable while traditional society is. Because 
traditional societies are living in stability within their own ecological setting and so are 
not damaging either Gaia or the ecosystems that make her up, says Goldsmith (1993), 
then it is to traditional societies that modem society should aim.
According to Dickens (1992) Parsons saw traditional societies not as 
ecologically-friendly and socially-benevolent (in the vein of Goldsmith) but as 
primitive, undeveloped and undifferentiated societies subject to perturbation. Modem 
systems, on the other hand, were, to Parsons, classifiable as complex and 
self-regulating. This varying evaluation of traditionality exemplifies two extreme 
approaches to pre-modem societies. Traditional societies were noble and enlightened 
according to Goldsmith, while being savage and uncivilised according to Parsons. 
Both versions sit within the extremes of western myth-making. Whether a social 
thinker is prejudiced toward the view that all traditional societies were harmonious 
with their environment and a joy to live in or prejudiced toward thinking they were all 
savage, undifferentiated and undeveloped societies, these views by themselves tend be 
homogenous views of vastly-differing societies that are actually incredibly diverse, 
even if only along a single characteristic of interest such as ecological-friendliness or 
internal complexity. Some traditional societies may be ecological friendly and 
socially-benevolent as Goldsmith suggests, but not all. And some traditional societies 
may be internally simple and undifferentiated as Parsons suggests but, again, not all.
SOCIAL SYSTEMS AND FUNCTIONS
The major relationship between Goldsmith’s traditional societies and Parsons
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1950s American society is in their parallel appreciation of the relationship of the 
whole society to their respective individual parts. Just as Parsons’ social parts 
(individuals, families, institutions etc.) were arranged to contribute to the stability of 
the whole society, so Goldsmith picks his social theories straight from Parsonianism 
to suppose that traditional societies are arranged so that the parts contribute to 
maintaining the whole. Here, the parts are--like the parts in an ecosystem— ascribed a 
role or a function. Individuals, families and institutions are occupiers of a particular 
social niche which is implanted within the whole via common values in order to 
maintain the whole society. This emphasis on society being a iunctional system is 
common to both Parsons and Goldsmith.
Lyotard would explain the Parsonian version like this:
It] he decision makers attempt to manage these clouds of sociality according to 
input/output matrices, following a logic which implies that their elements are 
commensurable and that the whole is determinable. (Lyotard, 1984:xxiv).
Whilst Bauman might explain Parsons’ version like this:
Constantly lurking behind the scene in the orthodox vision of social reality was the 
powerful image oft he social system-this synonym of an ordered, structured space of 
interaction, in which probable actions have been, so to speak, pre-selected by the 
mechanisms of domination and value sharing. It was a ‘...co-ordinated space...’, one 
inside of which the cultural, the political and the economic levels of supra-individual 
organisation were all reservant with each other and functionally complimentary. 
(Bauman, 1992:39).^ 48
48 As critics of structural functionalism have noted, in such a system even change (and the desire for
change) is co-opted to give rise to stability:
“in countries with liberal or advanced management, the struggles and their instruments have been 
transformed into regulators of the system” (Lyotard: 1984:13).
“Within the structural functionalist school...[hjere conflict is often seen as leading to ultimate 
harmony and stability.” (Demerath (1967:501).
“Deviant behaviour is regarded as a temporary aberration, a failure ol the socialisation process 
rather than an expression of difference or dissent”. (Farganis, 1993:364).
If even conflict against the system can be functionalised within the system to contribute to stability, then 
one may wonder what social phenomena cannot possibly be incorporated into the social system. This is the main 
problem with the Parsonian social system; at least according to it one ol its prime attackers Rail Dahrendorf. For 
example, Farganis (1993:222) paraphrases Dahrendorf as saying that within a Parsonian social system:
“Everything is too neatly laid ou t; the family performs the reproductive function
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My point here is that the same descriptions apply to Goldsmith’s social systems 
since he posits that traditional societies have commensurable, co-ordinated parts that 
are complimentary in their functionality so that an ordered whole is the result.
One of the functional parts common to both Goldsmith and Parsons is the family. 
Goldsmith, writing in 1993, approves o f ‘traditional’ families and looks distastefully 
on ‘modem’ single-parent families since:
a single parent family [isj a highly unstable entity that does not provide a satisfactory 
environment for the children’s upbringing, and which is likely to break down further, 
leading to abandonment of the children as is happening on such a scale in the slums of 
South America. (Goldsmith, 1993:216).
For both Goldsmith and Parson families are an essential level in the make up of 
social systems. They enable education, reproduction, value instalment and appropriate 
resource partitioning within society. For both of them the death of the family would 
be the death of the social system, (and thereby the death of the ultimate system; Gaia 
in Goldsmith’s case, and America in Parson’s case). However, Goldsmith’s restrictive 
definition of what it is that constitutes a family would strike many as being highly 
exclusionist. Just as in Parson’s conservative 1950s America, where the ideology of 
the family excluded many who did not come up to Parson’s version of family, so we 
might suspect the same if Goldsmith’s traditional society eventuates.
SOCIAL SYSTEMS AND THE INDIVIDUAL
Social systems, and the organic unities that they are said to reflect, have 
sometimes been criticised for being anti-individualistic. We might, for instance, note 
the following description of an organic view of nature:
Connectedness involves regulatory feedback that controls component dynamics to 
meet the best needs of the organisation itself, not necessarily the best needs of the 
components (e.g. programmed cell death during embryogenesis or ejection of drones 
from beehives are detrimental to the components but benefit the organisation as a 
whole). (Rollo, 19995:28).
and replenishes society with fresh births; the educational system secures conformity and 
adherence to the rules of thought, its function as an agent of socialisation, and the division 
of labour allocates different roles that people must play in a complex economic system.”
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If an organic view of nature is to be read as Rollo reads it, then might not an 
organic view of society based upon such a view of nature be ani-individual? This is a 
worry that has permeated environmental philosophy for all of its history and some 
environmental holists have grown annoyed at it. According to the holists, new 
socially-aware anti-umtarian critiques of environmentally-guided holist ideas:
are only the latest in a long line of indignant but vastly predictable accusations that 
continue to be reacted monotonously. Detailed responses to these criticism have been 
offered for years for instance by Callicott and Rolston. (Westra, 1994:126).
Westra goes on to inform us that although some major thinkers have provided 
carefully argued counter-claims, it appears that “no argument so far has succeeded in 
silencing the critics” and their “lack of open-mindedness or interest” (Westra, 
1994:127).
We can interpret Westra charitably to mean that she sees that holists have trouble 
getting their point across to those who choose to remain ignorant of the arguments of 
environmental holists or we can choose to interpret Westra’s statement uncharitably 
to mean that it is her intention to close down the ongoing debate about holism, 
conservatism and anti-individualism. In this section and the next the debate is touched 
upon so that it might be developed in later chapters.
The arguments of the “anti-holists” declare that—at least in the 
abstract—individuals are relegated to secondary importance compared to the value of 
the whole. Despite Westra and others’ protestations that environmental holism does 
not lead to social holism there are explicit examples within the environmental thought 
that seem show that it is possible. At the forefront is Edward Goldsmith who declares 
that:“[t]o keep to the Way, society must be able to correct any divergence from it”, 
(Goldsmith, 1993:369). The ‘Way’, Goldsmith makes clear, is the specific and general 
rules that run and maintain the holist entity that is Gaia. These rules are, to Goldsmith, 
at once social and biological.
Divergence from these rules can be normally handled, says Goldsmith, via the 
various self-regulating processes within the various systems of Gaia, be that system of
a social nature or of an ecological nature:
[ijf the Gaian hierarchy is to maintain its stability, all individual living things that 
compose it must obey a veritable hierarchy ol laws, which together constitute the laws 
of nature. (Goldsmith, 1993:8).
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These rules thus impose some sort of boundaries, parameters and self-discipline 
upon the individual. Both humans and non-humans live in a way commensurate not 
only with their immediate social and ecological system but with the greatest system of 
all; Gaia. In stronger words, this might be translated to mean that the freedoms, 
lifestyles and behaviour of individuals are sacrificed and curtailed for the good of the 
whole.
This idea of individual restraint and sacrifice in the face of a larger organic whole 
is also made by J. Baird Callicott when he says:
Our organic health and well-being, for example, requires vigorous exercise and 
metabolic stimulation which cause stress and often pain to various parts of the body 
and more rapid turnover in the life-cycle of our individual cells. For the sake of the 
person taken as a whole, some parts may be, as it were, unfairly sacrificed. On the level 
of social organisation, the interests of society may not always coincide with the sum 
of the interests of its parts. Discipline, sacrifice, and individual restraint are often 
necessary in the social sphere to maintain social integrity as within the bodily 
organism. (Callicott, 1995:42).
Another holist environmental writer says the same thing in a different way:
The life force...is calling humanity to a new organisation of human societies. Here is 
where the integration is most urgently needed. Here is where integration is most 
incomplete and inadequate. (Birch, 1990:108).
Charles Birch goes on to identify how exactly we may characterise any 
predilections toward not serving integration: they are instances of evil:
Evil is always the assertion of some self-interest without regard to the whole, whether 
the whole is conceived as the immediate community, the total community, or the total 
order of the universe. (Birch, 1990:15).
These flirtations with the supremacy of the organic integrated whole are indeed a 
problem for other investigators of the environmental and ecological theory. Most 
notably it has given rise to the charge of social fascism. Janet Biehl, in particular, 
makes strong connections between ecological holism and the social fascism 
exemplified by Nazism (Biehl, 1994; Biehl and Staudenmeier, 1995). Whether or not 
Gaian metaphysics can and will feed into the support for political and social fascism is 
yet to be determined but Biehl points out, with regard to the organic eco-spirituality 
ideas that have permeated the modem German ultra-right, that a real danger may be 
evident. She indicates that within this ultra-right Rudolph Bahro’s return to the
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Völkisch Spiritualism  is actually a philosophical alignment to Nazism. Biehl goes on 
to quote Bahro’s calls for a Green Adolph when Bahro talks of the need for “[a] new 
tiihrer to drive the German people towards environmental friendliness” (Bahro,
1994:152). Rudolph Bahro is an acknowledged leader of the German Green 
movement and his writings have~as Biehl points out-become riddled with statements 
like the following:
the most important thing is that ...IpeopleJ take the path ‘back’ and align themselves 
with the Great Equilibrium, in the harmony between human order and the Tao of life.
This sort of sentence also pervades Goldsmith (1993) and Capra (1996) but I am 
not yet willing to name them as Nazi intellectuals. However, Biehl probably would be 
inclined to make the comparison since the cosmology of Goldsmith and Capra 
sometimes appeal to cosmologies about which Biehl would point out that:
to establish their totalitarian regime and implement genocide, the Nazi’s easily drew 
on the common ideology of the Volk mediated between individual and cosmos, 
rendering the individuals mainly a member of the whole, the ‘Volk Whole’ or ‘Volk 
Community (where Volk equals ethnically and culturally united individuals and 
their common essences). (Biehl, 1994:160).
Michael Zimmerman echoes Biehl’s concerns over unity and harmony ideals 
when he says:
The fact that National Socialism was a perverted expression of the desire for social 
harmony does not make such desire illegitimate, but does require that critics of 
Modernity-including counter-culturalists and radical ecologists-proceed carefully in 
calling for alternatives. (Zimmerman, 1994:59)
Biehl’s concern about the re-emergence of holist ecological ideas and 
neo-Nazism might be a little extreme but if we adjust them to say that if holist 
environmental concepts are manifested strongly in social situations—as for instance in *
Goldsmith’s social systems—then elements of fascism do become apparent.
Blaming Nazism as a derivative of nothing else but organic views of nature and 
society is a far too clumsy and simplified view to take. It is doubtful to many social 
thinkers that culturally emergent paradigms of natural philosophical thought have a 
sole determining affect on the character of social operations and relations . Although
49Examples of scholars that have dealt with the interactions of natural philosophy and social practices but have 
also maintained that these interactions are never played out so that a natural philosophy maps exactly on to a soci
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such natural philosophical thought might serve as an aid in the legitimisation of what 
is feasible or desirable for either the political elite, the politically-aspiring or their 
audience during a particular historical setting. Whether this legitimisation is absolutely 
necessary, or of partial importance, or of no relevance at all to the social situations 
that the natural philosophy is supposedly connected with, is, of course, a subject 
unresolved. However, we can at least note here that there are some situations in 
which cultural paradigms do at least oifer profound legitimising schemes for particular 
political viewpoints and actions* 50 and that it is wholly feasible to regard it as possible 
that a Unitarian natural philosophy can act as a stimulus to an ongoing social theory 
and practice that might possess fascist tendencies.
However, the point that I want to press, here, is that my position in all of this is 
slightly different from those like Biehl who claim that Unitarian thought can lead to 
fascist political and social situations. My view is that we do not have to wait for a 
Nazism-like social situation for unitarianism to rear its head in conservative ways. The 
living spectre of the system is not something only inherent in Nazism and other such 
social unities, it is a spectre that is alive and well in the liberal democratic society of 
the modem world and as such can be noted to serve the rationalising purposes that 
unitarianism is said by Biehl to achieve for Nazism.
All this means that although theoretical caution may salvage environmental 
holism from moving towards policies of a Nazi-comparable nature, the greatest 
ideological danger of unitarianism may be its operation through the more politically 
acceptable medium of the ‘system7 concept. This important point is where the next 
chapter starts oft'.
practice include: Bloor (1976), Greene (1981), Young (1985), Barnes and Shapin, eds, (1979), Kempton e t a l  
(1995).
50For example, the writers cited in the note above provide details of such legitimising schemes in the works cited.
It is important to note that the exact ways that legitimising schemes of natural philosophy have affected social 
situations is different in all of these works since the authors are dealing with differing social and historical settings.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
THE UNITY OF NATURE: A METANARRATIVE OF SOCIAL 
CONSERVATISM?
According to many modem day natural philosophers and environmental thinkers 
humanity must leam to appreciate unity in the natural world (what Capra, 1996, calls 
‘The Web of Life’ and Lovelock, 1991, calls ‘Gaia’) and also behave as though this 
appreciation was important (and act according to what Goldsmith, 1991, calls ‘The 
Way5). One of the ways of appreciating this unity~and of acting consistently with The 
Way, according to Goldsmith—is to accept the continuity between nature and 
humanity, between natural systems and social systems.
If Goldsmith had his way humans would all mega-mutate towards The Way, 
towards Gaian ethics. Society would become traditional, less modem, and in doing so 
would fulfil Gaian order and become less destructive towards nature. In the process 
they would also become entrenched with ethics of hierarchy, unity and functionalism 
such that in a society like the one Goldsmith has planned, the individual needs, 
dissension and difference may very well be devalued. Such neglect of individual 
differences and dissension is evident, according to many social commentators 
(including Layder and Bauman) in the social theory of those from whom Goldsmith 
draws his theories, i.e.: structural functionalists like Talcott Parsons. Both Goldsmith 
and Parsons draw a lot of their inspiration from holist biological ideas, and just as 
these ideas are anti-individualistic and intolerant of difference and change in the 
biological world (as has been shown in Chapter Two), so they are anti-individualistic 
and intolerant of difference and change in the social world.
At this point it I conclude that it might serve environmentalists well to agree 
with Goldsmith that his traditional societies might be less ecologically destructive than 
modem societies but this has nothing to do with Gaian holism, social hierarchy and 
social functionalism as Goldsmith would submit. It is due to the less destructive 
material potential of such societies. Such societies would be less likely, as small 
scale/needs-based societies, to reify technological and economic gain and this in itselt 
would confer upon them a greater degree of eco-friendliness. A non-stratified, 
non-hierarchical, non-holistic, anarchic society of the scale Goldsmith posits for his
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planned ecological societies would be just as light on the environment as those replete 
with the hierarchy and holism of Gaian ethics.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE UNITY OF NATURE: UNITING THE 
ECONOMY WITH THE ECOSYSTEM?
INTRODUCTION. THE RISE OF CYBERNETICS
As alluded to in the last chapter, in the middle of the Twentieth Century the unity 
of nature was being reinterpreted using the concept of the ‘system’. Nature, viewed as 
a system, was thought to be a vast interlocking web of entities, energies, actions, and 
purposes and to this web of interacting components humanity, in some way or 
another, belonged.
This notion of the interacting, interlocking system is at the forefront of modem 
day manifestations of the unity concept, so much so that expressions of the unity of 
nature nowadays can very rarely escape the ideas and terminological practice of 
systems theory. For instance when we examine the natural philosophy of just about 
any late Twentieth Century holist-friendly environmentalist who, unlike most of the 
intellectuals examined in this work, have no real interest in systems ideas we still see 
within them the influence of systems thinking. For instance, when explaining Deep 
Ecology’s conviction toward ecological unity, Arne Naess (1994:122) characterises 
ecological unity like: “a multiplicity of more or less lawful, interacting factors may 
operate together to form a unity, a system”. This cornering of the unity of nature 
market by systems theory is not total but it is hard to understate. For this reason 
systems theory is often regarded as the science of unity.
One of the obvious ways to note the relationship of contemporary systems theory 
to conceptions of natural unity involves the very words ‘system’ and ‘unity’. The
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closeness ot the word system to the conceptual character ol unity can be explored by 
perusing the definitions of those that first scientised it. Bertalanfiy, for instance, 
defined systems as “Complexes of elements standing in interaction” (Bertalanfiy,
1967:117). Thus when we are talking about those that first formulated scientific 
theories about systems, and Bertalanfiy is adjudged by most systems theorists of 
today to have had a prominent role, then the idea of unity was a lull-time metaphysical 
commitment when systems theories were first outlined.
Given this history of the interaction between unity and systems—whose details 
will be entered into in the sections that tollow-it is of little surprise to find that just 
like Unitarians, (who cannot divorce themselves from systems thinking) systems 
thinkers can not divorce themselves from unity notions when defining systems. For 
instance Schulze and Zwolfer define a system thus:
laj system may be defined as an integrated entity whose overall properties are 
different from the properties of its elements ( Schulze and Zwolter, 1987:1).
This definition lies very close to the holistic definitions of unity employed by 
Unitarians (like Naess, above) who do not directly employ systems theory.
We need not rely upon the testimony of systems experts and Unitarians, however, 
when finding links between unity and systems. Any dictionary may be consulted to 
give similar indications of the link. The Burlington Universal Dictionary tor example 
defines a system as being “an assemblage of things forming a connected whole”. 
Similarly, unity is defined in a similar way; the “oneness” that comes from a 
“harmonious association” within a “connected whole”. Such connection doesn’t 
necessarily designate a direct equation between those who hold that the world is a 
system and those who hold it acts in unity but it does at least bring to the fore the idea 
that there is the possibility of a cultural or philosophical connection between the two 
since the language used by supposedly disinterested dictionary editors to define 
‘system’ is common to the language used to describe a ‘unity’.
These definitions of what it takes to be a system are, of course, rather open and 
vague; so much so that the system concept might be thought ot as encapsulating just 
about any object, any process, any thing that exists in space and time. The description 
of a thing as a system and the description of a thing as not a system is thus a process 
with an implicit arbitrariness within it.
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This ability to vaguely define systems, to draw upon the open-endedness of the 
system concept is actually a great source of strength for systems advocates. They may 
happily apply their concept-and its attendant metaphysical/mathematieal rules and 
principles—to all manner o f things and processes without much disagreement coming 
from within science that they cannot do this because their is no scientific, grounded 
definition of what a system can and cannot be. Any previously imagined unity (such as 
a society, forest, nation, household) can now become a system and be submitted to a 
systems analysis.
Here it is possible to spot some sort of paradox between systems theory’s veneer 
and its substance. Systems science has gained a lot of its adherents, support, funds, 
and popularity because it was perceived to be ultra-modem and ultra-scientific, yet it 
is actually not very scientific at all, merely a play towards certain metaphysical biases. 
Although it is a discipline that uses and produces a lot of numbers, a lot of 
mathematics, a lot of diagrams and a lot of sophisticated terms, systems science 
nevertheless is a science indissolubly welded to metaphysics. It merely hides this 
metaphysics under mathematical equations, flow diagrams and jargon.51
The major importance of the system concept to the unity of nature idea lies in its 
claim towards scientificity. This claim is brought about by systems theory’s supposed 
discovery and elaboration of a universal principle. This is to say systems science 
claims to provide the mechanism that shows exactly how nature is united. This 
mechanism—this glue that unites everything—is called ‘feedback’. Systems are 
systems, according to the systems theorists, because of the operation of feedback 
between the systems various constituents. Feedback may be defined as the circular 
process in which the activity of a thing contributes to the activity of another thing 
which then feeds back to contribute the activity of the first thing. In the case of 
Lovelock’s Gaia theory, feedback is the process whereby the geobiological 
components o f the Earth interact to keep the atmosphere or the seas at thermal and 
chemical constancy.
Lovelock, however, was not the first who aspired to bring in feedback concepts 
into the ecological realm. Drawing his insights from Norbert Wiener s mathematics of
51For more about this with specific relevance to systems theory see Lilienfeld (1988) and with general reference to 
mathematics see Assouni (1994).
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feedback, Evelyn Hutchinson52 was one of the first ecologists to emphasise the role of 
systems feedback in ecological situations. Hutchinson’s unit of feedback was not the 
whole earth, as in Lovelock’s case, but the ecosystem:
it is well known from mathematical theory that circular paths often exist which tend to 
be self-correcting within certain limits, but which breakdown, producing violent 
oscillations, when some variable in the system...transgresses limiting values. It is 
therefore, usual to find in nature’s systems various mechanisms acting to damp 
oscillations. (Hutchinson, quoted in Kwa, 1993.223-224).
Such announcements of the reality of ecologically-related feedback processes 
continues in modem day ecosystem ecology and its inescapable importance as an 
ecological concept is exhorted by Edward Goldsmith too:
the operation of all sorts of internally-generated negative feedback mechanisms 
(Eugene Odum’s environmental hormones) which inhibit the growth of species that 
are displaced in the succession towards a climax is clearly visible to all but the most 
prejudiced eye. (Goldsmith, 1993:262).
It might be alleged that systems science is far more than just finding worldly 
examples of feedback and that systems ecology is more than just finding ecological 
examples of feedback but although these allegations may be sound enough it is also 
true to say that both systems theory in general and systems ecology specifically can 
hardly exist without the concept of feedback.
If we trust a systems theorist to elaborate upon the history of their subject they 
would surely relate it to the rise of the discipline known as ‘cybernetics’. Cybernetics, 
they would point out, first self-organised itself into an intellectual system of thought 
within a military background during wartime and post-war USA. Hagen, who is not 
an avowed systems theorist, expresses this history in a concise way thus: “cybernetics 
had developed largely out of the wartime problem of designing an automatic control 
system for anti-aircraft guns” (Hagen, 1992:71).
As is alluded to in the statement above the leading figures of cybernetics, such as 
von Neumann and Norbert Wiener, were both involved in the military development of 
cybernetic machines during and immediately after the Second World War, although, 
[wjhereas von Neumann remained a military consultant throughout his career, 
specialising in the application of computers to weapons systems, Wiener ended his
52See Hutchinson (1957).
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military work shortly after the first Macy meeting. (Capra, 1996:54).
The Macy meetings about which Capra speaks were a short series of conferences 
convened by early systems theorists to discuss the emerging problems and ideas of 
their field. About these conferences, which both von Neumann and Wiener attended, 
Fritjof Capra writes:
The conceptual framework of cybernetics was developed in a series of legendary 
meetings in New York city, known as the Macy Conferences. These 
meetings—especially the first one in 1946—were extremely stimulating.
(Capra, 1996:54).53
Capra has enormous respect for von Neumann and Wiener and strongly 
advocates them as truly influencing the development of systems unity in both 
biological and ecological thought. Certainly, within the science of ecology, 
cybernetics is richly represented in ecosystems studies and in systems ecology. 
Although Wiener said nothing about ecology many ecological ideas within systems 
ecology, including James Lovelock’s Gaia were developed as variants based upon the 
cybernetics of Wiener. Von Neumann himself also said little or nothing about ecology 
directly but he was given over to philosophising about general systems in “biology and 
appreciated the richness of natural, living systems” (Capra, 1996:54). Von Neumann’s 
work, too, is said by Capra to have been a direct influence upon later systems 
ecologists like for instance Eugene Odum, Howard Odum and James Lovelock.
Indeed it might be pointed out that the Odums and Lovelock owe more to cybernetics 
theory than to any traditional approach in ecology. This is evident (and, incidentally, 
approvingly acknowledged by Edward Goldsmith) when Odum declares:
ecosystems can be considered cybernetic in nature, but control functions are internal and 
diffuse rather than external and specified as in human engineered cybernetic devices. (E.
53We might like to compare this statement of Capra’s with Hagen’s records of some biologists who went to these 
conferences and who actually found them pointless (see Hagen, 1992). Incidentally, within Capra s hagiographie 
treatment of systems science he thinks, for some reason, that we should pay attention to early systems theory 
because it emerged from people with fast brains. About von Neumann, for example he says:
“John von Neumann was...a mathematical genius, he had written a classic treatise on quantum 
theory, was the originator of the theory of games, and became world famous as the inventor of the 
digital computer. Von Neumann had a powerful memory and his mind worked with enormous speed.
It was said of him that he could understand the essence of a mathematical problem almost instantly 
and that he would analyse any problem, mathematical or practical, so clearly and exhaustively that 
no further discussion was necessary.” (Capra: 1996: 118).
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Odum in Goldsmith, 1993:130)
Similarly Lovelock states “Gaia has been...the hard science view of a physical 
chemist with an interest in control theory” (Lovelock 1995:280); ‘control theory’ 
being another name for those principles that describe feedback tendencies in 
cybernetic systems. Admissions like this permeate Lovelock’s work so that we must 
judge that Gaia is not merely imbued with feedback/control theory but is a product of 
the intellectual heritage that is cybernetics and systems science.
When looking at the systems ecology of Eugene and Howard Odum we find that 
they have articulated feedback processes tor the chemical transfer patterns in the 
physical environment o f an ecosystem. The Odums protracted elaboration of carbon 
cycles, nitrogen cycles and phosphate cycles are examples of such chemical feedback 
and transfer patterns. In Lovelock’s Gaia theory the feedback processes that he has 
discovered also include these things but the cycles are postulated on a global scale. 
Capra, too, makes much of the ecological and philosophical importance of negative 
feedback cycles involving carbon, nitrogen, phosphate etc. He then goes on to 
compare the prevalence of negative feedback to positive feedback in ecology: 
indeed, purely self-reinforcing phenomena are rare in nature, as they are usually 
balanced by negative feedback loops constraining their runaway tendencies...In an 
ecosystem, for example, every species has the potential of undergoing an exponential 
population growth, but these tendencies are kept in check by various balancing 
interactions within the system. (Capra, 1996:63).
This example, incidentally, is one of the favourites for those with an interest in 
both ecology and systems theory for not only does it give a easily understandable 
example o f the presence of negative feedback it also does other important things for 
cybernetics. Firstly it links cybernetics not just with any old science but with the 
politically attuned science of ecology; thus promoting cybernetics as a politically 
agreeable and socially responsible science. Having positioned itself within that 
science, systems theory can easily lose its somewhat politically-disagreeable 
connection with weapons of war. Systems theory—via systems ecology—then goes on 
to make very acceptable claims about the reality of ecological situations (i.e. nature is 
in unity, nature is in balance). These claims are acceptable because they appear to 
restate what has been known for so long.
I l l
SYSTEMS ECOLOGY AS MANAGEMENT ECOLOGY
If systems ecology can be characterised as ‘cybernetics meets ecology’ then the 
two men that encouraged that meeting most, and derived most from it, were the 
Odum brothers. The Odum brothers comprised Eugene, who obtained his Ph.D. not 
in ecology, but physiology, and Howard, who obtained his postgraduate training in 
meteorology. The Odums were able to gain support for systems ecology for two 
reasons. Firstly, the United States Atomic Energy Commission [AEC] wanted to 
know what affects radiation had on human health and the health of human 
environments. Eugene Odum was the first scientist to impress upon the AEC that 
systems studies of ecological settings were the best way to do this and so he went on 
to prosper in the funding stakes.
Up until then the sporadic fimding of ecosystem analysis was via the university 
system. Before the patronage of the AEC towards the work of Eugene Odum, 
ecology—whether of a community, ecosystem or population bent--was only funded by 
university-level grants. As Kwa (1993:247) points out: “in this context the importance 
of the AEC as a patron o f ‘big ecology’ must be understood”.
The second reason for support of Odumian systems ecology in the 1950s and 60s was its 
perceived relevance to environmental and ecological management. This idea has been 
developed by Kwa in a number of papers54.
Kwa explains that systems ecological concepts had “fallen on fertile ground 
because of their management applicability” (Kwa, 1993:248). As Kwa would explain 
it; systems ecology was not only new and quantitative (and produced numbers that 
management could use in planning) it also boasted the language and the rationality 
that managers (and their overseers) liked. Not only that but its results were presented 
in forms very much the same as management studies were presented. Ecosystem flow 
charts resembled the flow charts of 1950s management techniques so much so that 
one could just plug the ecological results into resource management strategies without 
fear o f rejection. In this way systems ecology became management ecology. Biggins 
(1976) found these links so remarkable that he was compelled to comment that the
54 See Kwa (1987) and Kwa (1993)
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central metaphors of modem ecological theory-i.e.: control, regulation, interaction, 
feedback, flows et cetera-derive from post-Keynesian capitalist management 
techniques and computing55.
This idea that systems ecology was management ecology was not repelled but 
positively fostered by the Odums and other ecosystem scientists. Eugene Odum, for 
instance, is said by Golley (1993:108) as having believed that ecosystem science could 
provide a “pure science basis for landscape planning in the future.”
As with the management of human-related systems the management of nature 
was, as Golley would put it, ‘fundamentally economical’. Nature, like society, could 
be converted into an economic entity. It was hardly any trouble at all to configure the 
carbon cycle or the nitrogen cycle in to the economy. Indeed this is what the Odums 
have continuously sought to do56.
As Kwa points out:
The development of systems ecology was a manifestation of great technological 
optimism with regard to the possibility of the management of natural systems. (Kwa, 
1993:249).
This optimism was developing in the 1950s and 1960s in relation to the perceived 
applicability of systems analysis to every form of human endeavour but it can hardly 
be periodised to being just a phenomena of the 50s and 60s. Nowadays the ‘systems 
ecology equals management ecology’ ethos is alive and well in the form of 
‘environmental integration management’.
Within this brand of environmental management it is often thought that only an 
integrated systems approach can solve problems in the environment yet it merely
53Twenty years later a similar, though less obvious, influence upon ecological metaphors via management concepts 
nan be found in Fritjof Capra’s The Web o f  Life. Where, for twenty odd years the system was Capra s prime 
metaphorical device (see Capra, 1975, Capra, 1982, Capra, 1988) to explain the nature of all existence now he is 
beginning to swap the ‘system’ for the ‘network’. On occasion we can see Capra use network in exactly the same 
way he has used ‘system’. Where Capra’s systems were ‘dynamic, integrated unities of parts’, so his networks are 
‘dynamic, integrated unities of parts’. Thus Capra now says: “during the second half of the century the network 
concept has been the key to recent scientific understanding not only of ecosystems but the very nature of life 
(Capra, 1996:35) where he would have said the exact same thing for systems in his earlier publications. This could 
easily lead one to ponder—in the vein of Biggins’ (1976) assertion—whether or not Capra s new emphasis on 
networks are the result of the continued growth of networks and network analysis in both management and 
computing and especially with regards to the Internet (It should be acknowledged that this transition from the 
system metaphor to the network metaphor is not complete within Capara’s writing and much explanation within 
his latest works still affords reference to systems.)
56See Odum (1971),
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reduces these problems to something that looks like it can be solved. Just as systems 
ecologists often castigated small-scale approaches as being fragmentary approaches to 
environmental management in the 1960s, so 1990s environmental managers castigate 
less than total perspectives in today’s management of the environment37. Calling for a 
total ecological appraisal, or worse claiming that such an appraisal exists and then 
using it as such, is still part of the tradition that mistakes systems in the natural world 
for the whole of the natural world. This is not to say systems approaches are in no 
way useful when they focus upon the subjects of interest to them (i.e. energy flows, 
material pollution) but it does suggest that the items of interest to systems managers 
are not always the items that should be of interest in environmental protection (such 
as the well-being of individual species and the communities they make up).
Without doubt one of the greatest affiliates to the optimistic and managerial point 
of view of the systems ecology is James Lovelock. His Gaia theory might in fact be 
interpreted as the epitome of such views and this, indeed, is the charge Bill Devall, a 
well-known American environmentalist, makes at Gaia theory. Bill Devall has 
described the Gaia theory as an updated version of Gifford Pinchot’s ‘scientific 
management’ of national forests (see Zimmerman, 1994). Gaia is thus, according to 
Devall’s line of criticism, a theory that offers humanity a chance to identify—via 
feedback/control theory—the global cycles essential for humanity to preserve itself. 
Once these cycles have been identified it seems that humanity only needs a 
management practice in place that preserves them to set the world’s ecological 
problems in order. The question that remains, however, is: ‘are these cycles in any 
way indicative of the presence or absence of the very animals and plants that humans 
wish to save?’
Although the success of ecosystems analysis was debated within the ecology 
profession itself57 8, many non-ecological scientists, including biologists, did not doubt 
its efficacy and applicability and also its scientific hardness. This is most evidently the
570ne of the best places to witness this phenomena is within the programmatic statements within the promotional
publications of applied environmental research bodies and institutes, like the USFS (United States Forest Service), 
the Department of Conservation (New Zealand) or the Institute of Sustainable Futures, (Australia). For instance 
the ISF declares that its task is to: “instigate an integrated approach to the study and management of A ustria  s 
ecology so that the environment is understood and managed in its entirety rather than piece-meal (ISF, 1 ).
58See McIntosh (1985), Kwa (1987), Kwa (1993), Hagen (1992) and Golley (1993) for the history of these debates.
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case if we consider that from a pedagogical point of view, ecosystem concepts and 
analysis still maintain a great degree of coverage in general science syllabi when they 
address ecological issues. Ecosystems and ecosystem analyses have thus become a 
potent, if not dominant, way of looking at nature; this dominance being at least partly 
encouraged by its links to managerial issues.
Another interesting twist of the ‘systems ecology equals management ecology’ 
equation is also worth mentioning. According to Golley, the systems ecologist that led 
a section of the grandiose 1968-72 International Biological Program; George van 
Dyne, ran his Grasslands Ecosystem project within this Program like a typical systems 
manager. Like a “dogmatic” king overlooking his hierarchically-organised domain, 
van Dyne “fiercely...drove his colleagues, co-workers and graduate students hard” 
towards maximum project efficiency.59 If nothing else this tells us about the similarity 
of ecosystems management to the management ideas of the time but it also hints at 
much more. It exposes the ease to which a metaphysical viewpoint may totally 
dominate the thoughts of its practitioners so that nothing in the world can be 
conceived or practised without regard to it.
One other question that seems reasonable to ask with regards to the history of 
systems ecology is about the origins of cybernetics and the impact of this on 
cybernetics as a whole. By this I mean to inquire if it might be plausible to assume that 
there is a connection between cybernetics and the conservative side of Western 
politics since both Norbert Wiener and John von Neumann pioneered cybernetics as 
part of the development o f military hardware. Thus, if Wiener and von Neumann are 
the type of people to entertain thoughts about the necessity of the defence of their 
nation, is it not reasonable for us to entertain thoughts that they were supportive of 
the USA as a good and free entity worthy of preservation? The fact that you work for 
a government military institution might mean that you are less likely to be a political 
radical but it does not mean you will necessarily use your techniques of the job to
39Auerbach (1995:xxix-xxx), from whom these quotes are taken, also had this to say about George van Dyne s 
management style:
To say that he was somewhat dogmatic is a bit of an understatement. When he was manager of 
the program, his forcefulness more than occasionally resulted in controversy with other scientists, 
especially those with similar traits. He firmly believed that his approach to ecosystem research 
in the grasslands was the appropriate model or paradigm for all the biome programs.
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justify that conservatism outside the job-place. However, von Neumann is well-known 
as a developer and promoter o f Games theory, whose intersections with American 
liberalist capitalism has been exposed a number of times60. Might there not also be a 
connection between systems science and liberal capitalism?
ORDER OUT OF CHAOS: THE NEW SCIENCES
For many systems theorists in this turn of the millennium period, systems theory 
is being superseded by something new. This something new is ‘complex systems 
theory’. No more do systems theorists deal with simplified things or believe that 
things are simple. They have matured in their way of thinking to believe that 
everything is complex, even the simple things.
This might make an outsider believe that systems scientists have admitted, at last, 
to being unable to model and explain all things in nature using only one 
methodological framework but that is not necessarily the case. In fact armed with 
complex systems theory, some scientists now believe that they may be able to explain 
and model just about anything in nature.
This new complex systems theory is, of course, a derivative of systems theory; so 
much so that it is sometimes impossible to tell the difference between the two. And 
each has evoked an over-excitement within the writings of its advocates. Just as 
systems theorists during the post-War period spoke of their discipline in revolutionary 
terms61 so complex systems theorists sometimes speak of complex system theory in 
revolutionary terms62.
60See for example Martin (1978), Lilienfeld (1988), Mainzer (1994).
61 For example, we may quote the systems theorist Rosen (1972:233) who said:
The developing family of ideas and concepts which fall roughly under the rubric of systems 
theory amounts to a profound revolution in science—a revolution which will transform human 
thought as deeply as did the earlier ones of Galileo and Newton.
62 For instance consider the proclamations about complex systems theory of Krohn e t  a l (1990.1) who are 
“[ojbserving a present day scientific revolution”, and Kuppers (1990:51) who says we are experiencing a singular 
phenomenon in the development of science, for which I can think of no better description than fundamental and 
Fabel (1994:304) who believes that “the current ferment in science is potentially more than another Copemican 
revolution.”
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Complex systems theory goes by various names. It is, perhaps, more familiarly 
known by its constituent parts; Complexity theory and Chaos theory. Added to these 
two core theoretical nodes might be number of others, like the Self-organisation 
theories o f Maturana, Varela, Prigogine and Jantsch63 and also Lovelock’s Gaia 
theory. All these four bodies of theory are all in some way related, having in common, 
according to Capra (1996:x) key concepts such as: “chaotic attractors, fractals, 
dissipative structures, self-organisation, and autopoietic networks”64. All of these 
sciences together; Complexity, Chaos, Self-organisation and Gaia, are dubbed the 
‘New Sciences’ by Paul Davies and some others and to save time that is what I shall 
call them too.
To sum them up we might say that the theories contained within the New 
Sciences advocate an evolutionary dynamic systems view of the cosmos that elevates 
processes over substances and recognises the ever-present operation of 
self-organising order emerging from chaos. Or as Davies puts it, the New Sciences 
tell:
the story of the universe [as] one of increasing complexity and organisation emerging 
spontaneously from primordial simplicity and uniformity. The self-organising and 
self-complexifying power of the laws of physics which are only now being studied, 
constitute a second remarkable property. (Davies, 1996:6).
True to the intellectual marketing zeal of those who promote complex systems 
theory, both Chaos theory and Complexity theory have independently been hailed as 
revolutionary sciences. Capra, for instance, says of Complexity theory.
[t]he discovery of this new mathematics of Complexity is increasingly being recognised 
as one of the most important events in 20th century science. (Capra, 1996:112).
And likewise, of Chaos theory, Hayles declares:
it is already apparent that Chaos theory is part of a paradigm shift of remarkable scope
and significance.
The word ‘chaos’ would seem to conjure up things anarchic, things sporadic, 
things random, yet the chaos in Chaos theory is not really like this. As various 
advocates of Chaos theory put it :
63See Maturana and Varela (1980), Jantsch (1980) and Prigogine and Stengers (1984).
64These key concepts«do not fear-will be explained and examined throughout the rest of this chapter.
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Although chaotic behaviour is, by definition, dauntingly difficult to model, there is 
still some underlying order in its manifestation. (Davies, 1987:51). In chaos theory the 
term chaos has acquired a new technical meaning. The behaviour of chaotic systems 
is not merely random but shows a deeper level of patterned order. (Capra, 1996:122).
Disorder can play a critical role in giving birth to new, higher forms of order.
(Wheatley, 1992:11).
Out of chaos comes forth the fertile variety of forms of existence and life in the universe. 
Chaos is the father of innovation. (Merry, 1995:13).
This order that is hidden in, and emerges from, chaos is not of a simple kind but 
is, according to Chaoticians, extraordinarily complex. Hence the name of the theory 
that explores this type of order is Complexity theory.
The process whereby complex order emerges from chaos is often given the title 
‘self-organisation7, the maintenance of which is termed ‘self-regulation7; two terms 
that we have occasionally come across in previous chapters. Within the New 
Sciences, the study of such ordering and regulation becomes so intense it is often 
described as constituting a particular theoretical node: Self-organisation theory.
Chaos theory and Self-organisation theory are intimately linked (so say the New 
Scientists), since “[c]haos is the basis of the ability of living matter to self-organise 
itself7 (Merry: 1995:13). Self-organisation, too, is also presented in 
paradigm-changing terms by certain New Scientists:
I have taken some time to outline the emerging theory of self-organising systems 
because it is today the broadest scientific formulation of the ecological paradigm with 
the most wide-ranging implications. (Capra, 1994:340).
Life itself, we are told by Capra, is a system defined by its spontaneous 
self-organising properties: “[a] living system is defined as a self-organising system 
(Capra: 1994). By living systems Capra means not only individual organisms but living 
systems at higher levels:
[l]ike individual organisms, ecosystems are self-organising and self-regulating 
systems (Capra, 1992:301).
Chaos theory, Complexity theory and Self-organisation theory have also been 
intimately linked to the unity of nature. Complexity theory, for instance, has often 
been intellectually tied with the unity of nature in general and with the Gaia theory in
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particular. Witness this statement from Lewin as an example:
[t]oday, researchers are viewing Gaia and the whole notion of the 
superorganism in light of the modem mathematical theory of complexity.
(Lewin, 1996:28).
Paul Davies, too, finds that:
Gaia provides a nice illustration of how a highly complex feedback system can display 
stable modes of activity in the face of drastic external perturbations. We see again how 
individual components and sub-processes are guided by the system as a whole to 
conform to a coherent pattern of behaviour...The fact that life acted in such a way as to 
maintain the conditions for its own survival and progress is a beautiful example of 
self-regulation. It has a pleasing teleological quality to it. (Davies: 1987:132).
Similarly, Fritjof Capra is also impressed by the relationship of Gaia theory to 
Self-organisation theory:
James Lovelock had an illuminating insight that led him to formulate a model that is 
perhaps the most surprising and beautiful expression of self-organisation—the idea that 
the planet Earth as a whole is a living, self-organising system. (Capra, 1996:100).
As well as Lewin, Davies and Capra, two of the loudest spokespeople for Chaos 
theory, Cohen and Stewert, also admit to appreciating Gaianism by saying:
Gaia, as an integrated dynamical system, replete with feedback loops and stabilising 
subsystems, is an entirely respectable concept. (Cohen and Stewert, 1994:387).
Whether or not it is actively linked to Gaia theory the complex systems view in 
the New Sciences still advocates a united conception of life and the universe:
Chaos in a certain sense reveals the unity of the universe and the hidden tie between 
one thing and another. (Merry, 1995:30).
Merry (1995:61) goes on to write that “[a] basic characteristic of complex 
systems is connectivity. In a world of complex systems everything is connected to 
everything else.” Similarly Fraser Clarke says of Chaos theory that it is:
unification science, interrelation science, whole science. It shows you that there is a 
connection between everything (Fraser Clarke quoted in Wright, 1996:227).
Although Chaoticians approve of the Gaia theory and think it quite workable as a 
part o f the New Sciences, James Lovelock himself, is not entirely supportive of Chaos 
theory. Lovelock does not want to praise any science that might offer support for a 
theoretical ecology that disagrees with his own emphasis on stability. Chaos theory 
hardly does this since its affinity to the chaotic is only to find hidden order but James
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Lovelock, like many others, has not realised this yet. Unlike the Chaoticians who 
admire Gaia, Lovelock does not return the admiration for Chaos theory. Instead he 
sees Chaos theory as part o f traditional science that continuously exhibits a fascination 
with sickness and atypicality (see Lovelock, 1988).
THE NEW SCIENCES AND ECOLOGY
Fritjof Capra (1994:340) indicates that one of the reasons he finds:
the theory of self organising systems so important is that it seems to provide the 
ideal scientific framework for an ecologically oriented worldview.
We might like to ask what the connection between the New Sciences and 
ecology and environmentalism actually is. Although Capra (1996), Birch (1990), 
Zohar and Marshall (1993), Gare (1995) and others talk about the New Sciences as 
prompting a paradigm change to an ‘ecological’ and ‘environmentally-fiiendly’ 
worldview, who amongst these writers actually talks about ecology or the 
environment in their new worldview? On reading those texts deemed to be 
descriptions of this new worldview it appears that the answer to this question comes 
out like this: not Capra, not Birch and not Zohar and Marshall. Out of these people 
only Gare makes a commitment into entering mainstream environmental/ecological 
discourse65. If  the others do somehow stumble on ecological issues it is either via 
Gaian ecology or ecosystemic unity and if they stumble upon environmentalism they 
just repeat the fact that the Earth is dying and we need to change our worldview as
65 Arran Gare’s environmental investigations in his 1995 book are devoted to exploring the postmodern condition 
(a term described by Lyotard, 1984, and Harvey, 1990) and its interactions with and influences upon the 
environmental crisis. Since, according to Gare, both postmodernism and environmentalism have intellectual 
programmes designed to understand the culture of modem society and how it has come to its present state, and 
since those attempting to understand postmodemity and the environmental crisis both see Western society as 
oppressive, and are striving to develop novel or resurrect traditional pathways of experiencing, understanding, 
acting and living, then it is arguable that the postmodern condition, associated as it is with a loss of faith m 
modernity, progress and rationality, reflects people's growing awareness that it is just these cultural forms which 
are propelling humanity to self-destruction. Although Gare acknowledges this link between postmodernism and 
environmentalism he also asserts that they have never been significantly brought together in an intellectual way. 
The way Gare does this, is by invoking Marxist critiques of capitalism, then utilising poststructural poltical 
messages (both of which he is critical of but sympathetic with) before ariving at a postmodern cosmology (tosed 
upon the New Sciences of people like Davies) that he believes represents a worldview fully comensurable with a 
variety of ecological politics, environmental philosophies, and Green economics.
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part of the process of stopping this. Any sustained attempt to enter into ecology and 
environmental issues is non-existent in the writings of these thinkers. As an example 
consider Capra. In his latest monograph, The Web o f Life, Capra tries hard to attach 
himself not only to ecological science in general, via references to ecosystem ecology, 
but to Deep Ecology specifically, a popular environmental movement:
The sense in which I use the term ‘ecological’ is associated with a specific 
philosophical school, and, moreover, with a global grassroots movement, known as 
‘deep ecology’ which is rapidly gaining in prominence. (Capra, 1996:7).
Now Deep Ecologists, themselves might be puzzled at Capra’s attempt to align 
his ‘ecological’ approach in The Web o f Life with Deep Ecology philosophy, since it 
is a book on the philosophy of complex systems theory and not one which seeks to 
explore environmental problems in relation to any of the precepts of Deep Ecology66. 
Capra’s retort to this would of course go something like this: ‘the cause of the 
environmental crisis is our modem worldview and what we need to stop it is a new 
worldview which posits the unity of all things’. Herein lies a very shallow and 
superficial resemblance to Deep Ecology in that both Capra and very many Deep 
Ecologists have a metaphysical commitment to unity but that is where the
66The precepts of Deep Ecology are expressed in the well-known Deep Ecology eight point platform. It reads like 
this:
1) The well-being and flourishing of human and non-human life on Earth have value in themselves 
(synonyms: intrinsic value, inherent value). These values are independent of the usefulness of the 
non-human world for human purposes.
2) Richness and diversity of lifeforms contribute to the realisation of these values and are also values in 
themselves.
3) Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy basic needs.
4) The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a substantial decrease of the human
population. The flourishing of non-human life requires such a decrease. . . .  .
5) Present human interference with the non-human world is excessive, and the situation is rapidly 
worsening.
6) Policies must therefore be changed. These policies affect basic economic, technological, and 
ideological structures. The resulting state of affairs will be deeply different from the present.
7) The ideological change is mainly that of appreciating life quality (dwelling in situations of inherent 
value) rather than adhering to an increasingly higher standard of living. There will be a profound 
awareness of the difference between big and great.
8) Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation directly or indirectly to try to 
implement the necessary changes.
This platform is announced in various publications, including: Naess (1973), Devall and Sessions (1985) and 
Naess (1989).This specific formulation of it was taken from Naess (1995). It should be noted that Capra does not 
talk about any of these things in The Web o f  N atu re, despite saying his is a cosmological manifesto for Deep 
Ecology.
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resemblance ends. Although he declares at the beginning of his book that he is a Deep 
Ecologist, nowhere else in his book does he take up any of the debates raised by Deep 
Ecology, nor does he enter into the value premises and focal arguments (such as 
biospheric egalitarianism, anti-classism, population and pollution control) of the Deep 
Ecologists (see for example Devall and Sessions, 1985; Naess, 1989; Sessions, 1994; 
and Naess, 1994). In fact Capra does not even go anywhere near the literature of this 
‘world-wide grassroots environmental movement’ he professes to be a part of. Given 
this, the overtures he makes to Deep Ecology must be interpreted as a play for 
political legitimacy within the environmental movement. His ideas, so Capra thinks, 
must be given cognisance by environmentalists, if for no other reason, than he is 
expressing their natural philosophy.
Another point to make about the New Sciences and their connections to ecology 
revolves around the possible attachment of ecology to Chaos theory. Dealing with 
chaotic phenomena as it proclaims, Chaos theory, if applied directly to ecology, might 
be thought somewhat more compatible to the changing dynamics of forest ecologies 
as theorised by Gleason and his disciples than the superorganicism of Clements. 
However, this is not the case. Chaos theory, as Capra, Davies, Lewin and others 
indicate, is actually more in tune with Clementsian ecology. Clements’ climax 
communities, Chaoticians and other New Scientists would say, is an example of a 
self-organising order emerging from chaos.
One of the claims of those who support Chaos theory and Complexity theory is 
that they give birth to views of nature that epistemologically liberate nature’s 
constituents. Thus we have people like E.C. White saying:
The role ascribed to stochastic self-organisation in this view of natural history is an 
emancipatory one. As the stochastic leaps toward the unprecedented liberates nature 
from determinism; so the emergence of order out of chaos overcomes entropic 
degradation. Nature is both ‘free’ and ‘progressive.’ (White, 1991:264).
But if Chaos theory and Complexity theory are more linkable (or linked) to 
Clements than Gleason, this claim for ‘freedom’ seems to come under some doubt 
since Clements superorganism tends to act as an imprisoning metaphysical framework 
as far as the species in a community are concerned. What’s more, if Clements 
superorganism is an example of the New Sciences of Self-organisation, Chaos and 
Complexity at work, then so must Odum’s ecosystems and Lovelock s Gaia since all
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three (Clements’ Climax communities, Odum’s Ecosystems and Lovelock’s Gaia) 
have been shown to be philosophically related. Therefore, far from having a role of 
emancipation as depicted in the above passage by White, Self-organisation theory and 
Chaos theory would impose a metaphysical schema of systems determinism, 
over-generalisation and uniformity upon nature’s supposedly ‘free’ members. Just as 
Clementsianism, Gaianism and systems ecology imprison living beings within an 
over-lording holism which goes on to trap them in levels and tyrannous niches, so the 
New Sciences of Chaos theory and Self-organisation may do the same.
It should be noted that the complex systems theory of the New Sciences does not 
break from unitarianising natural history in a way that is any different from ‘normal’ 
systems theory. All of its basic assumptions are still there: systems, unity, holism, 
determinism, as well as levels and hierarchy, as we shall soon see.
Another possible relationship between ecology and the New Sciences is 
introduced by Worster (1993). Worster explains that the continued growth of 
Gleasonian-type ecological views in science—which talk of individualism and chaos in 
ecological settings—mirrors the accent on chaos that the New Sciences supposedly 
epitomise and that both of these disciplines together (i.e. Gleasonian ecology and 
Chaos theory) mirror the prevalence of individualistic and chaotic situations in 
modem day liberal industrial society. “It is hard to exaggerate...” says Worster 
(1993:178):
...how far industrialism has gone in breaking down all the old notions of stability, 
community and order. Our entire world-view has been transformed profoundly by this 
force.
Even if one accepts the thesis that general social conditions, and their popular 
appreciation, may give rise to cogent worldviews (such as the one of chaos and 
individualism that Worster speaks) it is very difficult to accept Worster’s périodisation 
of this relationship that he draws between Gleasonian ecology, Chaos theory and 
modem day industrialism. If modem industrialism and liberalism have in some way 
imposed a worldview upon people by their manufacture of social chaos and 
individualism, then why did not Gleasonian-type individualistic/chaotic ecological 
ideas and the metaphysics of Chaos theory emerge at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century rather than in the mid/late Twentieth Century as was the case?
As has been outlined above, the link between Chaos theory and Gleasonianism
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(as explicated by Worster, 1993) is hardly justified since Chaos theory and 
Gleasonianism give rise to conflicting interpretations o f the reality of ecological 
situations- Chaos theory says that although things might appear to be chaotic, this is 
but a prelude to observable orders such as climax communities and stable ecosystems, 
whereas Gleasonianism would indicate that ecological settings are in a state of chaos 
without any hope of order emerging. Having said this, however, there maybe a link 
between chaos theory and the appreciation of chaos in modem liberal societies and 
this link is explored in the next section.
CHAOS. SELF-ORGANISATION AND CAPITALISM
‘Chaos frees the universe!7. This is the claim of the those who champion the New 
Sciences67. The chaos in Chaos theory supposedly frees the constituents of the 
universe from being trapped in the prison of Newtonian determinism:
In classical Newtonian mechanics, once the initial conditions and the force laws are 
given, everything is calculable for ever before and after. The system is governed 
completely by the laws of mechanics and of conservation of energy. It is totally 
determined. It has no freedom. (Birch, 1991:ix)
Now, however, we are said to be entering a new paradigm that says:
the cosmos is a self-organising and quasi-sacred process that is developing greater 
complexity and greater freedom. (Zimmerman, 1994:14).
Under the metaphysical framework of the New Sciences we now live in a 
universe that has the potential to evolve. The traditional scientific outlook which 
holds that the universe is a pre-designed clockwork mechanism slowly grinding 
towards thermodynamic decay is an outlook that is said to be, itself, grinding towards 
decay in modem day culture. Instead, we have an organic model of the universe; a 
universe that evolves towards greater complexity and a universe whose constituents 
are not predetermined in their behaviour.
According to many New Scientists this new, emerging paradigm~of evolution 
instead o f decay and indeterminacy instead of determimsm—is an answer to the
67‘Chaos Frees the Universe! ’ was the title of an article in N ew  S cien tis t by Paul Davies. See Davies (1990).
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age-old problem of reconciling order and freedom since the various constituents of 
the universe are free from predetermined actions of a central designer but the actions 
they do undertake nevertheless contribute to an overall order. In this scheme of 
things:
[t]he two forces that we have always placed in opposition to one another-freedom and 
order—turn out to be partners generating viable, well-ordered, autonomous systems. 
(Wheatley, 1992:13).
If we are to treat the ‘order from chaos5 idea with the respect that many New 
Scientists think it deserves then we must remember that the order from chaos idea is 
not just a phenomena of physics or of biology but is a phenomena associated with all 
sorts of things. Capra (1982:310) for instance believes that the science o f ‘order from 
chaos5:
makes it possible to begin to understand biological, social, cultural and cosmic 
evolution in terms of the same pattern of systems dynamics, even though the different 
kinds of evolution involve different mechanisms.
In Ayres5 Information, Energy and Progress (1994), in Davies5 The Cosmic 
Blueprint (1987), in Merry’s Coping With Uncertainty (1995), in Capra’s The Web o f 
Life (1996), in Mainzer’s Thinking In Complexity (1994) and in a host of other 
books, this universal process of order from chaos is laid out chapter by chapter in the 
different disciplines and subjects of study that Capra mentions in the above quote. For 
instance after explaining how the universe emerged as order from chaos, and after 
explaining how the planet Earth and its geological and biological components ordered 
themselves from chaos, Ayres (1994) goes on to devote consecutive chapters 
explaining how order from chaos gave rise to advanced life, ecological systems, social 
systems, and economic systems. A similar pattern unfolds in the other books listed 
above as well as many other books and articles68.
Now, the attempt by Chaoticians to free the universe may not be novel. Nor are 
their self-declared aims to reconcile order, chaos and freedom. In the Eighteenth
68A short list of such books and articles might include: Gleick (1987), Peat (1987), Dyke (1988), Bnggs and Peat 
(1991), Yates (1989), Krohn e t  a l (1990), Küppers (1990), Roth and Schwegler (1990),
Krippner (1991). Scott (1991). Davies (1993), Goener (1993), Waldrop (1993), Abraham (1994), Cash ( X 
Probst (1994), Cohen and Stewert (1994), Russell (1994), Babich e t  a l (1995), Kauffman (1995), Mmgers(1995), 
Volk (1995), Hall (1997), Bossomaier and Green (1998). The length of this short list gives an indication o e 
extensive and intensive investigation and promotion of the New Sciences in the 1980s and 1990s.
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Century Samuel Clarke, David Hume, Christian August Crusius, Leonard Euler, Colin 
Maclaurin and others attempted the same thing. According to the historian of science, 
Otto Mayr (1986) they sometimes found their inspiration in the machines of the age.
It is too much for Mayr to think that the development of this liberal metaphysic (that 
tried to merge order and freedom) and the development of the steam engine happened 
at the same time without any connection. Because of this Mayr (1986) embarks on the 
following story that explains how they might be connected.
As part of the political necessity to legitimise and promote the ideas of liberalism 
what liberals really liked, so says Mayr, were metaphors derived from situations in 
which there was no obvious authoritative or autocratic control of individual entities 
(and their activities) yet the situation as a whole did not actually slide into chaotic 
disorder. How could these values, order and freedom, be reconciled? The metaphors 
of the old age would not do, says Mayr. Clocks, which indicated an autocratic 
watchmaker and an intervening winder, were only ever used in political and 
philosophical writings as metaphors o f authority and autocracy.
For those who needed new metaphors nature provided many examples but so did 
some artefacts. For those with philosophical interest in Europe’s burgeoning 
technology there was also often a parallel interest in the philosophy of the new politics 
and the philosophy of the new economics that we today know as liberalism. Mayr 
notes that these philosophical investigations into various subjects often reinvigorated 
one another. In the example of interest to us, we see that whereas the clock was a 
metaphor for authoritarianism, certain other machines capable of regulating 
themselves without intervention were used as metaphors tor liberalism.
Mayr cites some examples of the metaphorical use of the clock and of 
self-regulating machines to support his argument and then goes on to boldly claim that 
the importance of the prominent metaphor is manifestly observable when considering 
the earlier rise of both self-regulating machines and liberalism in the British Isles 
compared to the rest of the Europe. In this regard, Mayr charts the development ot a 
Liberal metaphysics o f freedom and order in late Eighteenth Century England with the 
parallel development of self-correcting machines and their philosophical evaluation:
The notion of the se lf-reg u la tin g  system , applicable to the most diverse fields, 
splendidly matched the needs of the liberal concept of order and was well on its way 
to broad popular acceptance in Britain by the mid-Eighteenth Century.
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(Mayr,1986:139).
The most well established and well-known self-regulating machine of the time 
was, o f course, the steam engine. Here was a device that could adjust to internal and 
external variations and make appropriate corrections without the need of intervention. 
At this time the Steam Engine was hardly put forward by Watt or any other of its 
inventors as a masterly example o f self-regulation and the inherent compatibility of 
order and freedom. But tor those with a metaphysical bent it was a tangible example 
of the operation of self-regulation.
Mayr goes on to describe Adam Smith’s ‘Invisible Hand’ as the apex of the 
philosophical tussles about order and freedom. This he makes out, can thereby be 
regarded as the concrétisation of the Liberal metaphysic. He states.
The grand conclusion of the interdependent, almost symbiotic evolution of the 
concepts of self-regulation and the liberal system of economics was reached in Adam 
Smith’s classic book "The Wealth of Nations’. (Mayr, 1986:172)
In this book Adam Smith believed he:
explained how the self-balancing mechanism of the tree-market regulated the economy 
better than the most benevolent, omniscient central authority. (Mayr, 1986:165).
For Mayr, Smith’s Invisible Hand “is nothing other than the quality of 
self-regulation” (Mayr, 1986:175). Mayr believes that Adam Smith’s analysis of 
feedback in the economy is presented:
in language so clear and is conceptualised so generally that it can be translated into 
the notation of modem systems theory without the need tor any additional 
modification. (Mayr, 1986:176).
Just as in ecological theory where self-regulation has been a concept that enables 
the manufacture of theories and metaphysics of nature in unity, so too does 
self-regulation in economics give rise to notions of unity:
it was the notion of the Invisible Hand that enabled Smith to develop the first 
comprehensive theory of the economy as an interrelated system. (Vaughn, 1987.168).
It is not only Mayr that delights in the contemporaneous development of 
self-regulating machines and the rise of liberalist economics. Advocates of the New 
Sciences have also been known to endorse the relationship too. Krohn (1990) and 
Mainzer (1994) for example state:
The specific regulating mechanism of the feedback that Smith had propounded may be
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found in the new power machines that had a great impact on further development...The 
temporal simultaneity in articulating the idea of self-organisation in nature, economy 
and technology is astounding. (Krohn, 1990:2).
From a qualitative point of view, Adam Smith’s model of a free market can already be 
explained by self organisation. (Mainzer, 1994:11).
Now, whether Adam Smith is in anyway a progenitor of Self-organisation 
theory—as Mayr, Krohn or Mainzer might suggest—is not really as important for us as 
the Twentieth Century renderings of his theories as being compatible to the 
self-organisation ideas contained within the modem day New Sciences.
The economic equilibrium of the Invisible Hand has passed through various 
theories and ideas since Smith. It is, however, still a central concept in much applied 
economic analysis. Often historians of science have linked this concept to the 
appropriation and misappropriation of physical science theories and Newtonian-linked 
metaphors (for example see McClosky, 1985; Mirowski, 1988; Mirowski, 1989). The 
merit of these approaches by McClosky and Mirowski is not questioned but in the 
final years Twentieth Century liberalist/capitalist economics may be more likely to find 
metaphysical/scientific support from systems theory and systems biology than it is 
from Newtonian-type physics.
THE ECOSYSTEM AND THE ECONOMY: ARE THEY BIRDS OF A
FEATHER?
Adam Smith’s metaphysical musings about political economics were not merely 
specific intellectual tools for use in economic analysis. His notion ot self-regulating 
order emerging from unconscious and chaotic actions was a lull blown metaphysical 
outlook. Adam Smith, like Edward Goldsmith, Paul Davies and Fritjot Capra today,
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applied his metaphysic broadly; to economics, demographics, social theory, justice 
theory and the social differentiation of labour69.
Like Smith in the Eighteenth Century, those who have tried to reconcile order 
and chaos in the late Twentieth Century espouse them as near universal metaphysical 
constants. As well as being applicable to societies, machines, the cosmos et cetera, the 
universal principle of order from chaos is also held by systems-linked metaphysicians 
to be observable in that bastion of ecological and environmental existence; the 
ecosystem. According to those who champion the chaos from order idea the 
ecosystem is yet another example of a self-regulating order that emerges out of 
jumbled chaos. Davies (1987), Capra (1996) and Birch (1990) for instance adhere to 
this view.
Some metaphysicists of the New Science bent, however, give the ‘economy as 
ecosystem7 analogy an extra twist. It is not that just any old economy is analogous to 
just any old ecosystem, it is that frilly matured and self-regulating ecosystems show 
the same properties of organisation, process and complexification as capitalist 
free-market economies. For instance in his book about the ‘New Evolutionary 
Paradigm7 of self regulation and complexity, Robert Ayres (1994:134) says:
There can be no question that the operation of a money-based, free competitive market 
generates a kind of coherence, or long range order, somewhat analogous to so called 
co-operative phenomena.
Ayres goes on to conclude that the modernist foe of capitalism is not of this type 
of self-regulating complexity since socialism requires administration by intervention 
and planning by an overlooking orderer. Mainzer, another New Scientist, also reflects 
this attitude when he firstly celebrates the Free Market of Smithian economics as an 
example o f self-regulation only to go on to announce that planned economies do not 
possess the natural regulatory benefits of market economies:
Smith underlined that the good or bad intentions oi individuals are not essential. In 
contrast to a centralised economical system, the equilibrium of supply and demand is 
not directed by a program-controlled central processor, but is the effect of an invisible 
hand, i.e. nothing but the non-linear interactions of consumers and producers.
(Mainzer, 1994:11).
69See Barry (1982),and Muller (1993).
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The reversible metaphor between the ecosystem and free-market economies is 
brought into new emphasis by Michael Rothschild in his book entitled Bionomics: the 
Inevitability o f Capitalism. Rothschild believes he shows that all of life is:
a self-organising phenomenon. From the interplay of hormones in the body to the 
expansions and contractions of the great Arctic caribou herds, nature’s intricately 
linked feedback loops automatically maintain a delicate, robust balance. Markets 
perform the same function in the economy. Without central planning, buyers and 
sellers constantly adjust to changing prices for commodities, capital and labour.
A flexible economic order emerges spontaneously from the chaos of the free market 
(Rothschild, 1990:xiv).
Believing that “[a] capitalist economy can best be comprehended as a living 
ecosystem” (1990:xi) Rothschild then goes on to declare that because ecosystems do 
not need to be planned to function well, and because economies are like ecosystems if 
allowed to run free, then planning in economies will only ever lead to trouble: 
Capitalism was not planned. Like life on Earth it did not need to be. Capitalism 
just happened, and it will keep on happening. Quite spontaneously. Capitalism 
flourishes whenever it is not suppressed, because it is a naturally occurring 
phenomenon. It is the way human society organises itself for survival in a world of
limited resources. (Rothschild 1990:xi)70.
Rothschild’s book is an exercise in the naturalisation of capitalism, and he admits 
as much, stating that he regards capitalism “as an inevitable, natural state ot human 
economic affairs. Being for or against a natural phenomenon is a waste of time and
mental energy” (Rothschild, 1990:xv).
What we see from looking at Rothschild’s work is that he first assumes an 
economics based on biology, (something which is largely done for him by numerous 
predecessors) then he applies this economics back to biology (by using 
‘bionomics’--‘the study of the economic relations ot organisms and their environment 
1990:xiv) and then he brings this bionomics back to the social realm and sees in it 
economics again. This is a prime example of a reprojective spiral metaphor that has 
consistently accompanied nature/culture analogies, both within and without the unity
70Incidentally Rothschild obligingly outlines those things that upset the natural balance of the natural economy {a  
la  Lovelock’s identification of those things that upset the natural balance of Gaia). These are nationalisation of 
industries, income taxes, profit taxes, looking after the unemployed, and helping bankrupts. An obvious alignment 
between Rothschild economic thinking and rationalist economics appears to be present
130
of nature idea71. It shows in Rothschild’s case, also, that there is no original grounded 
base from whence the original metaphor flowed.
Now, ecological/environmental advocates of the New Sciences would probably 
like to disown anything that Rothschild might have to say but he is only deriving his 
metaphysics from the same place as they are; i.e. the Liberal metaphysics of order and 
freedom as interpreted by the self-organisation ideas of the New Sciences and mixed 
with popular ecological concepts. Although ecologically minded New Science 
advocates like Charles Birch, Arran Gare and Fritjof Capra often rely on the New 
Sciences to bolster the scientific credibility of their political aims and environmental 
evaluations, they would be aghast to learn of the links that New Science has with 
modem industrial capitalism.
The links, both present and potential, might be further exposed if we note that it 
seems as though one of New Science’s loudest spokespersons tacitly shares 
Rothschild’s commitment to the metaphysics of capitalism. Paul Davies (1992) wrote 
in an article for 21st Century magazine that the model of the worlds economy as a 
ship captained by a steersmen should be dropped for a model of the economy as a 
self-organising ecosystem. This is also something Davies was prepared to declare as a 
fellow of the World Economic Forum (see Davies, 1998).
More explicit about the connection between the New Sciences and -neo-classical 
economic ideas is the complexity theorist Klaus Mainzer who states that: “From a 
qualitative point of view, Adam Smith’s model of a free market can already be 
explained by self-organisation”.
In contrast to Paul Davies and Klaus Mainzer, who might be regarded as closet 
metaphysical capitalists that passively use the ideas of New Sciences to promote a 
worldview amicable to their economic commitments, there are some committed 
metaphysical capitalists who actively tie the ideas of the New Sciences to the 
operation of Free Market economies. Rothschild does this implicitly but we may also 
note in this regard how More (1991) enlists theories of self-generating order that 
come from the New Science to ‘prove’ the symbiosis of order and chaos in capitalism.
In presenting order and chaos as symbiotic, in the way that More and many
71For explorations of reprojective spiral narratives external to the unity of nature idea see Young (1974), Schweber 
(1980), Young (1985), Mirowski (1989), Porter (1990), Cohen (1994), Limoges and Menard (1994)
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others do, precise definitions o f order and chaos have to be arranged. For More this 
means that order equates to economic equilibrium and progress, and chaos equates to 
individualistic actions that are not interfered with from above
Advocates of New Science and holistic philosophy may be quite willing to press 
ahead in their elaboration of a new paradigm even if they did know that the new 
emerging paradigm was being usurped by various natural philosophers with Free 
Market sympathies since it is still a metaphysic which is, in other ways, beneficial for 
the world. However there are some thinkers who operate entirely within the 
professional circles of capitalist economics who themselves have cottoned on to the 
rhetorical appeal of self-organisation.
For instance, a captain of industry that shares Davies’ view about the equivalency 
of ecosystems and economies is Tachi Kiuchi, managing director of the Mitsubishi 
Electric Corporation in the United States. Kiuchi believes that to really get going and 
gain maximum efficiency players in the economy have to learn from (self-regulating) 
ecosystems; adjusting and adapting, as the components of ecosystems have, to 
feedback processes, niche competition, and new environmental conditions (Neville, 
1998
More theoretical than Kiuchi are the economists Parker and Stacey (1995) who 
refer to the connection between the New Sciences and liberal capitalism by indicating 
that Chaos theory shows us that economies are best able to adapt and seli-organise 
(and thus provide for the needs of the economy’s members) when they are unplanned 
and unregulated:
Chaos theory adds an important dimension to the study of economics. It helps explain 
why...an economic system is required which encourages adaptability...and... 
enterprise. Competitive markets have an important role to play in this process.
Unlike planned systems, they provide for spontaneous adaptation. (Parker and
Stacey, 1995: 76).
A very well-known celebrant of capitalist economics from within the profession 
of academic economics also shares similar views is Frederick Hayek. Hayek is one ol 
the foremost champions for Twentieth Century capitalism that there has ever been. 
Hayek always embraced the order from chaos metaphysic ot liberalism and often set 
about to detail some of its workings (see, for example, Hayek, 1967). Spontaneous 
orders, as he called them, are the results ot the actions of individual entities but not ot
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conscious planning by these entities. Humans act, so thought Hayek, individually and 
rationally upon de-centralised information flows, most notably price levels, to 
contribute to a spontaneous economic order.
It Hayek saw the emergence ot order from chaos as a pretty-well universal 
phenomenon in nature and society then might there not be a link between this 
viewpoint of his and his celebration of capitalism. As we shall soon see, according to 
one of his intellectual historians, Robert Kley, there very possibly is such a link (Kley,
1992). We can then develop Kley’s ideas to show how Hayek’s work is clearly, at the 
metaphysical level, intellectually attached to the New Sciences and Self-organisation 
theory.
Where Adam Smith saw order from chaos in economics and social theory, where 
Von Neumann saw it in machines and cell biology, where Davies today sees it in 
ecosystems and solar systems, Hayek also saw spontaneous order in a myriad of 
places; from crystals to organisms to animal societies and galaxies. His favourite place 
to observe the machinations o f self-ordering complexity, however, was, of course, the 
Free Market: “[s] spontaneous social orders are ‘the result of human actions but not of 
human design’, the unintended consequence of the independent decisions and actions 
of many individuals.” (Hayek in Kley, 1994:102)72
Although he used his own language and terminology when explicating the 
formation of spontaneous orders Hayek did see that the processes he had identified 
were compatible to that found by the cyberneticians in their developing 
self-organisation ideas. As Kley indicates, for Hayek, models of order from chaos in 
economic situations could be explained in terms of information flow, feedback 
mechanisms and self-generation. Writing in the 1970s—a time that is often interpreted 
as the historical cusp between the systems theory of cybernetics and the complex 
systems theory of the New Sciences—Hayek became interested in complexity and 
organisation. He wrote “with spontaneous orders...[tjheir unplanned emergence must 
arouse some curiosity and warrants the establishment ot a distinct body ot theory” (in 
Kley, 1994:38). This distinct body of theory would no doubt be claimed as being the
72 As Kley (1992) explains, although Frederick Hayek saw spontaneous orders in all sorts of places, his favourite 
subject of examination was the economy. Order from chaos in this realm meant the economic equilibrium and 
economic progress emerged from the actions of chaotic individuals as they played and acted in the Market Place, 
haphazardly buying and selling to push and pull supply and demand.
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preserve and pursuit o f the New Sciences by its scholars. Where Hayek in the 1970s 
looked forward to a “theory of complex phenomena”. Davies announced in the 1980s 
that:
There exists something like a law of complexity. But the study of complexity is still 
very much in its infancy. The hope is that by studying complex systems in many 
different disciplines, new universal principles will be discovered that might cast 
light on the way that complexity grows with time.(Davies 1987:21).
Thus it is easy to conclude that Hayek would have approved of the emerging 
disciplines of self-organisation theory and complexity theory that New Scientists have 
become so intensely fond of.
Following Kley’s (1994) work on Hayek it is also possible to see the parallel 
between Hayek7 s excitement in his discovery of complexity with the current 
excitement exhibited by New Scientists over their discovery of the same phenomena. 
Hayek wanted to supersede the simple causal physics/metaphysics of Newtonianism 
with a more complex science. Something that Davies, and Capra also talk about a lot. 
Kley summarises these ideas of Hayek by saying:
To bring out the features of complex phenomena Hayek contrasts them with ‘simple 
phenomena’. The number of elements constituting the order of simple phenomenon is 
small. The orderly structure of its elements is the effect of a few one-way causal 
relations, and these relations are captured by the basic laws of physics. Finally, its 
environment does not influence the formation of a simple order. A complex order on 
the other hand, consists of a large number of elements and is the result of manifold 
exchange processes among the elements and between them and their surroundings. 
(Kley, 1994:41).
Without knowing it Hayek, in expressing the above ideas, could have been 
setting up the program of research that has become Complexity theory.
One well-known modern-day ecologist (who would call himself not a systems 
ecologist after systems theory, but a complex ecologist, after Complexity theory) sees 
in his own field of work how appropriate Hayek7 s ideas are. Donald deAngelis states 
that it is reasonable to think of a complex ecosystem in the same way that Hayek 
thinks of the market. Just as the market exists as a spontaneous order from the chaotic 
actions o f individuals, so the ecosystem exists as the self-ordered product of the 
species and populations within it. DeAngelis (1995:463) makes clear that he is not the 
only ‘complex ecologist7 to proffer such views:
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rhis view of the ecosystem as arising from the selfish interactions of species 
populations has been emphasised by some ecosystem theorists (tor example O’Neill 
and Reichle).
It may be thought by new paradigmers like Fritjof Capra and Edward Goldsmith 
that there is at least one striking difference between what Hayek says about 
spontaneous order and what they, themselves, say about it. Hayek as a capitalist must 
have surely required competition and struggle to be a prime factor in the ordering of 
chaos. Environmentally conscious philosophers and metaphysicists often see their 
worldviews as having no central place for competition and struggle. But, according to 
Kley (1992:82), Frederick Hayek repeatedly and emphatically denied that 
spontaneous order depended on competition. In fact Hayek emphasised the idea that 
individuals freely co-operated when forming associations and transacting in the 
market place.
Although Hayek’s philosophical affinity to the metaphysics of the New Sciences 
might be considered scary enough for those contemplating the social and ecological 
relevance of the New Sciences, there are some even more disturbing developments for 
the likes of Capra, Gare, Birch, Fabel and Ferre. In an interesting use of the 
self-organisation concept and the ecosystems thought of systems ecology, two 
environmental economists, Maley (1994) and DiZerega (1993), have separately 
claimed that the science of ecosystems justifies not protecting ecosystems. Both these 
writers believe that as the ecosystem is a prime example of a self-regulating order, the 
best thing we could do to save ecosystems is to run our economies like them. Thus, 
Maley goes on to suggest, environmental protection must be left to the workings of 
the market, the only economic system that obeys the self-ordering processes of 
ecosystems, and ecosystems will actually be protected. Interfere in the machinery of 
the Market by implementing artificial regulatory regimes such as public reserves, 
environmental regulation and eco-taxes and the economy will collapse from being 
self-ordering and the ecosystems will not survive:
It is the preoccupation with achieving ends quickly, by fiat rather than 
adaptive process, which characterises political thinking and command and 
control makeshift. (Maley, 1994:92).
From this perspective, the ecosystem is held to act in accordance with its own 
processes only when the social derivation of those processes—that is unfettered
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capitalism~is allowed to act. While environmentalists such as Capra, Birch, 
Goldsmith and Gare, might regard unfettered capitalism as a major factor in the 
destruction of ecosystems73, they unwittingly contribute to a metaphysics that 
suggests that environmentalism should be based on not directly protecting 
ecosystems.
ARE SELF-REGULATING ECONOMIES AS FREE AS THEY ARE MADE
OUT TO BE?
Having been inspired by the complex systems theory and its relevance to global 
order Artigiani (1991:159) writes:
Only highly autonomous individuals, empowered to monitor and regulate their own 
experience, can collect and communicate the information necessary to preserve social 
structure in technologically advanced environments.
If we are convinced, as is Artigiani, that the New Sciences are compatible with 
liberal capitalism and if we know that order emerges from chaos and that chaos gives 
rise to order, then all we need to do to gain order in the economy is to allow chaos to 
reign. Remember that for Hayekian influenced New Scientists such as More, Ayres, 
Rothschild, Mainzer, Maley and DiZerega, ‘order7 is defined as economic 
equilibrium/progress and ‘chaos7 as the uninterrupted actions of unregulated 
individuals. Therefore to achieve order we must allow chaos. Even though one might 
disagree with the proposition that such order emerges out of such chaos it might 
reasonably be assumed that actually allowing for this type of chaos would be a pretty 
easy thing to do; you just let people do what they want to do. However, for the 
person that has continuously inspired the thinking of the above named metaphysical 
capitalists, Frederick Hayek, it was never that easy:
Spontaneous order, he [Hayekj claims arises out of the general observance of certain 
behavioural rules and the individual adjustment to local circumstances. As he puts it 
elsewhere: ‘the formation of spontaneous orders is the result ot their elements
73For instance see Devall and Sessions (1985), McLaughlin (1990) Gowdy (1994a), Loy (1997) and the references 
contained therein.
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following certain rales in their responses to their immediate environment'...The 
individual responses to particular circumstances will result in an over-all order only 
if the individuals obey such rales as will produce an order. ’ Even a very limited 
similarity in their behaviour may be sufficient if the rules which they obey are 
sufficient to produce an order. (Kiev. 1994:28).
So here it seems we are only promised order if the chaos that gives rise to it is 
somehow law-abiding. The promised freedom that Chaos theory supposedly delivers 
seems to be ejected, at least in the realm of the economic. Individual agents of chaos 
in the economy are not free non-determined agents whose actions give rise to order, 
as is presented by More, Ayres, Parker, Stacey, Artigiam and Rothschild, they are rule 
obeying units whose predilection to order submits them to rule observance.
This ambiguity does not just plague the application of the ideas of the New 
Sciences to economics but also its application to other social realms. For instance 
Wheatley has tried to impress upon her readers the relevance of the New Sciences and 
the order from chaos idea in the area of organisation and management. The 
management or organisational system, she says,
has infinite possibilities, wandering wherever it pleases, sampling new 
configurations of itself. But its wandering and experimentation respect a 
boundary. (Wheatley, 1992:123)
Wheatley, elsewhere, also says:
If we allow autonomy at the local level, letting individuals or units be directed in 
their decision by guideposts for organisational self-reference, we can achieve 
coherence and continuity. (Wheatley, 1992:95).
‘Guideposts’, ‘boundaries’; these are hardly the terms reminiscent of the freedom 
that Davies, Ayres, Rothschild and others have spoken about with regards to order 
from chaos. They may be softer words than the ‘control’ used in Bertallanfy, Wiener 
and Lovelock’s systems theory, but they amount to the same thing. Indeed; ‘boundary 
observance’ and ‘guideposted decision-making’ are the rhetorical manifestation of a 
theory that attempts to align itself with freedom by merely softening words like 
‘control’ and ‘rules’. This is patently the case if we examine the arbitrariness of the 
terms guidepost and boundary in Wheatley’s case.
The guideposts and boundaries of Wheatley are not those democratically arrived 
at via worker votes but are those ascribed by the profit endeavours of the organisation 
to which the ‘supposedly’ autonomous agents belong. No revolutionary progress in
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organisation studies has been made by inserting the New Sciences into management 
theory simply because the ‘boundaries’ and ‘guideposts’-once ‘orders’ and 
‘task-settings’—still come from the organisation’s hierarchically privileged members. 
If Lyotard was to assess the situation as described by Wheatley he would have 
something like this to say:
The decisions do not have to respect the individual’s aspirations: the aspirations 
have to aspire to the decisions, or at least to their effects. Administrative procedures 
should make individuals ‘want’ what the system needs in order to perform well. 
(Lyotard, 1984:62).
We might also note that in Hayek’s case, the rule-observance that individuals 
must obey to find overall economic order are not matters of irrefutable fact accepted 
by each and every member of an economy but arbitrary rules that emerge out of 
power invested members in that economy74. That the rules of the economy seem to be 
somehow skewed to the advantage of those making them exposes the arbitrary nature 
of the rules. The chaotic individualism that is claimed to exist in economies is thus 
exposed as a confidence trick. Each and every player in the economy or in the 
organisation must play within the rules and adapt themselves to it if they are to 
succeed/survive. They are hardly operating in some independent manner as Wheatley 
and Artigiani describe.
Thus an important issue never confronted when examining ‘order from chaos’ in 
social and economic settings is that of the nature of the boundaries and guideposts. 
There is the possibility that they are just as enslaving and imprisoning as the of state 
control whose necessity Wheatley and Hayek think they have demolished.
Having argued that this is the case when the New Sciences find their way into the 
social realm, we will now see that similar consequences emerge when they are applied 
in the non-human world. When Davies speaks of freedom in the post-Newtonian 
world it is a freedom that respects boundaries. When Capra talks about the 
indeterminism of ecosystems it is an indeterminism that is guided by rules. And when 
populations of organisms are freed from the bonds of mechanist, thinking as Birch
74For instance one of Hayek’s rules is that there should be a culture of economic freedom and that the state should 
enforce such a culture. Political sociologists have, for years, been at pains to expose this as an ideological 
component within Hayek’s thought since it suggests all should submit to the liberal capitalist agenda in their daily 
social and economic lives. See, for example, Bottomore (1985).
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would like us to think, they only achieve that freedom within certain limits. One of 
those boundaries, and a persistent theme in unitarianism of any sort, is the boundary 
of hierarchy.
THE RELIANCE UPON HIERARCHY WITHIN SELF-REGULATING
SYSTEMS
David Abram declares that:
if...we assume that matter is animate (or 'self-organising’) from the get-go, then 
hierarchies vanish, and we are left with a diversely differentiated field of animate 
beings, each of which has its own gifts relative to others (Abram, 1997:10)
But is this so? Another idea that is apparent in the New Sciences and especially 
that of the science of self-organisation is hierarchy. In every type of self-organising 
system the system is said to work by use of hierarchical structuring:
The tendency of living systems to form multileveled structures whose levels differ 
in their complexity is all pervasive throughout nature and has to be seen as a basic 
principle of self-organisation. (Capra, 1982:303).
A key criterion of this type of systems thinking, according to Capra:
is the ability to shift one’s attention back and forth between systems levels.
Throughout the living world, we find systems nesting within other systems, and by 
applying the same concepts to different systems levels-e.g. the concept of stress 
to an organism, city, or an economy—we often gain important insights. (Capra,
1996:36).
Of course, Capra, and all other New Scientists for that matter, include a whole 
host of entities under the title of living systems: cells, orgamsmal bodies, ecosystems, 
Gaia, nations, societies. About the universality of hierarchy, Rollo (1995.8) says.
The widespread existence of hierarchies is not trivial but probably represents a 
necessary conformation for organisations of great complexity.
Hierarchies, according to systems thinkers, allow quick processing of 
information, rapid decisions to be made and ensure the efficiency of the system as a
whole (see, for instance, Wiener, 1961; Bertalanffy, 1968; Laszlo, 1972). These 
thoughts stray happily into complex systems theory as can be seen in the writings of
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self-organisationists (see, for instance, Ayres, 1994, Merry, 1995, Capra, 1996).
When detailing the relationship between hierarchy and self-organisation Ayres 
graphically draws some models ot particular socio-political structures. He contrasts 
simple hierarchical structures like kingdoms, armies and the communist party, with the 
feedback hierarchy of the United States tripartite governmental system. The U.S. 
hierarchical political system is thought of, by Ayres, as a self-organising feedback 
dependent hierarchy, much the same as a self-organising cell or ecosystem. For Ayres, 
the ballot box is the crucial feedback process that serves as the link between different 
hierarchical levels (Ayres, 1994:208). Joseph, an advocate of Gaianism, does this too 
when he happily compares Gaian feedback with:
One of the greatest and most complex negative feedback systems operating in the 
world today is the American system of checks and balances, as set up in the U.S 
constitution. (Joseph, 1990:114)
Under the blanket o f Joseph’s and Ayres’ thinking the Communist Party is not a 
self-organising system. It is, rather, an imposed static structure without feedback. The 
fact that communist member leaders are voted for and the judicial section of the 
American tri-partite system is not, does not stop Joseph and Ayres from advancing 
their metaphysical legitimisation of American politics.
Herein lies a telling point about the application of seli-regulation in social realms. 
Whether or not the analogies are at all accurate, self-organisation is used as 
justification of the rightness of both Western societies (in particular Western 
capitalism and Western democracy)and the rightness of hierarchy within these 
societies. A more bourgeois, conservative and ethnocentric natural philosophy would 
be hard to find. Not only is Western democracy and Western capitalism sanctioned by 
natural laws but so is hierarchy which is a natural necessity for the efficient running of 
complex systems like the state75.
FRACTALS. BLOBS AND BOUNDARIES
75This bears analogy with the findings of social historians of science like Young (1985) and Schweber (1980) who 
see similar interplays between Darwinsim, Social Darwinism and social theory in the nineteenth century.
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There is within Chaos theory a discipline known as ‘fractal geometry’76. Fractal 
geometry is of interest to us in its relation to reductionism and hierarchical 
organisation. This in itself would be considered a bit odd by New Scientists since 
fractal geometry is o f interest to them due to its supposed holistic, chaotic and 
complex character.
Fractal geometry had its heyday with the widely circulated Mandelbrot blobs that 
were seen adorning all manner of professional and popular texts77. These blobs are 
characterised as being self-organising, complex and chaotic. Their relationship to the 
unity of nature has so impressed Fritjof Capra that he placed an example of one on the 
cover of his book The Web o f Life as though it were a magical graphic whose 
mathematics underpinned the unity of all nature.
What impresses New Scientists so much is the way Mandelbrot blobs exhibit 
what is named ‘self-similarity’:
The most striking property of these ‘fractal’ shapes is that their characteristic 
patterns are found repeatedly as descending scales, so that their parts, at any scale 
are similar to the whole. (Capra, 1996:125).
Numerous examples o f this self-similarity are given by those who are impressed 
by it. For instance, as Zimmerman and Capra explain:
there is a universal pattern in the relation between large and small-scale features.
The best known example of this relation is that of coastlines, which repeat the same 
ragged features at every scale of measurement. (Zimmerman, 1994:348).
Mandelbrot illustrates the property of ‘self-similarity’ by breaking a piece out of 
a cauliflower. He repeats this demonstration by dividing the part further, taking 
out another piece, which again looks like a very small cauliflower. Thus every part 
looks like the whole vegetable. The shape of the whole is similar to itself at all
levels of scale. (Capra, 1996:137).
Capra carries on in this vein to declare:
There are many other examples of self-similarity in nature. Rocks on mountains
76See Mandelbrot (1982), Gleick (1987), Lauwerier (1991) and Capra (19%) as examples of those elucidating and 
promoting the virtues of Fractal geometry.
^Including the pages of the publications cited immediately above as well as: Davies (1987), Gleick (1987), Parker 
and Stacey (1995), Briggs and Peat (1991), Yates (1989), Kauffinan (1993), Scott (1991), Wheatley (1992)> 
Davies (1993), Goener (1993), Waldrop (1993), Abraham (1994), Cohen and Stewert (1994), Kauffinan (1995), 
Hall (1997), Prigogine (1997), Bossomaier and Green (1998).
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look like small mountains, branches of lightning, or borders of clouds, repeat the same 
pattern again and again; coastlines divide into smaller and smaller portions, each 
showing similar arrangements of beaches and headlands. Photographs of a river 
delta, the ramifications of a tree, or the repeated branchings of blood vessels may 
show patterns of such striking similarity that we are unable to tell which is which. 
(Capra, 1996:137).
This self-similarity is also taken to be evident in biological organisation; cells; 
organisms; ecosystems et cetera, exhibit the same patterns at different scales. Each 
level is a repetition of the level above it and below it since these levels, too, are 
self-organising and self-regulating unities. Thus, for the New Scientists fractal 
geometry graphically and mathematically proves the concrete existence of the levels 
of biological organisation. Indeed the notion of a hierarchy of levels of biological 
organisation is a manifestation of self-similarity.
Wheatley, in her attempts to have the New Sciences guide the field of 
organisational management, speaks fondly of fractals. She indicates that a fractal 
organisation is one in which self- “similar behaviours show up at every level in the 
organisation because those behaviours were patterned into organising principles from 
the very start” (Wheatley, 1992:132). Wheatley attempts to tie fractals in with the 
autonomy of individuals and the order from chaos idea by saying:
Itjhe potent force that shapes behaviour in these fractal organisations, as in all 
systems, is the combination of simply expressed expectations of acceptable behaviour 
and the freedom available to individuals to assert themselves in non-deterministic 
ways. Fractal organisations, though they may have never heard the word fractal, 
have learned to trust in natural organising phenomena. (Wheatley, 1992:132).
Again, the important thing, and what is always left undefined by New Science 
advocates, is the nature o f the acceptable behaviours and the nature of freedom. If an 
individual is free to act within acceptable boundaries there is hardly any recourse for 
that individual if he or she believes these boundaries are not sufficiently open to fully 
enable his or her freedom.
This argument does not apply just to Wheatley’s organisations but to geometrical 
fractals generally. For instance when Capra says:
another important link between Chaos theory and fractal geometry is the shift 
from quantity to quality. As we have seen, it is impossible to predict the values 
of the variables of a chaotic system at a particular time, but we can  predict the
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qualitative features of the system’s behaviour, way. (Capra, 1996:137).
We see, here, that bounds and boundaries still affect the scope of what is 
measured. An organism can thus wander around within its role but it can never leave 
it, an ecosystem can fluctuate according to some measured parameter but it can never 
become unstable.
Although the emphasis has sometimes been put on the qualitative and visual 
nature ot fractals this does nothing to quell claims of reductionism. Instead of 
reducing things to genes or physical factors of matter and energy, they are saying 
things have a fractal pattern which is their essence. Discovering this fractal pattern 
will some how give us a clue to the phenomena. Thus if fractal geometry becomes a 
programme of science it is a programme grounded in reductionism since all 
phenomena are reduced to the essences contained within their fractal blobs.
SELF-ORGANISATION AND GOD
As well as being supportive evidence for the naturalness and efficiency of the 
Free Market and for the existence of levels of biological organisation, a few New 
Scientists have held Chaos, Complexity and Self-organisation in the universe to be 
manifestations of God. Davies is one that leads this charge:
that the universe has organised its own self-awareness is for me powerful evidence 
that there is something happening behind it all. The impression of design is 
overwhelming. Science maybe able to explain all the processes whereby the universe 
evolves its own destiny, but that still leaves room for there to be a meaning behind 
existence. (Davies, 1987:203).
Both Davies (1983) and Capra (1982) paraphrase Reich Jantsch (1980) to 
summarise this state of affairs: ‘God is not the creator, but the mind ot the universe.’ 
What is more, God is now, once more, fond of humans since we humans “have 
been written into the laws of nature in a deep and, I believe, meaningful way” (Davies, 
1993:196). In this view:
the deity is, of course, neither male nor female, nor manifest in any personal form, but
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represents the self-organising dynamics of the entire cosmos. (Capra, 1982).
This situation strongly parallels the situation identified by Robert Young within 
Victorian science where God changed from an entity-being that made the harmony in 
nature and society that humans observed to a deity identified with self-acting natural 
laws. At this time “Science did not replace God. God became identified with the laws 
of nature” (Young, 1992). As much has happened in the work of the New Sciences 
when Davies states:
The word God means so many different things to different people that I am loathe to 
use it. When 1 do, it is in the sense of the rational ground that underpins physical 
reality. Used in this way, God is not a person, but a timeless abstract principle 
that implies something like meaning or purpose behind physical existence. (Davies, 
1993:21).
For Davies, this abstract principle is ‘self-organisation’. Hence we come to a 
conclusion which Davies would, himself, honour: God is self-organisation.
The equation: self-organisation equals God, has in itself' all sorts of connotations 
apart from providing evidence for the existence of God. For one thing, it suggests 
scientists as the priests of the universe searching for the ultimate truths just as the 
clergy have done in the past. This undoubtedly adds to the authority of scientists 
when prescriptions are made for social change towards a supposedly environmental 
way of being.
Another implication that flows from the desire to acknowledge the Godliness of 
self-organisation is the chance that we stand of deifying all those things that have so 
far been said to be operating in a self-organising fashion. Goldsmith and Lovelock 
suggest we should actually do this in the case of Gaia but more alarming, perhaps, 
people like Rothschild, Ayres and Hayek say we should do this for capitalist Free 
Market economies. Free Markets thus become not only essential natural processes—as 
promoted by Rothschild and other capitalist New Science advocates—they also 
become sacred processes. The Free Market is thus the social and economic 
manifestation of the timeless abstract principle that Davies holds as God. If this is true 
then the Free Market is sure to be classed by some as a sacred untouchable divine 
entity worthy of reverence. The Free Market is not only natural and essential and 
unchanging, but omniscient, holy and transcendental. If this is so then it is fairly 
obvious that the Free Market should be treated with respect and that it should not
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tampered with.78
THE 'SELF’ IN SELF-REGULATION
If we disagree with the New Scientists and the systems theorists and announce 
that there is not necessarily any sustained self-regulation in ecosystems which goes 
towards maintaining a definite spatio-temporal structure then we might soon arrive at 
a more generalised suggestion with regards to self-regulation in ecology; the 
ecosystem is not a ‘self (which common agreement would take to mean a united 
entity) but merely a non-uniform mixture of separate entities that together are hardly 
even maintaining their own collective state of existence (since this is forever 
changing). This is the conclusion of Gleason, and of Gleasonian-type ecology 
generally, and such Gleasonian deconstruction of the ecosystem must render the ‘self 
in ‘self-regulation of ecosystems a mere abstraction.
This doubting of the self-hood of ecosystems does not necessarily mean we have 
to doubt the self in the self-regulation of all the other supposedly self-regulating 
phenomena of the universe but it does direct suspicion towards some of them. 
Capitalists, for example, cannot rely on the economy running like an ecosystem 
because the grounded object from which they draw their analogy is not a coherent 
identifiable self undergoing self-regulation but a tossing and turning collection of 
disunited plants and creatures.
78Many critics of the Free Market would probably comment here that such deification of the Market has already 
permeated culture via the growth of economic rationalism and monetarism and the resurgence in ‘neo-classical 
liberal economics. If we acknowledge (in line with Robertson, 1993:220) that Hayek, and his economic philosophy 
of self-regulating order emerging from chaos, was “largely ignored by economists and politicians for most of his 
career” (which spanned from the 1930s till his death in 1992) but “became extremely influential in the 1970s and 
1980s, when his ideas found favour with the Reagan administration in the USA and, above all, with the 
Thatcherite wing of the Conservative Party” and we also note the contemporaneous rise of self-regulation as a 
scientific idea, then we can see just how much monetarism might be the practical result of the metaphysical entity 
that is self-regulation. If the deified soul of economic rationalism is exposed to be ‘self-regulation then the 
importance of self-regulation as the primary metaphysical commitment of 1980s and 1990s Western culture might 
be hinted at. While I like to think that this chapter has opened up the possibility of such an exposition; that 
self-regulation is the society-wide cultural myth of the 1990s is a thesis which must remain as a project for a 
future work. My purpose in this work is just to expose the mythic potential of self-regulation only within 
environmentalism, science and natural philosophy.
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Now suppose we have successiully cracked and fractured the metaphysical 
character of the ecosystem into non-existence, what does this mean for other levels of 
biological organisation that have, according to Capra and Davies and many others, 
self-organised themselves from lower self-organised levels? It means that we might 
still be able to say that cells self-organise into organisms and organisms into 
populations. After this, however, we are in trouble, for populations do not 
self-organise into ecosystems because ecosystems do not exhibit the unity of a self 
that must exist to enable the process of self-organisation. What we find is that the 
grand hierarchy of levels of biological organisation is fractured and disrupted at one 
point. Lower levels have seemingly self-organised into higher and higher wholes until, 
above the population level, we find that everything is a bit of a mess. Similarly, the 
biosphere—which Lovelock, Goldsmith and other globally-attuned thinkers believe is 
the highest level of biological organisation—is not a self-organised entity that 
self-organised itself from the lower level of agglomerated self-organised ecosystems, 
but is an entity that—if self-organised at all—did so without the help of ecosystems.
New Scientists, and Unitarians in general, are often given over to a metaphysical 
interpretation whereby what applies to one level of biological organisation applies to 
them all.(this is reinforced now, as has been noted, by the idea of self-similarity). The 
ecosystem concept is held to be such a strong link in this process of self-similarity and 
hiérarchisation that it has often served as the referent from which to make new 
analogies from79. However if the ecosystem level is destroyed then Unitarians might 
wonder about the capacity for other levels to be named ‘selves’ and thereby be 
elaborated in terms self-organisation and self-regulation.
79Two examples whereby the ecosystem has become the fundamental example of self-regulation (and the basis of 
metaphorical ascription) include the following statements:
“the ecology of galaxies with matter recycling between dying and new bom star system” (Martin-Smith, 
1997:30),
“Dr. James Lovelock...can perceive the specifications of a globally interconnected ecological system - 
and the basis of the parameters for these specifications are alive - for the nature which is being studied is
best described as an ecosystem.” (Brown, 1996:Chapt. 1)
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Chaos theory believes it sanctions freedom. Chaoticians and other New Scientists 
thus value freedom, you might think. This may be so but just as likely is the idea that 
New Scientists know freedom has enormous political and philosophical clout and they 
attach themselves to its ideals via some (dubious) association between freedom and 
indeterminacy.
Chaos theorists also value order. Without it their beloved science cannot see or 
do anything. What they need to do, then, in order to maximise their rhetorical appeal 
to various political discourses, is to entangle both freedom and order together.
Liberal Capitalists also value freedom and order. The freedom of the individual 
and the order of the Free Market economy. Order can only exist with such freedom, 
and freedom can only exist if there is such order. Again Liberal Capitalists can 
maximise their rhetorical appeal by somehow entangling order and freedom together 
into one.
What is interesting is that both New Scientists and Liberal Capitalists do this 
entangling in a very similar way, and what is more, they both appeal to the same 
historical and intellectual parentage when doing it. So much so that the language of 
the order from chaos idea represented in 18th Century philosophical ideas is, 
according to Mayr (1986), understood by both modem day Liberal Capitalists and 
modem day New Scientists. It is also apparent that examples of self-organisation of 
order from chaos outlined by New Scientists (for example; Paul Davies) can help 
Liberal Capitalists further their cause (to naturalise and deify economic applications of 
order from chaos) and the examples of self-regulation outlined by liberalists (for 
example F. A. Hayek) can be utilised by New Scientists to help further their cause (to 
arrive at universally true principles of the operation of the cosmos).
This is not just a possibility: it is actually happening and can be observed in the 
writings of people like Ayres, Maley, Mainzer and Rothschild who not only possess 
the desire to present universal principles but also have an obvious pro-Liberal 
Capitalist agenda.
While this chapter might seem to advocate getting rid of the ecosystem concept 
(or, at least, some of the intellectual security it enjoys) because of the ease to which it
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becomes an ideological tool, Chapter Two indicated that we might get rid of the 
ecosystem concept because it fosters bad ecological practice. Both o f these chapters 
together, however, suggest also, that the reality of the self-regulating ecosystem 
should be doubted. That the New Scientists can postulate self-organisation in ecology 
so readily, where Gleasonian ecologists, can only doubt it, is unwittingly explained by 
an advocate of universal self-organisation, Max More:
The abstractness of the S.O.’s [self-organisations] make them particularly difficult for 
the untutored mind to recognise. You can’t simply look at an S.O. and spot it.
You need to apply a theory. (More, 1991:22).
Although More is a firm supporter of the existence of self-organisations in 
economics, physics and biology (and especially in the Free Market) he nevertheless 
knocks the nail right on the head with his admission of the abstract nature of 
self-organisation. In the case of self-organisation theory it may only be a short step 
from admitting the abstrcat nature of self-organisation to admitting that a 
self-organisation phenomenon can be conjured up anywhere and in virtually any 
situation because the theory in question posits such simple processes and lives within 
such vague parameters. First, you take the metaphysics of unity, second, add a 
preoccupation with systems, third, add feedback loops, fourth, characterise the 
process using a flow diagram and there you have it; a self-organising phenomena. 
Thus it is not hard for any theorist to postulate self-organisations all over the place.
As indicated, a way to destroy this line of abstract universalism is to derail the 
integrity o f the ‘self in self-organisation. We might note, for instance, that 
ecosystems succumb to such a derailment for it can be suggested using a wide variety 
of counter-evidence and argument, that they may very well be unregulated and 
un-regulating collections of entities that hardly fulfil what it is to be a self. Economies, 
too, might succumb to this derailment since they are hardly Unitarian phenomena but 
consist o f all sorts of conflicting and varying processes, behaviours, events and 
agents.80 .
New Scientists, and environmental writers who support the New Sciences (like
80 As has been suggested throughout the Twentieth Century by many Marxist, Feminist and Anarchist economic 
and social theorists whose recent disciples might include: Feenberg (1979), Trainer (1985), Dunlap and Momson 
(1986), Diyzak (1987), Eckersley (1989), McLaughlin (1990). Within these writings there is the acknowledgement 
of class, gender, ethnic, and geographical tensions, divisions and dissension in any real or advocated economy.
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Abram, Gare, Fabel, Ferre) would, of course, advise against getting rid of the concept 
of self-organisation since it has manifestly shown itself to be useiul in explaining and 
exploring the myriad wonders of the world through a new perspective which suggest 
that the world is alive, free and organic. Self-organisation, and the other theories of 
the New Sciences, are thus useful in ecopolitical discourse since it dramatically 
advocates the aliveness o f the Earth and many of the Earth’s processes. This 
aliveness, Abram, Gare, Fabel and Ferre, would feel, surely asks more of us when it 
comes to protecting the Earth and its environmental processes.
However, this is not the only thing the New Sciences are useiul for. They may 
also be useful in resurrecting an embattled God, useiul in resurrecting scientists as the 
priests and arbiters of the nature of reality, useiul in delegitimising any economics not 
based on Western Free Market principles, useful in reinvigorating systems science as a 
universal discipline, useful in legitimising hierarchy in modem society, and useful in 
limiting environmental evaluation to specific scientific and scientistic management 
practice. These uses can be considered to be contradictory to the programme of




I t’s all a Postmodern 
Plot(lessness)!
INTRODUCTION TO PART C
Part C focuses around a particular theme: that the unity of nature metanarrative 
is a cultural construction of various breeds of postmodernism. These breeds of 
postmodernism attempt to locate themselves in opposition to what they term 
Modernism. Part C, therefore, is devoted to an investigation of postmodern ideas that 
may lay within, or contribute to, the late Twentieth Century enunciation of the unity 
of nature. It examines the claim that if we postmodemise science-making it reject the 
Modernist ideals that stem from the onset of Modernity in the Seventeenth and 
Eighteenth centuries—then we can produce a ‘Postmodern Science’ that offers a 
post-mechanistic, post-reductionistic, post-atomistic, post-fragmentary worldview. 
Such a desire has obvious relations to the New Paradigm whose historical narrative I 
outlined in Chapter One; and indeed the New Paradigmers and the Postmodern 
Science supporters are the same people much of the time. What I have tound, 
however, is that Postmodern Science is also contiguous with systems theory and the 
New Sciences. (The name of these theoretical nodes of thought change, but much ot
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the underlying metaphysical thematics is the same). If this is so, and if systems theory 
and the New Sciences can be shown to be replete with the Modernist predilections 
towards reductionism, mechanicism, hierarchy, and also universalist metatheory, then 
Postmodern Science might be so attached to Modernist ways of doing science that it 
actually is not postmodern at all.
After desconstructing Postmodern Science, Part C enters into a critique of one of 
the metaphysical dichotomies which is being played out within the stories of the New 
Paradigm, the New Sciences and Postmodern Science; that is the story of 
mechanicism versus organicism. Postmodern Science supporters generally want to 
uphold the organicism versus mechanicism dichotomy; placing themselves distinctly 
within the organic dipole for this gives them what they believe is an inherently 
postmodern perspective on nature. My argument is that the mechanicism versus 
organicism division is hardly of the nature that Postmodern Scientists make out. 
Advancing yourself as an organicist, as opposed to a mechanist, is a rhetorical ploy 
which plays within the folds of Modernism rather than postmodernism. A postmodern 
deconstruction of the organicism versus mechanicism dichotomy reveals that 
organicists and mechanicists are often espousing very similar worldviews.
The final chapter of this Part, and of the whole work, addresses the remains of 
the deconstructed unity of nature concept. From these remains, Chapter Eight seeks 
to address the nature of what a more aggressively postmodemised environmental 
narrative might look like, especially with regards to the area of environmental concern 
most immediate to the minds of many Unitarians: the terrestrial ecological 
communities of the world. If environmentalists do need to find themselves a narrative 
about the world’s ecology it is suggested in this chapter how they might find one 




What is This Thing Called Postmodern
Science?
INTRODUCTION
In an effort to critique the scientistic ideals that developed strongly throughout 
the 19th Century, scholars in the past couple of decades have come to formulate a 
particular term to describe Western intellectual traditions and practices since c l850; 
they term it ‘Modernism’81. Modernism stands out (sometimes starkly, sometimes not) 
against what is believed to be ‘postmodernism’82. Some believe postmodernism can be 
characterised and chronologised as that period from about the 1960s until now, 
whence new modes of capitalism, art, architecture, culture and communication have 
invaded the social world83.
Having heard about this critique of Modernism, many thinkers of both a scientific 
and an environmental bent have decided that this is what they were also critiquing.
81 See, for example, Adorno and Horkheimer (1947), Lyotard (1984), Habermas (1985), Foucault (1986), Hall, ed, 
(1992), Tester (1992), Docherty, ed, (1993), Grenz (1996). Modernism stands out as a self-aware phase of a 
perioid of history often referred to as Modernity. Where modernity7 might be said to extend back beyond Newton 
and Descartes to the start of the renaissance, modernism is often given the starting date of 1846 when Charles
Baudelaire defined it in relation to contemporary art.
^Postmodernism is neid by postmodern scholars as being an inherently more lovable way to approach the study of 
life, society, science and art because it doesn’t get caught up in a Progress fetishism, it relinquishes a pointless 
search for the ultimate, truth through ideological politics, it promotes an inherent look at diversity and difference, 
and multiplies the stories which are afforded believability and value.
83 For example, see Bell (1979), Lyotard (1984), Jencks (1986), Calinescu (1987), Lash and Urry (1987), Harvey 
(1989), Jameson (1991), Lucie-Smith (1992).
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Thus Donald Griffin (1988), Charles Birch (1990), Carolyn Merchant (1994), David 
Bohm (1994), Arran Gare (1995) and Frederick Ferre (1996) have recently 
announced the rise o f ‘Postmodern Science’. Out of the ashes of a receding 
Modernism they have endeavoured to embark on reconstructing a Worldview that 
avoids the pitfalls of Modernist science such as extreme reductionism, mechanicism 
and atomism84. If these Modernist pitfalls (which had been brewing in western culture 
since before the Enlightenment but reached a crescendo when scientists had fully 
bought into Modernism in the 19th Century) can be ejected from science, then so 
much the better, they feel, for the environment, since a new environmentally friendly 
worldview will be encouraged to take centre stage in the metaphysics of Western 
culture.
The point I wish to make in this chapter, however, is that Postmodern Science 
might well be so inculcated with Modernism (as it is defined by postmodern 
intellectuals and as it is defined by Postmodern Science itself) that it can hardly be 
called postmodern. One of the ways that this inculcation is made manifest is the close 
association between Postmodern Science and both systems theory and the New 
Sciences. The closeness of association between Postmodern Science, systems theory 
and the New Sciences infects Postmodern Science with various Modernist impulses so 
that the project of Postmodern Science (to create an environmentally friendly 
worldview) is—by its own terms—undermined.
POSTMODERN CHARACTERISTICS
Before going on to detail the core theoretical premises of Postmodern Science, it 
is worth taking a look at the intellectual movement from which Postmodern Science 
takes its name. By doing this we can then go on to carefully analyse to what extent 
Postmodern Science is an expressions of postmodern sentiments.
84Unlike the intellectual postmodern movement which makes a critique over a whole spectrum of Modernist 
currents in history, society and culture, Postmodern Science tends to reduce Modernism to Modernist Science, 
whose major drawbacks are held to be the scientific principles of reductionism, mechanicism, atomism and 
dualism. These are, of course, the same things that Birch, Ferre, Gare, Bohm e t  a l were critiquing before they 
latched onto the ‘postmodern’ label (see Chapter One).
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As the Unitarians like Birch, Ferre, Bohm and Gare are so fond of identifying 
themselves with the term postmodernism, it is as well that we identify what 
postmodernism actually is. However, when defining postmodernism we immediately 
come into problems. Postmodernism defies definition. For reasons which may become 
more obvious in the following section postmodernists are loathe to define 
postmodernism since such self-definition might totalize the identity of the movement 
towards a narrow, restrictive and objectifying synecdoche, or as Sassower (1995:18) 
puts it:
providing a definition goes against the postmodern grain since it pretends to 
capture a moment that is too fleeting to catch85.
This penchant for ephemerality and this disdain for the restrictive notion of 
identity are not just principles of anti-definitionism, however, they permeate through 
the whole gamut of postmodern subjects of study. Postmodern sociologists decry the 
use of identity in social studies, for instance. They choose instead to focus on 
differences, diversity and heterogeneity. In doing this they often believe that they have 
unearthed the ephemerality and changeable nature of things. Life is hardly stable, or 
even progressively changing in an evolutionary manner, nor does it operate in clearly 
observable cycles or any other observable pattern.86
These tendencies towards heterogeneity, difference and plurality, like 
ephemerality and anti-identity, also serve as some of the core descriptions of 
postmodernism:
pluralism...has become the irritable condition of postmodern discourse, consuming
85The use of definitions to elucidate upon an object, subject, act, term etc. would strike many postmodernists as a 
way of not only describing what that object, subject, act or term is but also what it is not. Definitions categorically 
set up and describe what an object, subject, act or term is capable of being and is incapable of being. Definitions 
also enforce one dimensional elaborations of objects, subjects, acts and terms that might potentially be explained in
a myriad of ways if these ways were not categorically excluded by the definition.
86 It could be noted that within this the perspective, all of life (sociological life or ecological lire) and the things in 
it are transient and indeterminate:
“Indeterminacy often follows from fragmentation—the postmodernist only disconnects, fragments are all 
he pretends to trust. His ultimate opprobrium is ‘totalisation — any synthesis whatever, social, 
epistemic, even poetic. Hence his preference for montage, collage. (Hassan, 1987.168).
In this process of disconnecting and dis-aggregating the total, the category of ‘Life’ itself is tinctured; becoming 
ephemeral, diverse, fragmented, heterogeneous and decentralised. What emerges from the ashes of Life are 
pluralised ‘lives’. The category of Life succumbs to the overwhelming expression of different fives; fives which are 
too diverse to be able to be categorised by the one common abstract notion of Life.
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many pages of both critical and uncritical inquiry. (Hassan, 1987:167).
The very foundation of postmodemity consists of viewing the world as a 
plurality of heterogeneous spaces and temporalities. (Heller and Feher, 1988:1).
Postmodernism lends itself to...heterogeneity without any critical ordering 
principle. (Zagorin, 1990:265).
The heterogeneous nature ot language, society, geography and culture and the 
transient nature of intellectual, social and artistic trends, truths and traditions 
promotes heterogeneity and ephemerality as common postmodern characteristics over 
different subjects of study. As West would put it, postmodernism tends to:
trash the monolithic and homogenous in the name of diversity, multiplicity and 
heterogeneity; to reject the abstract, general and universal in light of the concrete, 
specific and particular; and to historicise, contextualise and pluralise by 
highlighting the contingent, provisional, variable, tentative, shifting 
and changing. (West, 1994:65).
Along with difference and diversity, fracture and fragmentation are also often 
held to be symptoms of Postmodern thought. Whether they are talking about the 
fracturing of the signified from the signifier, the fragmentation of social structures into 
cultural groupings or the breaking up of unilinear history into multiple histories, 
fracturing and fragmentation of some sort often lies within the studies of 
postmodernists.
Needless to say this advocacy of fracture, indeterminacy and pluralism has often 
been equated with intellectual decadence, nihilism, and impracticability by some 
writers87. It is acknowledged within postmodern circles that postmodernism:: 
rejects epistemological assumptions, refutes methodological conventions, resists 
knowledge claims, obscures all versions of the truth, and dismisses policy 
recommendations. (Rosenau, 1992:3)
Because of this program, postmodernism is sometimes seen as intellectual chaos 
with little ability to address major intellectual or practical problems. Or as Tester 
(1993:28) puts it:
from the point of view of certain modem boundaries postmodemity seems to be
See Haber, (1994), for example.87
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direction-less, blurred and lacking in rigor.
Tester, however goes on to reply on behalf of postmodernists that:
from the point of view of postmodemity, modernity is a prison of one sort or 
another towards which the only proper attitude is incredulity.
This incredulity applies since Modernism marginalises what is held to be unusual, 
generalises rather than specifies, and congeals together things which should be 
allowed to fragment apart.
For many who have in some way utilised or sympathised with postmodernism the 
broken nature of the social, cultural, or geographical world is only a secondary result 
of postmodern analysis. The primary result is the unearthing and deconstruction of 
ideas that have hitherto been thought of as being part of fundamental knowledge. 
Although they sometimes try to deny that what they are doing is analytical, 
postmodernists nevertheless critically analyse the founding ideas of their subjects of 
study to see what previous students in the field have failed to see; that these founding 
ideas are merely assumptions. Founding ideas, otherwise known as foundations, are 
thought by many in the postmodern movement to be the core problematic in 
Modernity and their deconstruction the core programme of postmodernism. 
Foundations are said to be expressed most cogently through the enunciation (and 
re-enunciation) of metanarratives:
...in Lyotard’s view, a metanarrative is meta in a very strong sense. It purports to 
be a privileged discourse capable of situating, characterising and evaluating all 
other discourses, but not itself infected by the historicity and contingency 
which render first-order discourses potentially distorted and in need of 
legitimisation. (Fraser and Nicholson, 1994:139).
WHAT IS THIS THING CALLED POSTMODERN SCIENCE?
Although postmodernism might like to characterise science as the epitome of 
Modernism there is within professional and popular science circles an ongoing 
attempt to postmodemise science. Having been made aware of the postmodern
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critique of Modernity some scientists and science writers who have been critical of the 
traditional scientific methods and principles have chosen to affiliate themselves with 
postmodernism. Instead of rejecting science altogether, however, they opt for 
replacing Modem science with ‘Postmodern Science’. Therefore, it may be said that 
instead of harbouring desires for a revolution against science, they want reform.
As in other intellectual fields that are involved with postmodernism, at the 
forefront o f Postmodern Science there is an interest in metanarratives. Instead of 
abandoning all metanarratives, however, Postmodern Science supporters want to 
resurrect environmentally friendly and socially benevolent ones. For many 
‘Postmodern Scientists this is the program of Postmodern Science; to resurrect more 
appropriate metanarrative statements about the natural world. Postmodern Science’s 
penchant for the reconstruction of metanarratives, rather than their total 
de(con)struction in the wake of general postmodern and anti-science attacks in the 
last thirty years leads Postmodern Scientists to label their peculiar brand of 
postmodernism: ‘Constructive Postmodern Science’. As Gnffin points out in his 
book, and the series in which it is located88, whereas most postmodernism has a 
penchant for breaking down bastions of Modernism in a destructive way:
[tjhe postmodernism of this series can, by contrast, be called con structive  or 
rev ision ary. it seeks to overcome the Modem worldview not by eliminating the 
possibility of worldviews as such, but by constructing a postmodern 
worldview through a revision of modem premises. (Griffin, 1988:x).
Where postmodernists have generally been critical of the competence of science 
to reveal the natural world, and where postmodernists are often critical ot the 
worldviews that science does ‘reveal’, Postmodern Scientists believe that science has 
now got something new to offer. Late Twentieth Century science, it is claimed, is 
now beginning to understand the universe in a whole new light, a light supposedly
compatible with many postmodern concepts.
Introducing this new Postmodern Science, Fabel (1994:303) says there is a new 
science, just now arising...with a conception ot the cosmos as a self-organising 
genesis” .
88 The book by Donald Griffin is Griffin, ed, (1988). This forms, according to Griffin’s introduction, the first 
instalment on a series on Constructive Postmodern Science. Ferre (1996) is the latest instalment in this series.
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This one comment o f FabeFs is, even by itself, quite telling. As he explicitly 
refers to the ‘new science7 (i.e.: New Science) o f ‘self-organisation7 as being 
Postmodern, Fabel seems to want to ally Postmodern Science with the 
self-organisation ideas of the New Scientists that were discussed in Chapter Three. 
This connection is confirmed by the comments of numerous other Postmodern 
Scientists. For example, although Davies does not use the label ‘postmodernism7, 
Arran Gare labels Davies7 New Science as Postmodern Science (Gare: 1995:110). 
Whether he wants to be or not Paul Davies, and many who share Paul Davies7 
worldview, are pulled in to the circle of Postmodern Science by self-confessed 
Postmodern Science enthusiasts like Gare by deed of the latter7 s willingness to class 
the former's scientific approach as Postmodern Science.
Charles Birch further strengthens the affinity between the complex systems 
theory of the New Sciences and Postmodern Science by repeating for Postmodern 
Science what he has for a long time said about systems theory:
In a postmodern world, the new images are no longer mechanical: they are organic 
and ecological. The universe turns out to be less like a machine and more like a 
life. (Birch, 1990: 75).
Birch then goes on to define more closely what Postmodern Science is in a 
section entitled: “Five Axioms for A Postmodern Worldview77 (Birch, 1990:128):
The first axiom: Nature is organic and ecological...The postmodern worldview takes 
seriously the proposition that we live in a universe and not a multiverse. it is 
ecological through and through. (Birch, 1990:128-129).
Birch’s second axiom of the ‘Postmodern Worldview7 declares that we must 
interpret lower levels of reality in terms of higher levels. His third declares that we 
should interpret the world in terms of monism as against a Nature/Humanity dualism. 
His fourth emplores us to adopt biocentrism and his fifth asks us to be 
post-disciplinary, simplifying and universalising.
Knowledge is lost in a sea of beliefs from a multitude of disciplines. The general 
purpose of the modem university is lost amid the incoherent variety of special 
purposes that have accumulated within it. The outlook of the postmodern 
worldview is for fewer beliefs and more beliefs. (Birch, 1990:140).
We shall come back to the themes of Birch’s fourth and fifth axioms latter on but 
for now we can identify his axioms 1-3 as programmatic statements that any
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Postmodern Science must look towards organicism, unitarianism and holism in some 
way.
For Wiessert and Hayles, that ‘some way’ towards holism and unitarianism and 
organicism is via Chaos theory. For Hayles (1990, 1991) and Wiessert (1991), Chaos 
and Complexity theory (which Davies loves to death) are examples of Postmodern 
Science because they approach the study of nature with an outlook that rejects the 
notion that physical matter is inanimate and particulate and that says physical 
processes are deterministic and isolated. Wiessert’s and Hayles’ versions of Chaos 
theory (which are the same as Davies’) posit chaos as an indication of the complexity 
of order and not as the absence of orderliness and they suggest that such order can 
only be understood by new mathematical ideas which have yet to be fully elaborated. 
Such new mathematics-which I suppose will be called Postmodern Mathematics-will 
liberate nature from determinism and go on to provide a dynamic view of matter.
Best (1991) would agree with most of this, stating: “Postmodern Science has 
three main branches of influence” : thermodynamics, quantum mechanics, and Chaos 
theory which all
emerge as a break from the mechanistic, objectivist and deterministic worldview of 
modem science. (Best, 1991:189).
Best goes on to say that “Postmodern Science rejects the crippling dualistic 
outlook of modem thought; instead it sees nature, human beings, and the relation 
between human beings and nature in holistic terms” (Best, 1991:189). David Bohm’s 
Unitarian physics also displays predilections towards this use of the term 
postmodernism. For most of his long life Bohm was without a label for his holistic 
physics but he found it just before he died: “I am proposing a postmodern physics that 
begins with the whole” (Bohm, 1988:119). Similarly Ferre (1994) believes holistic 
ecology to be Postmodern Science stating that Postmodern Science is a return to 
organic ecological ideas.
According to Krippner (1991) the Modem scientific worldview can be partially 
attributed to the unprecedented fragmentation, nihilism and destruction that we find in 
the world. He then goes on to say that as a corrective to this situation:
‘postmodern’ or ‘holistic’ thought hopes to preserve the virtues of the Modem 
worldview while replacing its mechanistic and reductionistic assumptions with 
those that are more organic in nature. (Krippner, 1991:133).
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So Postmodern Science is the science of self-organisation, the science of Chaos 
theory, the science of Complexity theory, the science of unity, organicism and holism. 
All this exemplifies the following conclusion. Postmodern Science is basically 
equivalent to the complex systems theories which in Chapter Three we called the New 
Sciences.
Sometimes this conclusion becomes obvious when considering the prescribed 
political responsibility o f both systems theory and Postmodern Science, respectively. 
Consider the similarities between Capra, an explicit advocate o f ‘systems theory’ with 
those of Gare an explicit advocate of ‘Postmodern Science’. In the same way as 
Capra, the systems theorist, says that a new worldview must be forged for 
environmental reasons so Gare, the Postmodern Scientist, says “what is required to 
address the environmental crisis” is a “postmodern cosmology” (Gare, 1995:3). And 
just as Capra labels Deep Ecologists the grass-roots organisers of the new paradigm, 
so Gare states: “Postmodern environmentalists, that is, the ‘deep ecologists’ and 
associated movements” are those who reject Modernist environmental destruction 
(Gare, 1995:87).
Because of their very similar critiques of Modem science and Modem living both 
Capra and Gare would, with little doubt, agree with Best’s following comments on 
postmodernity and living in harmony with nature:
in rejecting modernity as a historical era of wanton destruction, many advocates of 
postmodern science embrace the concept of postmodemity as a new historical 
period yet to be created—where human beings exist in harmonious relations 
with nature, each other, and their own selves. (Best, 1991:189).
All this is to say that what is presented as holistic/unitarian thought in Chapter 
Two and as the New Sciences in Chapter Five is painted as Postmodern Science by 
those who, in this chapter, are called Postmodern Scientists. If this is so, then surely 
we have a contradiction emerging. Given the penchant for unity and generalisation 
and universalisation in the holistic sciences, systems theory and the New Sciences, and 
given the penchant for heterogeneity, fragmentation and difference in postmodernism, 
how can Unitarians contemplate labelling holistic science, systems theory, and the 
New Sciences as ‘Postmodern’?
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POSTMODERNISM AND POSTMODERN SCIENCE IN (A) WORDLSV
When investigating the legitimacy of the claims to postmodernism by Postmodern 
Scientists we can do so by aligning the commonly-accepted characteristics of 
postmodernism with the characteristics ot Postmodern Science as announced by its 
advocates. To cover a lot ot ground quickly this can be done by listing twenty or so 
one word characteristics o f postmodernism and comparing them to the characteristics 
of Postmodern Science89. In this vein postmodernism can be characterised as being (or 
emphasising)90:
'Anti-scientific7: (for example as expressed by: Lyotard, 1984; Eagleton, 1986; 
Harvey, 1990; Best, 1991; Grenz, 1996; Grant, 1998)
This feature is succinctly expressed by Grenz (1996:46) who declares: 
“postmodernism is the end of science77. Here Grenz expresses the idea that science is, 
in fact, the epitome of Modernism, and its end paves the way for postmodernism since 
it will involve the end of scientific expertise, scientific management and the end of 
power struggles based on knowing the scientifically-refereed truth. In light of this, the 
term 'Postmodern Science7 ought to be considered an oxymoron. The fact that 
Postmodern Scientists can think up the term, and then espouse worldviews of unity 
from it, must also be seen as oxymoronic in the light of the postmodern critique of 
science. If Postmodern Science wishes to use science to erect a new philosophical 
worldview, then this sits uneasily with the claims of most other postmodernists who 
would declare that:
science and philosophy must jettison their grandiose metaphysical claims and
89 • *There is also another important purpose in the laying out of this section. Later in this work (i.e. in Chapter
Eight: A fn oth er) P ostm odern  E co lo g y) I enter into an altogether different attempt at postmodemising ecological
science, natural philosophy and environmentalism. This alternative attempt at a postmodemising effort will also
draw on some of the ideas outlined in this section. This dual purpose must be kept in mind throughout the reading
of this section. What must also be kept in mind when viewing this section is the fact that it is not me
characterizing the following listed attributes as postmodern, but the many people cited and named under the
various attributes.
^It should be noted that the names of those postmodern scholars who have declared the following properties as 
being distinctively and definitively ‘postmodern’ are included after each characteristic. It is not me who is 
classifying these characteristics as postmodern (as opposed to any other ‘ism’, say ‘poststructuralism’, but the 
people cited; all of whom are acknowledged academic postmodernists or students of culture and society.
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view themselves more modestly as just another set of narratives. (Eagleton 
quoted in Harvey, 1990:9).
On the count of being anti-scientific, then, it seems that Postmodern Science fails 
to be postmodern.
'Pessimism7; (e.g.: Best, 1991; Kroker and Cook, 1991; Bauman, 1993; Grenz, 
1996).
According to Grenz (1996:89) a “gnawing pessimism” pervades postmodernism. 
After being influenced by Foucault et a l it now seems to many social scientists that 
revolutionary and reforming Utopians are no longer able to validate their knowledge 
with references to the truth of things and the nature of nature since:
1) the knowledge (of nature and of society) that is said to be possessed by 
Utopians/ reformers/revolutionaries is not separable from their political aims, and
2) the politics and philosophies they espouse will be dangerous and oppressive to 
someone or other. With regard to number 2, Zygmunt Bauman (1992, 1993) would 
want to draw our attention to the omnipresence of dilemma in the postmodern world. 
If the ideas associated with a utopian or revolutionary plan are ever manifested in the 
name of liberation from oppression, genuine oppression of other ideas must 
necessarily follow for they cannot, too, be manifested. In a (postmodern) world 
replete with the values of diversity and difference it seems as though any utopian that 
somehow has his or her utopia come to fruition will be totally incapable of sparing 
themselves “the bitter after-taste which comes unsolicited in the wake of decisions 
taken and fulfilled” (Bauman, 1993:32).
This dilemma-ridden angst within postmodernism is, however, a topic that is 
avoided in a major way in Modernism. Dilemmas between interests have always been 
smoothed out or smoothed over by abstractly converting the opposing parts into a 
whole whose ongoing benevolence is served, maintained and delivered by the same 
processes that give rise to the dilemmas. Indeed, Modernism might be characterised as 
the era without any recognition of dilemma. Any dilemma could be solved simply by 
appealing to an abstract whole and the processes that form it such as the Adam 
Smith’s Invisible Hand, Spencer’s ‘survival of the fittest’, Parson’s social homeostasis 
and Lovelock’s Gaian self-regulation. From within this Modernist metaphysical 
viewpoint it is hard to get gloomy about the dilemmas of interest which are cruelly
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distributed amongst the members o f the world since in the end—and over the entirety 
of the world—the whole is held to be bettered by the presence of such dilemmas. 
However, if no abstract whole (like society, the economy or Gaia) exists then the 
processes that are said to regulate and maintain it are brought into question and the 
value o f dilemma as a progressive and self-ordering force is annulled.
So where does this gnawing pessimism leave Postmodern Science? Firstly those 
within its ranks who harbour utopian ideals might be seen to be conflicting with 
postmodern thought. Utopias, including environmental utopias and intellectual utopias 
that the likes o f Capra, Goldsmith, Birch et al describe, exist as single-dimension 
unitary fixations with a certain specified state of social being and thus are not only 
programmatic challenges to a particular status quo (in how we view the world or how 
we should change it) but attempted constructions of idealistic unities which 
necessarily exclude those that can not or will not conform to them.
The pessimism of postmodernism is most ardent when considering the various 
technotopian ideals that spill out from technocratic Modernists and their companions: 
the promoters of science. Far from enabling a better and better society, science and 
technology is only capable o f producing self-denying nightmares o f social poverty and 
environmental destruction. Science’s ability to get a handle on understanding these 
problems is undermined by the Power-Knowledge relationships within science so 
that—whether it is Modem science or Postmodern Science—it is void ot any ability to 
objectively convey to the planners of utopia and social betterment the grounded 
knowledge upon which value neutral policy decisions can be made.
Postmodern Science, however, is not nearly so pessimistic. Postmodern 
Scientists are sure that new ways of conducting science, i.e. organically and 
holistically; and new ways of viewing the universe, i.e. organically and holistically, will 
infiltrate both science and technology policy and social policy to deliver a civilisation 
of humans more at harmony with itself and its environment. Stephen Best iterates this 
difference between postmodernism and Postmodern Science when he says.
Although both postmodern science and social theory are critical of modem 
rationality postmodern science tends to be far more optimistic about the value 
of science, technology and rationality than most postmodern theory .
(Best, 1991:213).
Whether Postmodern Science is correct in thinking that it can produce a socially
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and ecologically agreeable scientific response to the world’s woes is not the really the 
point here. The point is that Postmodern Science is incongruously positioned with 
regard to the attitude of most postmodernists towards the optimism of science and 
planning.
The incongruity between Postmodern Science and postmodernism can also be 
spotted in the following declaration coming from Paul Davies that (1987:197) “the 
new way o f thinking about the world is more cheerful” . Davies here, as we noted in 
Chapter One, believes that the social acceptance of holism is directly related to 
collective despair promulgated by living in a reductionist universe. Although he does 
not otter any evidence to equate despair with reductionism he nevertheless supposes 
holism and the New Sciences (i.e. Postmodern Science) to be relatively optimistic 
points o f view. This, too, differentiates the optimism of Postmodern Science and its 
worldviews with the pessimism of much postmodern critique. On the count 
pessimism, then, it seems that Postmodern Science fails to be postmodern.
Anti-truth and anti-realism (e.g. Baudrillard, 1983; Lyotard, 1984; Appignanesi 
and Lawson, 1989; Bauman, 1992; Rosenau, 1992; Zimmerman, 1994; Easthope, 
1998; Scott, 1998)
Postmodernists have often held Nietzsche to be a proto-postmodernist91, so it is 
with one of his many aphorisms that I shall begin this sub-section. Nietzsche would 
say that ‘truths are illusions that we have forgotten are illusions; they are metaphors 
that have become worn out’92. Postmodernists, too, have a particular (but not 
necessarily peculiar) take on both truth and reality; neither exists. That is to say truth 
and reality are not independent objective references but socially constructed 
contingencies decided upon temporarily by the social milieu of particular situations.
91See Vattimo (1988), Zimmerman (1994), Keolb, ed, (1996).
92Nietzsche’s view on truth may be summarised by quoting the following well-known passage:
“What, then, is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, anthropomorphisms, a sum, in 
short, of human relationships which, rhetorically and poetically intensified, ornamented, and 
transformed come to be thought o f, after long usage by a people, as fixed, binding and canonical. 
Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions, worn out metaphors, now impotent to 
stir the senses, coins which have lost their faces and are now considered as metal rather than currency 
(Nietzsche, 1979:84).
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“Any particular truth...”, so says Rosenau (1992:31) “...is relevant or valid only to 
members of the group or community within which it is formulated. Knowledge, then, 
is relative to the community”. Inspired by Bruno Latour93, Rosenau (1992:110) goes 
on to summarise the postmodern view on reality as: “no external reality actually exists 
as the ultimate ‘arbitrator.’”
Far from being universal and independent of human activities, truth and reality 
are localised human inventions, but in addition to this, the concepts o f Truth and 
Reality are themselves local inventions of the Modernist world which have been 
constructed and reconstructed by political and intellectual players to serve their own 
purposes. Truth and Reality in the modem age have become such hugely important 
ideas because they exist as the socially-accepted final referee in the political games of 
all Modernists. Needless to say virtually all players in Modernity have inevitably 
described the referee of Truth and Reality as confirming their own claims to rightness 
and righteousness. To play outside of Tmth and Reality, to tail to utilise them in your 
knowledge claims during Modernity has meant to immediately cast yourself oft' as 
superstitious or irrational, mad or deviant, pagan or uncivilised. Within 
postmodemity, however, political play without Tmth and Reality has become 
acceptable.
For those postmodernists inspired by Foucault, tmth (and Tmth) is intimately 
linked to Power:
Tmth does not consist of propositions that correctly ‘mirror’ or ‘represent’ an 
independent, pre-existing reality. Instead, what passes for ‘objective’ tmth is a 
construction generated by power invested elites. (Zimmerman, 1994:94).
For Foucault, Power, because it is, itself a founding idea, is deconstructed and 
rearranged so that it does not resemble a pyramidal hierarchy as conceptualised within 
class, gender or race activism but is instead a pluralised notion reflecting a whole host 
of different and inter-relaying forms. Power thus operates in uniquely arranged local 
sites but always as part o f the fabrication of tmth: “[i]t is impossible to separate tmth 
from power, and so there is no real possibility of any absolutely uncormpted tmth 
(Rosenau, 1992:78).
If  this is so then environmentalists thus constmct truths (for instance; the unity of
93See for example Latour and Woolgar (1979).
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nature and the balance ot nature) as much around political aims and aspirations as do 
their anthropocentric industrialist foes who speak of the duality of Humanity and 
Nature, the superiority o f Humanity and the necessity to conquer Nature. Thus it can 
be said that:
Postmodern theorists...insist that no one is innocent; eveiy one...is concerned with 
defining truth as a way of acquiring and retaining power. (Zimmerman, 1994:135).
All this would tend to indicate that truth is never further from your grasp than 
when you think you have got it. One of the defining features of Modernism, according 
to postmodernists, is that all Modernists think they have got to it, or have at least that 
they have got privileged access to getting it.
For many critics of this facet of postmodernism the debate over issues such as the 
existence of an independent reality are of interest only to postmodernists (and other 
intellectuals) who, insulated from reality, never personally experience the violence, 
terror, and degradation prevalent in modem society. (Rosenau, 1992:111).
From such a point of view a postmodern engagement with the de(con)struction 
of all truths is also a disengagement from political fighting and social change 
altogether. Such disengagement with the ‘real’ issues of political and social life would 
constitute a conciliation to the enemy.
However, for postmodernists, there are ways around this. One can disregard both 
truths and Truth without conciliating to the enemy. For instance;
[tjo be sure, finite beings have no access to absolute truth, and establishing finite 
truths is often a difficult, disputational, and politically charged process. Still, none of 
this prevents some historical, philosophical, or scientific texts from being more 
informative or illuminating. (Zimmerman, 1994:100).
This is to say that although there is no independent reality or truth the 
operational mode of what was once seen to be true is just used now as a model to get 
things done. Such an approach is exemplified in the writing of Jean-Francois Lyotard 
where the undercurrent of expression is that as long as the model is always seen as a 
model and not mistaken for reality this approach will work94.
For some postmodernists, however, this approach might lie too close to the 
rhetoric o f Modernist science to be comfortable. Modem scientists still revel in and
94See Lyotard (1984).
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celebrate the dictums ot science that state that science has no pretenses to finding the 
final word on all things but only towards offering temporary solutions to intellectual 
and practical problems until better ones come along. Nullius in verba reads the Royal 
Society’s motto; ‘No man’s word shall be final’.
The problem with this idea is that the so-called ‘temporary’ truths in Modem 
science have often reached such levels of acceptance and dependability that they have 
come to be very permanent. So much so that they serve as the basis of the 
construction of the narratives of many other fields of human endeavour, including 
those in less well-formulated younger sciences95. And when science speaks of its 
‘temporary’ truths it does so with the claim that its ‘temporary’ truths are more 
truthful than non-scientific truths. Postmodernism would seek to arrest the arrogance 
of science and wrench from it its claim to be the only field of human endeavour 
capable of supplying us with useful models. If other endeavours are allowed a claim to 
be able to model the universe (and all things in it), then the voices of difference and 
dissent are allowed to reign and all models will be encouraged to be viewed for what 
they are, mere models.
Another way to puncture independent truths yet still retain some form of 
knowledge claim based political attack is to state that for every situation there are 
multiple truths;, i.e.: there is more than one adequate/accurate representation of 
reality which can be acted upon as a physical, social or historical base. To avoid the 
vortex of absolute relativism we can still admit that while there is more than one truth 
not all o f these provide an equal base upon which to enact the particular social and 
physical change that we desire.
In a world suspicious of truth and reality, metaphor plays an important role. 
Truths can be seen as metaphors that have just been sufficiently inculcated into 
language and culture that they have lost their status as metaphors. This Nietzschean 
view of ‘truths are metaphors’ would opine that we have long forgotten the parentage
95For instance, although there are hundreds and hundreds of disciplines and sub-disciplines in biology all are 
believed to have come to terms with the founding idea of ‘evolution via natural selection . Indeed, they must do 
this in order to sustain their scientificity. In this way the founding idea of evolution is not merely a temporary truth 
which might be abandoned if a better founding principle comes along, but is actually a un-abandonable and 
inalienable premise which defines scientificity and truthhood. There may be little things wrong with evolution by 
natural selection, the argument of Modem scientists would go, but these things will be sorted out through the 
course of good science’ , so the ‘evolution via natural selection’ idea as a whole is thereby ossified in biology as 
nothing other than an obvious truth.
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ot our truths (from what sites the metaphors were originally casting comparisons 
from) and we have long forgotten the original purpose of their use.
We might even choose to go iurther than this--and put trust in the previous 
chapters7 studies of the history and sociology of unity~to decide that the ‘original7 
metaphors were themselves not based upon grounded referents but upon other 
socially ingrained metaphors. Each truth that is uttered, therefore, is a metaphor based 
upon another metaphor96. There is no ultimate basis from which to make 
comparisons—and our truths ultimately float free and unattached above a never found, 
non-existent reality. From the perspective of examining big truths (like the unity of 
nature) as well as some not-so-big truths (like the self-organisation of plant 
communities) truths may be classified as attempts to describe the world by the use of 
metaphorical narratives that themselves are derived from elaborate and now dead
metaphors of metaphors.
Some more recent students of metaphor charge that we do not have to stop at 
assuming that only large metanarrative structures are free-floating metaphors. Lakoff 
and Johnson (1980:3), for example, maintain that:
our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is 
fundamentally metaphorical in nature, if...our conceptual system is largely 
metaphorical, then the way we think, what we experience, and what we do 
every day is very much a matter of metaphor.
If we agree to dispose of the idea that there is—in either micro or 
macro-metaphors—a grounded, reality-checked ‘original7 metaphor we soon come to 
believe that every utterance we make, every conceptualisation we hold and every 
action we take is dependent on an endless cascade ot metaphors of metaphors ot 
metaphors. A thing is elaborated not in literal terms as to exactly what it is but in 
terms of how it is like something else and that something else is elaborated in terms ot 
how it is like another something else (and sometimes in terms ot how it is like the first 
something else). If metanarrative metaphors such as the unity ot nature exist in such a 
cascade then there should be no wonder that we find it impossible to locate the 
singular origin of the unity metaphor and its supporting concepts.
What this emphasis on metaphors might suggest is that the popular duality
96A conclusion that Don Miller (1982a, 1983) is also forced to arrive at.
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between literal and metaphor is no longer in existence (Miller, 1983). It seems that 
rearranging and resurrecting metaphors (and hardening them into ‘truths’) gives us 
historical change and intellectual contingency. Rearranging and resurrecting 
metaphors also gives us politics since the rearrangement and resurrection of specific 
metaphors for political gain-rather than the search for the truth~is all that there 
seems to be. Relating this to the Foucauldian Power/Knowledge thesis we might state 
(as Lakoii and Johnson, 1980:160, do) that in Modernist culture the belief in Truth 
is very much alive and truth is always absolute truth, the people who get to impose 
their metaphors on the culture get to define what we consider to be true—absolutely 
and objectively true.
Rearranging and resurrecting metaphors is also the only activity of the human 
sciences, suggests Don Miller, since the human sciences “can only be engaged 
knowingly or otherwise in one enterprise: the creation of metaphors to analyse other 
metaphors” (Miller, 1983:6)
So how does all this relate to Postmodern Science? It seems that a lot of 
Postmodern Scientists are convinced that their worldview is not just a metaphorical 
rendering of the universe but a description of actual reality. For instance Charles Birch 
(1990) indicates that although the mechanist worldview is metaphor, Postmodern 
Science exposes an Ecopolitical reality. New Scientists, like Paul Davies may be even 
more committed to the truth-rendering properties of the sciences of Chaos, 
Complexity and Self-organisation. For instance, of his own work Davies says:
while emphasising the short-comings of a purely reductionist view of the nature, 1 
intended that the gaps left by the inadequacies of reductionist thinking should be 
filled by additional scientific theories that concern the collective and organisational 
properties of complex systems, and not by appeal to mystical or transcendental
principles (Davies, 1987:203).
Here Davies can be noted as explicitly defending both reductionism and the New 
Sciences as purveyors of scientifically refereed reality while also relating his 
commitment to the truth exposing nature of the New Sciences compared to the 
story-telling nature of religious narrative
Added to this we might note the work of Mainzer (1995) who described that out
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of the twenty New Scientists he had studied, only one (Humberto Maturana) accepts 
the social construction of his scientific work97. New Scientists generally feel that their 
work is only contingent from the perspective that all of science is contingent (in the 
vein of the Royal Society motto). This would tend to indicate that on the subject of 
truth and reality, Postmodern Science is not strongly allied to the rest of postmodern 
thought.
absence (Hassan. 1987; Bauman, 1992; Rosenau, 1992)
For postmodern intellectuals, of various disciplines, a familiar theme within 
postmodernism is the rejection of the notion of presence. In postmodern literary and 
art history this involves the rejection of the author or the artist as authoritative 
meaning-generating presences in the works that they produce. It also over-turns the 
premise that art and literature must reflect some reality since reality is taken away. 
This makes the work float free in its own local reality. In academic studies about how 
humans come to know things the predilection towards absence manifests itself in the 
rejection of reality against which words and sentences can be measured and 
quantified. In sociology and political studies it has come to mean the absence of a 
fundamental social or political reality.
One consequence of this penchant for absence, according to Rosenau, is the 
postmodern predilection towards “absence of unity” (Rosneau,1992:14). No single 
theory can explain away all experiences and episodes and, therefore, the experiences 
and episodes are hardly united or unifiable.
So how does this postmodern notion of absence relate to Postmodern Science? It 
seems only negatively, since Postmodern Science is devoted to understanding nature 
in unity, a unity whose presence is taken to be both real and of deep consequence for 
the future of humanity and the Earth.
"Aporia7 (e.g. Derrida; 1976; Bauman, 1992).
Related to absence, and specifically the absence of unity that Rosenau talks about 
above, is the concept of aporia. Aporia is a word derived from Greek that translates
97Some of the other twenty New Scientists include the people explored in Chapter Five: Merry, Ayres, Davies. 
Maturana’s admissions of the social construction of his own work are described in Mamzer (1995).
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into English as ‘the absence of a passage’. It is a word that indicates the loss and 
attenuation of connection between things. Such loss must inevitably frustrate any 
attempt to unify things together.
Zygmunt Bauman explains postmodern aporia like this:
‘postmodemity’ being a semantically negative notion, defined entirely by 
absences~by the disappearance of something which was there before—the 
evanescence of synchronic and diachronic order, as well as of the directionality 
of change count among its most decisive defining features. (Bauman, 1992:29).
In this regard the holistic unity of Postmodern Science is an inadequate reflection 
of either a) the absence of connections between things or b) the absence of unity all 
together. Whereas Postmodern Scientists like Charles Birch would maintain the total 
interdependence and interconnection of all things in nature**, and thereby attach 
supreme importance to the notion of the causal web—where one thing always affects 
another then another then another—postmodern aporia would, at the very least, 
describe the existence of non-dependencies and non-connections in the causal web. It 
may even do more, going on, perhaps, to declare the death of the causal web through 
aporia. Postmodern aporia would then describe the world about which Birch’s 
Postmodern Science narrates as being devoid of unity and connectivity. On the count 
of absence, then, it seems that Postmodern Science fails to be postmodern.
‘Anti-communication’ (Barthes, 1975; Derrida, 1976; Lyotard, 1988; Kroker and 
Cook, 1991).
It has been highlighted many times before how postmodernism involves a intense 
investigation of communication and the impacts ol changing schemes of 
communication on culture and society and identity**. However, postmodernism is not 
necessarily a celebration of the ultimate efficacy of communication and indeed might 
be considered to render a view of communication that declares that communication is 
in fact a utopian intellectual promise that is never fulfilled. By this I mean to invoke 
the postmodern penchant towards the fragmentation of the referent, the fragmentation
98See Birch (1990:81-85.)
99 Such as that in Lyotard (1984); Poster (1990); White (1997).
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of the sign, and the fragmentation of presence to indicate that when a communication 
is made (by any one to any one else, or by any thing to any thing else) it is never an 
exact communication; it is never a 100% sound and clear reproduction of the intended 
message.
When someone is communicating to someone else there are many constraints and 
barriers placed upon on their communications. For example, language itself is 
metaphorical and suggestive rather than representative and literal (Miller, 1982a) and 
the private linguistic experiences of each individual to the referent forbids the 
possibility that two communicants are necessarily talking about the same things 
(Miller, 1982b) as does the individual experiences of the communicators to a specific 
or purported referent. The power structure of the communicants also exacts a price as 
the communication becomes political. The schizoid and polysemous nature of most 
words must also be hurdled since, as Sim (1998:316) points out by paraphrasing 
Derrida: “any given word has a cluster of associations around it that undermine its 
supposed purity”. We must almost acknowledge the ideological components of many 
communication and language systems whereby a mode of communication or language 
is entrenched with a certain way oflooking at things (a la Karshevskij, see Steiner, 
1976). Communication thus has to be undertaken within a changing medium by 
changeable communicators in schizophrenic and unequal social circumstances. 
Although one might gain satisfaction from a communication it is just as likely that a 
communication will leave one unsatisfied. The reality ol communication (say Kroker 
and Cook, 1991 :vii) is o f “radical isolation.”
So is this anti-communication sentiment reflected in Postmodern Science? To 
start with it seems fair to say that a Postmodern Scientist may able to operate his or 
her metanarrative whether or not they adopt the stance ot anti-communication. For 
instance, acknowledging that the power structures often make communication a 
barrier to, rather than a conduit of, the expression ol certain lived experiences is 
possible whether you are an advocate ol Postmodern Science or not. A proclivity to 
acknowledging the pervasivity of communication as a barrier (rather than a conduit) is 
not extinguished by buying into holism, unitarianism and organicism. it is an individual 
conscience vote rather than a party policy ol Postmodern Science. This would suggest 
that as far as anti-communication is concerned, the case is thrown out ol court.
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However, if Postmodern Science is the intellectual baby of systems theory, or the 
1990s incarnation of systems theory, then there may be a link between communication 
and Postmodern Science that does entice the jury to reconvene and charge 
Postmodern Science as failing to be postmodern once again. Here, I wish to 
acknowledge that a primary theoretical position within systems theory is 
communications theory. As Lilienfeld (1988:49) says “communications theory is 
largely concerned with the processes whereby messages can be coded, transmitted 
and decoded” in a whole variety of systems. Within communications theory codes are 
transcribable in a literal way. What a biological molecule says when it is encoded in 
one cell is the same as what it says when it is decoded in another cell; and what a 
radio receiver receives in decoded form is the same as the transmitter codes in a 
transmittable form. If Postmodern Scientists are keen to adopt this theory from their 
intellectual parents, then it too may find itself with a fetish tor communication; 
marvelling about the way things are communicated in both natural and artificial 
systems. Such a fetish may de-legitimise Postmodern Science’s claim to be 
postmodern.
Interest in communication theory is, however, not a general characteristic of 
Postmodern Scientists. Where some New Scientists like Merry and Ayres are very 
fond of it, Postmodern Scientists like Birch and Gare are either unaware of it, or feel 
it has no place in their elaboration of a Postmodern worldview.
'Pastiche’ (e.g.: Jencks, 1986; Harvey, 1990; Rosenau, 1992; Appignanesi eta l, 
1995; Lewis, 1998)
In the art world the term pastiche refers to art works composed of varied parts 
brought together, often haphazardly and arbitrarily. In postmodern art the style is 
developed to mean the taking of all sorts of unrelated and related objects and styles, 
none of which acts as the focus or control or base upon which the others rest. This 
emphasis of defocus, un-controlledness, and baselessness means that no part of the art 
work can be called the basis or the essence of the work. Similarly when referred to in 
the world of the social, postmodern pastiche conveys a sense of the intermingled 
curdling of social space and social time. In any one place all sorts of cultures may 
pervade and then articulate upon others, be infused and defused by both similar and
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dissimilar politics, and project and reject all sorts of value frameworks. A social space 
is thus a mosaic ot sometimes interlocking and sometimes independent ideas, practices 
and values. No one social theory can explain how all these parts work or how they 
come together. Nor can social change predicated upon these theories change the 
whole society.
Again this characteristic of scholarly postmodernism may seem to only relate to 
Postmodern Science in the sense that they are incompatible. Postmodern Science as 
advocated by Ferre, Birch, Gare, Bohm, Griffin and others seeks to work out how all 
the parts come together and totally interact to form a coherent whole. Clements’ 
superorganism and Lovelock’s Gaia are hardly pastiches but more like complete 
all-seeing murals of the natural world.
Chaos theory might be thought to be compatible with pastiche since pastiche is 
sometimes arbitrary and impervious to theorisation. However, the arbitrariness of the 
chaos in Chaos theory is directly related to an impending, implicit or underlying order. 
This order takes away much of Chaos theory’s claim towards being a science of the 
arbitrary. It also imposes a precise theoretical principle upon its subjects of study, 
unlike the artistic and social pastiches envisaged by postmodern art and postmodern 
sociology. On the count of pastiche, then, Postmodern Science fails to be 
postmodern.
"Fragmentation’ (e.g.: Heller and Feher; 1988; Harvey, 1990; Ashley, 1991; 
Lewis, 1998)
When he is describing his Postmodern worldview David Bohm states:
We have seen that fragmentary thinking is giving rise to a reality that is 
constantly breaking up into disorderly, disharmonious, and destructive 
partial activities. Therefore, seriously exploring a mode of thinking that 
starts from the most encompassing possible whole and goes down to the parts 
(sub-wholes) in a way appropriate to the actual nature ot things seems reasonable.
This approach tends to bring about a different reality, one that is orderly, 
harmonious and creative. For this actually to happen, however, a thorough­
going end to fragmentation is necessary. ( Bohm, 1988:86).
How do we reconcile this with David Harvey’s rendition of a postmodern 
worldview?:
1 7 4
1 begin with what appears to be the most startling tact about postmodernism: 
its total acceptance of the ephemerality, fragmentation, discontinuity, and the 
chaotic that formed the one half of Baudelaire’s conception of Modernity.
But postmodernism responds to the tact of that in a very particular way. It does 
not try to transcend it. counteract it, or even define the ‘eternal and 
immutable’ elements that might lie within it. Postmodernism swims, even 
wallows, in the fragmentary and the chaotic currents of change as if that is all 
there is. (Harvey, 1990:44).
Harvey does not deny that Modernity and Modernism can be, and is, conceived 
as a period and a mindset where change and fragmentation is a persistent 
phenomenon. He does however feel that within postmodemity and within the 
postmodern mind such fragmentation and change is hardly intermixed, undergirded 
by, or contributory to either integration or stability. In the Modem world, change and 
fragmentation is ever-present but so are integration and stability. Not only that but 
Modernism has always utilised fragmentation and change as factors to contribute to 
ongoing changeless essences such as Man, Freedom, and the endless Progress of 
Science, Technology or the Economy. Change is thus linked to technological and 
economic development, two icons of the Modernist age. Fragmentation within this 
social and cultural framework is usually conceived of as part of modernisation and 
improvement and the fragmentation of community/society into its individuals is 
important for the development of individualism and of entrepreneurship.
If fragmentation and change are recognised as characteristics of Modernity, they 
are always linked to adjunct Modernist concepts like Progress, Mankind and 
Freedom. All these concepts were bom in Modernity and died—without changing—by 
the time o f Modernity’s supposed end; i.e. now.
When reconciling Bohm and Harvey we might note that Bohm is talking of the 
natural world and humanity’s relation to it and that Harvey is talking of the social 
world and the human interest in explaining it. Harvey and Bohm are naturally more 
interested in the social and natural worlds respectively since Harvey is a social 
scientist and Bohm is a natural scientist and if engaged in conversation about 
fragmentation they would likely talk past each other. Where Harvey would talk of the 
fragmentation of Modernity in terms of social fragmentation and of postmodemity in 
terms o f cultural, social and epistemological fragmentation, Bohm would prefer a
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simple binary division ol Modernity equals fragmentation and Postmodemity equals 
an end to fragmentation.
For many postmodernist scholars this binary division of Bohm’s (Modernity is 
that period where fragmentation exists in our views of nature and Postmodemity is 
that where nature’s unity is recognised) is either interpretable as 1) two strands o f 
Modemism~i.e.: industrialism and romanticism—fighting it out, with romanticism the 
rightful victor, or 2) as a clear cut case of Modernism and anti-Modernism. In this 
regard we could abruptly state that Bohm has just got his postmodernism wrong. His 
repulsion towards fragmentation is hardly a postmodern characteristic and this 
compels me to declare that on the count of fragmentation, Postmodern Science, once 
again, fails to be postmodern.
cAnti-representational’ (e.g.; Lyotard, 1988; S.K. White, 1991; Adair, 1992; 
Boyne and Rattansi, 1992; Trodd, 1998)
“I only want to speak out for Gaia because there are so few people who do, 
compared with the multitudes who speak for people” (Lovelock, 1988:xvii). So says 
James Lovelock in his second book on the Gaia theory; The Ages o f Gaia. Through 
his geophysiological science of the biosphere Lovelock claims to have unearthed the 
real nature of life and to offer an appropriate avenue whereby the needs of the whole 
(Earth)—which were for a long time hidden from environmentalists—are now 
displayed with abundant clarity.
As we can see from the statement above, Lovelock claims, no less, to represent 
the Earth. Herein lies another problematic explored by postmodernists, that of 
representation. Representation, it is said by postmodernists, is not feasible because 
representation always involves ‘re-presentation’. Whether we are talking about the 
epistemic representation of the Truth by science, the political representation of the 
people by elected politicians or the cultural representation of identity through national 
and social mythologies, representation is seen as an insidious cover for 
non-participation, elitism and status quo politics. Given this, the Earth’s laws, desires, 
needs et cetera are not so much represented in Lovelock’s Gaia theory so much as 
they are ‘re-presented’ via particular cultural, political and philosophical biases that 
afreet Lovelock and his theory.
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Whereas Modernist social progress has been advocated time and time again as a 
widening of representation in various social settings, “postmodernists believe that 
representation encourages generalisation” (Rosenau, 1992:97). Indeed, this is what we 
find in Lovelock’s representation of Gaia since the nuances and plurality of the 
world’s ecological communities are overshadowed by preoccupations with the big 
picture. In this process of generalisation Lovelock’s claims to representation are 
helped by the abstraction of the category of Life. Just as categories and abstractions 
such as Reason, Man and Truth are too general to account for specific reasons, 
humans and truths so Lovelock’s use o f Life is over-generalising. In this way when 
Lovelock talks of Gaia maintaining the planet for Life he is re-presenting the lives of 
species with the Life of Gaia. For many a postmodernist this victory of the abstract 
over the concrete is a hallmark of Modernism. If Gaia theory is inherently part of 
Postmodern Science, as claims Merchant (1994), Ferre (1996) and Birch (1990) then 
Postmodern Science fails to be postmodern.
'Otherness’ (e g.: Foster, ed, 1983; S.K. White, 1991; Harvey, 1990; Pefanis, 
1991; Tester, 1993)
David Harvey (1990:47) declares that:
the most liberative and therefore the most appealing aspect of postmodern 
thought {is] its concern for otherness.
Otherness is usually described by postmodern sensibilities as that category of 
objects and subjects which do not conform with, contribute to, or admire the 
mainstream majority, mainstream Reason or mainstream knowledge. Usually this 
refers to those members o f humanity whose histories, values, traditions and lifestyles 
have been described (by that mainstream) as abnormal, strange, savage, uncivilised or 
unnatural, and whose voices have been marginalized, patronised, forgotten or have 
been filtered through mainstreamism. As far as the living world is concerned all 
non-humans in the Modernist world have been treated in this way and so have been 
sub-consciously branded by Modernist sensibilities as the other .
There is often a case made that ‘Nature’ itself has been badly treated by humans 
in this way and, as a whole, is confined by humanity to the category of being an 
‘other’. Thus it can be claimed that if you are protecting, speaking tor, and celebrating
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Nature in any shape or form you are celebrating ‘otherness’. Thus Lovelock can, and 
does, claim that he is speaking for the silenced Earth as though it is a marginalized, 
forgotten entity100.
However, Lovelock’s role as spokesperson for the planet Earth can also be 
interpreted as shunning otherness. Instead of bringing every living thing into the fold 
of the ecological community (as in Clements), the ecosystem (as in Odum) or the 
global system (as in Lovelock), a postmodern approach might look at the differences 
contained within these groupings; identifying how the parts are different from each 
other rather than the same. When identifying the uniqueness of the parts, their 
otherness is in some way released. In generalising the activities and properties of the 
parts under the rubric of the ‘superorganism’, the ‘ecosystem’ or the ‘global system’, 
otherness is washed away. If Postmodern Science allies itself to the celebration of 
these unitary concepts then it, too, can hardly claim to be an effective celebrant of 
otherness. On the count of otherness, then, Postmodern Science fails to be 
postmodern.
‘Intertextualitv’ (Barthes, 1970; Riffaterre, 1983; .Rosenau, 1992; Storey, 1998)
As indicated in Birch (1991) one of the ‘doctrines’ of a worldview derived from 
Postmodern Science is interconnectionism. It may be pointed out that there is a 
potential articulation between Postmodern Science and postmodernism through their 
respective focus upon interactionism and intertextuality, respectively.
Intertextuality, in postmodernist circles, is the acknowledgement of the 
interconnected processes that go on in the making up of a text:
Writers who create texts or use words do so on the basis of all other texts 
and words that they have encountered, while readers deal with them in 
the same way. (Harvey, 1990:49).
This means, as Stephen Heath (1998:258) makes clear, that a written work “is 
not a self contained, individually authored whole, but the absorption and 
transformation of other texts”. Heath goes on to recite Kristeva (1967) to edify this
idea: a text is “a mosaic of quotations” .
Now this would only seem to relate to Postmodern Science in a tangential way
100See Lovelock (1979), Lovelock, (1988), and Lovelock (1991).
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since the interaction!sm supposed in postmodern intertextuality is only pertinent to 
written documents. However, postmodern discourse analysts have concluded that all 
discourses can be read as texts, whether written/printed or not. Therefore everything 
that humans say anything about becomes a text, including those things we say about 
nature and the things in it. In this way, nature, and the things in it, can exist in an 
“infinitely complex interwoven relationships. Absolute intertextuality assumes that 
everything is related to every thing else” (Rosenau; 1992:xii)) Postmodern Science 
can thus possess the postmodern attribute of intertextuality because of its penchant 
tor interconnectionism.
We may also, at this point, note Rosenau’s (1992:xiv) statement that:
[ejverything comes to be defined as a text in a postmodern context, and yet the text 
is marked by an absence of any concrete or tangible content.
This statement can be compared with Charles Birch’s idea that there are no 
objects and that Postmodern Science looks at events and processes as primary 
compared to substances and objects (Birch, 1990) and realise a possibility of common 
ground. However, whereas Birch would maintain that these ideas refer to real things 
out in the real world, postmodern intertextualists would be inclined to believe that 
their texts and their intertextualities are merely maps of an impossible-to-know, or 
non-existent, reality. Texts such as Birch’s five doctrines of a Postmodern Worldview 
are thus socially-complex human attempts to classify, describe and change our maps 
of the world—rather than actual reflections of the real world. Thus rather than 
believing that atoms on Jupiter are interconnected with gorillas in the misty mountains 
of Rwanda—as Birch might—postmodernists would say that gorilla’s are 
socially-construed beings whose construction may be dependent upon the atomic 
theories, scientific metaphors, cultural processes and intellectual contingencies that 
describe the physics of Jupiter.
We may also be able to delineate another possible difference between 
Postmodern Science’s holist interactionism and postmodern conceptions of 
intertextuality. Whereas Postmodern Science thinks of things as being so 
interconnected that they constitute a unity, postmodern intertextuality allows for holes
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in the net of intertextuality; areas where there may be isolation between any two 
texts.1U1 If Postmodern Scientists were to adopt similar ideas for their Postmodern 
Science they would have to acknowledge the incompleteness of the world’s physical 
and ecological interactions.
One aspect of interactionism that has been linked by Postmodern Scientists to 
interactionism is the concept of the unity of the observer and the observed, as 
epitomised in Bohm’s view of quantum physics. The familiar wave-particle thesis is 
thought to be antithetical to Modernist sensibilities by Bohm (1994) because the 
thing-ness o f the thing is determined by the context of the observer. Observed one 
way an elementary particle can appear as a particle, observed another way, it appears 
as a wave: “the quality of the thing...” says Bohm (1994:347) “...depends on the 
context”. For Wiessert (1991) this observer dependency also exposes the postmodern 
nature of quantum physics despite quantum physics obvious périodisation within the 
Modernism of early Twentieth Century science.
So how does this relate to postmodernism? Well it might strike some readers as 
being comparable to the postmodern predilection towards the elimination of a 
context-independent reality as outlined in the above section on Truth. This would then 
convey a certain degree of complimentarity between the postmodern intellectual 
movement and Postmodern Science. I would warn against giving this complimentarity 
much cognisance, however, since the context dependency of quantum physics as 
described by Bohm and many others is a purely physical phenomenon dependent upon 
the physics of the equipment used to measure the subject of its studies (i.e. 
fundamental particles); whereas critical postmodern views of context dependency are 
thoroughly social and cultural in nature. The thing-ness ot a thing in ‘postmodern’ 
quantum physics is dependent on the equipment used to measure it but is otherwise 
invariable whereas postmodern context-dependency would bring in those micro- and 
macro socio-cultural factors that give rise to varying interpretations ot reality despite 
the use of exactly the same equipment. 10
101 This intertextual holiness is, in fact, necessary within the theory of postmodern intertextuality since if all 
authors constructed their texts and if all readers read their texts on the basis of complete intertextuality then it is 
likely that every writer/reader will have been exposed to very nearly the same collection of texts (a collection that 
could be said to constitute a unity) and will very likely be writing and reading very similar things in those texts.
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‘Chaos7 (e.g.: Harvey, 1990; Hassan, 1987; Grant, 1998; Lewis, 1998)
Another one word characteristic of postmodernism might be chaos. 
Postmodernism finds that differences in social situations and in the natural world 
explicitly reflect the implicit chaotic nature of the social and natural universe. If this is 
so, then it might be thought that Chaos theory is immediately relevant to postmodern 
theorising. Indeed, this is the declared view of many Postmodern Scientists:
Advocates of postmodern science claim that the modem scientific paradigm...is 
giving way to a new paradigm based on principles of indeterminacy, chaos 
and evolution. (Best, 1991:189).
Wiessert (1991:224) is an example of one of these ‘Chaos theory is postmodern7 
advocates and he talks about the ‘postmodern revolutions in Twentieth Century 
science7 presented by Chaos theory102.
As we have seen in the previous chapter Chaos theory is held to be the 
mathematical manifestation of the order from chaos concept:
new forms of order emerge out of chaos, albeit considerably more complex, 
intricate and irregular in nature than the forms of order which previously 
were thought to exist. (Best, 1991:202).
Chaos theorists have often derided ‘society’s7 fixation with the goodness of order 
and the badness of chaos. This is a mistake, they believe, because chaos is a friend of 
the world since it gives rise to order. Chaos and order, Chaos theorists say, are 
connected and complimentary: chance is a part of purpose, stability is achieved 
through change and order is hidden within chaos. As Best explains:
It should be emphasised that the chaos scientists are finding everywhere today 
is not perceived as the logical antithesis ot order, for that is the type of rigid 
binaristic thinking that postmodern science attempts to displace. (Best, 1991:66)
Although Chaos theory might disrupt the binary nature of the chaos-order 
dichotomy in Modernist thought, it does this in a thoroughly Modernist way, by 
having order usurp chaos. Although Chaos theory has been claimed as a Postmodern 
Science and as a celebrant ot chaos, the chaos in Chaos theory is a bounded and 
packaged user-friendly chaos, a chaos that can be managed, controlled, utilised and
102 Likewise Chaos theory has been associated with postmodernism by Hayles (1990), Worster (1993) Zimmerman 
(1994), Gare (1995), Kember (1996), Jagtenberg and Mckie (1997) and Grant (1998).
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functionalised. Chaos is dished out in small doses—like vitamin pills—to help develop 
orderly, progressive processes. In this way the chaos in Chaos theory is Modernist, 
not postmodern. Modernists try to limit disorder and contingency; and this is what 
Chaos theory, despite its claims, is largely about. Postmodern chaos, if it were 
theorised, would not be bounded so. It would flourish uncontrollably. It would be a 
chaos constituted by the happenings of local agents whose collective pattern is 
sometimes interesting but hardly meaningful. Postmodern chaos could not be 
packaged as some sort of subsystem of variability within a mainframe system. It 
would exist precisely because it could not be systematised and packaged.
This need not be a reinstatement of the binary nature of order and chaos as Best 
might allude, it can be a pluralisation of both sides of the dichotomy. Where 
traditional conceptions (i.e. Modernist conceptions) of chaos and order have 
presented them as a duality (i.e. have set them up as chaos versus order), and where 
Chaos theory presents the chaos/order relationship as a union, deconstructive 
postmodernism would see order and chaos, and the order/chaos duality, in plurality so 
that there are many types of order and many types of chaos.
The chances are, however, that postmodernists might not even be prepared to 
pluralise order and chaos so that there are many forms and instances of both order and 
chaos. Instead they might wish to get rid of the concepts altogether, acknowledging 
them as no more than power investing and power divesting cultural categories.
It is possible to respect the argument made by chaoticians that under Modernism, 
chaos is regarded generally as a bad thing. The problem is, however, that their 
particular chaos is such a pathetic chaos that they, too, appear to want it restrained by 
order. In this way it seems as though Chaos theorists covertly regard chaos as bad 
too. With a name like ‘Chaos theory’ and with its avowed interest in chaos you would 
think that chaoticians were setting up a celebration of all those things that have come 
to denote chaos; including for instance; anarchy, un-controlledness, wildness et 
cetera. This is hardly the case, however. As intimated before Chaos theory is more of 
a continuation of the Modernist celebration of order and how it is achieved than an 
advocate o f its supersession.
Chaos theory only venerates chaos because it contributes to the natural order of 
things. In Chaos theory, chaos is not the only thing worthy of value and of study; both
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order and chaos are valued and studied. Systems theorists call it ‘Chaos theory’, as 
opposed to ‘Order theory’ because they believe that they are laying down new roads 
towards the idea that chaos is valuable.
Order and chaos, even within Chaos theory, and very many times outside of it, 
are valued in different ways. Order is valued intrinsically, and chaos, instrumentally. 
Thus order of any type is valued in and of itself; a manifestation the universe’s 
essential goodness, whereas chaos is valued because it is instrumental in the making of 
order. We can detect this differential valuation of order and chaos in the following 
statement by a chaotician: “[d]eep chaos is a natural, inescapable, essential stage in 
the transformation of all life” (Merry, 1995:13). Here chaos is presented as a 
phenomena that should be valued, not for itself but for its contribution to all life. If 
chaotic phenomena are valued at all by Chaos theory, it is not because of their 
intrinsic worth, and it is not on parity with orderly processes, but because they 
contribute to the intrinsic value held to lie in order and orderly phenomena.
What this means is that chaos, and those things deemed to be chaotic, exist as 
secondary entities to those things deemed to be orderly. In the ecological arena this 
means that those things which are held to be chaotic—which for many ‘order from 
chaos’ metaphysicists often means such things as the behaviours o f individual 
organisms and the groups they form—are only of value because they contribute to 
orderly ecosystems and then the overall Gaian order. To entertain ‘ecological’ and 
postmodern affinities, chaotic entities and processes must be given frill parity in value 
with orderly entities and processes. Chaos must be regarded as a valuable whatever its 
relationship to order.
Another way that Chaos theory tails to live up to the claims by Postmodern 
Scientists that it is a postmodemisation of science has been made by Rosenau (1992). 
Despite being hailed as radical, revolutionary and anti-Modem science, Chaos theory 
nevertheless emerged from traditional mathematical and physical sciences. Its 
formalistic nature and its presumptions towards the practical problems ot Modem 
physical problems thus enfolds it into the traditional techno-scientific framework. As 
Rosenau points out:
[cjhaos m^ins not the end of modem science but rather a new science
that improves on the old and makes it even more powerful. (Rosenau, 1992:170).
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One particular advocate of the ‘Chaos theory equals Postmodern Science’ 
equation admits as much, stating:
Chaos theory is not opposed to normal science. It is normal science. Its criteria 
for evaluating evidence, reproducing results, credentialling investigators, and 
so on, differs not at all from these other physical sciences. (Hayles, 1991:4)
Not only this but Chaos theory, and its relatives in the New Sciences such as 
Complexity theory and Self-organisation theory are delivering messages of Baconian 
utilitarianism in the same old way that Modernist science did:
Complexity is on the cutting edge of science. Physicist, Heinz Pagels put it 
this way: 1 am convinced that the societies that muster the new sciences of 
complexity and can convert that knowledge into new products and forms 
of social organisation will become the cultural, economic, and military 
superpowers of the next century. (Merry, 1989:53).
Having said all of this, however, there is a possible link between postmodernism 
and Chaos theory and it proceeds as follows. Much of the postmodern movement has 
been about capitulating to the fragmented material democracy that is thought to exist 
in Free Market societies and culture. The Free Market is held to exist as a chaotic, 
fragmented, heterogeneous social anarchy; very ‘postmodern’ one may think. But the 
breed of postmodernism that I am advocating here suggests that the Market is not an 
unplanned assemblage of chaotic self-ordering and self-renewing fragmented 
assemblages of localised free and autonomous agents. The Market is more of a 
totalitarian concept whose shallow plurality and plastic-coated anarchic freedom is a 
public relations endeavour on a mammoth scale. Free Marketism portrays itself as a 
free, open, unbounded and unplanned but, far from being unplanned, the capitalist 
Free Market is very much a forced economic practice instituted by planning on the 
mega-scale of multinational companies, international alliances, state-subsidisation and 
centralised authoritarianism. As much centralised planning goes on within this 
framework as ever did in Stalin’ s Department ot Internal Aftairs but it seems that 
Chaos theory lets its advocates feel proud of being part ot the benevolent chaos that is 
the Market.
‘Incoherence’ (e.g.: Bauman, 1992; Babich, 1994)
According to Babich et a l (1994:1), postmodernism can be seen as “running up
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against the modem ideal of clarity and distinctness”. This, for some, is interpreted as a 
negative thing and for others it is a positive.
Coherence serves as both a tool for action but also as a prison. It enables policy 
formation since it oilers views upon which action may be taken but it also codifies 
into a unitary form the widely divergent phenomena and experiences within the world; 
rejecting difference and atypicality so that something can be said about some situation 
and action can be put into effect.
When examining the relavance of coherence to unitarianism we see that Edward 
Goldsmith, for one, tells us that coherence is a most definite plan of his 
‘post-industrial metaphysics7:
1 have tried in this book to state clearly the basic principles underlying an 
ecological worldview. These principles are closely interrelated, forming an 
all-embracing and self-consistent model of our relationship with the 
world in which we live. (Goldsmith 1993 pxvii).
Likewise Paul Davies seeks to realise the inherent coherence of all of nature’s 
laws when he talks of the laws of the nature operating together, ‘dovetailing7, to 
neatly present a coherent whole (Davies, 1987). Neither Davies, nor Goldsmith use 
the term postmodernism in their elaboration of the metaphysics of the New Sciences, 
but their views on the meaning and operation of the universe are supported by many 
of those that do (for example Birch, Gare, Griffin, Ferre). These Postmodern 
Scientists also implicitly testify to the importance of arriving at a coherent natural 
philosophy.
What all this means in this analysis, however, is the unearthing of yet another 
divergence between aspects of Postmodern Science and aspects of postmodernism. 
Whereas Postmodern Science wants to codify and integrate a precise worldview upon - 
which ethical changes can rest soundly, postmodernism might choose to explicate 
wholly variable, multiple and sometimes contradictory worldviews in which the 
objects and subjects therein contained are also thought of as being variable, multiple 
and self-contradictory. In this light, a single view of nature as unitary, holistic, 
interconnected—and a single view of all the various processes of nature as 
self-organising orderings—may be coherent and understandable concepts but they are 
also imprisoning concepts since by imploring us to believe that the universe, and all 
life in it, is a single self-organising, holistic system (for whatever intellectual or
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political reason) other ways that the universe may be understood and interpreted are 
de-legitimised.
'Anti-teleological7 (e.g.: Slack, & Whitt, 1992).
After observing the order in Gaia and her ecosystems and after observing the 
evolutionary legacy of the members o f Gaia and her ecosystems, Paul Davies declares 
that life on Earth “has a pleasing teleological character to it77 (Davies, 1987:132). 
Charles Birch (1991) a self-declared Postmodern Scientist reiterates the same point 
over and over again in his book on metaphysics titled On Purpose. This is a book 
obviously designed to counter what Birch perceives as the predilections towards 
meaninglessness in science and the meaningless human lives it supposedly leads to. 
Reconciling Davies7 and Birch’s focus on teleology within the 'New Paradigm7 of 
Postmodern Science with more general postmodern sensibilities in academic writings 
is not easy since many postmodernist writers would be classified as being avowedly 
anti-teleological in their approach. Such postmodern suspicion of teleology arises 
from a variety of quarters; its relationship to Progress being a primary site.
Postmodernists see that Progress has become such a mythic emblem within 
Modernism that it is hard to contemplate social change without the word and the idea 
being raised. Technological and economic progress are particularly relevant here. 
Grenz (1996:7), for instance, declares that postmodernists are involved in “eschewing 
the enlightenment myth of inevitable progress77. Progress, the idea, is thus described 
by postmodernists as a product of Modernism and it manifests itself mostly as 
pertaining to economic, technological and scientific development. lu3 To abandon 
Progress as basic and fundamental, as the postmodernists have, is:
is to accept the idea that history may have no purpose, that it is not an 
evolutionary or progressive march towards an emanicpatory te lo s, but rather 
a contingent set of events, often accidental and with many unanticipated 
consequences. (Farganis, 1993:364). 103
103 However, it also pervades other fields of human endeavour and much borrowing, analogising and 
metaphorical interplay between the fields can be found. I will not go into these interplays here except to restate that 
when the history of science and the history of economics are analysed together the exact origins of the Progress 
myth become blurred. Neo-classical economists used analogies from Darwin and Spencer that were themselves 
informed by the work of classical economists (see Mirowski, ed. 1994).
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When dismissing Progress, postmodernists are usually talking from within 
disciplines dealing with human agents and processes, for example history, philosophy, 
development studies, sociology, cultural studies, history of science et cetera. Within 
all o f these disciplines, Progress has been abandoned by the resident postmodernists 
and along with it any teleological arguments which state that what has gone on 
before, say in society, is leading in an identifiable direction towards more social 
complexity, higher living standards, greater knowledge, expanded freedom and so on.
Science itself has long been hooked up on the idea of Progress. Not only does 
Progress in scientific discovery and knowledge occur most profoundly in science 
compared to other human endeavours, but also in the subjects of its study. In biology 
(and also a lot of non-biological disciplines) this progress is encapsulated in various 
evolution theories, most notably ‘evolution by natural selection’. Within biology there 
lies a metaphysical tendency to pronounce on about how complex things evolve from 
simpler things.
While many scientists try to eschew teleology as an explanation within evolution 
most Postmodern Scientists are not so adverse to the use ot teleology and purpose 
when describing the activities of nature. Birch, Davies and Goldsmith, for example, 
feel that it is an integral part of their scientific and metaphysical descriptions ot the 
world. If this is so, then there is obviously a sharp difference of opinion between 
Postmodern Science and that of postmodernism, generally. On the count of 
anti-teleology, Postmodern Science fails to be postmodern.
‘Heterogeneity’ ( e.g. Hassan, 1987; Heller and Feher, 1988; Zagorin, 1990; 
Pefanis, 1991; Sim, ed,1998).
Where Modernity sought to unite science, art and philosophy with reality in an 
attempt to change things for a universally acknowledged better world, where 
Modernity sought to unite the troubles ot the all the world s peoples under the banner 
of countering classism, racism and sexism; where Modernity s theories ot social 
change posited utopian ideals to mark out a desired model and pre-planned course ot 
improvement; postmodemity would do otherwise. Postmodernism seeks to reveal 
reality as a multifarious assemblage of elements. It diversifies and multiplies the 
oppressions and concerns of people and the angles ot attack against such oppressions
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and for such concerns. Postmodernism recognises that single master models of social 
being and social development must give way to, what Foucault would say are, 
heterotopian images of what is and what can be. In a world acknowledging 
heterogeneity we must, says Foucault (1983 :xiii), “prefer what is positive and 
multiple, difference over uniformity, flows over unities, mobile arrangements over 
systems”. In heterotopia there can be little room for confining belief in just a single 
idea or a single God, and there is also little room for an all-embracing metaphysics 
and for universal laws and principles.
So does Postmodern Science, or the Constructive Postmodern worldview, allow 
for heterogeneity and pluralism? Its allegiance with systems and unities would not 
convince Bauman, Derrida or Lyotard since these postmodernists have taken as a 
prime problematic the need to disintegrate the systems concepts and their 
homogenising tendencies . Charles Birch’s dismissal of the idea that the universe can 
be considered fractured, and his entrenched commitment to a single universe and a 
single way of looking at it104, would, in this regard, seem to place him firmly within 
the Modernist mode. And along with Birch, are carried many other Postmodern 
Scientists who would, likewise, tend to very similar single and unitary views of reality. 
Given this different attitude with regard to heterogeneity, it seems likely that 
Postmodern Science fails to be convincingly associated with postmodernism.
'Anti-hierarchical’ (e.g. Hassan, 1987; Deleuze and Guattari, 1987; Bauman, 
1992))
Bauman believes “postmodemity...is about flattening of hierarchies, absence of 
discretion and equivalence” (Bauman, 1992:34). This again imposes a distinction 
between Postmodern Science and postmodernism because Postmodern Science, as we 
have seen, involves a promotion of a self-organising, united universe which, as we 
have also seen, is necessarily inscribed with hierarchy and hierarchical concepts. 
Postmodern thought, instead of ascribing nature and society in hierarchical terms, 
would attach itself to non-hierarchical conceptualisations such as Deleuze and 
Guattari’s 'Thousand Plateau’s’ (1987) where knowledge and the things it refers to
104Birch (1990:129) states “the postmodern worldview takes seriously the proposition that we live in a universe 
and not a multiverse. It is ecological through and through”.
188
are disseminated into multiple planes, none of which are more basic or o f higher 
stature than others. On the count of being ‘anti-hierarchical7, Postmodern Science 
tails to be postmodern.
‘Meaninglessness7: (e.g. Hassan, 1987; Harvey, 1990; Bauman, 1992)
If we allow only one thing to characterise Postmodern Science, that one thing 
might well be its search tor ultimate meanings. If we allow only one thing to 
characterise postmodernism then that one thing might well be its rejection of ultimate 
meanings. For postmodernists ultimate meanings, and the search tor them, totalise the 
myriad realities of the world into restrictive schemes that can hardly do justice to the 
differences o f opinions, ways o f living and experiences that abound.
For Postmodern Scientists, the search tor new ultimate meanings must go on in 
order to both free us from the meaninglessness of the Modernist universe and to 
overturn oppressive Modernist ideals:
if there is no formulation to the meaning of our life, we are adrift. One of the 
agonising dilemmas of our times is the death of meaning. The relentless 
march of the empiricist worldview has denuded us of meaning.
(Skolomowski, 1981:100).
Charles Birch is one of the Postmodernist Scientists who has been searching for 
the meanings that have been ejected by Modem science. Here, again, Birch’s focus on 
meaning is unitary and singular; there is only one meaning and all must follow it. Birch 
admits that the universe is in some way composed of numerous individual entities that 
appear to be manufacturing their own experiences and their own meanings but about 
this he states:
A multiplicity of creative agents implies the need for the rule of one. Too 
many cooks spoil the broth. There must be something that sets limits to the 
contusion and anarchy possible with a multiplicity of creative agents.
Individual purposing agents need to be co-ordinated. (Birch, 1990:43).
These two sentences tend to express exactly what Postmodern Scientists are 
willing to give up in the search for their ultimate meaning, namely difference, dissent, 
and contusion. The need for an ultimate ordered and ordering meaning takes away the 
individualistic nature of meaning. Meanings can only exist as mega-entities for 
Postmodern Scientists not as micro-entities which are merely part of the changing
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mindscape in the lives o f individuals and groups o f individuals.
Both Skolimowski and Birch try and characterise the lack of meaning as a 
Modernist project but Modernism is replete with many founding principles that are 
equivalent with meaning. Progress, Truth, Unity, Freedom, Man; all o f these concepts 
are positioned within Modem science as fundamental and all are hailed as meaning 
invested conceptualisations replete with a religious ambience to the point that people 
not affirming them are held out as heretical.
Another reason for requiring ultimate meanings to be discovered and 
disseminated, according to the ideas of Postmodern Scientists, is to replace 
environmentally and socially malignant ultimate meanings105 with new, 
environmentally and socially benign ones. On this score we can note how many 
philosopher-environmentalists, including all known Postmodern Scientists, have 
attempted to wrestle the struggle for existence metaphor away from nature and 
expose it as a bourgeois interpretation of the natural world which justifies the laissez 
faire  capitalism of Modernism. In its place they seek to imbue nature with an intrinsic 
co-operative meaning; upon which they wish to erect their varying aspirations for a 
post-industrial or postmodern ecological society (see Bookchin, 1990;
Goldsmith, 1993; Sylvan, 1994, as recent examples)
A thoroughly postmodern appraisal of the situation, however would not attempt 
to describe nature with any meaning. Although a meaningless nature casts our 
metaphysical outlook on life adrift from any cosmic purpose, at least we are not 
enslaved into the metaphorical ravings of those who attempt to exercise control over 
us by appealing to the natural law of things. Each individual106 develops its own 
meaning of nature (though this is, most of the time, mediated by its socio-ecological 
context) whose precise characteristics are unique to that individual. The unique 
contextualised experiences of each individual and the absence of totally transcribable 
true representation and communication of those experiences (due to the inherent 
difference in each individual7 s contextualised experiences) means that no two 
individuals can have the same compliment of experience-generated meanings. Every
105 Which for Postmodern Scientists sometimes includes those meanings that I have identified above as arising 
within Modernism. For example: Humanism, Materialism (and its associations with productivism and 
consumption!sm), and Progress.
106Here an individual might be human or non-human.
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individual thus carries around with it its own hermeneutical universe. Meaning is thus 
localised and de-centred into the mini-universes that exist as each individual. Where 
meanings do overlap from one individual to the next, there are plenty of meanings to 
divide and differentiate them.
Something to note here is that such individuation of meaning within the human 
realm does not have to lead directly to nihilism and the abdication of social 
responsibility (although many a modernist and postmodernist alike often allude to this 
as being the case). While meaning is individualised, the inter-subjective abrasion of 
meanings—via the collision and conflicting of clashing universes—is a prime medium 
for the voices of difference to be heard. An over-arching meaning acts to stifle this 
abrasion and silence the exchange that flows from inter-universal conflict.
Because “the postmodern perspective reveals the world as composed of an 
indefinite number of meaning generating agencies, all relatively self-sustained and 
autonomous, all subject to their own respective logics and armed with their own 
facilities o f truth validation” (Bauman, 1992:35), then to prescribe meanings for other 
universes is an act of metaphysical imperialism; an attempt to colonise another 
universe and reconfigure its reality.
To construct a particular underlying or ultimate meaning for nature (whether that 
meaning is based upon co-operation or competition, or unity or duality) has a 
tendency to neglect the many instances in nature where neither co-operation nor 
competition nor any other ultimate meaning are relevant. Such neglect would defocus 
empathy with the lived experiences of individual organisms and the collections they 
comprise. Somehow there must be a willingness to allow multiple sets of meanings 
and multiple sets of purposes in the universe rather than one ultimate meaning and one 
ultimate purpose.
For many postmodernists the idea of meaning is itself a dangerously stifling and 
totalitarian concept. It places singularity and closed-ness on whatever it is referring to; 
a sentence, a social pattern or the whole universe. For postmodernists the only way 
out is to get rid of it. And this applies especially to the penchant for ultimate meanings 
that Postmodern Scientists advocate are floating around in the universe waiting to be 
uncovered.
As an example of the tyranny of meaning consider Wheatley and her
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organisational attractors. She asks the question ‘Is there a magnetic force, a basin for 
activity, so attractive that it pulls all behaviour toward it and creates coherence?” Yes, 
she answers, by saying:
[mjy current belief is that we do have such attractors at work in organisations 
and that one of the most potent shapers of behaviour in organisations, and 
in life is m eaning. (Wheatley, 1992:187).
Wheatley’s equation of attractors with meaning is a telling connection between 
Chaos theory and its closeness to unifying and universalising thought. Remember; 
Wheatley’s theories are an attempt—or at least they make a pretence 
towards—breaking down the monolithic structure of organisations and their 
decision-making and action-taking systems. With pretences towards this supposed 
new liberty and localisation of organisation decision-making and action-taking 
Wheatley nevertheless feels it important to bring in the concept o f ‘meaning’. Suppose 
we think o f ‘Meaning’ as a word given over to describing a ‘unity of purpose’, a 
‘reason for being’. This, in relation to Wheatley’s statements above, suggests that she 
is claiming that the behaviour of parts of an organisation are governed by a ‘unity of 
purpose’ or ‘reason for being’.
If this is so, then the important question to ask here becomes: ‘where does this 
leave freedom and autonomy in these organisations?’ Freedom and autonomy have 
been granted if, and only if, it conforms to the ‘natural’ boundaries of the strange 
attractor that Wheatley calls meaning. This might be all right if the organisation exists 
under a meaning that is imbued with sentiments that indicate the importance of those 
who work in the organisation and how they may be kept happy and contented. 
However, the ‘meaning’ of an organisation, especially in the late Twentieth Century is 
almost always more likely to revolve around either profit or efficiency, than it is 
around worker iulfilment.
Under the operation of an ultimate meaning like profit, it individuals do not 
contribute to, or at least live by, this meaning (to this ‘unity of purpose , to this 
‘reason for being’) they cease to be part of the organisational system and will be either 
made to come back into line or be expunged from the system altogether. What this 
means for those entities that make up the system, otherwise known as people, is that 
they have to do what the management says or be let go. If Wheatley’s organisation is 
to eschew this totalitarianism, and if organisations are to be made more able to deal
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with freedom and localism, they must eschew the existence of a primary overarching 
meaning and realise that an organisation is full of highly dispersed and highly 
contingent meanings, none of which should be necessarily applicable to all members.
From this analysis, it is necessary to conclude that, on the count of 
‘meaninglessness7, Postmodern Science fails to be postmodern.
‘Anti-foundational7 (e.g. Hassan, 1987; Harvey, 1990; Best and Kellner, 1991; 
Lyotard, 1988)
As Best and Kellner (1991:4) point out, postmodern theory finds that:
Modem theory-ranging from the philosophical project of Descartes, 
through the Enlightenment, to the social theory of Comte, Marx, Weber 
and others~is criticised for its search for foundational knowledge, for its 
universalising and totalising claims, for its hubris to supply apodictic truth, 
and for its allegedly fallacious rationalism.
Although Postmodern Science is often hard on rationalism it nevertheless stands 
within Modem theory as Best and Kellner fashion it in the above quote. Just as 
Enlightenment thinkers searched for principles that could be placed at the foundations 
of all social and philosophical theory so Postmodern Scientists search for the 
foundations of a true description of the world which may forever-more be held as 
basic knowledge. As has been revealed above the foundations for Postmodern Science 
lie within the unity concept, and its accompanying ideas of balance, hierarchy and 
order, and it is upon this foundation that new scientific knowledge, ecological insight, 
environmental evaluation and social policy must be crafted. It the characters of these 
latter human endeavours may change, waxing and waning to historical contingency, 
Postmodern Scientists like Birch, Gare, Ferre and Artigiani are nevertheless 
determined to embed unity as the bedrock foundation of all being-ness.
If, as Haney (1994) alludes in his studies of postmodemity, anti-foundationalism 
is an openness to the questions of is-ness of the world, then Postmodern Science must 
be interpreted as belonging to Modernity since it has closed down this avenue of 
debate by stating and restating that the is-ness of the world is one of undeniable unity.
Another obvious problem for Postmodern Scientists revolves around the 
enunciation of alternatives. Postmodernism, it is usually suggested by its supporters, 
offers an explanation of worldviews without a recourse to an alternative since to do
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so would harden a whole plethora of biases, metaphors and illusions into dangerous 
theoretical unities that might soon act as foundational statements-casting down their 
own sermons and policy-plans. Alternative foundations (in the study of nature or of 
society) are just not an alternative for most postmodernists. Postmodern Scientists, 
however, jump easily from critiquing certain foundations-that of atomism, for 
instance-into erecting another in its place-that of holism. This active programme for 
the construction of an alternative foundation, from which all perspectives of the 
universe must in some way associate themselves, shows that, on the count of 
anti-foundationalisnT, Postmodern Science may well fail to be postmodern.
c Anti-systems7 (Bauman. 1992; Lyotard, 1984; Foucault 1994; Sim, ed, 1998) 
The first victim of advancing postmodernity was the invisibly present, tacitly 
assumed spectre of the system, the source and the guarantee of meaningliilness of 
the sociological project and in particular, of the orthodox consensus. (Bauman, 
1992:39).
Pertaining to Bauman’s above comment, there seems to be a sharp contradiction 
between Postmodern Science and postmodernism. While postmodernists have 
sometimes expressed an intellectual outrage against the unifying assumptions implicit 
in systems thinking, Postmodern Science is actually dependent on, descended from 
and completely at ease with systems theories of all sorts. Whereas Artigiani, Birch, 
and Gare and other Postmodern Scientists advocate one form or another of systems 
thinking, Bauman goes on to state:
postmodemity would do well if it disposed of concepts like the system  in its 
orthodox and organismal sense...Suggestions of a sovereign totality 
logically prior to its parts, a totality bestowing meaning on its parts, a 
totality whose welfare or perpetuation all smaller (and by definition 
subordinate) units serve; in short a totality assumed to define....the 
meanings of individuals....that compose it. (Bauman, 1992:190).
POSTMODERN SCIENCE AS POSTMODERNISM: THE VERDICT
What this section tends to show, then, is that Postmodern Science is hardly
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postmodern. Instead of recognising heterogeneity, diversity, difference, 
meaninglessness (all of which are acknowledged characteristics of postmodernism) 
and instead of rejecting fbundationalism, systemisation and teleology (which are 
rejected by most academic postmodernists), Postmodern Science promotes systems, 
defends unity against fragmentation and aporia, calls for foundations and searches for 
foundational meanings (including the ultimate meaning of life and the universe).
To be sure, you do not have to exhibit all of the above characteristics to be 
postmodern, and many postmodern studies have little to do with some of them, but 
any strong claim towards postmodernism might be thought capable of generously 
embracing at least a tew of the ideas in some way. With regards to Postmodern 
Science and its claims towards postmodernism, Postmodern Science might be seen to 
reflect aspects of some particular postmodern characteristics listed above, perhaps 
intertextuality for example, but surely if you can qualify as being postmodern by 
exhibiting a tenuous link with just one particular characteristic of postmodernism then 
might you not be disqualified from postmodern membership if you exhibit the 
antithesis o f any other one characteristic—and certainly if' you exhibit the antithesis of 
nineteen of those characteristics?
INTELLECTUAL IMPERIAL! SM/TOTALITARIANISM
We have already seen how Gaia exhibits a tendency for space imperialism but we 
can also raise questions with regard to its intellectual imperialism. When Lovelock
speaks of modem science he says:
The Victorians were careless when they allowed science to divide and become 
an array of sectarian expertises. Each newly separated science soon developed 
its own argot and gang of professors who ruled, from the cloistered turrets of their
universities, over sharply bounded fiefs. (1991:90).
As we shall see, however, far from attending to a destruction of these cloistered 
fietdoms of knowledge, it seems as though Lovelock and his systems colleagues 
would like to erect systems theory as the all pervasive imperial ruler over the kingdom 
of science (and over the whole cascade of human knowledge).
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To see the how the New Sciences are involved in such an intellectual colonising 
endeavour, witness this statement by one of its agents of colonisation in the area of 
organisational management:
1 share the sentiments of physicist Frank Oppenheimer who says 'if one has a new 
way of thinking why not apply it wherever one’s thought leads to?’ (Wheatly:
1992:13).
By intellectual totalitarianism I am referring to the desire to have a theory explain 
the totality of existence (or a large chunk of it) without the need for alternative 
theories. This sort of totalitarianism is most manifest in what we might call the 
colonising of other disciplines. Systems theory, for instance, seeks to make itself the 
central idea in the study of biology, ecology, economics, society, physiology, et 
cetera. This type of colonising endeavour sometimes goes by the name of 
‘multi-disciplinarianisnT. Systems theory is put forward as a theoretical nexus of 
various disciplines but if the traditions of those disciplines are inimical to the systems 
approach they are ignored; cast off as ephemeral practices and consequently 
marginalised. This is the way that systems theory has characteristically rode into the 
various areas of its concern. In sociology it accepts the unity of culture of Durkheim 
and Parsons without looking at the dissension of Marx and Baran. In ecology it looks 
at the integration of ecosystems and communities by Odum and Clements without 
looking at the disintegration of ecological communities by Gleason.
This intellectual totalitarianism started early in the history of what Postmodern 
Scientists would probably have us believe is the forerunner to their Postmodern 
Science; i.e. systems theory. For instance, when talking about the systems theorist 
Norbert Wiener, Fritjof Capra says:
Wiener was not only a brilliant mathematician but also an articulate philosopher.
(in tact, his degree from Harvard was in philosophy). He was keenly interested 
in biology and appreciated the richness of natural, living systems. He looked 
beyond the mechanisms of communication and control to larger patterns 
of organisation and tried to relate his ideas to a wide range of social and cultural
issues. (Capra, 1996:54).
Capra then goes on to explain the universalist tendencies ot another early systems 
theorist (and proto-Postmodem Scientist); Ludwig von Bertalanfiy:
[s|mce living systems span such a wide range of phenomena, involving individual
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organisms and their parts, social systems and ecosystems, Bertallanfy believed 
that a general systems theory would offer an ideal conceptual framework for 
unifying various scientific disciplines that had become isolated and fragmented.
(Capra, 1996:116).
Capra then goes on to approvingly quote Bertalanfly (Capra, 1996:49) when he
says:
General Systems Theory should be an important means of controlling and 
instigating the transfer of principles from one field to another, and it will no 
longer be necessary to duplicate or triplicate the discovery of the same 
principle in different fields isolated from each other.
As already noted in earlier chapters Bertalanfly himself has explained the exact 
nature of systems comparative studies as “The search for such isomorphies is a major 
pursuit of systems science” (Bertalanfly, 1967); these isomorphies being
a consequence of the fact that in certain aspects, corresponding abstractions 
and conceptual models can be applied to different phenomena. It is in view of 
these aspects that system laws will apply. (Bertallanfy, 1967:118).
Carrying on this tradition—that systems theorists might call 
multi-disciplinarianism but many postmodern intellectuals might feel to be intellectual 
imperialism—the systems theorists of the late Twentieth Century also state that 
systems theory is applicable to diverse and seemingly disparate fields. Capra, for 
instance, states that since:
living systems cover such a wide range of phenomena—individual organisms, 
social systems, and ecosystems—the theory provides a common framework and 
language for biology, psychology, medicine, economics, ecology, and many 
other sciences, a framework in which the so urgently needed ecological 
perspective is explicitly manifest. (Capra, 1994:335-336).
Agreeing with Capra, and problematising it in terms of Postmodern Science, 
Kuppers claims that the new paradigm of Postmodern Science might have roots in 
physics but has obvious and not so obvious “applications to the humanities. ’ 
(Kuppers, 1990:52).
Similarly Merry likes to see the New Sciences as being directly applicable to 
social science:
The social and behavioural sciences, both theoretical and applied, are at the 
beginning of the road of applying the insights of the New Sciences to their
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field of study and practice. (Merry, 1995:24).
Wheatley (1992), as we have already seen, sees the complex systems theory of 
the New Sciences as being applicable in organisational management. Others, however, 
do not stop at proclaiming the relevance of systems ideas to just one particular 
discipline; they believe Postmodern Science’s applicability is quite universal. Merry 
(1995) for instance talks of Ilya Prigogine’s chemical ‘order from chaos’ concept107 (a 
central tenet in the New Sciences and also--as Fabel, 1994, tells us—in Postmodern 
Science) as being applicable to many other areas:
Prigogine’s theory could be applied to chemical solutions, to termites 
building nests, to traffic jams and to the growth of cities, it could describe 
and explain transformation in a person’s belief system, in organisations, in 
cultures, in political systems, and in all historical eras. In all of these systems 
new patterns of order emerge out of chaos. In all of these, the same phenomenon 
takes place. (Merry, 1995:44).
Mingers says much the same of self-organisation:
Maturana’s and Varela’s concept of autopoesis, originally a biological 
concept has made a remarkable impact not just on a single area, but across 
widely differing disciplines such as sociology, policy science, psychotherapy, 
cognitive science and law. (Mingers, 1995 :ix)108.
For Capra the same is said of Erich Jantsch’s (1980) self-organisation ideas:
Erich Jantsch...makes it possible to begin to understand biological, social, 
cultural and cosmic evolution in terms of the same pattern ol systems dynamics.
(Capra, 1982:310).
Davies also finds the universality of self-organisation appealing:
Again and again we have seen examples of how organised behaviour has 
emerged unexpectedly and spontaneously from unpromising beginnings. In 
physics, chemistry, astronomy, geology, biology, computing—indeed, in 
every branch of science-the same propensity for self-organisation is 
apparent. (Davies, 1987:200)
Not to be outdone, Capra also reaffirms the universality ot self-organisation.
As 1 mentioned before, living systems include individual organisms, social
107See Prigogine and Stengers (1984).
108Maturana and Varela’s work on self-organisation can be fcund in Maturana and Varela (1980).
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systems and ecosystems, and thus the new theory can provide a common 
framework and language for a wide range of disciplines --biology, 
psychology, medicine, economics, ecology and many others. (Capra, 1994:338). 
Another advocate of the New Sciences, Alan Moore, expresses this ability 
of the New Sciences to explain everything in an even stronger fashion:
In a way Chaos and fractal maths gets rid of the need for a God. Previously people 
said that the unfathomable complexity of existence was the best argument lor 
the existence of a creator. But Chaos and the Mandelbrot Set say that’s not 
the case, that with one simple rule fed into a primordial mess, you can 
have infinitely complex, perfect order emerging. (Moore quoted in Wright, 1996:228) 
This universalism is such a strong current in complex systems theory that it has 
been expressed as being a core characteristic of the discipline. For instance witness 
Krohn et al (1990) who proclaim that we are:
lojbserving a present day scientific revolution encompassing many fields of 
the natural and social sciences as well as of the humanities109.
109 While all these programmatic statements show us the totalising intentions of Postmodern Scientists, can it still 
be claimed that such colonising actually occurs? As Postmodern Science is very young as a label (only being 
properly bom in the 1990s) it is more suitable that I give examples of the colonising feats of its intellectual parent; 
systems theory. This has been done in some detail by Lilienfeld (1988) who, in a chapter titled ‘The M igra tion  o f  
System s T h eory’, lays down evidence that the ‘besetting vices’ of systems theory have migrated into public 
policy-making, psychiatry, organisational studies, social work, and global economics. If the New Sciences follow 
its parent—as its advocates are hoping and working for—then a similar migration of Chaos theory.
Self-organisation theory and Complexity theory from the realm of the abstract and the mathematical to ‘real-life’ 
application will ensue. Some notable examples of such migration of the New Sciences into various disciplines 
include: literary theory (Hayles,1990), sociology (Luhman, 1990), psychology (Sulis and Combs, 19%), planrung 
(Cartwright, 1991), art theory (Sobchack, 1990; Schlain, 1991), economics (Anderla e t  a l, 1997), market analysis 
(Parker and Stacey, 1995), geology (Turcotte, 1992), population geography (Dendrinos, 1990), neurobiology 
(Basar, ed, 1990), history (Abraham, 1994), electronics (Van Wyk and Steeb, 1997) and organisational studies 
(Wheatley. 1992). It might be noted here that given its tendency to cross-disciplines, postmodernism might itself 
be accused of being a colonising discourse. However, most postmodernists would hold that postmodernism hardly 
issues programmatic statements aimed to inspire trans-disciplinary colonisation. Instead postmodernists would 
point out that when postmodernism does cross disciplines it does so in an attempt to re-story the human sciences so 
that new stories are opened up or made possible. Systems theory, on the other hand, closes down story-telling by 
issuing a monolithic, universal story that acts to position all other stories within itself. Where postmodernism 
attempts to pluralise stories wherever it goes, systems theory—and its relations—act to unify various stories. This 
difference ran be demonstrated by acknowledging that the stories of systems theory can all be related to the key 
concepts of self-organisation and feedback. When systems theory (and the New Sciences, and Postmodern Science) 
advance narratives about anything in nature they always include the essential processes of self-organisation or 
feedback. Without them, systems theory would have no story; it would not exist. On the other hand there is no 
essence to postmodernism; no essential focal narrative which must be retold in order to characterise a postmodern 
story as postmodern. Postmodernism is more a ‘structure of feeling’ (Pfeil, 1988) than a codified theoretical 
framework. While systems theory’s identity is very strongly linked with its essence of self organisation and 
feedback, postmodernism has no identity; or if it does it is plural and heterogeneous. This lack of a central plank 
mpanc that postmodernism, when it does enter into unfamiliar intellectual territory, can be moulded and shaped at 
will by those whose territory it is entering.
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An explanation for the universal appeal of the systems theory within the New 
Sciences and Postmodern Science is attempted by Capra:
it is useful to keep in mind that dynamical systems theory is not a theory of 
physical phenomena but a mathematical theory whose concepts and 
techniques apply to a broad range of phenomena. The same is true of Chaos 
theory and the theory of fractals, which are important branches of dynamical 
systems theory. (Capra;1996:112)
Lilienfeld also talks about abstraction. To Lilienfeld this abstractness is the prime 
heuristic and practical weakness of systems theory since:
systems theory achieves its all encompassing ‘universality' only by its 
very abstractness. All things are systems by virtue of ignoring the specific, the 
concrete, the substantive. (Lilienfeld, 1978:192).110
Either way, whether we class mathematics or philosophy (or non-linear physics 
or evolution or any other intellectual entity) as the foundation of the New Sciences it 
is becoming clear that the New Sciences, and Postmodern Science along with it, are, 
despite their veneer of holism, of a reductionist character due to their appeal to 
founding principles which all phenomena may be reduced to. If we define 
reductionism as does Dupre (1993:87): “[rjeductionism, in its broadest sense, is the 
commitment to any unifactorial explanation of a range of phenomena”, then we see 
that the mathematics and philosophy of self-organisation in the New Sciences is such 
a unifactorial explanation. All things; mountains, galaxies; ecosystems, eating habits 
etc., can be reduced to the mathematics and philosophy of self-organisation and its 
associated ideas.
So how does all this relate to postmodernism? The answer that academic 
scholars o f postmodernism would give would be ‘only negatively!5. This sort of 
universalism is exactly what postmodernists object to. The drawing up of founding 
principles that can be applied to all phenomena is one of the most striking critiques of 
postmodernism:
The postmodern mind does not expect any more to find the all-embracing, total 
and ultimate formula of life without ambiguity, risk, danger and error and is
110It is interesting to note that this is the same criticism that sociologists have often levelled at the idea of the 
social system. For instance Abercrombie e t  a l (1984) note that one of the arguments against social system theory is 
that “many of the propositions of the theory are tautological and vacuous. For example, in the last analysis the 
existence of a social system is the only real evidence of its adaptation to its environment.
200
deeply suspicious of any voice that promises otherwise. (Bauman, 1993:245).
Postmodernism talks about the pluralising and localising of knowledges and 
beliefs, not of their integration into one all encompassing, universalising and totalising 
set of ideas. If this is so then there is surely little justification for Postmodern Science 
to continue to call itself such; since it is a name infected with self-contradiction.
We might like to ask, then, how Postmodern Scientists can possibly see 
themselves as postmodern? Having enunciated the varied and sometimes unconnected 
elements of postmodernism above it is hard to see how comments like the following 
one from Birch (1990:140) can possibly be referring to postmodernism:
Knowledge is lost in a sea of beliefs from a multitude of disciplines. The 
general purpose of the modem university is lost amid the incoherent variety 
of special purposes that have accumulated within it. The call of the postmodern 
worldview is for fewer beliefs and more belief.
One may suspect that Birch and the other Postmodern Scientists are devoid of 
knowledge of postmodern theory but this is not the whole story. Birch, like Griffin, 
labels the postmodern negativity towards metanarratives ‘deconstructive’, whereas 
they themselves wish to pursue a ‘constructive’ brand of postmodernism where 
metanarratives are reassembled. Postmodern Science is thus, according to Gare 
(1995:159), looking for a new ‘mediating master discourse’ produced by reflection 
and mediation between all other discourses.
This word, ‘mediating’, conjures up all sorts of cultural possibilities. It could 
refer to a mutually selected governor that brings to the fore a clarity of focus in 
assembling the concerns of differing partners or it could mean the authoritative 
handing down oflaw that must be obeyed by both parties whether they like it or not.
Most commonly it conjures up the image of the latter proceeding under the guise of - 
the former, and this is the concern of deconstructive postmodernists. What might 
seem like an innocent, sharing, participatory, universally-pleasing, considerate and 
holistic framework for deciding the nature of the universe must always possess the 
dangers of intellectual totalitarianism where micro-narratives are marginalised it they 
conflict with larger metanarratives. No worldview can be without the possibility that 
totalitarianism might come with it.
Having said all of this, there are a few people that nevertheless put forward 
Postmodern Science as being capable of recognising the necessity of localised and
201
plural metaphysical viewpoints. Wiessert, for example, in writing about Chaos theory, 
says:
In non-linear dynamical systems, island of order arise from the sea of chaos.
The interspersed order comprehensible where chaos is not, implies 
abandoning the modernist project of a global theory and attempting to compile 
a postmodern catalogue of local theories. (Wiessert, 1991:225)
While complex systems theory might be capable of recognising the localism of 
particular islands of order, all the islands of order arise according to the same laws as 
each other. They are separated by space but are nevertheless basically the same since 
they are governed by the same laws of formation.
This link between superficial difference and universal sameness is noticeable 
throughout much of the writings on New Science and Postmodern Science.111 We can 
see it, for example, when we look once more at the levels of organisation that New 
Scientists are so fond of pointing out. Levels are physically different from each 
other—hierarchically separated in space and time—but their underlying laws of 
formation and organisation remain the same.
About the levels that both Modernist and Postmodern Scientists see, postmodern 
scholars in academia would more likely view them as fields of discourse. Scientific 
traditions have carved out traditions of practice and discursive fields within what both 
old and New Science announce as levels or scales. To integrate these levels by 
presupposing common mathematical principles happening within them is to enact a 
unification program so that all the fields of discourse are made to submit to an 
over-arching meta-discourse. This, again, is a program of colonisation and 
totalization, and it is, again, a program that postmodernists would most commonly 
reject.
CONCLUSIONS
Thinking that postmodern intellectuals are academic fashion-slaves who are
111 And plenty of old sciences do the same thing.
202
over-sensitive to intellectual trendyism, anti-postmodernists have continually tried to 
derail postmodern enthusiasm by declaring it passé or outdated. This is nothing new 
to 1990s postmodernism, and was happening within months of the label 
‘postmodernism’ being attached to a type of art and architecture in the early 1970s. 
Despite this insistence that it is a declining fashion within academia it seems as though 
the postmodern critique of various subjects within the human sciences has become so 
entrenched that few academics are able to practice without some reference to it. This 
popularity has very many times spilled over into the philosophy of the natural sciences 
and especially those whose natural philosophies lie at the edge of academic culture 
and popular culture such as Fritjof Capra, Arran Gare, Frederick Ferre, David Bohm 
and others.
However, given that—if the above analysis is correct—Postmodern Science is 
hardly reminiscent of the postmodernism as actually theorised by most academics, 
how can Postmodern Scientists associate themselves with it? It seems as though most 
writers on Postmodern Science grab what they can from postmodern thought. For a 
lot of them it is just the word, and the popularity of that word, along with some vague 
acknowledgement of postmodernism’s criticism of Modem society and science. For 
instance Laszlo turns his New Age science of the 1970s in to Postmodern Science for 
the 1990s. Similarly Bohm was for a long time out of sorts as to what to call his 
worldview of interconnectedness and implicate order until the word postmodern was 
delivered to him in the 1980s, pre-packaged with a critique of orthodox scientific 
ideals.
In the framework of postmodern localism, plurality and incoherence there is 
often an implicit recognition of the incompatibility ot all theories. The whole can only 
be dreamt of in its parts; a broken assemblage of disintegrated complicated fragments 
that themselves often far supersede our ability to comprehend and imagine them. 
Postmodernists, as Bauman (1992) has indicated, have learnt to deal with this. 
Postmodern Science (which we might now start to see as indistinguishable from 
Modem science) is grossly uncomfortable with this inability to conjure up the wholes. 
Gaia is the result, an imagination of the whole Earth modelled in its entirety, complete 
with an ethics, a philosophy and a set ot policy prescriptions. Chaos theory is also the 
result as it declares that those things that were thought incomprehensibly disordered
203
and unconnected, are now comprehensible, ordered and able to be modelled by 
science (and if some New Scientists are to be believed, they are also somehow 
manageable by science).
Postmodern Science declares that the extirpation of Modernist principles from 
science must be undertaken in order to gamer an environmentally friendly worldview. 
However Postmodern Science is unable, itself, to escape Modernism. This means that 
within its own intellectual framework (which states that a environmentally-worldview 
will only come about after Modernism has been exuded from science and natural 
philosophy) Postmodern Science has a very weak claim in being able to encourage an 
environmentally friendly worldview.
If Postmodern Science does fail to eject Modernism from science, and if such an 
ejection is needed within science in order to let environmental metaphysics flourish, 
then what are we to do? Is there another way that science, or at least ecological 
science, might be postmodemised in a far more nuanced way so that it can properly 
call it self ‘postmodern’. The answer to this question is revealed in Chapter Eight, 
where an alternative postmodern ecology is suggested. Before then, another problem
that relates to the postmodemisation of the unity of nature concept is explored.
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CHAPTER 7
Mechanicism Vs Organicism: A False 
Dichotomy?
INTRODUCTION
Modem science is mechanistic and the worldview that such science gives rise to 
is a mechanised worldview; or so say Davies (1987), Ferre (1988), Birch (1990), 
Goldsmith (1993), Zohar and Marshall (1993), Bohm (1994), Gare (1995), Capra 
(1996) and many others. According to Moore (1992:157):
Ltjhis mechanisation of the world has led us to believe that we live in an 
essentially dead universe where life arises only by chance. The result has 
been a total separation of ourselves from nature. This separation finally reached 
its logical extreme in the modem myth...that we can use technology to 
dominate, manage and control nature for our own benefit.
There is much claim by Postmodern Scientists that what we need in science is an 
initiation or resurrection of organic thinking in science and philosophy in order to 
make a sustained attack on mechanistic thinking. This organicism is what Postmodern 
Scientists believe lies in Postmodern Science. It is also what New Scientists believe 
lies in the New Sciences, what holist environmental philosophers believe lies in 
ecological holism, what systems thinkers believe lies in systems science. All these 
‘organic’ sciences, together, tend to believe that the Modernist evil of mechanicism is 
ejected from these new forms of thinking about the world. Such organicism reveals 
the world~and the things in it—to be actively making themselves like a unified living 
things.
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By encouraging the supersession of mechanicism by organicism, Postmodern 
Scientists, New Scientists, holist environmentalists et cetera are making a declaration 
that Clements should replace Gleason (for example see Odum, 1971; Goldsmith, 
1993; Lowe, 1997), that Gaian systems theory should replace the fragmented 
sub-disciplines of biology (e.g. Goldsmith, 1993; Lovelock, 1991; Capra, 1996) and 
that selt-organisation should become a prime theory to help explain life, the universe 
and everything in it (e.g. ; Fabel, 1994; Ayres, 1994; Merry, 1995, Ferre, 1996).
There are problems with this angle of attack. Notably, it is not always clear, 
historically, where mechanicism comes from and organicism went. Nor is it easy to 
distinguish between the two from a metaphysical perspective.
THE METAPHYSICS OF ORGANICISM AND MECHANICISM
So superorganismic ecology, the Gaia theory and Complexity theory might be 
cited as organic. What does that mean? Apart from the obvious idea that “[a]n 
organic worldview generalises from observed organisms” (Cobb, 1988:122) instead of 
machines, the idea of organicism is often thought to be closely tied to the concept of 
unity. Witness this definition of what it is to be organic:
Glacken identified two pervasive views of nature which were evident in 
traditional natural history and persist in current discussions of ecological 
theory: 1) Mechanical = actions of individual parts of a whole are explained 
by known laws, and the whole is the sum of the parts and their interactions.
2) Organic = The whole exists first and its design explains the actions of the 
parts. (.McIntosh, 1985:13).
For those who are in the job of promoting organicism, as well as for many who 
are not, mechanicism is allied to materialism, reductionism and atomism. For instance 
Benton states that whether you may call it mechanical reductionism, reductionist 
materialism or mechanical materialism, mechanicism “asserts that living organisms are 
subject to the same laws as those that govern inorganic nature” (Benton, 1991:14). 
David Bohm, likewise, links mechanicism to reductionism by saying:
The first point about mechanicism is that the world is reduced as far as possible to 
a set of basic elements... Second, these elements are basically external to each
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other... because the elements only interact mechanically by sort of pushing 
each other around, the forces of interaction do not affect their inner 
natures. (Bohm, 1994:343-344).
Similarly Charles Birch contends:
The mechanistic model is properly called atomistic...Its method consists of 
subdividing the world into its smallest parts, which at one time were thought 
to be atoms. The essence of atomism is that these parts remain unchanged no 
matter what particular whole they constitute, be it a stone or a brain. Having 
divided the universe into its smallest bits you then tiy to build it up again, 
and of course when you do you get a machine. (Birch 1990:57).
Similarly Cobb (1988:107) sees that mechanicism is equivalent to the materialism 
of what he calls ‘substantialism’: “a substance is that which depends on nothing else 
tor its existence” and under mechanicism such “a thing remains fundamentally the 
same regardless of its relations”.
To counteract mechanicism, and in contrast to materialism, atomism and 
reductionism, both Birch and Cobb advocate what they regard as the postmodern 
alternatives: ‘processes over substances’, ‘events over objects’, ‘wholes over parts’; 
in short ‘organicism over mechanicism’. For both Birch and Cobb, as well as for 
Capra, Davies and Bohm, the shift from mechanical thought to holistic process 
thought is adequately encapsulated in systems theory and complex systems theory.
The closeness of the organic approach to systems thinking, as interpreted by 
organicists, is reflected in Capra’s assertion that:
It is perhaps worthwhile to summarise the key characteristics of systems 
thinking at this point. The first, and most general, criterion is the shift 
from the parts to the whole...In the shift from mechanistic thinking to 
systems thinking, the relationship between the parts and the whole is 
reversed. Cartesian science believed that in any complex system, the 
behaviour of the whole could be analysed in terms of the properties of the 
parts. Systems science shows that living systems cannot be understood by 
analysis. (Capra, 1996:37).
So whereas “[t]he mechanistic outlook reduces reality to a set of basic elements 
or elementary particles and forces” (Capra, 1996:50) the organic outlook sees every 
element as ‘interconnected’, ‘interrelated’, ‘interdependent’, and ‘part of a greater 
whole’.
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It is easy to see here the divide between some of the ecological traditions and 
environmental concepts that have been talked about so far. Clements, Lovelock and 
Odum are organic (and indeed they have all had the word attached to their work) and 
Gleason, and the community ecologists, are mechanical.
Unfortunately, however, this dichotomy does not hold up in practice, such that 
even in ecology (and in science in general) mechanicism and organicism is a false 
dichotomy. One way to show that organicism and mechanicism are hardly appropriate 
tools through which to dichotomise ecological science is to examine those instances in 
which traditional mechanistic ecology can be shown to have what the organicists 
themselves class as ‘organic’ principles. In this regard we can focus upon the 
predilection of organicists against materialism and substantialism. In the substantialist 
thinking of mechanicism “the substance is independent of relations and then enters 
into relations which are always external ones” (Birch, 1990:75). Bohm (as we have 
just seen) expresses this idea thus:
these elements are basically external to each other, not only are they 
separate in space, but even more important the fundamental nature of each is 
independent of that of the other...Third, because the elements only interact 
mechanically by sort of pushing each other around, the forces of interaction 
do not affect their inner natures. (Bohm, 1988:60).
This is contrasted to the process thinking of systems theory whereby the primary 
entities of existence, i.e. events (instead of substances), are fully constituted by their 
interactions. In physics this means that a particle such as an electron turns from being 
a mechanical ‘substance’ (that collides into others while not being affected by the 
collision except so far as its position in space changes) into being an event (which is 
intimately affected by the other events that go on around it). We can see how this 
dichotomy might be applied in eco-political natural philosophising since in an organic 
ecological worldview the various constituents of nature, both living and non-living, 
are turned from mechanical ecological atoms that collide with each other without 
really affecting one other into organic events that intimately change the nature ot each 
other when they meet. This is to say the major critique that orgamcist Unitarians 
would level at atomistic science (including atomistic ecology) is that they treat the 
members of the ecological world as though they were mere mechanical substances.
This might be an adequate criticism of substantialism in ecology if it actually
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concurred with what non-holist ecologists (for example the Gleasonians) say about 
what happens in the world, but it does not. The substances that non-holist ecologists 
talk about are not ecological atoms but are conceived of as enormously 
heterogeneous, interacting beings capable ot having their ‘internal structure’ (i.e. their 
actions and their characteristics) changed when they collide with other ‘substances’.
In tact it seems as though the criticism emerging from orgamcism may be more 
aptly applied to process-type thinking in ecology. This is to say we can easily 
hypothesise a process ecology (which emphasises ‘events’ over ‘substances’) whereby 
the events move around and interact with each other yet remain unchanged by the 
interaction. This is, tor example, the point that I make about ecosystems ecology (the 
preferred ecology ot orgamcists) in Chapter Two, since the events in ecosystem 
ecology (organismal growth, cycling flows, material transfer) might interact proiusely 
but still give rise to unchanging essences (i.e. elemental matter and energy) that 
remain the same whatever interactions they undertake. Thus it seems, at least in 
ecology, you can have mechanical events just as you can have mechanical substances 
and you can have organic substances just as you can organic events.
Another way to deconstruct the dichotomy of the organic versus the mechanical 
is to look at the intellectual and metaphysical heritage of the organic school of 
thought. Here we find some telling dilemmas.
THE INTELLECTUAL HERITAGE OF ORGANIC THOUGHT
When taking a look at the relevance of organic/mechanical ecosystem debates in 
environmental studies and within the unity of nature concept it is more than relevant 
to look at that organic entity that organic ecologists are so proud of; the one which is 
so indebted to holism, the one which is so guided by the physical laws of the New 
Sciences and the one which is the basis of environmental policy-making; the 
ecosystem.
As has already been explored, the usual story in the history of ecology (see 
Glacken, 1967; McIntosh, 1985, Hagen, 1992, Golley, 1993, Worster, 1994) is that 
the ecosystem was a name dreamt up by Arthur Tansley in the 1930s but it was a
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concept that did not really make any difference in ecology until Raymond Lindeman 
used it as a practical concept in his peculiar methodological/philosophical approach to 
the study of an actual geographical site. Furthermore, the ecosystem concept as an 
environmentally-relevant unit did not really takeoff until the Odums used it, 
popularised it and gained grant money for studying it in the 1960s.
For the Odums and their followers the ecosystem was talked about as being the 
fundamental unit of ecology. This is a view taken up and supported in modem 
environmental practice and policy-making and also in much environmental philosophy. 
Amongst other things the ecosystem was held to operate holistically, i.e.: organically. 
As we have seen (in Chapter Two) such a view of ecosystems as organic entities is 
somewhat strange given the desire by the ecosystem concept’s originator, Arthur 
Tansley, to have it used as a mechanising influence on ecology. It is also strange given 
that ecosystem studies mainly focus on physical and not biological aspects of natural 
areas. I might restate here Golley’s comments about systems analysed species being 
mere mechanical objects when he says:
lajithough the advantages were many, the disadvantage was that most of 
biological reality encompassed in the species was lost. In the ecosystem model, 
species acted abstractly, like robots. The decision to cut ecosystems studies off from 
biology and natural history linked them more closely to engineering, physics 
and mathematics. (Golley, 1993:107).
What may be considered paradoxical, though, is the use of the Odums and their 
work, to promote organicism. Edward Goldsmith, for example, praises the organic 
viewpoint of Odumian ecology (i.e.: ecosystems studies) for its inherent organicism 
only to go on to unwittingly support mechanicism by favourably quoting Eugene 
Odum when he uses intensely mechanical metaphors. For instance in The Way 
Goldsmith (1993) firstly praises Odum:
Eugene Odum, one of the tew remaining academic ecologists whose work has 
not been perverted to fit the paradigm of mechanistic science, (p.xix)
Then Goldsmith berates modem ecology for being too quantifiable, too obsessed 
with energy and for being:
reconcilable with the paradigm of science which sees living things as no more 
than machines, (p.54)
Finally Goldsmith approvingly quotes Odum when Odum himself is working
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within the paradigm of science Goldsmith has just denounced:
Eugene Odum notes how ecosystems are endowed with the necessary 
mechanisms for self-regulation and hence homeostasis...These information 
networks Odum thought as The invisible wires of nature’ or alternatively as 
the 'hormones of ecosystems’ (pl91).
In a similar vein Stan Rowe (1997) makes the same sort of self-contradictory 
case for organic ecology. First Rowe decries the reductionism of modem ecology for 
concentrating too much on the parts of nature rather than nature as a whole and he 
asks for us to reconsider Odumian systems ecology as a new approach to Deep 
Ecology. Eugene Odum’s work in the 1950s, Rowe tries to make us believe, is a 
manifest example of the holist approach that environmentalists are desiring in science. 
The 1950s work that Rowe identifies as being of an organic nature, however, is the 
same work in which Odum charts out the similarities of ecosystem flow to ‘networks’, 
‘circuits’, ‘organismal physiology’, ‘machines’, ‘water-mills’ and ‘automobiles’ 
(Hagen, 1992), which are all usually regarded as very mechanical analogies.
Equally ambiguous to organic ecological sensibilities in this respect is the fact 
that the Odums, and other ecologists that followed them, used mixed organic and 
mechanical metaphors when describing their ‘fundamental unit of ecology’: the 
ecosystem. According to Hagen (1994:135):
the Odums’ writings exemplify this Janus-like conception of ecological 
systems...For example when he needs an analogy for communication 
and control mechanisms in the ecosystem, Eugene turns to the physiology 
of the endocrine system.
Another analyst of the history of the Odums’ work, F.E. Golley (1993), also 
confirms that at very many times the metaphors in use by both Eugene and Howard 
Odum were mechanical and that this could also be said of most systems ecologists and 
ecosystem ecologists in the 1950s and 60s. Ecosystems scientists, says Golley, were 
generally unafraid of combining mechanistic/organic holist analogies. Ecosystems 
were, for example, variously compared to the networks of electrical circuit boards, 
organismal and cellular physiological systems and automatic machines.
Eugene Odum delivers these metaphors as much as anyone but sometimes he 
goes further than that, indicating that machines are not merely metaphorical when 
applied to ecosystems but in fact analogous at the level of fundamental laws. For
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example, he is quoted as saying that:
The relationships between producer plants and consumer animals, between 
predator and prey, not to mention the numbers and kinds of organisms in 
a given environment, are all limited and controlled by the same basic laws 
which govern non-living systems, such as electric motors and 
automobiles, (in Hagen, 1992:136).
Odum, when he said things like the above, might be interpreted as being in a 
historical point of ecology (the 1950s and 60s) that required a mechanical outlook just 
to insure the success of his field during the mechanistic predilections of science at the 
time. The ecosystem concept, from its inception in the 1930s to its acceptance in the 
1960s, was viewed by its practitioners and advocates as a modernisation program.
The ‘New Ecology’112 movement that was systems ecology was presented as a 
modernisation movement also by the Odums, and the famous 1953 Odum textbook on 
ecology has been seen as a manifesto for such modernisation (see Kwa, 1987, Kwa 
1993, Golley, 1993). Golley, for instance states:
In America...the ecosystem concept appeared to be modem and up to date. It 
concerned systems, involved information theory, and used computers and 
modelling. In short, it was a machine theory applied to nature. (Golley, 1993:2) 
However, this is not the whole story behind Eugene Odum’s apparent 
mechanicism since he continued his references to mechanistic analogies all his life and 
also continued to make comparisons between organic and mechanical systems. He not 
only did this for ecosystems but all systems that ecosystems might be connected to. In 
this regard human populations, like cities and nations, were hypothesised by Odum, to 
run like (his version of) ecosystems. As Steverson (1994:86) notes
Odum even lists cities as examples of heterotrophic ecosystems. One can 
isolate the input of energy into the system (e.g. the burning of fossil fuels 
to produce electricity), its transfer along various pathways composing the 
system (the transmission of electricity along power lines and into homes), 
the various uses to which energy is put by constituent organisms (watching 
television, heating homes, powering appliances, etc.) and the dissipation 
of energy from the system (loss of heat from poorly insulated homes, unused 
lights left on etc.)...ecosystemically speaking there is no difference between
112The name given to ecosystems studies by Eugene Odum.
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New York City and the Everglades. They are both simply physical systems, 
analysable in terms of patterns of energy production, transfer, and loss.“3 
What this may say to those who wish for an ecologically-relevant organic view of 
nature is not to focus upon the Odumian version of the ecosystem in order to do it. 
ORGAN1C1SM AND THE CYBERNETICIANS
The Odums were not the originators or the developers of the mixed organic/ 
mechanical metaphor; they had it virtually handed to them by the cyberneticians. As 
Golley (1993:67) notes:
Ecosystem ecology also was formed, in part, in the languages of engineering 
and economics and in the new subjects of cybernetics and information.
Cybernetics, as has already been discussed in Chapter Three, owes much to 
Norbert Wiener’s projects on the theory and operation of advanced weaponry. When 
Wiener retired from service at the RAND corporation, however, his determination to 
apply cybernetics to other situations meant that he continued to explore the 
parameters of his new cybernetic ideas. Wiener, like holist organic thinkers before him 
and systems theorists after him, would talk of homeostatic mechanisms in both living 
settings and non-living settings, in both natural and artificial situations and with both 
mechanical and organic metaphors.
Today the ambiguity between organicism and mechanicism is continued by 
modem day promoters of cybernetics. For instance Capra praises what Birch, Ferre,
Cobb and Davies would regard as organic thinking and incessantly delights in talking 
about the need to develop an holistic ‘organic’ ecological worldview. Capra himself 
goes on to state that the science of ecology is “the mapping out of pathways of energy  ̂
and matter in various foodwebs” (Capra, 1996:172). This is to say that while he 
advocates holism and organic-type thought in ecology Capra actually suffers from 
mechanicism by choosing an ecology rooted to mechanical materialism. 13
113Steverson (1994:86) goes on to detail how this approach by Odum is inimical to environmental evaluation:
""if taken seriously and placed in the context of an ecosystem perspective, the ecocentric claim 
that moral consideration should be extended to our ecosystemic flows and to the ecosystem as 
a whole might entail extending moral consideration to such things as power stations and 
telephone lines. 1 assume that such a conclusion would be unacceptable to ecocentrists.
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We can see this, for example, when Capra himself admits cybernetics has a 
mechanical heritage. For instance when he tells his readers how the cyberneticians 
explained their concept o f self-regulation Capra says:
To illustrate the same principles with a mechanical device for sell- 
regulation, Wiener and his colleagues often used one of the earliest and 
simplest examples of feedback engineering, the centrifugal governor of a 
steam engine. It consists of a rotating spindle with two weights ('tlyballs ) 
attached to it in such a way that they move apart, driven by centrifugal force, 
when the speed of the rotation increases. The governor sits on top of the steam 
engine’s cylinder, and the weights are connected with a piston, which cuts 
oft' the steam as they move apart The pressure of the steam drives 
the engine, which drives a flywheel. The flywheel, in turn, drives the governor, 
and thus the loop of cause and ettect is closed. (Capra, 1996:61).
As the historian Otto Mayr says of this connection between cybernetics and the 
steam engine:
When Norbert Wiener in 1947 christened his new science of cybernetics, he 
was expressly paying tribute to what he considered the earliest cybernetic device, 
the word g o ve rn o r  is derived via the Latin g u b e m a to r  from the Greek steersmen. 
(Mayr, 1986:195).
Capra generally tries to down play the mechanical heritage of systems thinking by 
claiming that “the main characteristics of systems thinking...were pioneered by 
biologists...in the 1920s... who emphasised the view of living organisms as integrated
wholes” Capra astutely uses the term ‘systems thinking’ instead o f ‘organic thinking’ 
because he is only too well aware of the contradiction in labelling systems as organic. 
This does not stop a whole lot of other people, whose ideas are very similar to 
Capra’s, like Ferre, Birch, Cobb, Artigiani, Goldsmith et cetera, from interchanging 
the words ‘organic’ and ‘systems’ quite freely.
The ability for systems to be identified with both organicism and mechanicism is 
a consequence of the closeness that all three terms have with unity. They can be 
interchanged quite freely in public parlance without seeming at all contradictory. For 
instance one can describe the ‘machinery of the state , the state as being an organism 
and the ‘state as a system’ without sounding contradictory.
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PRE-CYBERNET1C AND PRE-0DUM1ST MIXINGS OF METAPHORS
Since machines and organisms, and mechamcism and organicism, are so 
intimately woven when considering the history and theory of cybernetics and systems 
science we might ponder on whether there was a time before systems science and 
before cybernetics when a pure form ot organicism was around. The superorganism 
theory ot Clements might be one example but Clements was really trying to 
physiologise ecology: “for Clements, ecology was ‘nothing more than rational field 
physiology7” (Hagen, 1992:15). And as Hagen also points out, other natural historians 
that were Clements7 contemporaries were also given over to mixing their metaphors: 
in feet, the ideas of nature as superorganism and nature as machine were 
often used interchangeably...For Forbes, the lake was both a complex 
machine and an organism. (Hagen, 1992:9).
Stephen Forbes, like Clements, Gleason, Tansley and Lindeman, is another 
reputed ‘founding father of ecology7 who sits uneasily within one or the other of the 
camps of organicism and mechanicism. Organicist Unitarians might like to claim 
Forbes as one of theirs for he talked much about the balance of nature and the unity of 
ecological communities. Forbes, indeed may be claimed as the first ecologist (thirty or 
more years before Clements) to have postulated about the self-regulatory processes 
that kept populations in a balanced unity. In doing this, however, Forbes, himself was 
influenced strongly by Herbert Spencer (Kingsland, 1991), who himself had both 
organicism and mechanicism embedded deep within his writings about both society 
and nature.
This intermixing of the organic and the mechanical was evident, amongst other 
places, in Spencer’s work on population equilibrium (which was the work that Forbes 
used to map out his balance of nature ideas). Although Spencer’s name is 
synonymous with the ‘organic view of society7--which flowed to and fro with his 
similar thoughts on nature—Spencer, was originally trained as an engineer and 
maintained himself as “an assiduous... inventor of gadgets77 (Andreski, 1969) who 
“thought o f nature as a moving equilibrium between opposing forces77 (Kingsland, 
1991) like those evident in physics. If the metaphysics of equilibrium in Spencer’s 
work is traceable to his machine heritage then we may assume that this had an afreet 
on his own writings on balance as well as that of his readers like Forbes. Where
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Spencer used his equilibrium concepts to promulgate the idea that industrial society 
was working towards a harmonious balance like that already achieved in a 
homeostatic organism, Forbes posited that such self-regulation was also a tendency in 
natural communities. And just as Spencer uses concepts o f ‘systems’ and 
‘mechanisms’ which are derived from the mechanical sciences, so Forbes uses 
mechanical metaphors in his work on actual ecological communities.
As well as this it can also be claimed that when Spencer is being explicitly 
biological, (and thus explicitly organic according to many New Scientists and 
Postmodern Scientists) his organicism is still linked with mechanical concepts since 
the biological metaphors he is using (to describe either social phenomena or different 
biological phenomena) are in fact today regarded by environmental sympathisers as 
being mechanical. This is to say Spencer’s emphasis on functions, his emphasis on 
physiology, his emphasis on systems, could only have come about if he prescribed to 
mechanical ideas of biology. Functions and systems, after all, are traceable to earlier 
‘mechanical’ ideas that variously flowed from mechanical sciences such as astronomy, 
physics and engineering, or from mechanised biological disciplines such as physiology 
(see Glacken, 1967; Mirowski, 1989; Christensen, 1989; Mirowski, ed, 1994).
The inability to distinguish (both historically and philosophically) between 
organicism is not a view shared by Goldsmith. Goldsmith, as we have seen, berates 
traditional ecology for being mechanist and praises Odumian ecosystem ecology for 
being organic. In doing this he tries to characterise the organic/mechanic dichotomy 
with regards other pre-Odumist players in ecology. This dichotomisation, however, 
also fails. Goldsmith picks on the early Twentieth Century mathematical biologist 
Alfred Lotka as being reductionist and mechanist for Lotka’s quantitative studies of 
population biology seem, to Goldsmith, to treat nature and its members in a robotic 
manner. However, Lotka operated within a metaphysical schema so similar to 
Goldsmith’s that Goldsmith might end up criticising himself'.
Like Goldsmith, Lotka believed evolution to be a universal biotic principle and 
thought “it would be profitable to analyse the evolution of the entire world system as 
a whole” (Kingsland: 1994:232). And like Goldsmith’s heroes, Lovelock and Odum, 
Lotka then went on to “compare the world to a giant engine or, using an image 
familiar in thermodynamics, to a giant mill wheel” (Kingsland, 1994:234). And like
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Goldsmith (and Lovelock and Odum), Lotka also wanted humans to be partnered 
with nature, as collaborators rather than manipulators, to altruistically contribute to 
nature’s efficient running of energy and materials (Kingsland, 1994). And also like 
Goldsmith, Lotka wanted society not to float free from nature but to be grounded in 
the laws of nature (Kingsland, 1994).
What is interesting is that Lotka got his insights not from ecology itself but from 
the mathematical economics of early Twentieth Century capitalist economists 
(Kingsland, 1994). This may be interpreted as Lotka being unlike Goldsmith from a 
moral point of view but, as has been indicated in Chapter Three, very much like him 
from a theoretical and historical point of view since Goldsmith’s metaphysics might be 
just as much a construction of capitalist/liberalist philosophy as it is a construction of 
late Twentieth Century organic ecology/environmentalism.
What is also of interest to us with regards to the topic of this chapter is that 
mechanicism, for Lotka, is not opposed to unity but very workable within unity since 
mechanicism, to him, is completely capable of working with the teleology, 
interconnectedness and functionalism that we find so prevalent in organic unity 
thought. Lotka for instance saw the whole world as one vast machine and he spent 
much of his time searching for efficient energy flows within it; much the same task 
that Lovelock performs today.
If Goldsmith decries Lotka as mechanist then how does Goldsmith’s preferred 
founding father of modem ecology, Frederick Clements, stand up? Perhaps we should 
note that:
Late in his career, Clements dabbled in philosophical holism, but his 
physiological perspective actually reflected an extreme form of mechanistic 
reduction!sm_ At all levels—individual, species, or community--. Clements 
explained change in terms of simple, stimulus-response reactions. (Hagen,
1992:23).
So it appears that to Clements delved into both organic and mechanical science 
too, even as adjudged from Goldsmith’s own criteria for distinguishing those two
things.
Other important figures in ecology also exhibited what looks like, to modem day 
sensibilities, similar ambiguities between unity, mechanicism and orgamcism. For 
example; when describing the balance of nature (a very Unitarian idea that Goldsmith
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has much sympathy for), the important mid-Twentieth Century ecologist A.J. 
Nicholson chose to express it not in organic terms--as Goldsmith would see fit—but in 
mechanical terms:
Nicholson believed that animal populations are normally in equilibrium and 
fluctuated only within restricted limits. He used a gas law analogy of a 
balloon to illustrate how a population would change if its environment 
changed but would rapidly become into equilibrium with the new 
environment, presumably as it stabilised. (Macintosh, 1985:188).
And we might also add once more that Arthur Tansley, the inventor of one of the 
favourite Unitarian ecological concepts: the ecosystem (a concept that is viewed by so 
many Unitarians as being intrinsically organic), actually invented the concept to 
mechanise ecology from its organic sensibilities within Clementsianism. Although 
“Tansley7 s sophisticated mechanistic view of nature also retained strong organismal 
overtones77 (Hagen, 1992:80) Tansley often suggested that “all living organisms may 
be regarded as machines transforming energy from one form to another77, (Tansley 
quoted in Golley, 1993:218).
As has been alluded to the connection between organicism and mechanicism is 
not just a thing of the past. It is alive and well today when scientists make natural 
philosophical utterances. For instance, listen to the holist sympathiser Rollo as he 
explains from where modem ecology might gain better holistic principles:
To forge a unified science of biology, a broad base of understanding that 
transcends scales is required. Biologists can learn some strong lessons 
from engineers. (Rollo,1995:57).
If unitarianism may express its holistic ideas via both mechanicism and 
organicism without fear of contradiction then what does that say about Gaia, about 
whom organicists claim to be the largest organic being in existence? If organicism is 
so affiliated with mechanism so that we can hardly speak of one without recourse to 
concepts derived from or applicable to the other, and if James Lovelock s cybernetic 
heritage is just as imbued with these mixed metaphors, then Gaia is not just the 
ultimate living organism as Capra and Goldsmith would state, it is also the ultimate
machine!114
114This does not mean Capra would think it all right to absolutely classify Gaia as the ultimate machine with no 
qualifications since he, at times, makes admissions as to the differences between machines and organisms. Witness
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That Lovelock might envisage Gaia in this very vein can be observed when he 
states:
In this book I often describe the planetary ecosystem, Gaia, as alive, because 
it behaves like a living organism to the extent that the temperature and chemical 
composition are actively kept constant in the lace of perturbations. When l 
do 1 am well aware that the term itself is metaphorical and that the Earth is not 
alive in the same way as you and me, or even a bacterium. At the same time I insist that 
Gaia theory itself is proper science and no mere metaphor. My use of the term 
‘alive’ is like that of an engineer who calls a mechanical system alive to 
distinguish its behaviour when switched on from that when switched 
off, or dead. (Lovelock, 1991:6).
Lovelock’s mechanistic heritage is further betrayed—quite openly—when 
Lovelock himself describes his program in science as an extension of physiology to 
the biospheric level; physiology, of course, being a prime site of mechanism within the 
biological sciences. Just as William Harvey’s mechanical renderings of human blood 
circulation announced the arrival of physiology in natural philosophy, so Lovelock 
wishes to extend and advance Harvey’s insights to invent geophysiology; the 
physiology of the globe (see Lovelock, 1991:10).
Furthermore, Lovelock chooses to “describe Gaia as a control system for the 
Earth—a self-regulating system something like the familiar thermostat of a domestic 
iron or oven” (Lovelock, 1991:11). I suggest that it would be hard for any holist 
environmentalist or Postmodern Scientist to interpret irons or ovens in an organic 
framework.
this passage from Capra (1992:Chapter 8):
“The first obvious difference between machines and organisms is the fact that machines are constructed, 
whereas organisms grow. This fundamental difference means that the understanding organisms must be 
process-oriented. For example, it is impossible to convey an accurate picture of a cell by means of static 
drawings or by describing the rate picture of a cell by means of static drawings or by describing the cell in 
static forms. Cells, like all firing systems, have to be understood in terms of processes reflecting the 
system's dynamic organization. Whereas the activities of a machine are determined by its structure, the 
relation is reversed in organisms - organic structure is determined by processes. Machines are constructed 
by assembling a well-defined number of parts in a precise and pre-established way. Organisms, on the 
other hand, show a high degree of internal flexibility and plasticity. The shape of their components may 
vary within certain limits and no two organisms will have identical parts. Although the organism as a 
whole exhibits well-defined regularities and behaviour patterns, the relationships between its parts are not 
rigidly determined. As Weiss has shown with many impressive examples, the behaviour of the individual 
parts can in fact, be so unique and irregular that it bears no sign of relevance to the order or the whole 
system. This order is achieved by co-ordinating activities that do not rigidly constrain the parts but leave 




There are numerous ways to look at the organic/mechanic dichotomy. The first is 
to say that orgamcism and mechamcism are completely separate and different ways of 
looking at the world. This is the way Postmodern Scientists look at the dichotomy. 
This may be the only wrong way ot looking at the organic/mechanic dichotomy. 
However, there are several right ways. You can look at the dichotomy as cloudy and 
see that the organicism as presented in science is actually mechanical and then try and 
find the right (pure) type of organicism. Alternatively you can say that organicism is 
infected with mechanical bits and pieces that must be severed oft' and taken out. 
Another alternative is to break down the inherent objectivity o f ‘organicism7 and 
mechanicism7 altogether and then go on to say that they are virtually the same things. 
Under this view, and with regards to Twentieth Century science, to call something 
organic is to invoke mechanical metaphors and to call something mechanical is to 
invoke organic metaphors. This is most stark in relation to the science of ecology and 
its attempts to form ideas about ecosystem structure and function. What defines both 
organicism and mechanicism through these metaphors can always be applied to the 
other.
To define organicism more precisely organicists have had to invoke other, not 
necessarily related concepts, such as holism versus reductionism and materialism 
versus process thinking. In this they also fail since reductionism and holism are linked 
as are materialism and process thinking. What this deconstruction of organicism and 
mechanicism tends to do, then, is to unsettle the normative and epistemological appeal 
of organicism. If New Paradigmers, New Scientists and Postmodern Scientists like 
Capra, Birch, Ferre, Cobb, etc. are to appeal to the normative righteousness and the 
metaphysical rightness of organicism, then they also appeal to the normative 
righteousness and metaphysical rightness of mechanicism. The construction of a 
worldview that is supposed to be environmentally friendly must be aware of this 
mixing of natural philosophies and must be aware that an environmental narrative 




An (Other) Postmodern Ecology
INTRODUCTION
If the unity of nature concept is an environmental metanarrative which is unable 
to do the things that environmentalists ask of it, i.e.: value and protect the 
environment, then where may we look for one that does? Can we erect an alternative 
narrative that does not rely on systems, physicalism, functionalism, anti-individualism, 
self-regulation or progressive evolution and which does not posit ontological unities, 
hierarchies or organic/mechanical balances? Is there an alternative that might eject the 
metanarratives of Modernism, an alternative that we might properly call postmodern? 
This chapter attempts to identify what such a narrative might have to be like in order 
to relinquish Modernist sentiments and live up to postmodern ideas. As such it 
recounts some of the criticism drawn in Chapter Six to make such an identification 
and instigate such a relinquishment.
The first thing that a postmodern environmental narrative might have to give up 
is its ‘meta -ness’. Given that postmodernism is not fond of universahsing tendencies 
it is right to restrict our metaphysical schemes to just to a part of the universe. To this 
effect this chapter can be seen as addressing that part of the universe that Unitarians 
are most fond of uniting in order to pursue ecopolitical endeavours: the terrestrial 
forest communities of the world. As we all know, the science that narrates about this 
part of the universe, and the science which, as we have seen, has been the playground 
of Unitarian thinkers, is ecology. This chapter, then, can be simultaneously thought of 
as; 1) an attempt to document what a postmodern ecology might be responsive to and
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acknowledging of, and; 2) an attempt to postmodemise ecology, and 3) an attempt to 
proffer an example of what a postmodern ecology might possibly look like.
When doing this it must be remembered that it will not be the only postmodern 
ecology, or postmodemisation of ecology, that may exist, since:
An infinite combination of alternatives allow different and varying ways 
to put together the elements that constitute postmodernism. (Rosenau 1992:14).
To start with, however, we need to identify what a postmodern ecology would 
need to be appreciative of. Here we may draw on the analysis provided in Chapter Six 
to assert that a postmodern ecology would appreciate ephemerality, change, dissent 
and disunity, atypicality and non-universal story-telling. A postmodern ecology might 
also be thought to exhibit at least some of those one-word characteristics of 
postmodernism detailed in Chapter Six. For example, a postmodern ecology might be 
anti-scientific, anti-systems, anti-hierarchical, anti-teleological, anti-foundational and 
inclined towards fragmentation, heterogeneity, absence, aporia, pastiche, 
meaninglessness and the value of otherness. To do this with any effect (and as alluded 
to throughout Chapters Two to Seven) a postmodern ecology would also be 
non-mechanist/non-organic, non-functionalist and appreciative of chaos without 
supposing such chaos gives rise to order. Within such a postmodern ecology each 
pattern, operation, behaviour, process, object or subject in such an ecology would 
have to be explained in terms of its own local narrative history rather than as 
contributions to an overarching unity, purpose or process. Such a postmodern 
ecology would also be aware of its own metaphoricity; its own social creation as a 
malleable and underdetermined political tool in ecopolitical discourse. There may be a 
tradition within ecology that does all this or at least has the capacity to do so; 
Gleasonian ecology. In this chapter a postmodemised Gleasonian ecology is written 
out. Such a postmodemised Gleasonian ecology is not presented as offering a 
superior project in ecological metaphysics, but as offering an alternative one that does 
not rely on unity and that utilises atomism in a positive environmental way (something 
which unity intellectuals have maintained couldn t be done).
A POSTMODERN GLEASON?
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The strand ot ecology that may possess some affinity with the postmodern is 
derived from Henry Gleason. We might recall that Gleason’s ecological oeuvre was a 
reaction to unity and uniformity in professional ecological theory. In contrast to 
Frederic Clements and other superorganicists, Gleason maintained that there is not a 
lot of order in ecological communities and hardly a direction of change towards 
climax. This seems to exhibit some resonance to comments by some postmodern 
intellectuals. For instance when Zygmunt Bauman makes the following statements he 
could be talking about Gleason’s ecology just as much as about changes in society 
and culture in the late Twentieth Century:
"Postmodemity’ |isj a semantically negative notion, defined entirely by 
absences—by the disappearance of something which was there before—the 
evanescence of synchronic and diachronic order as well as of directionality 
of change. (Bauman, 1992:29).
Gleasonianism’s appreciation of disunity accompanied by its pervasive incredulity 
towards large structures might lead us into investigating Gleason’s ecology as a 
postmodern form of ecology. Viewing the terrestrial assemblages of plants and 
animals in the world as anarchic patches of unrelated individual (and groups of 
individuals) does confer upon Gleasonianism a parallelism with postmodern art and its 
penchant for pastiche and muddled mosaic. We could also note that Gleasonianism’s 
recognition of the typicality of non-conformity-rather than the subjugation of 
non-conformity towards the realms of negligibility and exception—superficially 
resembles postmodern social and political theory.
If “the very foundation of postmodemity consists of viewing the world as a 
plurality of heterogeneous spaces and temporalities” (Heller and Feher, 1988:1), and 
if postmodernism is held to seek “the uniqueness of the parts rather than the unity of a 
theoretical whole” (Rosenau, 1992:81) then it is probably legitimate to acknowledge 
the postmodern credentials of Gleasonian ecology over Clementsian ecology.
However, such a fracturing of theoretical unity does not necessarily contribute to 
another major postmodern aim: the fracturing of metanarratives. Just because there is 
a dissolution of unity within Gleasonianism does not mean that there is a dissolution
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ot foundations. Although fragmentation lends itself to the extirpation of foundational 
principles115, a fragmented view of the world’s ecology does not, by itself, sufficiently 
derail foundational ecological theory. If we extend Gleason’s scepticism towards 
superorganismic unity in ecology through a postmodern deconstructionist type of 
critique we may, however, dissolve the need for both ecological unity and a whole 
gamut of interrelated foundational principles that prop it up and support it. When 
doing this we elicit, in this particular case, what might be named ‘postmodern 
associationism’116.
According to Tester (1993:153) the “dismantling of bounds and boundaries is an 
inherent project of postmodemity”. While Gleason makes inroads towards breaking 
the ontological boundedness of ecological communities (by denying the fact that 
communities are bounded), a postmodern critique would extend the breaking up of 
boundaries to the epistemological realm. In modem ecology epistemological 
boundedness is most explicit in the idea o f ‘levels of biological organisation’. As we 
have seen the orthodox way to present this is through a hierarchy framework like this:
cell—organ—organism—population—commumty—ecosystem—landscape--biome—biosphere.
Under unitarianism the varying levels of biological organisation are essentially the 
same phenomenon. Individual organisms are much the same as ecosystems; they 
merely operate, or are characterised, at different scales. This is evident in the systems 
theory of both Lovelock’s Gaian ecology and also in the Odums’ ecosystems studies. 
For example we can spot this as a working metaphysical viewpoint in Eugene Odum 
when we note Hagen’s comments about Odum’s doctoral training. Hagen (1992:123)
*15 If no generalisations can be made, laws cannot be found and defined, and theories will always remain 
gap-ridden and local.
*1 Postmodern associationism might be considered an ironic and self-contradictory label for that which it purports 
to describe, in the sense that the members of an ‘association’ are much of the time not at all associated but merely 
coincidentally arranged as neighbours in space and time. Gleason, himself, reflects this ambiguity since while 
using the term association as a key metaphor when describing certain aspects of ecological settings he, in his 1926 
paper, alludes to the non-existence of associations as distinct entities:
"Aiq  we not justified in coming to the conclusion, far removed from the prevailing opinion, that an 
association is not an organism, scarcely a vegetational unit, but merely a co in ciden ce?  (Gleason, 
1926:16).
Having acknowledged this, it becomes acceptable to use the term association as Gleason would have us use it. to 
refer to a loosely-gathered group of coincidentally-arranged, separate ‘unitary organisms that live in a common 
(though impossible-to-define) geographical site without contribution to the regulation, maintenance or ordering of 
the ‘whole’ contained within that site.
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quotes Eugene Odum as saying:
The transition from bird physiology to ecosystem function was quite natural 
for me since it involved moving up the hierarchy from physiological ecology 
of populations to physiological ecology of ecosystems. It’s really not such a 
big step to go from whole organism metabolism to community metabolism.
Here we see how Eugene Odum’s particular conceptualisations o f ‘levels of 
organisation’ follow fairly strictly the framework outlined just above. An ecosystem is 
virtually the same as an individual bird. All the various organisms of an ecosystem 
become unified into an individuated unified entity that is Odum’s ecosystem.
Under Gleasonianism, however, any properties of individuation (such as 
self-preservation, teleological behaviour, autopoesis, psycho-physical unity et cetera) 
afforded to the levels of organisation above the individual can only be maintained with 
much analogical manoeuvring. Due to the indefinite and unbounded character of 
Gleasonian ecological communities, the very concept of hierarchically-arranged levels 
of biological organisation can be brought in to doubt. This is due to the fact that while 
levels may be heuristically convenient and pedagogically useful they also 
compartmentalise and unify spatio-temporal phenomena that are much more 
heterogeneous and unbounded than the concept of the level signifies.
In many breeds of ecology (most notably community ecology) the concept of the 
level is acknowledged as a mere abstraction, flowing—as it does—around, over and 
under the many nuances of ecology to which it cannot apply. Unitarians, however, 
tend to use the concept in a totalizing manner, envisaging biological levels to exist as 
clearly defined layers like floors of a modem building. The various levels are held to 
be variously connected by ladders of information (Margalef, 1968), staircases of 
feedback mechanisms (Allen and Starr, 1982) or elevators of energy (Odum, 1971). 
This view of the world’s ecology is one of a well-ordered and intricately organised 
hierarchy whereby the process of downward causation acts to keep all lower levels in 
line:
[ajs smaller units integrate and aggregate into larger units, so they give rise 
to new rules, which in turn constrain and regulate the component 
subsystems to comply with collective behaviour of the system as a 
whole. (Davies, 1995:149).
Goldsmith expresses the idea of downward causation like this:
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larger systems, from Gaia downwards, control and co-ordinate the behaviour 
of their constituent parts... [ and the]...adaptive strategies [of these parts] are 
all geared to maintaining the stability or homeostasis of the entire Gaian 
hierarchy. (Goldsmith, 1993:106).
Capra, in turn expresses it like this:
order at one system level is the consequence of self-organisation at a 
larger level. (Capra, 1982).
A postmodern alternative would want to obliterate such an orderly and 
hierarchical conceptualisation of ecology (especially since the presence of such order 
and hierarchy tends to rely on the concepts of self-organisation and self-similarity). 
The postmodern penchant for fragmentation, heterogeneity and anti-hierarchy would 
also reject any attempt to place individuals and groups of individuals within neatly 
defined hierarchical levels117. If explicit metaphor is required, rather than envisaging 
the organisation of the biotic world as a well structured building, postmodern 
ecologists might choose to follow a path of de(con)struction and disintegration so as 
to view the ecological world as resembling a broken and fragmented jumble of 
variously shaped and precariously perched shards of debris in whose nooks and 
crannies the lives of individuals are contextualised and from whose micro-fissures 
reflections of localised worlds are ricocheted118
Many contemporary natural philosophers and environmental thinkers like to 
invoke the use of levels organised into a hierarchical scheme since it allows them to 
discern level specific laws; laws that operate at one level and not others. Given this 
the heinous crime of reductionism cannot be conferred upon them since it is willingly 
acknowledged that lower level laws (such as genetic rules or atomic behaviour) do 
not determine the operation of higher level laws (such as populations or 
ecosystems)119. Although such a hierarchical view of ecology might render
117 Recall the anti-hierarchical stances as exemplified by of Hassan (1987), Deleuze and Guattan (1987) and 
Bauman (1992) in Chapter Six, as well as the discussions on heterogeneity and fragmentation in the same chapter.
118 Yet even this metaphor is unsatisfactory, for it does not capture the idea that the splintered structure of the 
ecological world emerged from the activities of contextualised individuals but suggests the shards and splinters are 
mere remnants of a once organised higher whole or level.
119For instance this is how Goldsmith looks at reductionism:
“The Cambridge zoologist and ethologist W.H. Thorpe defines reductionism as ‘the attribution 
of reality exclusively to the smallest constituents of the world and the tendency to interpret
2 2 7
reductionism a benign force, hierarchical conceptions tend towards breeds of 
essentialism and holism within ecological science which are every bit as totalizing as 
reductionism120. When utilising the epistemological framework of ‘levels’ to describe 
biological organisation the member entities of levels tend to become characterised by 
the essential properties held to exist for their particular level and are deemed to 
operate according to level-specific laws that confer upon them their totality of 
identity. A population ot beetles becomes essentialised to the characteristics that 
populations ot any type of organism are said to possess. A benthic ecosystem is made 
to suffer the indignities of being considered fundamentally the same as any other 
ecosystem upon the planet. The endothelial cells of a bandicoot are held to be 
basically comparable to algal oocytes. Intra-level generalisation is held to exist over 
and above any intra-level differences.
This type of intra-level generalisation is exhibited in the Wu and Louck’s paper 
that attempts to generalise modem day ecological theory. In this paper they state:
Such a hierarchically organised system can be seen as a system in which 
levels corresponding with progressively slower behaviour are at the 
top, while those reflecting successively faster behaviour are lower in 
the hierarchy. Higher levels impose constraints on the lower levels, and 
thus can be expressed as constraints. On the other hand, the dynamics of the 
lower levels can be so last that their signals are smoothed out at higher 
levels, and often can be treated as averages. (Wu and Loucks, 1995:449).
higher levels of organisation in terms of lower levels’” (Goldsmith, 1993:9).
This is also the reductionism that Davies thinks he avoids by using levels:
“Starting with atoms, building up through molecules, cells and organisms to conscious 
individuals and society, each level contains and enriches the one below, but can never be reduced to it” 
(Davies, 1987:146)
However, Paul Davies himself is liable to forget this in his own schemes of elaboration, as sample of his own 
writing, reproduced below, shows:
“So are we all doomed to act out a pre-programmed genetic agenda that all too often serves to 
make men and women miserable or can human beings successfully override their genetic legacy?
Alas, the statistical evidence suggests that whatever the prevailing social or religious norms, our 
genes manage to manipulate us with surprising efficiency. We may not be able to alter human sexual 
behaviour much, but at least it helps to understand how it originated.” (Davies, 1996:1).
120In light of this we see the convergence of holism and reductionism. If reductionism is that which describes the 
existence of ecological phenomena according to a set of simple (usually physico-chemical or mathematical) laws, 
then it stands very close to holism which dictates that ecological phenomena are at the mercy of simplified general 
laws (which again are usually physico-chemical or mathematical) operating at a higher level.
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What should worry us here is the keenness to average out the actions of lower 
levels. Despite the chaotic abundance of a multiplicity of organisms producing a 
multiplicity of emergent properties, these properties themselves are capable of 
producing a ‘smooth’ base upon which the actions of higher levels can rightly be 
assumed to be based.
A postmodern association view would not honour such intra-level generalisation 
and would argue that the purported levels have no fundamental laws or essential 
characteristics. Nor do they give rise to cohesive ‘smoothable’ emergent properties as 
Wu and Loucks have suggested. Thus, different ecological communities are more 
different from each other than they are similar. Similarly, ecosystems cannot be 
generalised into a tew laws, and there is no one typical cell that all others aspire to.
If there is not a definable set of cohesive general features that can be invoked to 
characterise a particular level, then the actual existence of levels must be called into 
question. Each plant community, each marine ecosystem, each temperate biome or 
each bird population must exist as a unique and non-essentialisable collection of 
individuals that must demand to be studied on its own terms. They cannot be bounded 
by the concept of level without receiving decrees of generalisation which are 
ill-fitting. Thus the application of levels (populations, communities, ecosystems) 
become vague and necessarily fluid.
UNGLUING THE ECOLOGICAL WORLD
The postmodern deconstruction of levels of organisation in nature is one way of 
countering the modem scientific preoccupation with order and unity. Another way is 
to identify and eject two other metanarratives of contemporary ecology; competition 
and co-operation, which are both very important to unity.
According to most spokespeople in the natural sciences there are two common 
ways of looking at the interactions that prevail in nature. The first way is to perceive 
nature from the Darwinian perspective; a competitive struggle for existence. The
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second may be described as the Kroptkinesque view121, whereby the dominant 
interactive process in nature is co-operation or symbiosis. While the co-operative 
view of nature is a common line of thinking to many Unitarians, Darwinism is still, by 
far, the dominant paradigm in ecological science when it comes to explaining 
inter-organismal relationships and the structure of ecological collections. Of course 
Darwin said a lot more about evolutionary ecology beyond competition, and an 
exclusive emphasis on competition as being the only contributor to community 
structure is held to be unwarranted by most ecologists. The American biologist Jared 
Diamond has been cited as indicating that competition is virtually the only determining 
factor of community structure (McIntosh, 1985:266). But other biologists feel that 
competition is only one factor and not necessarily the most important one, in 
determining the structure of particular ecological communities. For instance; 
predation and herbivory (Paine, 1980; Crawley, 1983), disturbance (Drury and Nisbet, 
1973; White, 1979), parasitism (Anderson and May, 1979; May and Anderson, 1979), 
and symbiotic mutualism (Faegri and van der Pijl, 1971; Boucher et al, 1982) have all 
been noted as being important factors in influencing community structure.
This last process is often hailed by Gaians and Unitarian environmentalists as 
being the prime relationship in nature, such that it is said to be a major determinant of 
the biotic structure of ecological collections. Darwinians do not necessarily negate the 
importance of symbiosis in ecology but they do try and bring it into the fold of 
Darwinism by claiming that mutualist relationships are naturally selected adaptations 
that give the symbionts a competitive edge over other organisms; allowing better rates 
of survival in the face of nutrient shortage, predation or environmental stresses. 
Scientifically trained Gaians, alike, do not want to rid ecology entirely of Darwinism; 
they merely like to see natural selection as operating at higher levels than Darwinians 
have hitherto appreciated. Ecosystems, and even the whole biosphere, thus become 
the unit o f natural selection, hinting at the immense co-operation that must go on to 
achieve this.
Whether competition or co-operation is seen as the underlying expressive force
121 After Kropotkin. Kroptkin’s anarchist ideals for utopian societies required the revocation of Darwinian 
competition and its replacement by a metaphysic proposing cooperation as the essential driving force of nature. See 
Kropotkin (1902) and, for a modern-day interpretation. Pepper, (1993).
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in nature, both Darwinism and Gaianism can develop causal explanations about nature 
from these metatheoretical bases. Co-operation and competition are needed to glue 
the individuals to the whole. Their action in nature is to work to supply a uniform set 
ot emergent properties which give rise the the community or ecosystemic level of 
organization.122 Getting rid of co-operation and competition will undo the unity 
concept in ecology by eliminating the need tor intense (competitive or co-operative) 
relationships between all nature’s members and by breaking up the levels of biological 
organisation whose very existence relies on the identifiable emergentproperties that 
co-operation and competition are said to produce.
As both competition and co-operation serve as metatheoretical bases in 
ecological explanation, a postmodern approach to ecology would probably agree to 
regard them both with suspicion. For instance, postmodern associationism would cast 
doubt on competition and co-operation not only because both approaches may be 
right in differing circumstances but also because one of the most common 
relationships in nature is non-interaction. Yes, a particular predator may hunt and kill 
a particular prey, and yes, a particular tree may compete with another particular tree 
for light, and yes, a particular alga might live symbiotically with a particular fungus. 
But it is just as possible to say that the most prevalent relationship in nature is no 
relationship. From this view there are no connections between most organisms in the 
world, they exist in their own environmental context of course, whereby they interact 
on a local and capillary scale, sometimes in strangely-contorted and complicated 
networks, but any organism is profoundly disconnected with nearly all the other 
organisms in the world. Networks are never complete, never total. If they exist, they 
exist in a state of aporia.
While this work suggests ecological interactions as being much more variable 
than the physicalism of systems ecology and Gaianism presupposes, the prevalence ot 
fragmentation and disparity between the world s ecological members must be 
emphasised, so that interactions and interconnections are many times non-existent.
The absence of interaction, however, does not make the world a simpler place. It
l22Co-operation gives rise to the community or ecosystem level of organisation by tying all the organisms within a 
community or ecosystem into a tightly bundled and complimentary assemblage of related parts. Competition ties 
the individual to the whole by invoking the concept of evolution through natural selection as a feedback 
mechanism that also produces a tight and complimentary asemblage of well-adapted individual organisms.
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makes it more chaotic (remember the cha in chaos denotes absence) since there is a 
constant fragmentation of cause and effect in a world thought to be intimately linked.
The connectionism so apparent within ecological thought has been built up to 
convey how the delicate web of nature is prone to collapse if ill-inspired tampering 
with nature is undertaken by human beings. The postmodern view that is presented 
here, however, does not see the environmental crisis as the result of misguided 
tampering with the delicate balance and interconnections evident in nature but as a 
wholesale destruction of the ecological world itself. The forests of the world are not 
collapsing due to the web destroying nature of pollutants and micro-disasters which 
destroy a particular ecosystem by untangling the various networks that make it up, 
they are being destroyed by a sweeping and blanketing destruction that eliminates all 
members of an ecological community in near unison. Forests are mowed down in 
bull-dozer like fashion, rather than slowly advancing towards a state of morbidity due 
to the surgical removal of species.
What this might suggest is that there is not one great big global ecological 
disaster lying over the horizon in the future due to ongoing disentanglement of 
ecological networks (as Lovelock would suggest) but bundles of smaller concentrated 
disasters, each itself a travesty, occurring right now. This is to say that extinction and 
environmental disaster, if we are to regard them as ethical issues at all, are local 
phenomenon. The environmental crisis occurs every day, when a beetle becomes 
extinct, when a town gets swamped by a dam, when a lake gets polluted by industrial 
waste: these are the environmental crisis in action, here and now. In contrast 
Lovelock would have us believe that the environmental crisis is only a potential; only 
something that will happen one day if we keep doing these minor things so that one 
day, together, they cause a change in the Earth’s ambient conditions. Such a 
big-picture view of the environmental crisis as forever imminent rather than present 
devalues the daily tragedies that keep going on.
THE POSTMODERN ECOLOGICAL INDIVIDUAL 
The destruction of levels, as well as competition and cooperation, in nature
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releases individuals and their aggregates from being trapped in an over lording holism 
whereby their lives are constituted according to a greater whole. Downward causation 
cannot exist in postmodern ecology since there are no higher levels from which to be 
dictated to or determined by, only a heterogeneous cascade of shard like collective 
features whose effects are ungeneralisable, lawless and self-contradictory and whose 
interactions with individual organisms and their environments are fragmented in scale 
and intensity.
If individual organisms are thus freed from the action of downward causation 
they are disassociated from the actions of any greater ecological whole. Such wholes 
only exist in the mental and social milieu of humans. As some postmodernists have 
alluded, postmodernism sometimes has the tendency to shatter structural entities to 
near non-existence123 whereby the primary agents of any theoretical or normative 
relevance are individuals. This emphasis upon ecological individualism tends to 
concur with other postmodern analysts who maintain that while the cohesive identity 
of the autonomous Modernist subject may be pronounced dead, “the postmodern 
individual is still very much alive” (Rosenau, 1992:53) so that postmodemity has 
become the ‘Golden Age of the Individual’ (Hassan, 1987).
However, such fragmentation towards individualism could be seen to represent 
an alternative foundationalism by appealing to individualism as ontological reality.124 
This appeal would give heart to many a neo-Darwinist who would see in such a 
postmodern deconstruction of nature philosophical support for natural selection 
(which is founded upon the sanctity of the individual as being the basis of the selection 
process).
Here we see that the concept of individuality itself can become a unifying and 
totalizing concept (and here I refer not to the ease to which Liberalism focuses on 
individualism but to the anthropogenic construction of the individual as the theoretical 
base in neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory). Darwinian evolutionary biology posits 
that the unitary nature of the individual is manifested through its genetic essence. An 
individual equals this genetic essence and vice-versa. On a closer inspection than that
123See Bauman (1992), Lemert (1992) and Waugh (1992) as examples of this.
1240n this aspect of postmodernism it might be prudent to remember that ‘there is often an alternative 
foundationalism lurking in many postmodern arguments” (Waugh, 1992a: 11).
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which Darwinists are capable, it becomes apparent that the genetics of an organism 
does not solely define an individual’s life. Nor does the ‘selfish gene’ even lay down 
the parameters ot an organism’s existence. An organism is much more pluralistic than 
is generally accepted. It the genetic program of an individual does not enable it to feed 
from a particular energy source, the organism is not about to give up the ghost and 
submit to its pre-ordained genetically prescribed extinction. It goes on attempting to 
escape the essence reputedly embodied in its genes. It tries other food sources in 
order to do what it wants...survive, propagate, lie around in the sun...whatever. It has 
no essence, no essential drive to survive or to reproduce. It is essence-less and has a 
myriad of other things that it might like to get up to.
By acknowledging the relevance of a certain degree of ecological atomism in the 
description of ecological communities it might be assumed that postmodern 
associationism tends to give rise to a coherent and cohesive notion of an ecological 
self; an organism is a rational and autonomous actor blessed with a high degree of 
ecological agency and a fixed identity. However, postmodern associationism might 
choose to parasitise upon the postmodern predilection towards schizophrenia to assert 
that ecological actors operate under a plurality of self. The Gleasonian view of natural 
history might be interpreted to confirm that in any one ecological situation an 
individual can act in one (or more) of a multitude of ways. The exact way which is 
enacted being just as influenced by extra-genetic factors as by genotypic boundaries
held to exist within the organism
We are all familiar with the extragenetic cultural activities of primates that might 
be cited to indicate the plurality of the ecological self; tool-using chimpanzees 
(McGrew et al, 1979) and potato-washing macaques (Kawai, 1965) for example. Yet 
there are many other animal types that exhibit a plurality of self. From the milk-cap 
ravaging blue-tit (Barber, 1993) through the jumping spider that chooses different 
predatory tactics for the various prey it encounters (Jackson et al, 1993) to the 
rock-leaping Gobi fish that jumps from rock-pool to rock-pool at low tide based upon 
topographical experience gained at high-tide (Aronson, 1971) the pervasivity of 
extra-genetic ecological activities is notable. All this lends credence to the conclusion 
that: “It is also becoming increasingly clear that animals share with us potential for 
cultural adaptation” (Cavalli-Sforza, 1986:845).
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The plurality of self in plants is demonstrable in the way that individual shrubs 
and trees adjust to the variations in spatial patterns, herbivory episodes and dispersal 
agent availability that they experience in subtle and diverse ways. These environmental 
variations cannot be predicted by genetic essences, thus implicating a great degree of 
sensitivity to its lived environmental context.
Microbes too exhibit a plurality of self where they are called upon to act 
according to extragenetic factors, tor instance the irregularity of algal cell movements 
(Goldstein, 1992) and protozoan disturbance responses (Applewhite, 1979) might 
indicate a plurality of options afforded to members of these microbial groups. What 
this says, at least to Postmodern Associationists, is that it is possible to conclude that 
“[a]t the moment one should accept with extreme caution any statement on the 
inheritance of behavioural traits”, Cavalli-Sforza (1986:855). It also says that far from 
being an automaton with a genetic essence; non-human individuals exist like 
Rosenau’s postmodern characterisations of human individuals, since they submit “to a 
multitude of incompatible juxtaposed logics, all in a perpetual movement without 
possibility of permanent resolution or reconciliation” (Rosenau, 1992:55). Whether or 
not it is wise to assume that non-human organisms are manifestly capable of multiple 
self-construction that postmodernists believe of humans, it is at least worthy to 
consider them as capable of experiencing pluralised lives whereby they operate as 
though unbounded by any coherent anthropogenic laws.
With the genetic blueprint gone, with the essences of instinct downgraded in 
importance, the non-human organisms of the world must attract the same sort of 
detailed and pluralistic study as human individuals. Instead of existing as 
manifestations of their genetic heritage and phenotypic morphology they become (as 
Hollinger says of postmodern human individuals):
multiple, not fixed...with no overall blue print. The various multiplicities 
that constitute the self at a given time are marked in play and dance with each 
other. (Hollinger. 1994:11).
THE METAPHORS IN A POSTMODERN 1 SEP GLEASON IAN ECOLOGY
Because of its emphasis on an individualistic explanation ot ecological
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communities, and because its penchant for atomistic deconstruction of larger 
ecological abstractions, the ecology of Gleason has often been held to be both 
mechanistic and reductionistic by holist ecologists. Goldsmith (1993) and Rowe 
(1997), for instance, have attacked modem day versions of Gleasonianism in this vein. 
However, Gleason’s associations are hardly mechanistic. The Gleasonian units, i.e.: 
individuals, of an ecological community are not hollow mechanical shells and they do 
not just bounce of each other like solid particles. Nor would a postmodern 
Gleasonianism insist upon chaotic or atomistic individualism as an absolute. Local 
unities are often constructed (and dissolved) by the peculiar activities of individual 
members and the groups they comprise.
What this tends to indicate is that postmodern associationism is not an ecological 
form of a billiard ball universe; comprised of crashing and clashing atomistic 
individuals that operate according to predetermined laws12i. Postmodern 
associationism does not “see the world as consisting of mindless, meaningless, totally 
determined physical bits and pieces that are non-purposive” as Charles Birch 
(1990:xi) would claim of non-organic philosophies. Nor does postmodern 
associationism necessarily advance an ethical theory promoting the sanctity of the 
individual over an ecologically or socially constructed whole. But a postmodern 
ecology such as postmodern associationism would place emphasis on respecting the 
individual other as arbiter of its own reality without imposing metaphysical 
imperialism under the guise of organic unity.
If mechanicism is hardly an apt scheme of description within Gleasonian ecology 
then another of the Modernist characters outlined by postmodernism, i.e. centralised 
control, is also hardly reconcilable with Gleasonianism. According to two community 
ecologists who followed a neo-Gleasonian line in the 1960s:
There is in the community no centre of control and orgamsation, and no 
evolution toward a control system (Whittaker and Woodwell in 
McIntosh 1985:239). 125
125If postmodern associationism were a metaphysical announcement of a billiard ball ecology it would state that 
each of the ecological billiard balls would be of different sizes and weights, would walk about on their own without 
needing to be hit would cling unpredictably to other billiard balls, would refuse to sink mto the (w)holes. would 
jump chaotically from table to table and would then probably proceed to invent their own rales of billiards without
much recourse to known laws.
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Whittaker and Woodwell were reacting to the rise of systems ecology in the 
1960s126 and they were expressly interested in denying that there was a tendency for 
the biotic components of ecosystems to work with the abiotic components in order to 
evolve into a stable, self-controlling and self-maintaining system.
Systems ecologists may claim the same tor the ecosystem but the point that 
Whittaker and Woodwell would make, and which prompted them to make the above 
statement, is that an ecosystem conception of nature is a centralised form of natural 
history since everything of importance is run via the negative feedback processes of 
ecosystems.
This decentralisation within Gleasonianism might be made more visible if we 
attempt to graphically represent the worldview of ecology as presented by someone 
like Frijof Capra and the postmodern natural history described in this chapter.
Capra’s model would look something like figure one (next page). In Capra’s 
model organisms A, B, C, D and E contribute to emergent properties which are so 
hard and fast and unified that they form (or 4self-organise’) into a coherent set of 
emergent properties that equals a unified entity (which may be Clements’ community, 
Odums’ ecosystem or Lovelock’s Gaia). The unified entity then acts homogeneously 
(though homeostatic feedback) mechanisms to envelop, control and limit organisms 
A, B, C, D and E. All of this together then rolls progressively forward via evolution to 
ever more stability (see Goldsmith, 1993) or higher complexity (see Davies, 1987, and 
Capra, 1996) or more diversity (see Merry, 1995).
If we attempt the same sort of modelling with Postmodern Gleasonianism then 
we end up with something different (see figure two, next page).
In this alternative model organisms A, B, C, D and E give rise to multiple, 
divergent and contradictory emergent properties which are not unified enough to act 
homogeneously and thereby effect a controlling influence via uniform negative 
feedback on the organisms. This disorder is set amongst, and gives rise to, various 
'directions’; increasing complexity, decreasing complexity, increasing stability, 
decreasing stability, increasing diversity, decreasing diversity etc.
126As detailed in Chapter Two.
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THE REFLECTION SEC I lON
A single cohesive alternative to any reputedly debunked metatheory sounds 
suspicious, especially to the postmodern mind127. Some might suspect that in 
proposing postmodern associationism at the expense of the Unitarian perspective, this 
work is merely replacing one totalising discourse for another. This concern is 
legitimate and there are a number of ways that it may be addressed.
Firstly it might be wise to restate the metaphorical nature of all human 
endeavours; our truths, our models, our maps and our speeches (in the vein of Lakolf 
and Johnson, 1980; Miller, 1983). It'this is so then we can no more regard 
postmodern associationism as a literal translation of the reality of nature than we can 
regard superorganicism, the New Sciences or Postmodern Science as sciences of the 
literal with a privileged ability to represent nature. If “[a] worthwhile application of 
metaphor...must begin with the awareness of its own problematic; its own 
metaphoricity” (Miller, 1983:6) then we must conduct postmodern associationism in 
the light of its own metaphorical nature. This thought will sober (or condemn) a 
postmodern associationist towards modesty with regards to the authentic 
correspondence with nature that postmodern associationism may suggest. Or as Miller 
puts it:
[tjhe rejection of a metaphor [like the unity of nature! is not the work of 
objectivity, rationality, science, let alone ‘purer’ language; it can only be 
the challenge and replacement of another metaphor. (Miller, 1983:7).
This said it nevertheless becomes important to qualify postmodern associationism 
as a worthwhile alternative metaphor that avoids the pitfalls ol unitarianism.
On the issue of being yet another totalising discourse it may be asserted that the 
postmodern associationist outlook enables, or accepts, that (as in the construction of 
meaning) each biotic member on the planet constructs its own version of reality 
(although whether the member is doing anywhere near all of the constructing is 
seriously open to debate) rather than having its reality thrust upon it purely by its 
functional position in a unity. Postmodern associationism thus reflects a pluralistic
127 Recall the attacks of the Postmodernists against foundations discussed in Chapter Five.
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way of looking at the world. It argues that we should not look to extra-galactic 
astronomy, quantum physics or science tiction to detect other dimensional universes. 
The plurality inherent on planet Earth reflects that every organism has its own 
de-centred, essence-less and fragmented reality. Each individual is its own universe 
with its own peculiar set of laws and generalisations. This suggests that we might 
need to redefine this thing that we live in as a pluriverse.
Furthermore, to counter claims that postmodern association is totalising it might 
be declared that the postmodern association outlook is not a metaphysic of the 
universe, nor a metanarrative of life or of all things living but merely a micronarrative 
story of some of the vegetation stands of the planet Earth. Thus it is a story that is 
only locally applicable from a spatial and disciplinary point of view, having very little 
to say that might be influential beyond the various sub-disciplines of the scientific 
tradition known as ecology and having nothing whatsoever to say about the 
ontological character of the physical universe.
Unlike systems science and unitarianism it makes no colonising forays into 
adjacent sciences and it certainly does not entertain the thought of being another 
‘New Paradigm’ which must be adopted by the world’s human members in order for 
an environmentally and socially benevolent society to be enforcedliX.
Students of the postmodern association outlook might also be unwilling to 
propose postmodern associationism as the only viable narrative of the world s natural 
history. Concessions are willingly made with regard to the relevance of ecosystem 
ecology and unitarianism by admitting the importance of emergent properties, 
ecological interaction and symbiosis in the practice of ecological study. And while 
Gleasonianism might like to see forests and other natural collections as heterogeneous 
mosaics varying unpredictably in composition throughout space and time, there is 
plenty o f room within Gleasonianism for acknowledging the existence of uniform
patches of nature within a particular area of ecological interest However, Gleason 
inspired ecologists would probably be more inclined to view these uniformities in 
composition as attributable to the adaptive significance and physiological tenacity 128
128Compare this with the rhetoric of some (self-proclaimed) ‘paradigm-shifting’ umtanan thinkers who make 
detailed social and moral prescriptions based upon the universal values that are held to flow from a metaphysical 
commitment to unity and systems thinking (see Devall and Sessions, 1985; Spretnak. 1986; Birch, 1990; Zohar 
and Marshall, 1991; Goldsmith, 1993)
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developed by particular species rather than with any theory invoking 
super-individualistic homeostasis, in addition the science of community ecology is 
well endowed with unity-like concepts (taxocenes, patches, guilds, co-evolution) that 
emphasise the many close relationships within ecological collections; thus postmodern 
associationism may be interpreted as a molecular rather than atomistic view of 
ecology. We might compare such molecular natural history to Deleuze and Quartan’s 
postmodern molecular epistemology, whereby they:
advocate a molecular (as opposed to both an atomistic and macro) 
analysis. (Hollinger, 1994).
This is not to deny that in the case of ecology some of these molecules can be 
amazingly long.
By constantly attacking the ecosystem outlook of nature this work might, 
perhaps, be thought a little cruel in its attempted extermination of totalitarian 
ecological theory within systems science. In constructing an alternative from the 
remains of such an extermination it might be thought more charitable if ecosystems 
analysis is not wiped from the face of the Earth but merely downgraded in its 
universality. Using this perspective, and from the point of view of postmodemity’s 
schizoid individualism (where the death of the Subject as a concretely conscious and 
stable identity is acknowledged but the multi-dimensional character of the Self is 
regarded as alive and kicking) it is easy for postmodern associationism to 
acknowledge that the ecosystemic dimension of the ecological self may indeed be a 
transiently important part in describing the life and times of an ecological individual. 
But it is repugnant to postmodern sensibilities, however, to regard the ecosystemic 
part as the only part worthy of consideration in ecological study or in environmental 
valuation.
There is also a need to point out that although there are many calls for 
community ecology and systems ecology to become more unified so as to elicit a 
more balanced scientific approach129 this work is not one such call. Such calls allude 
to the possibility of a single intellectual utopia emerging that balances between 
respective methods and metaphysics of community ecology and systems ecology
i29por example see Allen and Starr (1982), Bazzazz and Sipe (1987), Wiegert (1988), Carney (1989), Westra 
(1994). Wu and Loucks (1995).
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which, when articulated, will supply humanity with an undistorted version of nature. 
All versions of nature and natural history, whether carefully crafted hybrids or not, 
must admit to being distortions through specific cultural/philosophical lenses. A 
systems-community hybrid is just as loosely bound to the referent about which it 
narrates as either systems ecology or community ecology by itself.
On the issue of foundationalism, and the postmodern desire to transcend it, we 
may adopt the sentiments of Waugh’s (1992a) statement about how many 
postmodern arguments are infected with alternative foundations and then go on to 
admit that postmodern associationism is just one such infected beast. Postmodern 
associationism might reject unitarianism, natural selection, levels of biological 
organisation, balance of nature... etc. as unifying principles in ecology, but it still 
appeals too much to founding principles (methodological individualism, ontological 
‘being’-ness, or biocentism, perhaps) to claim total ejection of foundationalism.
Alternatively we may wish to go beyond Waugh’s (1992b) statement and assert 
that every postmodern theory necessarily has its lurking foundationalisms since, 
despite claims to the contrary, any postmodern view that constitutes itself into a 
theory will appeal to some or other foundationalism, either because: 1) it wishes to 
survive in the academic world, 2) any theory has to make some suppositions about the 
nature of reality or knowledge, 3) theory is inherently unable to avoid constituting and 
defining that which it is explicating without pre-existing foundation laden theory or 4) 
theorists are unable to escape the myriad of foundations contextualised into their 
lives. If postmodern associationism, or any other narrative of the world, is able to 
escape such problems of foundational transcendence it may only do so by miring itself 
into a foundationalism of anti-foundationalism. This is to restate a persistent problem 
within postmodernism that a belief in no foundations or metanarratives might be 
classed as such a strong and ever-present assumption that it is a kind of foundation 
and metanarrative in itself. (We might also argue, however, that the idea that we can 
never transcend foundationalism in narrative construction is itself such an absolute 
statement that it displays inherent totalitarianism).
The relevance of all these musings to postmodern associationism’s desire to end 
ecological foundations once again recounts Bauman’s allusions to the ever-present 
existence of dilemma in postmodemity;
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behind the postmodern...hides a genuine practical dilemma: acting on one’s 
moral convictions is naturally pregnant with the desire to win Tor such 
convictions an ever more universal acceptance; but every attempt to do just 
that smacks of the already discredited bid for domination. (Bauman, 1992:xxrii).
Where Modernism gets over its dilemmas by positing that all dilemmas lead to a 
better order, postmodernism accepts the insurmountability of these dilemmas without 
trying to sweep them under the mat of self-regulating unity.
DISSOLVING HUMANITY AND NATURE
Every movement operating under modernism has had a great and evil monster 
that it is out to slay. For socialists it is the capitalist monster, tor feminists it is the 
patriarchy bogey-man, for black-activists it is the great goblin of racism. 
Environmentalists, too, have often embarked upon a battle to the death with an evil 
monstrous being; one called anthropocentrism. This great and evil monster operates 
to undermine the true unity that the species ‘humanity’ has with the rest of nature, 
thus ensuring our anti-environmental attitudes and actions which have plunged the 
world towards destruction. This section aims to make a specific comment about this 
monster of anthropocentrism.
The view of nature and humanity as promoted in this work is one of pluralism. 
Humanity/Nature is not dualistic as orthodox Marxists and capitalists perceive 
(whereby there are two ontological categories of which individuals might be a 
member, that of humanity and that of nature). Humanity/Nature is not monistic as 
Gaian environmentalists perceive (whereby there is only one ontological 
category—that of unity—from which you can not escape). Humanity-Nature is, indeed, 
pluralistic, whereby there are as many ontological realities as there are members of 
the world. Maybe more, given the plurality of self
This postmodern emphasis on a plurality of selves in a plurality of worlds (in 
which each member of the living world is its own essence-less universe with its own 
schizophrenic and transient laws of reality and its own particular set of interactions 
with other members of the world) means that postmodern associationism is inclined to 
dissolve the ‘humanity-nature’ barrier in a different way from that of the monism of
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unitarianism.
Since neither ‘Humanity’ nor ‘Nature’ are categories that reflect any cohesive 
essence or defining generalisms within individuals and the groups of individuals that 
they purport to represent, their existence as ontological entities may be brought into 
question. Both Humanity and Nature are too heterogeneous, too disunited, too 
self-contradictory to be defined as unified entities about whose members you can say 
anything denoting the fundamental commonality. Certainly in defining ‘Nature’ and 
‘Humanity’ we come in to problems.
For example; nature may be defined as that which is not human and humanity as 
that which is not nature. (This is, of course, the point of Derridean deconstructionlJU; 
That the poles of such dichotomies are only negatively definable in relation to what it 
is not; the ‘other’). If either humanity or nature is dissolved the defining partnership is 
perturbed and both concepts must come crashing down, for that which is not human 
is not definable because that which is human is not definable. When postmodernists 
analyse binary oppositions they typically find that one pole is privileged (ethically, 
politically or epistemologically) over the other (environmentalists for instance hold 
that the humanity/nature dichotomy is socially positioned so that humanity holds 
privilege over nature. However, with the nature/humanity dichotomy the privileging is 
not one way but nuanced and confused. Nature for instance is privileged in 
sociobiological interpretations of society and in nostalgia laden advertisements that 
label their commodities ‘natural’)
Any attempt to define nature or humanity with references to fundamental 
characteristics is either doomed to impose generalisations in places they do not 
belong, or is doomed to hide from view other hugely important facets of the lived
experiences of the world’s constituent members.
Not being unifiable by a common essence, or definable by core characteristics, 
humanity and nature are reduced to historically contingent cultural constructions that 
can serve to include disparate members into great projects that will only benefit a few 
or that can serve to exclude members from the unified category by claiming that they 
do not come up to standard.
130See Derrida (1973) and Derrida (1976).
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While the Unitarian metaphysic dissolves the humanity/nature barrier to elicit one 
truly great beast called Gaia, the postmodern association view first dissolves humanity 
and nature so that the abstract boundaries that held the individuals, and groups o f  
individuals, together dissipates to allow an unbounded jumble o f  individuals and 
groups o f  individuals.
If the duality of humanity and nature are so dissolved (whereby Humanity and 
Nature are dissolved out of existence as well) this would suggest anthropocentrism as 
being a much more complicated beast than the unified monster currently presented. If 
humanity is only a vague and value-laden term used to describe a loose collection of 
individuals that possess no inherent essence, then the anthro part of anthropocentrism 
becomes less focused. Indeed if Humanity has been a convenient totalising conceptual 
tool in the hands of bourgeois, white, male imperialists, then anthropocentrism may be 
a convenient political tool in the hands of philosophising environmentalists. 
Anthropocentrism is a unifying concept, uniting humanity as a common coherently 
identifiable evil which is homogeneously spread throughout the social world. Rather 
than viewing anthropocentrism as a ubiquitous, uniform and singularly encompassing 
value that inspires attitudes and actions that are detrimental to nature, it is perhaps 
better presented as a range of value positions which have differing social and 
philosophical bases and varying types of environmental impact. As discussed in 
Marshall (1998), anthropocentrism may be just a convenient name (or cover) for, 
amongst other things:
a) egocentrism (it is not that we do not value anything but humans but that we 
do not value anything but ourselves);
b) chronocentrism (people are trapped in their own particular historical and 
temporal framework and they can not see the heritage from which they came, nor can 
they see the future to which they are headed. To many people, their past environments 
were much as they are now, especially as they are seen through a filter of indifference. 
If this is so then there is reason to believe that the drastic environmental changes that 
environmentalists keep going on about are only mild afflictions and the future really 
will not be any different from the past);
c) humanism (because humans shamelessly elevate themselves “into the absolute 
masters of creation” (Levi -Strauss in Pace, 1983 :247) that can rightly act to benefit
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humans as the ultimate ends of life);
d) materialism (because material possessions are an indicative measure of one’s 
interests being happily provided for, anything not contributing to that material 
well-being—i.e. much of nature—is valueless);
e) capitalism  (alienation from one’s own labor, and this applies to both capitalists 
and labourers, means that one becomes alienated from one’s natural heritage, or one’s 
‘inorganic body’ in Marxist terms);
t) androcentrism (the ease to which man dominates nature flows from the ease to 
which man dominates women);
g) technologism and economism (due to the reiflcation/deification of technology 
over and above nature as one of the gods of modernity, natural objects are now 
converted into resources, resources which can only be measured in economic terms).
The schizoid multiplicity of anthropocentrism suggests that environmentalists 
might fight the destruction of the worlds biota by addressing a whole plethora of 
(related and unrelated) value positions rather than engaging in a struggle with one 
great ism often thought to be lurking at the base of environmentally malevolent 
attitudes.
Having dissolved anthropocentrism in this fashion, postmodern associationism 
may still have a specific comment to make in the ethical arena that nevertheless 
accords closely with some of the non-anthropocentric environmental thinking. As 
postmodernism respects and celebrates the Other (as a disconnected being from 
oneself) and as Humanity has been dissolved (so that every being on the planet is 
granted the status of Other, rather than just human beings) and as Nature, too, has 
been dissolved (so that the members of the ecological world are not represented by a 
unified concept of collective Otherness) then any postmodern breed of 
environmentalism might be inclined to celebrate and respect every being with equal 
fervour regardless of the abstract unified whole that it was once said to be a member 
of. Thus the non-anthropocentric value system may be allowed to proceed without 
conferring the totalising and essentalist tendencies of unity upon the natural history of 
the world.
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THH ABSENCE OF NATURE AND ENVIRONMENTALISM
Deconstructing nature has some people worried:
I conclude that the nihilism and relativism of radically constructionist 
critiques ot science and the materiality of nature, while popular in some 
academic circles, is sophomoric. Further it is harmful because, as we shall 
see, it undermines efforts to save wildness and biodiversity....the covert assault 
[of social constructionism] is ideological and therefore social; it serves to 
justify, where useful, the physical assault. (Soule, 1995:137).
On this score it would seem that Soule would need the concept of nature because 
without it governments, industrialists and all those who decimate nature can claim that 
nothing is wild, nothing exists which is independent of humans (and therefore worthy 
of preservation because of that fact). Nabhan (1995) points out, however, that there is 
a difference between mental construction and physical construction so that it is not 
that there is no wilderness simply because all wilderness is physically constructed by 
humans but that the concept of Wilderness is a mental construction that is represented 
differently in many different stories and maps; all of which may have their own validity 
within the context from which they come.
If Soule were to maintain the consistency of his arguments he would have to 
argue that those stories and maps of wilderness that get rid of wilderness are all 
dangerous and those that do not are all good. However there are plenty of stories of 
nature and wilderness which affirm the existence of nature and wilderness as 
independent referents but which may be regarded as environmentally harmful to those 
independent referents. For instance there are many stories and maps of wilderness that 
are detrimental to wilderness since they are stories that indicate wilderness is evil or 
uncivilised and must be tamed, or is a resource which exists primarily for our 
enjoyment. I hope to have shown by now that one particular story that confirms the 
existence of nature, namely the unity of nature, is a story replete with such 
environmental dangers. Not only that but I hope to have shown that a story that 
dissolves nature, i.e. postmodern associationism, is capable of being environmentally 
friendly. What this all means is that the construction of environmentally-appropriate 
stories is not dependent on the existence o f ‘Nature’.
Regardless of the above points made by Nabhan and myself, a deconstructed
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Nature might still fall well within mainstream environmental ethics. If postmodern 
associationism suggests that individuals of each species are worthy of respect then it 
might be thought of as lying close to the normative ends suggested by individual 
rights based environmental ethics of people like Regan (1983) for example, who 
generally say that it is the individual organisms and their interests that should be 
valued in environmental preservation policies. The intellectual heritage of rights based 
environmental ethics and postmodern associationism might be quite dissimilar but if 
both emphasise the value of individuals over holistic entities then there may be much 
of consequence in common.131
Deconstructing nature to end its existence as a culturally-independent referent, 
for example, might seem to banish the very thing that environmentalists have strived 
to protect. However, it also invites us to go beyond the reprojective spiral narratives 
that many scientists and philosophers have played us into over the last two-hundred 
years. If nature no longer exists then the natural laws that it supposedly exudes for us 
to understand and obey also no longer exist. We can no longer be made pawns of 
natural philosophical discourse without acknowledging the social origins of that 
discourse. When Davies and Lovelock and Capra and Goldsmith claim to be the high 
priests of nature, the medium through which nature’s truth is revealed, we 
immediately have a way of disarming them by uncovering the metaphors within their 
work that do more than what they say.
THR WIDENING OF SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM
One way of allaying the fears of those who doubt the political schemes of social 
constructionists is to encourage a new view of social constructionism. The possibility 
of widening up the base of social constructionism in order to relate it to some
131 If this commonality does exist then postmodern associationism might be thought of as suffering the same 
problems as rights-based Environmental Ethics. This may be so and I do not intend to address these issues 
as they have already been brought to my attention many times.
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non-anthropocentric sentiments within environmental philosophy is suggested in this 
section. As a suggestive section only, this section relies more on the good will of the 
reader to entertain speculations based on the preceding eight chapters than it does on 
the close referencing of existing support in the academic literature. It should be 
viewed as an intimation to a possible line of work rather than as a fully substantiated 
piece of scholarship to which I am indissolubly attached.
If postmodernists are avid fans of social contructionism, and if that social 
constructionism applies just as well to the pronouncements of truth and reality made 
by science, and if postmodernists agree to deconstruct the divide between Nature and 
Humanity, between Nature and Society then we have an interesting thing happening 
to social constructionism. If postmodernists approve of radical social constructionism 
and they are also sympathetic to the deconstruction of binary categories such as 
Nature and Humanity and Nature and Society and Nature and Culture, then the 
bounds of social constructionism must anticipate their own widening. Social 
constructionism is not the preserve of just Humans since the category of Humanity 
has been deconstructed. They are the preserve of individuals; deconstructed, 
multiple-selved, identity-perplexed individuals. All individuals—humans or 
not—partake in constructing the stories and metaphors that are formed of them. 
Animals and plants are social constructionists too.
When we admit to the constructionist ability of non-humans, two particular 
facets of this constructionism may reveal themselves. Firstly, non-humans may help in 
the construction of stories we have about them and secondly, they construct their own 
stories about the world.
To deal with the first facet first: this suggests that our stories of non-humans, the 
metaphors we use to describe them, might, in some way, come from them as well as 
from other humans. How is it possible, it may be asked, that non-humans can 
contribute to human stories about them when the ‘non-humans are not even able to 
communicate with ‘humans’ in order to partake in such story construction? Obviously 
‘humans’ do not share the same language as non-humans, but there are 
communications going on; albeit fragmented, partial and non-representative 
conversations (but the same is evident, it might be pointed out by postmodernists like 
Kroker and Cook, in the communication exchanges between one human and another).
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When I suggest that non-humans partake (in some small way) in the social 
construction ot our stories about them I am not saying that there is some essence, 
some independent referentiality, that shines through from an animal or plant despite 
the various human to human social constructions of non-human nature but that our 
constructions can be influenced by the behaviour of those non-humans. An animal like 
a bird, for instance, does not reveal itself via its own objective and intrinsic reality into 
our stories. The bird that we see in our science, in our novels, in our myths and in our 
films is not a mirrored reflection of some independent real bird. It is just that in some 
ot the stories we have about birds, the ‘bird-ness’ is negotiated into place with the 
help of the behaviour and activities of birds.
An example of this may be fitting. In his book the human nature of birds, Barber 
(1993) describes a sixteen year old male African Grey parrot who has been an 
experimental bird in the laboratory of German animal behaviourist I.M. Pepperberg 
for most of his life132:
Alex is not isolated in the laboratory, and he exercises much control over his 
life. He is out of his cage about eight hours every working day. During 
this time he interacts with the experimenters, who treat him respectfully, as 
an important member of the laboratory team, while teaching him words and 
concepts and testing him in formal, rigorously controlled experiments.
(Barber, 1993:4).
During his sixteen years Alex has shown, according to Barber and Pepperberg, 
that he is able to communicate an understanding of human conceptual systems, from 
colour and shape to numbers and sentence structure. Barber is convinced that Alex 
does not just mimicking but that he:
understands what he is saying, and when he answers a question correctly, 
he demonstrates confidence in his answer. About 5 percent of the time, 
student experimenters have mistakenly scolded him for a correct response.
Not accepting their reprimands, Alex confidently repeated his correct 
answer. (Barber, 1993:7).
What is, perhaps, of more significance, however, is the following:
Alex is not passive; to a large extent he actively controls his life, tor instance, 
when a desired nut was placed by an experimenter under a heavy metal cup
132See for example Pepperberg (1983), Pepperberg (1991). Barber assures us that the African grey parrot is, by all 
accounts, living a life of both contentment and adventure within this laboratory.
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that Alex could not lilt, he told the experimenter 'Go pick up cup'. As soon 
as the experimenter picked up the cup, Alex walked over and ate the nut. If 
the experimenters failed to make the experimental tasks sufficiently interesting 
for him, Alex lets them know he is bored. He communicates his boredom by 
asking to be moved to a new location or by ignoring the experimenters and 
preening. During an especially long and difficult experimental session, Alex 
communicates his frustration and desire to stop answering questions by 
requesting to return to his cage: 'Wanna go back'. When brought to his 
cage, he tells the experimenter 'go away', and climbs inside the cage onto the 
swing, ignoring the experimenter and refusing to interact with any one. (Barber, 
1993:7)
What we could possibly infer in Alex the parrot’s case is that a non-human can 
realign the subject of examination in the process in which it is being studied. Alex the 
parrot can contribute to the negotiations about itself, re-sort the problem being 
examined into new (admittedly anthropogenic categories), and re-devise the 
experiment, or even sabotage the experiment and the experimental dialogue 
altogether.
Needless to say this sort of fragmented and partial communication between 
non-humans and their human observers does not always happen. The voice of very 
many non-humans are, no doubt, hardly ever heard and so are not able to negotiate in 
many instances.
To deal with the second facet of the widening of social construction-that 
non-humans construct their own version of the world—it is easier to hypothesise the 
possible existence of a mediating language between various social constructors, since, 
for the most part the construction will be within groups of individuals of the same 
species133. These communications (languages) may be verbal, as in birds, or they may 
not be.
If we are to describe the communications between non-humans as a form of 
language, this is to implicitly to say that non-humans exhibit awareness, intelligence,
133 The acceptance of pervasive intra-species communication (language) between non-humans might not be 
forth-coming from every reader but it would be a brave and fool-hardy person that would claim that there has never 
been, in the whole history of the world, at least two members of a non-human species that have managed to
communicate with each other in some instance.
2 5 0
foresight, alertness, purposeful behaviour, willfullness, and many other characteristics 
generally only ascribed to humans. It is also to say that the communications using 
these languages are involved in effecting change, conveying maps, telling stories, and 
exchanging metaphors. Again, perhaps an example is warranted.
Consider the dance language of bees134. This familiar tale of communication 
between the members of a non-human species takes on a new light if we recount a 
story that Barber narrates about the process of honey bees finding new nest sites:
After the returned scouts have reported the distance, direction, and desirability of 
their best nest sites to each other; they all fly out again to inspect sites reported by 
others. If another bee’s find is more satisfactory than her own best find, the scout 
"changes her mind’ and, when she returns to the swarm, dances for the alternate 
site. All scouts now literally "vote with their feet’ (by vigour of 
dancing), and the dancing-voting process continues until they are all come to an 
agreement. (Barber, 1993:144).
This example may be a possible instance in which the social negotiation of reality 
(the best nest site) by a non-human species is undertaken. The way that bees may use 
their languages to communicate may be entirely unlike the way humans do it. The 
rules of their language exchange, and the processes of the story-telling may very well 
be unique to the species that it concerns. A wiggle or a dance is not equivalent to a 
word, a sentence, or a syntax device in any human language, verbal or non-verbal, but 
they can nevertheless communicate their own stories to other members of their 
species whilst these other members offer up their own stories.
A (rather obvious) suggestion that can be made here is that the human inability to 
accept communication and language exists in non-human society is because of the 
alienness of their mode oflanguage and the alienness of the stories they tell. The 
language of each non-human species is so specific, so accented, so unique, that 
humans can not recognise the immense variety that might possibly occur in a bird 
song or a pheromone smell. The scientific stories of humans cannot properly describe 
all of these different languages and if it could it would need such a vast orchestra of 
laws, rules and assumptions that it could not be housed within any general theory.
This acceptance of culture within animals does not have to deny the biological
134As described in, for instance, Lindauer (1961) von Frisch (1967), or Michener (1974).
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and genetic heritage of species but it does downgrade it in importance. This process 
ot downgrading the importance of genetics is a prime concern of those ethologists 
who describe cultural activities in animals, for instance Beck (1980), Bonner (1980), 
Bradbury (1984), Cavalli-Sforza (1986), Pepperberg (1989), Pryor and Norris, eds 
(1991), Ristau, ed, (1990), Jackson (1993). It is from the work of such studies that 
the sociality and culture within non-humans may be assessed in a new light135.
No doubt some will label the views of these people who see culture in 
non-humans as anthropomorphic. However, I would defend these researchers by 
indicating that they are not declaring that there is any cultural similarities between 
humans and non-humans only that non-humans have cultures: non-determined actions 
that are the happenstance of historical contingency and experience.
CONCLUSIONS: POSTMODERN ASSOCIATIONISM AS A POSSIBLE 
FORM OF POSTMODERN ECOLOGY
What does an attempt to postmodemise ecology have to consider? A postmodern 
ecology would have to give cognisance to many or most of those ideas described in 
Chapter Six as postmodern characteristics136.
For instance, a postmodern ecology might try to be anti-scientific. Gleasonian 
ecology might hardly be said to do this. Alter all it is a development of Gleasonian 
community ecology; a tradition that is steadfastly within the tradition ol ecological 
science. However, if we postmodemise Gleasonianism so that it is aware ol its own 
metaphoricity, so that it suspects the realism ol science, then postmodern 
associationism can be made to be critical ol its own competence to relay the exact 
nature of the world.
135 Incidentally such a program of incorporating postmodern cultural studies into biology rallies behind the call by 
Jagtenberg and Mckie (1997) to have cultural studies evaluate environmental issues. Their call mourns the lack of 
interest and they suggest a variety of ways this may be entered into. These programmatic statements outlined very
briefly above may be one more way.
l36See Chapter Six pages 101 to 123.
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A postmodern ecology might be pessimistic. Since postmodern associationsm is 
sure about its inability to otter up either an ultimate meaning for the world’s existence 
or a grand theory that describes what is going on in that world, postmodern 
associationism achieves a certain postmodern affiliation with pessimism.
A postmodern ecology might exhibit an affiliation with anti-realism and the total 
absence of truth. With this in mind, postmodern association has to narrate itself with 
knowledge of its own social construction. As is detailed in The Reflection Section, 
postmodern association may indeed be able to do this.
A postmodern ecology would acknowledge absence and aporia. The section on 
Ungluing the Ecological World details exactly how absence and aporia, and especially 
the absence of unity, might be an intrinsic part of both Gleason’s ecology and an 
attempt to postmodemise Gleason’s ecology. Where Gleason tried to demonstrate 
that there is a lack of integration between most members of an ecological community, 
a postmodern Gleasonianism goes on to indicate that there is no Invisible Hand, no 
self-regulation (indeed, no self) and no unifying process holding a collections of plants 
and animals together.
Ecology, if it is to be postmodemized, might also reject the fetishism within 
Modernism for communication. From this perspective, postmodern associationism can 
claim to be postmodern if it acknowledges that while communication occurs in the 
natural world, including between non-humans, such communication is never 
monosemic; never exact; never entirely trust-worthy. Unlike the communications 
theory that rides along within some systems theory (and in the case of Margelef,
1968, within systems ecology) a postmodern ecology would acknowledge that 
communications are polysemous, plural and open to confusion. Postmodern 
associationism is capable of doing this because it acknowledges the unique and 
specific experiences of individual members within an ecological community (see the 
section on The Postmodern Ecological Individual). These experiences make any one 
individual organism liable to act with complete specificity to a common ecological (or
social) event.
A postmodern ecology might acknowledge and value pastiche, chaos, 
heterogeneity and fragmentation. As Burrows (1990:432) explains, H.A. Gleason 
envisaged ecological communities as “temporary and fluctuating phenomenon whose
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composition was decided by chance confrontations with disturbance, parasitism, 
geographical specificities and “the availability of species in the surrounding 
vegetation” (whose composition was determined, also, by chance confrontations with 
disturbance, parasitism, geographical specificities and by the availability of species in 
the surrounding vegetation, and so on and so). This results, it might be said, in a 
chaotic, fragmented, heterogeneous, pastiche of unrelated plant and animal species 
which possess no inherent ecological integration. Such pastiches are not tailored by 
any organising factor (such as Succession, Evolution, or Self-organisation), but are 
chaotically thrown together by innumerable individual circumstances.
If an ecological community is thus disintegrated into its component parts by such 
a narrative, then it is not possible for an abstract representation, such as the 
superorganism, Gaia, the global system, or Life, to truly represent the actions of those 
parts. Each individual has a story which is unique to it, a story which is not workable 
within a ‘general’ story of the whole. In this way the postmodern penchant tor 
dismissing representation may be found within postmodern associationism.
Gleasonianism might also be said to reflect the postmodern characteristic of 
anti-teleology since its reliance on chaos, fragmentation and heterogeneity disavows 
any effort to indicate that any ecological community is developing in any particular 
direction. This is demonstrated by the second figure drawn in the section The 
Metaphors Within a Postmodernised Gleasonian Ecology.
A  postmodemising o f  ecology would confer upon ecology a sense o f  value in 
those w hose stories and values have traditionally been marginihsed; the ‘other’. Any 
environmental philosophy that recognises the intrinsic value o f  non-humans might be 
said to do this. However, postmodern associationism, by taking care not to treat 
nature as a united other, can go on to recognise and celebrate otherness in a much * 
more enduring way than can a Unitarian narrative. Postmodern associationism, by 
involving itself with the widening o f  both culture (so that non-humans are regarded as 
being able to possess culture) and o f  social constructionism (so that non-humans 
becom e social constructionists, too) might also unveil a way in which the stories o f  
others may be subjected to the same intensive quest as is already undertaken in the 
human sciences.
Postmodernism, as w e have seen in Chapter Six, is usually steadfastly involved in
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the deconstruction of foundational ideas: ideas that are thought to be so basic that 
they have not been questioned. It is with this spirit o f deconstruction in mind that 
postmodern associationism attempts to both postmodemise ecology and evict from it 
the foundational ideas that have storied ecology since its inception. In this vein, this 
chapter has sought to call into question ecological foundations such as the balance of 
nature, the unity of nature, Succession to climax, natural selection, levels of biological 
organisation, and the categories of Nature and Humanity. By entertaining the possible 
dissolution of these foundations, new narratives that explore difference, dissent, 
atypicality, meaninglessness, and otherness can be opened up.
The full ecopolitical potential of such new narratives is, of course, yet to be fully 
determined. But they may be just as capable oflegitimising the protection of the 
ecological communities of the world as is the unity of nature metanarrative. Under 
postmodern associationism stories are able to be constructed for each and every 
biological individual that exists in the ecological world. In this way, through atomising 
the ecological stories of the world, the needs, lives, tragedies, interests, values and 
historical heritage of each non-human may be told in all their variety and diversity. 
Stories which, under unitarianism, are drowned out by the constant re-telling of the 
one metanarrative that is unity.
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SUMMARY
If asked to identify those cultural concepts that have given rise to deleterious 
environmental worldviews, and therefore (suggest many environmental thinkers and 
natural philosophers) to deleterious environmental practices, the concepts of atomism, 
mechanicism, reductionism and dualism--in all their various guises—are said to be the 
most malevolent. The antidote to this quartet of death and decay, it is said, is an 
enculturation within science (and within culture) of three metaphysical saviours: 
holism, organicism, and, most especially: unity. Unity will unite all the processes and 
objects in the universe under a worldview that might advise us as to how to 
understand the various parts of the universe. Unity will also unite us in our attempts 
to revere nature and the things in it, most notably by casting nature, and the things in 
it, as alive and therefore, in some way, valuable. Unity will also offer a perspective of 
long-termism, overallness and universality from which social processes might be 
derived and enforced so that we do not destroy nature and ourselves.
The conclusions of this work, however, suggest otherwise. Not only does unity 
become a socially malevolent concept that plays into the hands of conservatism, 
managerialism, and technocentric imperialism but when unity narrates about the 
reality of the terrestrial ecological communities of the world, which is one of the 
prized sites of interest for environmentalists, it also becomes a totalizing, foundational 
discourse that inappropriately distributes value within those communities.
When looking at society and nature it is often the case that social scientists 
lambaste those who take any thing from biology and apply it to society. This work 
does not adhere to this view, although it is sympathetic with it. It adheres to a view 
that says that we cannot get away from speaking metaphorically in everything we say
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about nature and society and that no referent (including the big ones like Humanity, 
Nature, Unity, Truth) can be referred to without some form of metaphorical 
utterance. In this case each metaphor must not be castigated as inappropriate just 
because it comes from nature to society or from society to nature since all our 
speeches and writings about nature and society are metaphors that probably contain 
within them references to things in both nature and society. Each metaphor thus has 
to be judged on its own merits, with reference to its peculiar political aspirations and 
for the things that it does in that context.
If metaphors are omni-present in our modern-day descriptions of the world, and 
probably in all our daily lives, we might like to choose to investigate the original 
referent from which a metaphor was drawn so that we can better see if it is politically 
appropriate or not. However, it seems that, at least in the case of the metaphors 
examined in this work, and probably in the case of all metaphors, no point of origin 
and nooriginal referent can be determined. Because no point of origin can be 
determined for any particular metaphor then the original site can hardly claim to be 
absolutely original. The original referent no more adequately reflects reality any more 
than the metaphors which might have descended from it.
Theorising about the natural and social worlds means the rhetorical re-activation 
and re-deployment of metaphors (in the vein of Mirowski’s Teprojective spiral 
narratives’), none of which can maintain purchase on an original referent; they merely 
slip and jostle passed one another in their bids to be believed and/or utilised. Neither 
nature, nor society, are the base from which things were originally extracted. Each 
feeds into the other and back again.
This inability to escape metaphors in our descriptions of the world (and if Lakoff, 
Johnson and Miller are to be trusted, in our daily activities, speeches and acts) seems 
to leave us at odds as to how to locate ourselves and our politics since both ourselves 
and our politics are marked by an ‘irreferentiality’; an absence of the real from which 
to concretely generalise, philosophise and politicise. This does not however, preclude 
us from making a sustained critique of, and raising an alternative to, any one 
metaphor since we can acknowledge that within their own schemes of elaboration, 
transmission and value (metaphysics, sociology and politics) a metaphor makes 
connections with other metaphors that may or may not be self-consistent with the
2 5 7
declared aims of the users. In the context of this work this is to state that unitarianism 
is a metaphor whose links with other metaphors undermine the very politics and 
values of its elaborators, transmitters and valuers. Unitarianism overwhelms its 
advocates’ particular political positionings by its associations with other metaphors. 
This, accompanied by its associated claim to be a non-metaphorical natural truth (and 
also the only ecopolitically-valid natural philosophy of the cosmos) suggests that 
unitarianism is not only vulnerable to colonisation by anti-environmental thought but 
that it is overwhelming most thought about nature in the late Twentieth Century.
As we have seen in Chapter One, many natural philosophers (who double as 
scientists or environmentalists) are nominally aware of the metaphorical nature of 
large-scale human pronouncements about the world. (In the language introduced in 
the prologue it might be suggested that they are involved in the deconstruction of 
certain metanarratives and so are also nominally classifiable as being aware of the 
social construction of scientific/natural philosophical knowledge). For instance, 
people like Goldsmith, Birch, Davies, Ferre, Merchant and Capra are of the opinion 
that mechanicism is a vast metaphorical story with grand deleterious repercussions for 
the environment. Notwithstanding the critique in Chapter Seven (which declares 
mechanicism versus organicism an artificial division) these writers are concerned that 
the metaphorical nature of the mechanistic worldview has become such a dominant 
natural philosophy that scientists and science managers are very often unable to 
escape the consequences of using these metaphors; positing a dead earth, reinforcing 
anthropocentrism, establishing fragmented policies and research programs, devaluing 
the environment and its members. For the writers listed above, a new view of the 
world is emerging that renders mechanism merely an outdated and fallacious 
metaphor. This new view is that of holistic unity, organicism and self-organising 
complexity.
Environmental thinkers and natural philosophers are not the only ones involved 
in the construction o f ‘new’ scientific worldviews, however, and in Chapters Two, 
Three, Four and Five it is suggested that environmentalists have, in a major way, had 
their view of the cosmos constructed for them and with them by ideologues of a 
conservative and capitalist bent. The metaphors used by environmentalists and 
environmental sympathisers like Capra, Zohar, Birch, Devall, Sessions, Merchant, and
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Goldsmith, are the same metaphors used by capitalist and conservative apologists 
such as Hayek, Merry, Ayres, More, Maley, Stacey, DiZerega and Rothschild. Indeed 
they seem to be the same people some of the time as in the case of Davies, Goldsmith, 
DiZerega, and Maley. For instance in Goldsmith’s case we find that he promotes the 
unity of nature concept not just for environmental reasons but for the reason that he 
also wishes to promote a kind of conservatism that naturalises stability and 
changelessness in society and which reifies hierarchy and consensus in favour of 
heterarchy and dissent.
The attendent ideas to Goldsmith’s particular construction of the unity of nature 
concept (i.e. stability, homeostasis, hierarchy, Succession, unity through diversity etc.) 
are also inherent positions within the particular ecological traditions that he entertains; 
Clementsian ecology, ecosystem ecology and Gaia theory. We can observe within 
these traditions that the leading spokespersons; Frederic Clements, Eugene Odum and 
James Lovelock respectively, all share Goldsmiths ecological convictions. For 
Clements the plant community was a self-regulating orderly entity, for Odum the 
ecosystem was a self-regulating orderly entity and for Lovelock the Earth’s biosphere 
is a self-regulating orderly entity. These three traditions are sown together by 
Goldsmith, Capra and Davies to present a view of the universe as a 
hierarchically-arranged self-repeating unity of levels which interact with each other via 
the processes of self-organisation, negative feedback and downward causation. Small 
ecological populations and communities are self-organising unities that coagulate to 
form ecosystems which are self-organising entities that coagulate to form Gaia. Each 
level, Unitarians have suggested, is similar with that above and that below it. And each 
level, the advocates of hierarchical backward causation would suggest, also acts to 
impose boundaries upon the lower level.
This ‘organic’ or ‘ecological’ worldview, it is concluded in this work, is not a 
benign or benevolent one. It does not do the things that Goldsmith, Capra and Davies 
ask of it, and indeed, it positively refutes their suggestions that it is either ecological 
or organic. Goldsmith, Capra and Davies suggest that this ecological or organic 
worldview vitalises what Cartesian science has killed; it supposedly gives life to 
non-human members of the universe and it gives life to the Earth. However, in the 
case of those that are taken as paradigmatic exemplars of this new organic and
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ecological worldview such conclusions are not valid. The life that Odum’ s systems 
theory affords to ecosystem constituents and the life that Lovelock’s Gaia theory 
affords to the Earth is a shallow physico-chemical kind of life. So shallow is this 
version of life, since it is measured in the materialistic terms of energy and matter (and 
how Descartes would have loved that), that the members of the ecosystem and the 
biosphere display no other manifestation of life apart from their interactions with 
energy and matter. If one is of the opinion that animals and plants and microbes are 
only alive because of their relation to energy cycles then it appears that they are only 
alive as black boxes. Gaianism thus sucks the life out of living things. Any remaining 
value is then distributed around the natural world in strict accordance with the 
functional attributes and niche roles that underlie the transference of energy and 
matter.
We also find that in the end what Goldsmith, Davies and Capra are advocating as 
holistic science might also be more appropriately positioned within the realms of its 
perceived opposite: reductionist science. Where Goldsmith, Davies and Capra would 
advocate Clements’, Odum’s and Lovelock’s superorganismic theories as holistic we 
might just as well say superorganicism is reductionists since Clements and Odum 
were attempting to physiologize ecology (i.e. they tried to reduce ecological 
situations to physiological systems by positing the individual parts of the system as 
merely physiological entities and by characterising the system as a whole a one big 
physiological system). For Odum and his systems ecology colleagues this 
physiologising of ecology meant reducing the members of an ecosystem into mere 
shells; components that were in existence only in order to transfer what were 
thought to be the real essences of the natural world: energy and matter. In this light it 
is not necessary to see that holism and reductionism are opposites, nor are they two 
sides of the same coin. They exist—at least in ecology and environmental 
science—within each other. Holism attempts to characterise the whole gamut of 
activities within a field of interest by observing common emergent patterns which are 
then seen to be operable according to some simple generalisation. Reductionism 
similarly attempts to offer simple generalisation of an acknowledged group of 
collective activities.
From both holism and reductionism we thus find very similar theoretical
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consequences. Where reductionism in biology and ecology reduces the actions of 
populations, communities and ecosystems first to population and organismal genetics 
and thence to molecular biology and organic chemistry and thence to the 
mathematical principles of a very few universally-applicable scientific ‘laws’, so 
holism first reduces the activities of populations, communities, ecosystems to a 
general set of emergent properties which are held to be workable entirely within the 
narrow and simplified mathematical ‘laws’ of self-organisation and self-regulation. 
Where a molecule of DNA adorns the cover of many biological texts written to 
expose the ultimate truth about all life via reductionist science, a series of arrows 
making up a circular symbol of self-regulation adorns Ayres book which similarly 
claims to explain the secrets of all life using holism. Where molecular biology admits 
to its reductionism, Ayres’ program to find ultimate explanations denies its own 
reductionism under a veil of false holism.
Gaia theory, perhaps the grandest holism-reductionism complex of all, possesses 
many of the problems that false holisms exhibit. It is not only implicitly predisposed 
towards environmental malevolence by positing a value framework that denies the 
value of individuals and individual species, it is, via its creators James Lovelock and 
others, explicitly anti-environmental in the social sphere; positing economic growth, 
high technology, and interplanetary colonisation as part of its implications. These 
explicit implications are not attached to Gaia like an unimportant redundant organ. 
Gaia was made up and developed and pursued by Lovelock precisely because it 
sanctioned and sanctified these implications. Lovelock is also of the belief that other 
people should see his particular reading of Gaia too. He endlessly berates 
‘wrong-headed environmentalists’ while promoting functionalism, economic growth, 
big science, high technology and space exploration in his writings on Gaia. Here we 
might note that if we are to take seriously the deconstruction of anthropocentrism that 
is attempted in Chapter Eight, we might want to confirm that Gaia isn t really 
anthropocentric, but Lovelock-centric. All those whose ideas coincide roughly with 
Lovelock’s thus suffer from the same kind of centrism; believing that their Gaian 
Goddess is advocating—through her unchanging laws—a world of 50 million white 
temperately-situated middle class people that rightly possess high technology and 
nuclear power stations and who rightly express a desire for economic growth and
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interplanetary colonisation.
Just as Gaianism and systems ecology and Clemenstian plant ecology give rise to 
very obvious ecological fascism—where the value of individuals are sacrificed for the 
good of an abstract whole—so it has been charged by other writers, notably Janet 
Biehl, that the unity of nature concept possesses potential socially fascist ideas. 
Whether or not this is so has not been resolved in this work. However a more 
important point is raised. Unity in Nature might give rise to social fascism of the 
Nazism type but the manifestation of the unity of nature concept in the form of the 
‘system’ is the way in which this fascism manifests itself in modem day society 
through the much more politically agreeable thought of Liberal Capitalism.
If the ultimate opprobrium for postmodernism is totalization then the most 
common manifestation of that totalization is the system concept. Radical politics must 
fight not just against the System (the status quo system of government) but also 
against the concept of the system. By the time they have called the amorphous thing 
that they are fighting against a ‘system’, the system has already one, since they have 
already accepted the reality, order and necessity of those things which functionalise 
us, detract from our individuality and deny us indeterminism
If the systems theory within systems ecology and Gaianism (and also structural 
fimctionalism) seems to be a legitimisation of certain conservative forces in 
modern-day industrialism we must also note that its prodigy; ‘complex systems 
theory’, is also the legitimiser of such conservative forces. Not only that, though, 
complex systems theory seems to be a legitimiser of one particular social form within 
modern industrialism; Free-Market capitalism. This legitimisation is not half-hearted. 
Firstly it involves the naturalisation of the Free Market through the ‘order from chaos’ 
ideas of the New Sciences and then it involves the deification of the Free Market 
when it is claimed by various New Scientists (most notably Capra and Davies) that 
anything self-organising is a manifestation of God. It seems now that it is not enough 
to present the Market as an all-pervasive natural process but as an actual God whom 
we must revere, learn from and never question. If the New Scientists have their way 
and give rise to a society literate in the importance of this self-organisation, and it 
Capra and Davies have their way so that humans deify self-organisation, then the 
future of natural philosophising discourse may tend towards tyranny. Anybody caught
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interfering with the self-organisation of the Free Market will not only be thought of as 
going against nature but against God.
According to the New Sciences, God--through the magnificent and divine 
transcendental process that is self-organisation—has, like many other divine beings, 
our ‘overall7 best interests at heart. He supplies our needs if we revere Him and act 
according to His will. (In economics and society this means the preservation of those 
things which enable the Smithian Invisible Hand to operate). If we do not, we will 
wreak havoc upon ourselves and our environment and we will have only ourselves to 
blame.
The Godliness of self-organisation also manifests itself in other ways. The 
Goddess that is Gaia, for instance, has her God-hood bestowed upon her in such a 
way by Gaians that we are to believe that she is the ultimate Earthly example of 
self-organisation. Bowing to Gaia, the Earth Goddess, is not only to submit to the 
dubious environmental values of Gaianism, however, it is also (as suggested in 
Chapter Three) to give in to the Gaian potential to spread human destruction 
throughout the Solar System.
If science and technology give rise to such metaphysical legitimisation of 
environmental destruction and social malevolence then what are socially and 
environmentally-concerned natural philosophers to do? Well, one of the things they 
have done is to latch on to the broad and fragmented critique of Modernist science as 
put forward by the intellectual movement known as postmodernism. This strategy is 
flawed, however, as the only thing of consequence that emerges from this natural 
philosophical flirtation with postmodernism is a name for their natural philosophy: 
‘Postmodern Science7. Postmodern Scientists have successfully latched on to the term 
‘postmodern7 but that is all they have latched on to. Most of the ideas and critique of 
scholarly postmodernism completely eludes them. And, as is outlined in Chapter Six, 
the actual metaphysics behind Postmodern Science is patently similar to that of the 
systems theorists and New Scientists. This metaphysics itself, as we have seen, 
cogently legitimises what the Postmodern Scientists often make out that they are 
trying to delegitimise; authoritarianism, Liberalist capitalism, industrialism and 
imperialism. Not only that but it seems as though Postmodern Scientists are involved 
in an imperialist conquest of their own; to colonise all disciplines of thought and
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practice and bring them into the fold ot Postmodern Science.
The conclusion that comes from looking at Postmodern Science closely is that 
Postmodern Science is not postmodern. Postmodern Science contributes to the 
Modernist inscriptions of unity; of hierarchy; of overlording holism; and of 
totalitarianism. Postmodern Science, like the New Sciences, claims victories over 
reductionism and mechanicism but these are shallow victories since the 
mechanist/organic divide, and the reductionist/holist divide are artificial divisions with 
only superficial relevance for environmental evaluation. Buying into these divisions 
Postmodern Science only succeeds in extending the tyrannies contained within them: 
abstract wholes are valued over multiple-selved individuals; systems are reified and 
deified over the parts they profess to organise; intrinsic value is extinguished in favour 
of functionalism; order is valued over chaos and ‘lives’ are turned into a single lifeless 
‘Life’. The detour of Postmodern Science is thus a blind alley if one wishes to utilise 
postmodernism ‘proper’ in order to deconstruct the various environmentally offensive 
elements o f Modernism within science. If this failure is so obvious then we might 
glean a message from this obviousness. As Postmodern Science attempts to be a 
predominately ‘constructive’ narrative of the universe, might we not force our way 
into a diametrically opposed direction in the hope that via it we may glimpse a 
(‘proper’) postmodern narrative of the ecology of the world. This is to say that a 
different approach should be explored. Rather than directly and actively building a 
metanarrative on the basis of previous metaphysics, might we not just undertake a 
radical deconstruction of those metaphysics to see what we arrive at. Within the 
remnants and crumpled ruins of Modernist scientific conceptions of ecology and the 
environment we can find such a fractured postmodern narrative: postmodern 
associationism. It is not an enlightened, clear and reality-corresponding vision that 
translates all of nature to expose its absolute truth but the crumpled, heterogeneous, 
fragmented, localised remains that arrive from investigating the blind spots ot 
Modernist metaphysics. Such a narrative is reactionary, such a narrative is 
socially-constructed, such a narrative, despite being applicable to only to terrestrial 
forest communities, might even be tethered to metaphors whose foundations are yet 
to be admitted. But it is still a narrative that releases the stories ot the members ot 
these terrestrial ecological communities from an imprisoning unity, and, unlike the
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literal interpretations of the Unitarians, postmodern associationism is a metaphor that 
admits its own metaphoricity.
When we arrive at the associationist version of a postmodern ecology we find 
that the claims recounted in Chapter One about atomism may not be valid. Atomism is 
not such a deleterious natural philosophical principle and may even be a substantial 
contributor to an environmental ethics respecting otherness.
We also find that in deconstructing Nature and Humanity we have come more 
than just lull circle with respect to the social constructionist approach alluded to in the 
Prologue. Where environmentalists and natural philosophers urge us to study nature 
on its own terms so as not to destroy it, and where social constructionists (and 
especially the postmodernists) believe that such studies are socially constructed, this 
work suggests that social constructionism must anticipate the widening of its own 
boundaries in the face of the deconstruction of Nature and Humanity so that all living 
individuals come to be seen as social, and therefore social constructors. The exact 
nature of this construction is still left unexplored but its mere suggestion is radical 
enough that it might hope to surprise and shock natural philosophers, environmental 
philosophers and constructionist social scientists out of their commitments to the 
bi-polar separation of naturalism and constructionism and so go on to encourage 
possibly novel directions of future study in the Nature/Humanity relationship.
Notwithstanding the implications of the widening of social constructionism, if it 
is accepted that all of the stories of the New Scientists, Postmodern Scientists, 
systems scientists and holist environmental philosophers are only stories, are only 
social constructions, are only metaphors (and that postmodern associationism is, too) 
where does that leave us with regards to unity? Might unity still be ecopolitically 
significant despite admitting to its metaphorcity? The conclusion posited here is that 
the unity of nature metaphor is ill-equipped to handle the political desires of the many 
environmentalists who use it. As I foreshadowed in the Prologue Unitarians cannot 
utilise the unity of nature concept anymore as though it were purely an environmental 
narrative. The unity of nature is a politically-charged cultural construction which is as 
politically-charged to act against the political desires that environmental thinkers hold 
as it is politically-charged for them. If this is so, then what we must also conclude is 
that Goldsmith’s Way, Capra’s Web o f Life and Lovelock’s Gaia do not actually
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contribute to developing an environmentally-friendly worldview. This is a big problem 
for them, since these works were written by their authors on the understanding that 
they would do this very thing. The eco-political significance of these works is 
undermined since when they claim to speak for ecology and environmentalism 
through Gaia theory, through systems ecology, through Chaos theory, they do so 
through a morass of ethical and political contusions that twist and turn against them.
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